India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020 - Part 2

[abhik]

Whats the point of spending all this mental effort trying to figure what caused China to do what it is doing? Why does a g@ndu indulge in g@ndugiri? Even if we figure it out what do we do with that information? If our infrastructure is causing them concern, are we going to stop it building roads? If repealing 370 was the problem, are we going to roll it back? Have they ever stopped needling/attacking us in the last 6 decades in spite of our constant GUBOing?

[samirdiw]

Whats the point of spending all this mental effort trying to figure what caused China to do what it is doing? Why does a g@ndu indulge in g@ndugiri? Even if we figure it out what do we do with that information? If our infrastructure is causing them concern, are we going to stop it building roads? If repealing 370 was the problem, are we going to roll it back? Have they ever stopped needling/attacking us in the last 6 decades in spite of our constant GUBOing?

Many folks on the forum have mentioned that but when as a country we have decided last 70 yrs no action to take enemys territory (or even friends territory taken over by enemy depending on how you define) there is nothing much else to do but figure out all the fantasies of the opponent.

[chetak]

[img]https://pbs.twimg.com/media/EixUJCyXgAA ... =large[img]

Chetak, please why don't you summarise the substance of the conversation and post a link? It is difficult to read the conversation given a black tint in the background at my age. Currently I have only access to my handphone.

here is a pdf link to what tellis says

https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Tel ... doffs1.pdf

In fact, Chinese pugnacity toward India along the LAC represents deliberate intimidation through the use of military force, a development with roots in events that predate the pandemic. If Beijing’s protestations are anything to go by, Chinese anxieties appear to have grown since the August 2019 Indian decision to transform Ladakh, which previously had been part of the autonomous state of Jammu and Kashmir, into a union territory directly governed by New Delhi.

This Indian decision was driven entirely by domestic exigencies. The only international consequence India intended was to signal to Pakistan (and to Pakistani-supported dissidents within India) that the door to secession was conclusively shut and that all parties to the conflict accordingly would have to reconcile themselves to the reality of Jammu and Kashmir forever being part of the Indian Union.

Senior Indian policymakers repeatedly emphasized that their August decision involved only the political question of Jammu and Kashmir’s relationship with the rest of India; this action did not in any way prejudge the territorial issues relating to the boundaries with China. Beijing, however, remained unpersuaded by these reassurances and, in collusion with Islamabad, attempted to rally international opposition to New Delhi. These efforts failed miserably, in part, because the United States supported India in key international forums such as the UN Security Council.

It will never be known with certainty whether this failure intensified China’s desire to punish India in other ways (and for other reasons, such as New Delhi’s increasing diplomatic proximity to Washington), or whether the failure only reinforced the Chinese determination to wrest control of disputed territories that were long desired but were now judged to be imperiled by India’s domestic decisions.

But China’s fierce opposition to the transformation of Ladakh’s status, something that received only passing attention hitherto, set the stage for the militaristic power play that is now under way along the LAC. Other developments since have accentuated China’s determination to “fix” India: New Delhi’s criticism of Beijing’s failure to help contain the international spread of the coronavirus and the Indian decision to limit Chinese investments at a time when similar global sentiments were gathering steam deepened China’s resentment and strengthened the prospects for a riposte when circumstances permitted.

Only weather conditions likely prevented China from responding earlier than it did: the onset of summer in the high Himalayas dramatically improves China’s access to the hostile front lines and enhances its ability to build up the infrastructure necessary to sustain a new military presence significantly. The annual summer military exercises in Tibet made things even easier because it allowed Beijing to divert troops to the borderlands without calling undue attention to its activities. While the changing seasons may explain much about the timing of current Chinese actions, the thrust of China’s policy—the incremental acquisition of claimed territories along the Sino-Indian borderlands—resembles the patterns Beijing’s behavior has exhibited elsewhere in the world such as the South China Sea.

[KLNMurthy]

This is trying to do 2+2=5. If 370 was the reason, how does blocking patrol points at 2 places out of 700 KM long LAC, force India to roll back 370?

If it was meant to "protect" Aksai Chin, why leave the hole in spangur gap and most importantly Chumur and Demchock?

And again, if the action was meant to protect Aksai chin, I take PLA is ready to stay put all round the year? You cannot protect an region by going home for winter vacation.. who knows evil Indians might invade in winter...

I don’t think Tellis is telling that Chinese are trying to get India to roll back 370 abrogation.

According to him,370 abrogation made Chinese think India is up to something big wrt China (maybe Tibet), and do they want to urgently teach India a lesson so that India will retreat into its shell and not wag its tail.

[chetak]

Whats the point of spending all this mental effort trying to figure what caused China to do what it is doing? Why does a g@ndu indulge in g@ndugiri? Even if we figure it out what do we do with that information? If our infrastructure is causing them concern, are we going to stop it building roads? If repealing 370 was the problem, are we going to roll it back? Have they ever stopped needling/attacking us in the last 6 decades in spite of our constant GUBOing?

Many folks on the forum have mentioned that but when as a country we have decided last 70 yrs no action to take enemys territory (or even friends territory taken over by enemy depending on how you define) there is nothing much else to do but figure out all the fantasies of the opponent.

the CCP think that modi has fundamentally changed India's strataegic posture regarding the border management with china and so are trying to head us off at the pass, so to speak.

Ladakh being made as a union territory, after the removal of art 370 has spooked the hans regarding the safety of the CPEC and the military viability of the gwadar port which is vital to their core interests considering that this single link provides almost the entire strategic foundation of their afghanistan, iran and gulf access and power projection into the IOR without being hemmed in by the malacca straits.

India should now make place in the A&N islands for a QUAD naval base and allow US, AUS and JAP ships and aircraft to be based there quasi permanently with an Indian Navy Admiral in charge as it is Indian territory after all.

they are in a real panic about the QUAD getting off the ground and becoming a reality so close to the malacca straits.

[madhu]

https://twitter.com/AssaultArmoured/sta ... 06337?s=20

Not sure how much true it is but will be intresting pic if true.

Dont know how to post the pictures so leaving the link of tweet.

[chetak]

https://twitter.com/AssaultArmoured/sta ... 06337?s=20

Not sure how much true it is but will be intresting pic if true.

Dont know how to post the pictures so leaving the link of tweet.

here you go

tweets below via Armoured Assault@AssaultArmoured

In this scene, a PAF fighter controller calls out a hot scramble and directs 2 PAF JF-17s towards 2 hostile IAF Mirage 2000s which have violated Pakistani airspace. Take a close look at the radar display console.

The toolbar to the left has tabs like trace, plot, etc. The map looks fairly accurate, and so does the radar symbology. Accurate markings, genuine looking numbers and gibberish. Overall it looks exactly like an actual RDC should.

So, I decided to upscale this image and overlay a map over it, on which I have marked various Indian & Pakistani air bases. Voila! It matched. Here you can see names of Indian bases marked in red & Pakistani ones marked in green, overlapping directly over my markings.

There are some extra details too, some dot-like placemarks which probably indicate Pakistani Radar and SAM installations. A couple of which I have been able to triangulate using the image. It's amazing that PAF didn't vet this info before making it public.

Armoured Assault@AssaultArmoured ·3h
They have given away locations of key PAF installations in guise of propaganda, and were probably sleeping happily till now, completely ignoring what kind of intel they have fed to us, with their own hands, served on a platter.

[Deans]

There were some fundamental differences between the PLA in 1962 and now. The PLA in 1962 was a battle hardened army, with all its senior officers fighting us, having survived the Korean war - which was a ruthless Darwinian test. By contrast hardly anyone in IA had combat experience.

To be precise, hardly anyone in IA had higher-formation command experience in combat. Most of the senior officers (Colonel and above) and JCOs had plenty of combat experience in World War 2 and First Kashmir War, but they didn't have command and operational planning experience. It is a subtle but important distinction.

The Indian Army is no more "battle hardened" today than in 1962. In fact, it has even less experience with higher-formation combat than in 1962 since no one has seen a large-scale conventional war (I think Gen VK Singh was the last COAS who fought in 1971 War). The real difference is, today the Chinese have even less battle experience than Indians.

In terms of battle experience I must clarify what I meant:
In 1962, to the best of my knowledge, none of our officers in any of the fighting formations had WW2 or Kashmir experience (except Brig Hoshiar Singh) What was more important, as you suggest, is that the experience they did have (e.g. the JCO's or Brig. Hoshiar Singh) was not in staff work or planning. That is what we lacked.

Currently, while we do not have experience of conventional war (which almost no army has) our infantry has been in an almost constant combat like situation, either on the LOC or in counter insurgency. We are also the only army with high altitude experience - in terms of formations permanently deployed at high altitude.

[Anoop]

Regarding combat experience, or lack of, of higher ranked officers: Unless we are talking about a large scale (in both time and space) war, with a lot of fluidity, I think this lack of full scale war experience is not really a lacunae. Where terrain dictates what is possible in terms of objectives and when distance and time are not so much that loss of command and control is not really a major concern, it is logistics (staff work), defensive location preparedness, morale and sound tactics (of the junior commanders) that can win the day. And of course, faith of higher command in junior leadership and supporting them in their actions. Would you agree, ParGha?

[chetak]

This is trying to do 2+2=5. If 370 was the reason, how does blocking patrol points at 2 places out of 700 KM long LAC, force India to roll back 370?

If it was meant to "protect" Aksai Chin, why leave the hole in spangur gap and most importantly Chumur and Demchock?

And again, if the action was meant to protect Aksai chin, I take PLA is ready to stay put all round the year? You cannot protect an region by going home for winter vacation.. who knows evil Indians might invade in winter...

I don’t think Tellis is telling that Chinese are trying to get India to roll back 370 abrogation.

According to him,370 abrogation made Chinese think India is up to something big wrt China (maybe Tibet), and do they want to urgently teach India a lesson so that India will retreat into its shell and not wag its tail.

the chinese are deceitful in all their dealings so they only see and expect deceit from everyone else.

I hope that Modi counted his spoons and forks before xi left after he, Modi, had invited xi for the state dinner.

after galwan, xi is up the gum tree without a pot to piss in.

[abhik]

India & China agree to ‘sincerely’ implement Jaishankar-Wang peace plan at WMCC talks

India and China held yet another round of talks Wednesday under the Working Mechanism for Consultation & Coordination (WMCC) on bilateral border affairs and agreed to “sincerely implement” the five-point plan reached between External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and his Chinese counterpart and State Councilor Wang Yi earlier this month.

This is the fifth round of WMCC talks since the ongoing stand-off in the Ladakh sector of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) began in May 2020. The meeting was chaired by Naveen Srivastava, Joint Secretary (East Asia), Ministry of External Affairs, and Hong Liang, Director of the Boundary and Maritime Affairs Department in China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

During that meeting, apart from committing to talk and disengaging fast, both sides also agreed to conclude new confidence-building measures on border affairs.

[ramana]

I asked in another place what is the definition of the End Game from India Point of View?

Would like to develop a matrix.
Three columns : Maximum End Game (MEG), Minimum Acceptable Endgame (MAEG), and Likely End Game(LEG)

And Three or four rows:
Military
Political
Economic
Societal
Try to keep them separate and only in tough choices can be listed in two cells.

Eg.. Formal LAC can be MAEG in both Military and Political Rows.
I know it needs some thinking and please bear with me.

[Mukesh.Kumar]

I asked in another place what is the definition of the End Game from India Point of View?

Would like to develop a matrix.
Three columns : Maximum End Game (MEG), Minimum Acceptable Endgame (MAEG), and Likely End Game(LEG)

And Three or four rows:
Military
Political
Economic
Societal
Try to keep them separate and only in tough choices can be listed in two cells.

Eg.. Formal LAC can be MAEG in both Military and Political Rows.
I know it needs some thinking and please bear with me.

Ramana-ji great idea. How do you propose to build and qualify this?

[Rishirishi]

Many folks on the forum have mentioned that but when as a country we have decided last 70 yrs no action to take enemys territory (or even friends territory taken over by enemy depending on how you define) there is nothing much else to do but figure out all the fantasies of the opponent.

the CCP think that modi has fundamentally changed India's strataegic posture regarding the border management with china and so are trying to head us off at the pass, so to speak.

Ladakh being made as a union territory, after the removal of art 370 has spooked the hans regarding the safety of the CPEC and the military viability of the gwadar port which is vital to their core interests considering that this single link provides almost the entire strategic foundation of their afghanistan, iran and gulf access and power projection into the IOR without being hemmed in by the malacca straits.

India should now make place in the A&N islands for a QUAD naval base and allow US, AUS and JAP ships and aircraft to be based there quasi permanently with an Indian Navy Admiral in charge as it is Indian territory after all.

they are in a real panic about the QUAD getting off the ground and becoming a reality so close to the malacca straits.

China has picked a fight with almost all its neigbours. Be it Japan, Taiwan, HK, Tajikistan, Bhutan, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, Australia and even Russia (claims on Vladivastok region) and Nepal. So it should not surprise us that China also piked a fight with India. Indians keep on looking at the Sino-India politics. Maybe it has nothing to do with that. Maybe China's game is somewhat different.
So let us find out what these countries have in common? Eventually USA can get all these countries to side with them against China.

Now given that China thinks it will face a confrontation with USA (cold war, economic war or what ever), what should china do?

If it sits and waits, all the countries will get comfortable and gang up against China. So maybe be (i am just speculating here) it calculated that it sparks a confrontation and offers a big lollypop in exchange for a peace treaty. If it offered a lollypop without the confrontation, the countries may not feel the urgency to get a peace treaty.

It has been suggested that China can move back to the borders to the pre 62 war (1959 line) in global times.

There is little evidence on the above and is highly speculative. Constructive critique and comments welcome.

[Anoop]

I will hold the PLAAF in a defensive role in the western sector due to payload penalties, etc. I will attack in the eastern sector using strategic bombers taking off from Chengdu or Lijiang to target areas bordering South Tibet (I will not bomb Arunachal since it is my territory with my people, but Dibrugarh would be a good target).

RaviB, how would you, as a Chinese strategist, square your focus on the Eastern sector with only a holding action on the Western sector, with your stated aim of the war viz. India's unilateral change in Ladakh's status as a UT, thereby threatening your interest in that region? And also how would you square it with the recent Chinese claim that they recognize only their 1959 articulation of the LAC which recognizes the McMahon line in AP but pushes forward their claim in Ladakh?

There is another problem with sudden escalation to such levels as using strategic bombers and attacks on population targets - unless these completely knock out the adversary's fighting potential or morale which it won't; it will galvanize the nation - you must be prepared for India to do the same. If things come to such a pass, they have to be prepared to lose Chumbi Valley, Rutog, maybe Ngari, the north bank of Pangong Tso, live with a threat to G219 from an altered LAC, lose their listening post at Coco Island, perhaps destruction of their ships at Djibouti and severe disruption of their shipping through the Malacca straits. And if they keep escalating, an attack on their populations centers too. It doesn't seem to be a good cost-benefit analysis - unless they can drag Pakis in too, to maintain pressure.

[vnadendla]

China has picked a fight with almost all its neigbours. Be it Japan, Taiwan, HK, Tajikistan, Bhutan, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, Australia and even Russia (claims on Vladivastok region) and Nepal. So it should not surprise us that China also piked a fight with India. Indians keep on looking at the Sino-India politics. Maybe it has nothing to do with that. Maybe China's game is somewhat different.
So let us find out what these countries have in common? Eventually USA can get all these countries to side with them against China.

Now given that China thinks it will face a confrontation with USA (cold war, economic war or what ever), what should china do?

If it sits and waits, all the countries will get comfortable and gang up against China. So maybe be (i am just speculating here) it calculated that it sparks a confrontation and offers a big lollypop in exchange for a peace treaty. If it offered a lollypop without the confrontation, the countries may not feel the urgency to get a peace treaty.

It has been suggested that China can move back to the borders to the pre 62 war (1959 line) in global times.

There is little evidence on the above and is highly speculative. Constructive critique and comments welcome.

Good Angle. Lets see if probable?

The minimum India would take is 1947 borders. Nothing else is acceptable. Maybe they can exchange other side of G219 with Kailash Mansarovar region. If this can be done why didn't Mao do it with a semi communist Nehru? China would have easy path to the Indian Ocean with India on its side.

So its likely there is no carrot here. Chinese only have Small stick - Big stick policy.

[Anoop]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cIdSXzxGJMw

Useful discussion, but it disappoints me because it seems to be paving the room to prepare Indian public opinion for concessions ('give and take', 'bold political action'). If India now compromises under the threat of force, we will take a body blow in credibility. It's also inconsistent with the two guests' articulation of Chinese aims - that peace is a smokescreen while they enhance their capabilities. So, even a final demarcation of the international border doesn't mean anything to them, it is always subject to revision based on their perception of strength and weakness.

[KL Dubey]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cIdSXzxGJMw

Useful discussion, but it disappoints me because it seems to be paving the room to prepare Indian public opinion for concessions ('give and take', 'bold political action'). If India now compromises under the threat of force, we will take a body blow in credibility. It's also inconsistent with the two guests' articulation of Chinese aims - that peace is a smokescreen while they enhance their capabilities. So, even a final demarcation of the international border doesn't mean anything to them, it is always subject to revision based on their perception of strength and weakness.

You are taking it too seriously. The participants are not Indian goremint representatives. They're just discussing their personal views.

[Anoop]

You are taking it too seriously. The participants are not Indian goremint representatives. They're just discussing their personal views.

Trial balloons and opinion shaping is never done by Govt. employees. In any case, I hope I am wrong and that we stare China down like never before.

[ks_sachin]

If things come to such a pass, they have to be prepared to lose Chumbi Valley, Rutog, maybe Ngari, the north bank of Pangong Tso, live with a threat to G219 from an altered LAC, lose their listening post at Coco Island, perhaps destruction of their ships at Djibouti and severe disruption of their shipping through the Malacca straits.

How does square with our capabilities sir?

Can we pull all this off simultaneously?

[VikramS]

1. Cartographic: India's long term goal should be to restore India-China relationship to what it was historically.
Not neighbors.

This means demilitarized zone (Tibet) separating India and China.

2. Geo-Strategic: India also needs to limit Chinese delusion of the world revolving round China; China the middle kingdom.

A multi-polar world with free exchange of ideas, goods, and services will be the safest. Right now China is not setup to be a responsible power in a multi-polar world.

Someone has to bell the cat; and India will have a key, if not the key, role to play in that.

3. Economically, India needs to be an equal trade partner with China. That can only happen if India can create its own manufacturing supply chain which can provide an alternative to China.


What India needs to do is get the stars to line up.

The first step of course is to show the military strength to stand up the PLA-CCP bullying.
The second step is to build a global coalition of powers aligned with India.
The third step is to build a highly productive domestic MIC which can supply in new numbers disruptive weapons like MALE drones, standoff air-launched munition, precise artillery munition. This is well within the reach of the domestic industrial complex and does not require cutting edge technology.
The last step and the most important long term is to create the political, regulatory and economic environment for the creation for an alternative global manufacturing hub which can complement or replace China

[Anoop]

How does square with our capabilities sir? Can we pull all this off simultaneously?

I am no expert at this, Sachin, but I think with stand-off weapons from the IAF and the willingness to take casualties it's possible i.e. a severe degradation in their Rutok, Sirijap and Ngari garrisons and they won't have the benefit of inter-theatre reinforcement. They also have a significant vulnerability in the Chumbi Valley and that is very politically sensitive for them. Obviously, we will pay a big price for this too, but if China escalates to the extent described earlier, then all bets are off. Plus, we don't have to be successful in all these ventures; even 2-3 of them, if successful, while denying them similar advantages, works out to be a victory for us. We didn't start this war, they did. So what do they have to show for it?

From what I have been told offline by veterans, the IN has significant advantages now over the PLAN in the IOR and this level of escalation by them means we won't hesitate to press our advantage.

[Anoop]

In the Nitin Gokhale interview, AVM Subramanian (R) says that the Chinese seem much more comfortable with "soft-kills" at worst i.e. cyber attacks, info wars, maybe satellite kills, and are reluctant to get into a no-holds barred fight. It doesn't sit well with the image the CCP wants to project and who knows how a war will turn out? I expect such attacks on India - banking systems, power grids etc, if they can manage it. Coupled with paid voices in Indian media asking for reconciliation to allow for our economic recovery. That message might sound reasonable to an Indian population.

[Cain Marko]

I get a distinct feeling that china will fight and play it's cards indirectly. Through TSP. They'll push tsp into declaring GB as their own and India will be faced with a decidedly nasty situation.

[schinnas]

There are already multiple DDoS attacks on both Indian public and private financial institutions, with many traced to (or suspected to originate from) China. This is my direct info from a chai walla. This started from Galwan standoff and has been continuing intermittently. Most of our large institutions have reasonably improved their infra now, but Cheen may not have shown all their armaments yet.

Info war is also happening... just that GT has become a laughing stock but their commies and Paki agents in India will create FUD.

Satellite kill would be a very different ball game than cyber attacks given the deniability of the later.

[Prem Kumar]

Subtle satellite kills are possible:

1) Maneuvering their satellite close to ours and firing a projectile that disables our satellite. Or shoot some debris in the expected orbit of our satellite. We can't tell the difference whether it was an enemy attack or space-debris. We can speculate but not prove. Example: RISAT-1 got hit by space debris shortly after 1st Surgical Strike post Uri.

2) They've demonstrated soft-kill capabilities like disrupting satellite-to-ground-station communication

Whether we like it or not, "Space Wars" have already begun. China, with their lack of scruples, has started it and Russia/USA will follow (if they aren't doing so already). Then, the 3 of them will get together and create Outer Space Treaties & keep others out.

[pankajs]

^^
Plus, IIRC, the Chinese recently claimed to have developed/deployed Lasers powerful enough to disable satellites, maybe no the Geocentric ones but the Earth observation ones.

[Prem Kumar]

Yes. Way back in the 80s/90s, I used to devour Star Wars material. Not the movie but actual moves and counter moves between the USA and Soviet Union.

All these concepts existed even back then. Even most of the technologies did. But they were found to be too destabilizing + the SU broke up. Due to advances in tech, many of these are now more economical to do than before.

At one point in the cold war, even BMDs were considered destabilizing and there were treaties to avoid their deployment. That's gone out the window now. Similarly, space-weaponization is only a matter of time.

Anyway OT for this thread...

[Aditya_V]

While this thread is more focussed on the China Border, the LOC is hot, I hope we get our act to together and seriously target Paki supply army trucks, bridges, Electricity power, cell phone towers etc, there should be 10-15km no mans land west of the LOC, so Paki helicopters, ammo dumps, missiles being carried , Hino trucks, Toyota Jeeps, along with fair number of PA officers and cannon fodder get eliminated. Pakis must be made to spend enough on the LOC, there is no money to maintain SAAB 2000 and F16's

Blood still boils hearing this

J&K: Lance Naik killed in Pakistani shelling in Poonch district

[pushkar.bhat]

@PraGha if the Indian army is not battle-hardened, then the PLA is still in a kindergarten and getting regular diapers changes. You have the right to voice opinions on this forum but please talk sense. Please don't instigate for the sake of it.

[tsarkar]

In the Nitin Gokhale interview, AVM Subramanian (R) says that the Chinese seem much more comfortable with "soft-kills" at worst i.e. cyber attacks, info wars, maybe satellite kills, and are reluctant to get into a no-holds barred fight. It doesn't sit well with the image the CCP wants to project and who knows how a war will turn out? I expect such attacks on India - banking systems, power grids etc, if they can manage it. Coupled with paid voices in Indian media asking for reconciliation to allow for our economic recovery. That message might sound reasonable to an Indian population.

Yes, the way I see it is that China will have serious loss of face with smaller neighbours if it doesnt "punish" India for not submitting to its bullying.

1. Prelude to this conflict will be lulling India with CBM's and disengagements and limiting number of troops.
2. Then Cyberattacks on both military and civilian infrastructure.
3. Information Warfare will commence thereafter peddling false reasons and false news with the intent of confusing Indian & Global leaders and people.
4. China will use its superior infrastructure to build up local superiority
5. Start a massive fire assault using BM's, Air Power, Artillery in areas it has tactical advantage
6. Follow up with an infantry assault and try to occupy territory
7. When faced with stiff Indian resistance, loss of surprise, logistics running short call off the conflict saying India has been punished, mission accomplished and claim victory.

The way India needs to prepare is -
1. Not get lulled by CBMs/Disengagements
2. Staying alert for cyber warfare and information warfare
3. Constantly scanning to check if Chinese are building up local superiority anywhere
4. Avoid or Absorb the initial fire assault
5. Inflict massive casualties on Chinese. Like our AMX-13 tanks caused at Chusul
6. Occupy Chinese territory if possible.

India needs to teach China that messing with it will lead to unacceptable costs and that will deter China from a hostile stance.

[vimal]

6. Occupy Chinese territory if possible.

We are still thinking about this?

[pankajs]

I am with @tsarkar on this.

Small incision across the commonly percievd LAC such that it cannot be denied and will mean a bigger loss of face than the current status.

It can still be within the Indian claim line BUT a visible loss of control for the Chinese. It does not have to be an invasion nor capture of a big chunk of territory.

E.g. Cross the Spanggur gap and occupy the Moldo garrison.

[pushkar.bhat]

****Long Post Alert****

Why the Chinese Belligerence towards India in 2020?

Many of us have wondered the reason for the Chinese hostility towards India and its timing. I have tried to piece the dots together and create an overall picture.

China has a whole bunch of grudges against India. We all collectively are a pain in the wrong part of the anatomy for them.

First, India is one of the few countries that has not joined the Belt and Road initiative - this does not bode well for the relationships between the two countries, according to China.

Second, India is one of the few nations in Asia, which has demonstrated multiple times over the capability to push back on Chinese military coercion. Till recently India did it very discretely but since Dokalam India has been open and transparent on Chinese belligerence and the strong response that has evoked from India - this leads to loss of face for the Chinese leadership. India’s handling of the events which started in the Summer of 2020 shows that the Dokalam incident was not an exception but instead has become a template for how India will deal with China.

Third, India’s Border infrastructure projects are looked at with great suspicion by the Chinese. These projects have not been localized but are instead happening all across LAC. In the eastern sector, they have reached a point where India already can move a critical mass of troops to the LAC very quickly. And thus, any Indian breakthrough in this region can mean an immediate threat to the most densely populated areas of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). On the Western sector or SSN, these infrastructure development projects are likely to reach a critical level in the coming two years. The completion of all-weather access to Sub-sector North from the plains will allow Indian to threaten the G219 highway, which is the lifeline to Xinjiang and the CPEC highway passing via Karakoram Pass at a time and place of our choosing. And we will be able to mobilise so fast that we could theoretically deploy a Division to DBO in 48-72 Hours including elements of armour. This gives the Chinese very little reaction time specially if they are forced to base the majority of their troops to the east of the Kunlun range.

Fourth, India has been a threat to China’s “taller than the mountain and deeper than the sea” friend and client state Pakistan. After India abrogated Art 370 and created the union territory of Ladakh, the Chinese had to react, since the Indian territorial assertion negates their claim to the area. Any Indian takeover of Gilgit Baltistan will also affect the CPEC Highway which is China’s lifeline to the middle east bypassing the Malacca straits chock point in the Andaman seas.

Five, India has been pushing for the settlement of the India-China Boundary dispute and at the same time not folding up to Chinese threat. - this is being looked at by the Chinese as pushing china to accept the border settlement at India terms.

Six, India and its Military have shown the resolve to project power if and when required; this is both in India’s immediate neighborhood or even in far off nations as a part of the global or a multilateral coalition.

The biggest issue that China has with India is that it does not play set-pieces, and the plot has invariably gone off the script. The Chinese have still not figured out how to control and manage the Indians. Their usual cookie cutters are just not working.

In my opinion, the primary intent of Chinese was the rattle India into submission and vitiate the environment to the extent that India will halt or at least slow down the infrastructure development.

Secondly, they want to facilitate the declaration by Pakistan of GB as the 5th Province of Pakistan under a Chinese security umbrella. This, according to the Chinese, may constitute an adequate riposte to the abrogation of Art. 370 by India and the subsequent statements by India’s Home Minister on the floor of the Parliament.

Thirdly, China is very concerned about the rapprochement between India and the US and the convergence of interests between Japan, Australia, US and India. In the past, the Chinese have privately communicated that they will have to harden their stance on the boundary negotiations if India participates in the QUAD. However, once the Modi government understood that the current boundary settlement talks were going nowhere, they decided to call the Chinese bluff since they view the coming together of the QUAD is a Zero-Sum Game for India in the Short term. In fact, the QUAD can have positive payoffs for every participant except China in the medium to long term. On this front, China has clearly failed to read the Indian’s intent and actions and the border stand-off has further aligned Indian Foreign & Military Policy with the objectives of the QUAD.

In summary, I will say that while the Chinese expedition across the Kunlun Mountains did initially rattle India, the mirror deployment and the subsequent counteractions by India has definitely derailed the Chinese plans. Today India has more than three divisions in SSN, and this has already become a cause of anxiety for the Pakistani’s who are unlikely to do anything that gives India a casus belli to attack and takeover GB. And finally, the Chinese actions have for once forced the QUAD to come together and become a coalition if not a formal alliance.

So now that the story has gone off the script, what are the implications for China? In my opinion, if the Indian army remains deployed in Ladakh this winter (and its looks to be the case), then the Chinese know that they can forget a cold LAC. The LAC will always be dynamic, and there will be readjustments in the deployment of Indian troops. The Chinese are very concerned about having to man the entire LAC through the year. The current deployment is not just very costly for them but also carries a threat of becoming a template for states surrounding china to tie the monster down. Imagine the Chinese being forced to deploy in Xinjiang by the Afghans and CIS and along Mongolia and Vietnam borders across the year. This can effectively wear down the PLA as well as their attrition reserves with a No War No Peace situation.

This No War No Peace strategy is also a strategic nightmare for the Chinese Communist Party. Even though they are the second-largest economy in the world, they just cannot sustain this posture. And with so many objects in the air, mistakes are likely to happen. This will inevitably lead to loss of face and territories for China.

The Chinese also to be very concerned is the materialization of the QUAD. This moment these four countries join hands, the ASEAN who have played it both ways will have to take sides. This is a worst-case nightmare for the Chinese strategists who have always called for a peaceful rise of China. ASEAN has more to lose by antagonizing the US, JAPAN, AUSSIES and INDIA then going with China and poses to the ASEAN with a Hobson’s choice. If that happens, the summers will suddenly become Long and Hot for the CCP, and the winters will be very harsh and cold.

Xi and the CCP frankly do not know how to tame the Indian elephant. They, in fact, don’t understand the elephant enough. As Nitin Gokhale mentions in many of his interviews, they seem to be good at set-pieces, but once things go off the script, they have no clue on how to respond. Their biggest problem is that India is teaching the world how to push back the Chinese Dragon. So once other countries know that China is venerable, they too will individually or collectively exploit these to get better deals that will hurt China in the long term.

Lastly, we need to accept that the Indian Armed forces have in the last two decades been showing the Indian Flag in all the places that matter. We showed how we could launch rapidly into Nepal for HADR operations after the earthquake, we have been to enough places in Africa and in some cases even saved the bacon of the Chinese PLA and have also been patrolling the SCS and 6 and 10 Degree Channels for the nations in the region to sit up and take notice. A firangi friend of mine, fondly calls them the Ruffians of Asia. Always capable of getting into a rough and tumble but self-restrained at the same time.

[tsarkar]

6. Occupy Chinese territory if possible.

We are still thinking about this?

Our bureaucracy and political class (including present leadership) are yet to indicate their willpower towards going on a proper offensive and occupying territory.

Even in 1971, Sagat Singh defied orders and captured Dhaka, much to the disappointment of Luytens Pappi Jhappi Mushaira Mujra gang. The LPJMM gang ensured we gave most of our wins back in the 1972 Shimla agreement. Though Indian Army kept areas of Kargil and Turtuk that we won in 1971.

[AshishA]

Subtle satellite kills are possible:

1) Maneuvering their satellite close to ours and firing a projectile that disables our satellite. Or shoot some debris in the expected orbit of our satellite. We can't tell the difference whether it was an enemy attack or space-debris. We can speculate but not prove. Example: RISAT-1 got hit by space debris shortly after 1st Surgical Strike post Uri.

2) They've demonstrated soft-kill capabilities like disrupting satellite-to-ground-station communication

Whether we like it or not, "Space Wars" have already begun. China, with their lack of scruples, has started it and Russia/USA will follow (if they aren't doing so already). Then, the 3 of them will get together and create Outer Space Treaties & keep others out.

I had seen reports of Chinese trying to hack indian satellites in Wion. So I believe they have might have subtle means to disable satellites whithout going the ASAT way and right now they might be doing just that. And in 2008 I think they had taken control of a NASA sat and another US govt sat.

[RaviB]

RaviB, how would you, as a Chinese strategist, square your focus on the Eastern sector with only a holding action on the Western sector, with your stated aim of the war viz. India's unilateral change in Ladakh's status as a UT, thereby threatening your interest in that region? And also how would you square it with the recent Chinese claim that they recognize only their 1959 articulation of the LAC which recognizes the McMahon line in AP but pushes forward their claim in Ladakh?

There is another problem with sudden escalation to such levels as using strategic bombers and attacks on population targets - unless these completely knock out the adversary's fighting potential or morale which it won't; it will galvanize the nation - you must be prepared for India to do the same. If things come to such a pass, they have to be prepared to lose Chumbi Valley, Rutog, maybe Ngari, the north bank of Pangong Tso, live with a threat to G219 from an altered LAC, lose their listening post at Coco Island, perhaps destruction of their ships at Djibouti and severe disruption of their shipping through the Malacca straits. And if they keep escalating, an attack on their populations centers too. It doesn't seem to be a good cost-benefit analysis - unless they can drag Pakis in too, to maintain pressure.

My response as a Chinese strategist

1. The change in the status of Ladakh is a useful argument to raise diplomatic pressure but irrelevant in the short and medium term. Our boundary settlement with Pakistan in 1963 is based on the assumption that the sovereignty of J&K will be given to Pakistan (in which case the settlement stays as is). So, in the long term a change in sovereignty of J&K may challenge the 1963 treaty and require a fresh boundary settlement (with India). But, even then, such legal claims can be safely ignored if they're against our interests, just like we did for Philippines.

2. The planning for the current action began in 2018, and the go ahead was given in autumn 2019. Some events in this period made it easier to get the go-ahead but the plan would have been implemented regardless, even if much later. The impact on the Indian economy and the impact of Covid on the Indian Army (20 k soldiers are affected, don't ask me where I got this information) also made this a good time to act strongly

3. The 1959 claim line thing is a diplomatic feint and a statement by a spokesman, the statement can be denied or the spokesman can be punished, if need be. Expectations of a diplomatic breakthrough weaken Indian military resolve and create public pressure for a diplomatic settlement.

4. There is zero likelihood of regaining South Tibet since it is very strongly guarded and the demography of the area has changed dramatically since 1962. But claims on it are necessary to keep pressure for a favourable settlement in the Western sector.

5. Bombing NE India will turn the local population against the central government and break Indian resolve. India is full of splittist elements and this will strengthen them. India will not respond due to domestic opposition and calls for ceasefire, the lower caste population and soldiers will turn against the upper caste leaders and officers. The PLAAF and air defense can defend against any possible reaction from India towards Chengdu.

6. India will not dare escalate by bringing in the Navy and diplomatic talks will be initiated soon as there is any danger of the IN being used. We will control Indian domestic opinion and combine the diplomatic option with the military actions to prevent an all out war. Democracies are indecisive and any dramatic escalation towards Djibouti and Coco islands can be preempted by dangling the offer of talks, delaying talks, discussing long term peace, etc.

As a Chinese strategist, I have my own blind spots, and I am as likely to miscalculate as anyone else. Regardless of my poor understanding of India, I am the planner. If India can foresee some of these actions, and act unpredictably, our decision making will go for a toss, especially since whoever screws up will end up in vocational training and there will be a lot of passing the buck and CYA.

[Vips]

CCS clears Rs 7796 crore communication network for Indian Army, to be done by ITI.

The Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) has cleared a project to establish a secure communication network for the Indian Army that will include
modern optical fibre cable links to forward areas, with Public Sector Undertaking ITI set to implement the Rs 7796 crore plan.

The defence ministry has said that the new Army Static Switched Communication Network (ASCON) will provide a “big boost to the operational capability of the defence forces”, given the current operational situation on the border with China and provides an opportunity to the PSU to give an “impetus to the Indian economy”.

The project will lead to a complete upgrade of military communication systems that will shift to Internet Protocol (IP) / Multi Protocol Label Switching (MPLS) Technology. “Optical Fibre Cable (OFC), Microwave Radio and Satellite will be used as communication media,” the defence ministry said.

Officials said that the project will provide better survivability, responsiveness and high bandwidth in any operational scenario and enhance the communication coverage of network close to international boundaries, like the Line of Actual Control (LAC), where tensions have been simmering with China since May.

“The project would augment the communication network of Indian Army in the sensitive forward operational areas which in turn will provide a major boost to the operational preparedness of the Indian Army especially keeping in view the current operational situation at LAC,” the ministry has said.

The network will extend the high bandwidth communication to the remote operational areas in Central and Eastern Sectors and enhance communication reach to the forward locations in the Western border too.

The project will have indigenous content of about 80 percent, with official saying that it would come as a boost for the industry as well. “The project involves execution of civil works, laying of OFC, tower construction, etc and with utilization of local resources, hiring of manpower, it would generate employment opportunities especially to the people in remote border areas, support and boost rural economy, assist in upliftment of the local of the local economies, provide skill development during the prolonged period of execution and maintenance of the network,” the ministry has said.

[Anoop]

My response as a Chinese strategist

6. India will not dare escalate by bringing in the Navy and diplomatic talks will be initiated soon as there is any danger of the IN being used. We will control Indian domestic opinion and combine the diplomatic option with the military actions to prevent an all out war. Democracies are indecisive and any dramatic escalation towards Djibouti and Coco islands can be preempted by dangling the offer of talks, delaying talks, discussing long term peace, etc.

Thanks, RaviB. I think the Chinese reading of this point may be flawed. During Kargil, India talked and fought simultaneously. Of course, the objective then was clear and measurable - to evict the PA from Indian territory, so we continued to fight.

What would our objectives be here? Apart from some territorial gains, I would like to ensure that China does not repeat such an intrusion for the next, say 20 years. This should be achieved by such an unambiguous demonstration of force of will that both China and the world recognizes that there is an alternate power center in Asia that can form the core of a new regional alliance (trade, political and in select cases, military) against China. A message not only to the Quad and Russia, but to Nepal, Bangladesh, Myanmar, SL, Vietnam, Indonesia, Philippines etc that will benefit us in the decades to come - our own RCEP, if you will.

This leads to one other point I wanted to bring out w.r.t Chinese unilaterally declaring victory when convenient for them and that is tied to their info war capabilities. They could do that in 1962 because we didn't have the means to regroup and pursue them. Today, it is different. So they not only have to stop our counteraction through diplomatic or other coercion, they need some proof to sell to the Indian public and to the world that they have come out on top. That probably means satellite imagery either using/turning sources that have now gained visibility and credibility in India e.g. detresfa, or else denying those sources access to their primary images (anti-sat). While negating this, we should definitely prevent a repeat of Balakote and have as a war aim incontrovertible evidence of Chinese losses - their defaced map on Finger 5, PoWs, smouldering garrisons, tanks, artillery pieces, Indian flag at defensible locations.

[rajpa]

RaviB, how would you, as a Chinese strategist, square your focus on the Eastern sector with only a holding action on the Western sector, with your stated aim of the war viz. India's unilateral change in Ladakh's status as a UT, thereby threatening your interest in that region? And also how would you square it with the recent Chinese claim that they recognize only their 1959 articulation of the LAC which recognizes the McMahon line in AP but pushes forward their claim in Ladakh?

There is another problem with sudden escalation to such levels as using strategic bombers and attacks on population targets - unless these completely knock out the adversary's fighting potential or morale which it won't; it will galvanize the nation - you must be prepared for India to do the same. If things come to such a pass, they have to be prepared to lose Chumbi Valley, Rutog, maybe Ngari, the north bank of Pangong Tso, live with a threat to G219 from an altered LAC, lose their listening post at Coco Island, perhaps destruction of their ships at Djibouti and severe disruption of their shipping through the Malacca straits. And if they keep escalating, an attack on their populations centers too. It doesn't seem to be a good cost-benefit analysis - unless they can drag Pakis in too, to maintain pressure.

My response as a Chinese strategist

1. The change in the status of Ladakh is a useful argument to raise diplomatic pressure but irrelevant in the short and medium term. Our boundary settlement with Pakistan in 1963 is based on the assumption that the sovereignty of J&K will be given to Pakistan (in which case the settlement stays as is). So, in the long term a change in sovereignty of J&K may challenge the 1963 treaty and require a fresh boundary settlement (with India). But, even then, such legal claims can be safely ignored if they're against our interests, just like we did for Philippines.

2. The planning for the current action began in 2018, and the go ahead was given in autumn 2019. Some events in this period made it easier to get the go-ahead but the plan would have been implemented regardless, even if much later. The impact on the Indian economy and the impact of Covid on the Indian Army (20 k soldiers are affected, don't ask me where I got this information) also made this a good time to act strongly

3. The 1959 claim line thing is a diplomatic feint and a statement by a spokesman, the statement can be denied or the spokesman can be punished, if need be. Expectations of a diplomatic breakthrough weaken Indian military resolve and create public pressure for a diplomatic settlement.

4. There is zero likelihood of regaining South Tibet since it is very strongly guarded and the demography of the area has changed dramatically since 1962. But claims on it are necessary to keep pressure for a favourable settlement in the Western sector.

5. Bombing NE India will turn the local population against the central government and break Indian resolve. India is full of splittist elements and this will strengthen them. India will not respond due to domestic opposition and calls for ceasefire, the lower caste population and soldiers will turn against the upper caste leaders and officers. The PLAAF and air defense can defend against any possible reaction from India towards Chengdu.

6. India will not dare escalate by bringing in the Navy and diplomatic talks will be initiated soon as there is any danger of the IN being used. We will control Indian domestic opinion and combine the diplomatic option with the military actions to prevent an all out war. Democracies are indecisive and any dramatic escalation towards Djibouti and Coco islands can be preempted by dangling the offer of talks, delaying talks, discussing long term peace, etc.

As a Chinese strategist, I have my own blind spots, and I am as likely to miscalculate as anyone else. Regardless of my poor understanding of India, I am the planner. If India can foresee some of these actions, and act unpredictably, our decision making will go for a toss, especially since whoever screws up will end up in vocational training and there will be a lot of passing the buck and CYA.

I have slightly differing views on some of these points.

1,4 seem entirely too rational to be Chinese strategic thought.

2. It was Xitler's plan all along. He tested out in Chumar, Doklam much earlier than 2018.

3. The 1959 thing is the beginning of the downhill ski by the Sugarlanders, unable to withstand the pressure of the diplomatic and media onslaught by the Indians. They intend to show strength by posing the 1959 question to us, not out of cleverness but out of fear and a sense of defeat. They are just running behind the 1959 wall.

5. China will not even consider bombing NE. They will be content to do the winning without fighting through insurgents.

The way they think is "he put pressure, i put more pressure. i put more pressure first, then he die." You play this back on them, then they downhill ski.