nachiket wrote:VikramA wrote:if we are not occupying black top , then we are again repeating at least 50% of the mistakes on 62 that we made in the chushul sector. the only saving grace is that we control mukpuri near rezang la.
I think it is best to move beyond the narrow discussion about black top. Rohit Vats' video which he posted long back shows what the IA's moves in August mean for the entire Chushul region as a whole. To be on the safer side he assumed Black Top was still in Chinese hands but despite that it shows how IA's moves change the game in the region. This fixation on black top here is pointless.
And nobody demanding we take Black Top has yet pointed out exactly how to do it without starting a shooting war.
I would request Admins go a bit easy on Abhik & Vikram. Occupying heights is critical in mountain warfare, especially
before the shooting begins. Black Top is within "Indian" LAC but beyond "Chinese" LAC. Given that Chinese have no respect for "Indian" LAC, atleast when Clubs and Sticks were used, Black Top could have been occupied.
I hope it doesnt end up in a situation like Jelep La below. The author's credentials are well established. Maj Chandrakant Singh VrC 4 Guards (1RAJPUT) exploits have been covered in the book The Garud Strikes. His account of 1971 is also there on Bharat Rakshak Army Page.
https://salute.co.in/cover-story-tibet- ... -nathu-la/
COVER STORY-TIBET ABANDONED AND THE LESSONS OF NATHU LA
written by Maj Chandrakant Singh, VrC August 14, 2017
The stand off between Indian and Chinese troops on the Dolam plateau in Bhutan has all the potential of leading to full scale war. My Battalion 4 Guards (1RAJPUT) has had three tenures in Sikkim including two at Jelep La and I have been fortunate to have visited the state several times thereafter. I also have personally known Gen. Sagat Singh and the Sikkimese Princesses Pema Tseuden and Pema Choki whose contributions to India and Tibet need to be better known.
The Chumbi Valley is like a dagger pointed at the neck. Only a thin strip of land between the Himalayan state of Bhutan and Tibet connect Assam to the rest of India. In 1903 it was through the Jalep La pass and Chumbi Valley that the Younghusband mission went to Lhasa massacring many innocent and unarmed Tibetans on the way. Not many people know that both the 1890 Anglo Chinese Convention and the 1893 Tibet Sikkim Convention have a Hong Kong link. The negotiations were carried out between two Englishmen Henry Durand from the Indian side and James Hart representing the Chinese Imperial Customs and Frontier Service. The British were keen to obtain concessions for their interests in China particularly Hong Kong and Kowloon. To obtain these they accepted some spurious demands of the Chinese. Hong Kong as an entre-port for opium was a more attractive market than barren Tibet. The 1890 treaty was thus signed by a Britisher who was employed by the Chinese, and not by any Chinese official! Also not well known is the fact that the Chumbi Valley towns of Gyantse and Yatung used to be the summer capitals of Sikkim till 1948.In 1903, it was through the Jelep La pass and Chumbi Valley that the Young husband mission went to Lhasa massacring many innocent and unarmed Tibetans on the way.
History
Chinese claims over Tibet are weak at best, notwithstanding their high decibel claims that Tibet was always a part of China, which is not factual. Chinese claims on Tibet are premised on the fact that during the reign of the Mongol Emperor Chengez Khan and his heirs particularly Kublai Khan when Marco polo visited China, Tibetan representatives were seen in the Court at Peking. But at that time, China itself was a part of the Mongolian Empire and Tibet and Mongolia have always had close relations which continue even till today. When Chengez and Kublai ruled China, the relationship between Tibet and Mongolia was never between master and vassal, but as equals. So why did Nehru cede Tibet to China?
Nehru’s knowledge of history was sketchy and moreover stemmed from the viewpoint of the English, who wrote that history. But more than his lack of knowledge of history was his shocking ignorance of geography. In a letter he wrote to the Chief Ministers during his journey from Sikkim to Bhutan via the Chumbi Valley, he expressed surprise at seeing trees and forests when all he expected was a barren waste land, which perhaps also explains why he thought Ladakh too was a wasteland where not a blade of grass grew! His admiration of the socialist cause and the Stalinist model of governance made him more amenable to the Chinese viewpoint at the expense of the Tibetan people, which has led to the near extinction of an ancient civilisation and people, and also created an insoluble problem for India. Morally and legally, the ‘Hanification’ of the Tibetan population is genocide by another name. Linguistically, racially, culturally, and genetically the Tibetan are a different race from the Han Chinese and so are the Mongols, Manchurians, and many other ethnic minority groups, millions of whom have been killed in the process of Hanification.
Few people know that prior to the adoption of Buddhism as a state religion and its emphasis on ahimsa as a guiding principle for state policy and individual conduct, the Tibetans were a powerful and warlike people who dominated an immense swath of land starting from China to Western Iran. This lesson perhaps must never be lost on nations who seek to maintain their independence. Also not well known is the fact that when the Chinese Army invaded Tibet in 1950, they found themselves short of food even after having ransacked the country side of all food supplies. It was the Nehru government which supplied huge quantities of rice from India via Jelep La Pass in Sikkim. Then, in 1952, Nehru agreed to downgrade India’s representation in Tibet to consul general, implicitly conceding that Tibet’s foreign relations were controlled by China. Two years later he agreed to withdraw the Indian Military posts and trade representative from the Chumbi Valley that had been established by Young husband. During the hasty and ill planned withdrawal from Yatung and Gyantse several lives were lost including that of the Company Commander of the 2nd Battalion Jat Regiment Major Nagal, whose son, Lt Gen BS Nagal is the present Director of the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS). With great difficulty and persuasion was a team from 1Maratha under Major Brar allowed to proceed to Yatung and recover the bodies (Brar later rose to the rank of Lt Gen. and is more prominently known for his role in clearing the Golden Temple of terrorists). Nehru also had the telegraphic link to Lhasa and other facilities handed over to China. India thus, not only gave up all claims in Tibet but also surrendered Tibet’s rights to have independent relations with the outside world. India’s trade representatives at Kashgar, Gartok, Yatung and Gyantse were withdrawn cutting off centuries old links to Tibet. In the Panchsheel Agreement signed a year later at the Bandung Conference, whatever residual interests and rights that India had in Tibet evaporated.
Another fact which has been kept hidden from the gaze of the Indian public is that in 1951, just after the relics of the Buddha’s disciples which had been returned by UK had been exhibited in Gangtok and Kalimpong, India not only facilitated the journey to Lhasa but played host to the newly appointed Chinese Military Governor of Tibet, General Chang Chin Wu even after having received reports of atrocities being committed by the first batch of Chinese invaders led by General Liu Po Cheng. At this point in time, access to Tibet from China was very difficult, so much so that the Chinese Military Governor of Tibet had to proceed to Lhasa via Calcutta and Sikkim like Younghusband before him. If one Chinaman found it difficult to go to Lhasa directly how much more difficult it would have been to move an entire Army and then support it. India’s blindness after Independence led to the fiasco in 1962.
PRINCESS PEMA TSEUDEN OF SIKKIM WAS MARRIED TO A HIGH GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL OF TIBET WHO BELONGED TO A NOBLE FAMILY RELATED TO AN EARLIER DALAI LAMA. IT WAS SHE WHO WARNED THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA OF THE INVASION OF TIBET BY CHINA IN 1950. SHE WAS KNOWN FOR HER BEAUTY, CHARM, SOPHISTICATION AND DEDICATION TO THE TIBETAN CAUSE. MANY PEOPLE WHO MET HER WERE CAPTIVATED BY HER AND EVEN NEHRU WAS REPUTED TO HAVE BEEN ENTRANCED. AFTER THE TAKEOVER OF TIBET BY CHINA SHE MOVED TO CALCUTTA AND STARTED A BUSINESS MANUFACTURING TIBETAN JEWELLERY. NEHRU HAD ARRANGED A LICENCE FOR HER TO IMPORT SEMI-PRECIOUS STONES. FOR MANY YEARS SHE WAS THE BEST SOURCE OF INFORMATION ON THE HAPPENINGS INSIDE TIBET AND OUR INTELLIGENCE BUREAU AND THE CIA MADE USE OF HER SERVICES AND THOSE OF HER SISTER PEMA CHOKI MORE POPULARLY KNOWN AS PRINCESS KULA.
The Face-off at Nathu La At this point, mention need to be made of what happened in 1967, just a few years after the debacle in 1962. Here, the role of General Sagat Singh needs special mention. Sagat is rightfully remembered for his role in the 1971 War, but to me, his audacity and moral courage in disregard of his superior’s orders in taking on the Chinese in Sikkim in 1965 and 1967 is unequalled. It must not be forgotten that these actions took place just three years after India had been humiliated by the Chinese in 1962. Our Government and the defence establishment was extremely apprehensive and nervous about our Army’s ability to handle the Chinese. Sagat however had no such doubts and turned the tables on the Chinese. For this action alone he deserves a special place in the annals of Indian military history, for the action at Nathu La restored our self-confidence and pride which proved to be battle winning factors in 1971.
In 1965, during the Indo Pakistan War, the Chinese, in order to help Pakistan, issued an ultimatum to India to vacate Nathu La, Jelep La and the adjacent passes on the Sikkim Tibet boundary. General Manekshaw was the Eastern Army Commander and General Aurora was GOC XXXIII CORPS under whom was 17 Division with Sagat as GOC at Gantok, responsible for Nathu La and Cho La. Jelep La near the tri-junction of India, Bhutan and Tibet was under GOC 27 Mountain Division. Eastern Command and HQ XXXIII Corps had issued orders to 17 Div and 27 Div that in case of hostilities they were to vacate the posts on the watershed and fall back to the depth positions at Chhangu and Lumthu respectively, leaving behind only observation posts at the passes.
Sagat however felt that the natural boundary was the watershed at the passes and adjoining heights and refused to pull back his troops. Instead, he went about having the border demarcated by laying a wire fence at the pass to clearly demarcate the boundary. Sagat understood that in the mountains, anyone who controlled the heights had an unassailable advantage so he went about strengthening his positions and siting his observation posts from where they could look deep into the Chumbi Valley and bring down effective artillery fire right up to Yatung. There was a lot of pushing and jostling the like of which we have seen recently on TV but Sagat refused to budge and in fact at Cho La which is a few kilometres North of Nathu La there was a fire fight and the Chinese were pushed back a couple of kilometres.
Whilst Sagat’s Division was holding its ground and refusing to vacate the dominating features, the GOC of 27 Division at Jelep La and the Tri-junction area withdrew his troops to the rear positions vacating the dominating heights which were promptly occupied by the Chinese. This domination of the heights is what is making the Chinese assume an aggressive posture. The defence of this area is critical for India, should we lose it then it is all the way downhill to the plains of North Bengal and the narrow strip of land barely thirty kilometres wide that connects Assam to the rest of the country. Having gained an upper hand at Jelep La, the Chinese felt confident enough to try their luck again at Nathu La in 1967 but here they did not take into account the presence of Sagat. Having gained an upper hand in 1965 he was not the man to give it up, come what may. He had appreciated that dominating Nathu La was critical to the defence of Gangtok which is a few thousand feet lower and not too far from the pass. Loss of Nathu La would thus endanger Gangtok. So, keeping the national interest in mind, he was prepared to take on the Chinese with all the resources at his command, even at the risk of incurring the disapproval of his superior commanders and putting his career on the line.
On 13 August 1967 our observation posts reported that some Chinese troops had crossed over and dug some trenches on our side of the border. When they were challenged they filled up the trenches and withdrew. But they installed several loud speakers and beamed propaganda on to our side. Sagat countered this by installing more powerful loudspeakers in a tit for tat game of one-upmanship. He however realised that the Chinese were starting something new and after getting a clearance from Corps Headquarters decided to demarcate the border and strengthen the barbed wire fencing with concertina coils. The Chinese tried to prevent this and several eye ball to eye ball encounters which ended in scuffles took place. The Jat troops of 3 Grenadiers like all Jats are big in build and have a powerful physique so they always got the better of the Chinese. The Chinese, realising that they could not best the Grenadiers started to resort to stone pelting which was answered in a like manner by our troops. Several minor injuries were sustained by troops on both sides. On 11 December things came to a head when the Chinese opened fire on our troops laying the wire. Col Rai Singh, CO 2 Grenadiers was hit and so were several other troops. Seeing their CO hit, the Grenadiers went mad with rage and charged the enemy positions. Several of our men were mowed by Chinese machine guns but some managed to reach their bunkers and took on the Chinese with their bayonets and hand to hand combat. But a company of 18 Rajputs and the Engineer personnel laying the wire were caught in the open and suffered heavy casualties. Sagat, as was his habit, was close to the front. Seeing the situation had escalated and we had suffered considerable casualties, he ordered artillery fire from his medium 5.5 inch guns to be brought down on the Chinese positions. Ever since he had taken over 17 Division in 1965 he had positioned his artillery observation posts on heights overlooking the Chinese positions not only in the front but deep inside Chumbi Valley upto and beyond Yatung. These artillery OPs did a sterling job, and the Chinese positions at Nathu La were devastated and positions in the rear were also targeted and destroyed. Sagat as a Divisional Commander did not have the authority to open fire with his medium guns, so the moment HQ Eastern Command and XXXIII came to know that he had deployed his medium guns they called for an explanation. Anticipating this, Sagat made himself unavailable on radio and telephone and continued to conduct the battle according to his own plan till all Chinese positions at the pass had been neutralised. Thereafter, a ceasefire was declared and bodies of the dead exchanged. Many acts of unprecedented valour were performed and Sagat ensured that they received due recognition. There were also a few cases of desertion of duty which Sagat enquired into and the guilty were brought before courts martial and those found guilty were punished. We had suffered heavy casualties — 65 dead and about 145 wounded — but the Chinese had lost many times more. Their dead were about three hundred and of the wounded about twice that number. After the ceasefire when normalcy had returned Sagat’s Division was in a commanding and advantageous position at Nathu La, but his superiors were none too pleased at his open defiance of their instructions and after a couple of months Sagat was shifted to the command of a non-operational formation, 101 Communication Zone based at Shillong. But no one could keep Sagat down, for just a few months later, Sagat was leading the campaign against the rebels in Mizo Hills and in two years had successfully restored normalcy.
Whereas Sagat went on to win further laurels in the service of India his counterpart, the obedient commander of 27 Division at Jelep La who vacated the pass when not even threatened has left behind a permanent headache and security problem for India. The problem has got more complicated as the exact spot where the recent incident has taken place lies within Bhutan and we are guarantors of Bhutan’s defence. It was heartening to see big built Sikhs pushing back the Chinese in the present face off at Dolam.
The obedient commander of 27 Division at Jelep La was General G G Bewoor who became Chief of Army Staff over Lt. Gen. Sagat Singh and Lt. Gen. Prem Bhagat.
My only hope and prayers is that we've a Sagat Singh, Thimaiyya or Thorat out there and not a G G Bewoor, Thapar or Kaul out there.
The Indian system is notorious for promoting the least meritocratic of people.
Rest everything else we're well covered and top of our game.
