India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020 - Part 2

[John]

We need Xi or Xi like character in China. More they get over confidence of their power, more trouble they will create.

And China creating trouble is what we want.

One of the biggest suprises with China in past four years is they didn't take advantage of Trump and vaccum he left in lack of global leadership and allies he alienated.

Rather than take advantage and portray themselves as global leader, they started out that way in 2015 by taking center stage in pollutionand trade talks but Xi need to boost his ego and consolidate power got in the way. US tech companies have definitely benefited the most as Chinese tech giants had a chance to dominate the globe but themselves in the foot.

[ramana]

Hari Nair, Manjugu, Philip, jamwal, rohitvats, chola, Deans,

What did 2020 reveal to each of you about the Chinese you did not know earlier?

[chola]

We need Xi or Xi like character in China. More they get over confident of their power, more trouble they will create.

And China creating trouble is what we want.

Agree 100%

Xi dies and it becomes an excuse for Western countries, especially the non-Anglosphere ones to work again with Cheen.

In fact, there would be pressure in the US under Biden as well.

Xi stays around as a bogeyman and hopefully the pressure from the West continues (though the Germans are already off script in pushing a new EU investment pact with Cheen.)

[Hari Nair]

Hari Nair, Manjugu, Philip, jamwal, rohitvats, chola, Deans,

What did 2020 reveal to each of you about the Chinese you did not know earlier?

Well, 2020 revealed, in my opinion the following:
-The PLA was supposed to be meticulous in their analysis and moves - the extent of planning ,gaming, prediction and even risk-taking was supposed to have been absolutely superior. This statement is in the context of the 62 ops in the Kameng Sector - that Chinese general was a brilliant hot shot who went into classic manoeuvre warfare mode and struck at the minds of the Indian commanders. Their Army today is very obviously different and my assumption about them in this context was proved wrong twice - the first time during Galwan and the second time when we surprised them on the south bank of Pangang Tso.

-Their soft underbelly - training and their two-year rotation of personnel has shown to be a major shortcoming. It even appears to dictate their strategy. This is a bit of a surprise.

- Their arrogance, built into their culture, perhaps had affected their analysis of the dirty, unshaven and hairy barbarian Indians. They thought that their shiny superior forces would just walk all over us. Truth be told, till the beginning of the spread of the Wuhan Virus, even we were believing in the great Chinese success story that included their armed forces. Now. the Great Superior Han from the Middle Kingdom halfway between heaven and earth, has been brought down to earth on his posterior with a resounding thud.

- Regarding their tech - perhaps the jury is out on this one. How good is the quality of their kit at the unit level? So far, its all been propaganda on You Tube and paid media.

[chola]

Hari Nair, Manjugu, Philip, jamwal, rohitvats, chola, Deans,

What did 2020 reveal to each of you about the Chinese you did not know earlier?

For me, 2020 revealed that they have a large naval base directly across from a beach resort in Hainan. The watchers community is looking forward to many more photos of carriers, LHDs and other major vessels from this intel hotspot:
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/EngsNcfXEAA ... name=large
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/EqUUezlXIAA ... ame=medium

[manjgu]

chinese : nothing at all. i always knew they are double dealing b...ds / bullies
India : 1) that we have finally mustered the balls to stare down the chinkis and give it back. though the loss of 20 in galwan hurt a lot but they took down more. on shanti. 2) that we are critically short in many areas and yet making half hearted attempts at developing and supporting indigenous tech.

[chetak]

We need Xi or Xi like character in China. More they get over confidence of their power, more trouble they will create.

And China creating trouble is what we want.

One of the biggest suprises with China in past four years is they didn't take advantage of Trump and vaccum he left in lack of global leadership and allies he alienated.

Rather than take advantage and portray themselves as global leader, they started out that way in 2015 by taking center stage in pollutionand trade talks but Xi need to boost his ego and consolidate power got in the way. US tech companies have definitely benefited the most as Chinese tech giants had a chance to dominate the globe but themselves in the foot.

where exactly was the vacuum, saar

every affected country moved to take up the perceived slack that was created by the so called retreating amerikis under trumpwa.

Countries like India stepped up smartly and went far beyond what the hans ever expected.

IMHO, the amerikis defocussed away from relatively non productive geographies of potential rivalry and refocussed on a narrower front where the conflict of interests was more destabilizing to the hans and therefore had the potential of causing the hans to deploy a disproportionate amount of resources to counter the enhanced threats.

hence the attack on chinese trade and the Indo pacific south china sea arena which would be known to all chinese by now, enabling the amerikis in showing up xi as the impotent leader that he is.

the han trade and trust levels in the international arena has visibly diminished and a coalition of like minded interests against the aggressive han hegemony and xi's hitherto largely uncontested overreach have coalesced where none existed before

trump is a master at the strategy of creating chaos and benefiting from it.

The relevance of chaos theory for the strategy that trump seems to have used is to be seen in the position that xi, the CCP and his china find themselves in today. Trump seems to have leveraged all of xi's internal problems at home to isolate xi and leave him sequestered internationally.

the very thing that the hans feared most of all was a coordinated international resistance against the chinese and their so called "peaceful rise".

trumpwa seems to have delivered on that front and left biden with little option but to follow through.

don't the recent polls show trumpwa as the most popular guy in the US today.

That's quite a vote of confidence in a guy who allegedly "lost" the elections, no

[chola]

^^^ True, the chinis can't take advantage of a vacuum that was created precisely because the US had disengaged from the global stage to focus on clobbering the chinis.

[jamwal]

Hari Nair, Manjugu, Philip, jamwal, rohitvats, chola, Deans,

What did 2020 reveal to each of you about the Chinese you did not know earlier?

I've learned a few things and more things come up regularly.

1. Chinese armed forces not a huge, well armed, disciplined and efficient piece of perfection as they like to pretend and how media reports. CCP had barely any control over PLA and recent reforms by Xi were meant more for his control over the generals than actual military reforms. Huge amounts of corruption and high ranks were running their own fiefdoms. Perhaps still are.

2. PLA did quite well in Korea and 1962 even with limited resources. But they seem to have lost most of their expertise and skills in later years. Even a depleted Vietnam pushed them to limits.

3. They have done well with their indigenous equipment in terms of development and procurement. India can learn a few things from them. Yet a significantly large number of systems are not as good as their claims.

4. Inspite of all their bravado, they don't want to stay away from a fight. They are comfortable with bullying weaker nations but if there is any chance of blowback, they are not as adventurous. They tend to rely on intimidation and subterfuge more than actual action.

5. It's not possible to be successful in PLA without loyalty to party. After recent reforms, control of CCP even tighter and I think that PLA will be politicised a lot more.

6. Even with so many roads and railways and Tibet, logistics are still their biggest weakness wrt India and it'll likely stay this way for a few years atleast.

[Vidur]

I am taking the liberty of broadening the question and sharing what I learnt

1. I learnt that China has big gaps in strength especially in the PLAAF. I learnt with fascination about the deployment and tactics, runway lengths, airfield logistics, recovery air fields, air battle concepts and was relieved and surprised to learn that IAF has an edge over PLAAF. What was the most fascinating was the compelling assessment that if we initiate air war our edge goes up exponentially giving us exponential higher returns in the theatre

2.I was surprised to learn about the serious deficiencies in PLA infantry tactics due to excessive mechanisation even in terrain not suited for it. Some very interesting lucanae in their command, control came up which were very instructive. Interestingly NDC does not touch upon many of these aspects.

3. I also learnt that China is good at error recognition and correction and have already started taking corrective action. I learnt about the 3 warfares strategy and the war zone strategy and how it is being effective and countering their military gaps very effectively

4. Most of all I learnt things about us - that our military is not as weak people think vis a vis China, how terrain plays a role even in air operations, the criticiality of terrain even in Air ops, our significant edge in ethos, experience, tactics, training.

5. I was always aware of a degree of risk aversion in our military leadership (I don't mention the bureaucracy because they really do not have any understanding or interest in defence barring some anomalies like yours truly) but I wasn't aware of how its much more in the Army and Navy rather than the IAF. The on ground consequences of this were very instructive to see. I also learnt that the fundamental defensiveness of the Indian state has not significantly changed. What was almost astonishing was the deep fear about China still in the Indian pysche at many levels.

It was fascinating watching how we were presented with cold hard facts about our military edge on one hand and the risk aversion on the other. The IAF's conduct was instructive - innovative, can do, and keen to take battle to the enemy.

[nam]

5. I was always aware of a degree of risk aversion in our military leadership (I don't mention the bureaucracy because they really do not have any understanding or interest in defence barring some anomalies like yours truly) but I wasn't aware of how its much more in the Army and Navy rather than the IAF. The on ground consequences of this were very instructive to see. I also learnt that the fundamental defensiveness of the Indian state has not significantly changed. What was almost astonishing was the deep fear about China still in the Indian pysche at many levels.

It was fascinating watching how we were presented with cold hard facts about our military edge on one hand and the risk aversion on the other. The IAF's conduct was instructive - innovative, can do, and keen to take battle to the enemy.

Risk Aversion because there has been no thrust given towards fighting a equivalent or larger adversary. With Pak everyone is gung ho, because it can either be a victory or in the worst case a stalemate.

The only entity which can shape the battle/war in the 2 front war is IAF. Both IA & IN will be fighting a defensive war. Which is why, I have been constantly of the belief, that the resources should be prioritized towards IAF. Not adding tens of divisions in to IA or carriers in to IN, we should be expanding and modernizing IAF.

No Pak or Chinese action will survive if IAF is not taken out.

[chola]

4. Most of all I learnt things about us - that our military is not as weak people think vis a vis China, how terrain plays a role even in air operations, the criticiality of terrain even in Air ops, our significant edge in ethos, experience, tactics, training.

Vidur ji.

I've always been surprised by how people don't know this. I've posted during Doklam that Cheen had only three brigades in Tibet and a handful of planes. All backed by data. I said repeatedly back then that had we initiated war then it might have gained us everything back from 1962 and then some. We had OVERWHELMING advantages in manpower and aircraft. People here treated me like I was nuts and then banned me for warmongering.

I'm also surprised that people always expected them to attack. Again, the data is there staring us in the face that they won't. They haven't fought a proper war in the four decades they grew into a major menace. They simply don't fight. Unlike the Pakis, they don't play to their disadvantage (actual fighting) and use their production and industrial base to gobble up gray zones.

Their military is set up to intimidate smaller countries and deter bigger ones not to actually fight. They build things, that is their strength. As those ships and planes mount up, the real and perceived costs of fighting them grow and it becomes progressively harder to consider hot war as an option. Which is exactly what they want. They haven't fought in the 40 years they grew their power and stole an ocean the size of India itself so why would they?

[Vidur]

5. I was always aware of a degree of risk aversion in our military leadership (I don't mention the bureaucracy because they really do not have any understanding or interest in defence barring some anomalies like yours truly) but I wasn't aware of how its much more in the Army and Navy rather than the IAF. The on ground consequences of this were very instructive to see. I also learnt that the fundamental defensiveness of the Indian state has not significantly changed. What was almost astonishing was the deep fear about China still in the Indian pysche at many levels.

It was fascinating watching how we were presented with cold hard facts about our military edge on one hand and the risk aversion on the other. The IAF's conduct was instructive - innovative, can do, and keen to take battle to the enemy.

Risk awareness because there has been no thrust given towards fighting a equivalent or larger adversary. With Pak everyone is gung ho, because it can either be a victory or in the worst case a stalemate.

The only entity which can shape the battle/war in the 2 front war is IAF. Both IA & IN will be fighting a defensive war. Which is why, I have been constantly of the belief, that the resources should be prioritized towards IAF. Not adding tens of divisions in to IA or carriers in to IN, we should be expanding and modernizing IAF.

No Pak or Chinese action will survive if IAF is not taken out.

Risk Awareness ? Sir, I talked about Risk Aversion which is almost 180 degrees opposite

[nam]

Risk Awareness ? Sir, I talked about Risk Aversion which is almost 180 degrees opposite

Apologies, I meant Risk Aversion. This is seen even on the LoC. Instead of going in for a sustained campaign to silence Pak artillery & mortar units using PGM, IA just responds with artillery fire, which most of the time does not hit anything worthwhile.

We are stuck in a constant attrition of our forces and civilians.

[ParGha]

-Their soft underbelly - training and their two-year rotation of personnel has shown to be a major shortcoming. It even appears to dictate their strategy. This is a bit of a surprise.

The Chinese recruitment, training and organization is geared for industrial-scale warfare. While it is a weakness in small-scale border-skirmishes and proxy-wars, its purpose is different. They can scale up 5x in manpower in six months.

In contrast, Indian Army's recruitment, training and organization were originally geared for colonial-policing, and they excel at small-scale wars; their difficulties in scaling up to large-scale modern wars are well-documented during the World Wars and the 1961-67 expansion. Repeated attempts to change this have failed because of electoral, economic and internal-security considerations. In recent years, Indian Army seems to have settled into a fatalistic acceptance that, "If a conflict between two nuclear-powers goes on for more than a few weeks, it will turn nuclear. After a nuclear war, we will all be dead or wishing we were dead. So why worry about scaling-up our manpower reserves? Jo hoga, so hoga!" In a strange way, for all kinds of bureaucratic one-upmanship and social-engineering bull$#!+ reasons, the CAPFs actually have made more progress on this issue than the Indian Army.

At this stage, I'm not sure which approach is definitely better. But there are definite pros and cons of each approach.

[chetak]

Risk Awareness ? Sir, I talked about Risk Aversion which is almost 180 degrees opposite

Apologies, I meant Risk Aversion. This is seen even on the LoC. Instead of going in for a sustained campaign to silence Pak artillery & mortar units using PGM, IA just responds with artillery fire, which most of the time does not hit anything worthwhile.

We are stuck in a constant attrition of our forces and civilians.

the military is not risk averse but the politicians are. They have kept the military starved and impoverished as far as equipment and resources go. and on whose say so was this being done.

why did the artillery guns take so long to procure and how were they scuttled at the very last minute, so many times. who benefitted, if not the pakis and the hans and who knows who got paid off. In any other country, such traitors would have been shot out of hand for risking the security of the country

why were the IN and the IAF starved of weapon systems, and platforms and left holding aged, degraded and rundown equipment when hundreds of thousands of crores were being openly stolen by the congis

why are the babooze still ruling the roost and where else in the whole wide world does such a thing happen.

why were the border roads and infrastructure not developed according to the threats that were looming in full view of everyone.

why were the chinese so upset when Modi moved to close many if not all of the gaps purposely engineered by the BIF led congi commie combine.

what was the secret MOU signed very specifically by the gandhis with the hans.

why was the IA hogtied and manacled at the borders in a way that they were not allowed to respond appropriately to whatever the provocation.

why were the bodies of paki and foreign terrorists handed over to the locals after each and every encounter. who benefitted from this if not the pakis directly. Now, thanks to covid and Modi, 158 militants have already been buried in far off places in lonely, unmarked graves as they richly deserve.

This is the disciplined army of a democratic country that faithfully follows orders even while taking much heavier than normal casualty because they are constrained in so many ways by the paki controlled cashmeri political scum who dictated terms to their commie and congi counterparts.

How is the Indian Army risk averse when babooze and its elected masters are impotent, traitorous, corrupt and sold out

the situation seems to have changed now, upsetting both the pakis and the hans and leaving the BIF sucking their thumbs, reduced to using means like NYT, BBC, WAPO and twitter to hit out at the RSS and Modi.

[John]

trump is a master at the strategy of creating chaos and benefiting from it.

I highly doubt Trump is master of anything, his strategy is focused on benefiting him financially, politically or to help out his boss ( Putin). He wanted to keep a amicable relationship with Xi remember all the comments downplayed Chinas' handling of Covid19, HK protests and China human right violations. Trump Jr ramped up his china trips and we're hoping to expand this buisness in China.

But after Trump handling of Covid19 he found it better to get aggressive On China and so he can shift the narrative and blame them. Rather than use that to their advantage and portray Trump as the bully Xi decided to pick on other nations around him giving much needed credibility to Trumps assertions.

[ramana]

Thanks Hari, chola, jamwal, vidur.

Keep it coming. I want more thoughts.
Will post my views later.

[ramana]

Risk Awareness ? Sir, I talked about Risk Aversion which is almost 180 degrees opposite

Apologies, I meant Risk Aversion. This is seen even on the LoC. Instead of going in for a sustained campaign to silence Pak artillery & mortar units using PGM, IA just responds with artillery fire, which most of the time does not hit anything worthwhile.

We are stuck in a constant attrition of our forces and civilians.

This is erroneous.
Pak has been hit very effectively since 5 August 2019.

[Anoop]

The Chinese recruitment, training and organization is geared for industrial-scale warfare. While it is a weakness in small-scale border-skirmishes and proxy-wars, its purpose is different. They can scale up 5x in manpower in six months.

In contrast, Indian Army's recruitment, training and organization were originally geared for colonial-policing, and they excel at small-scale wars; ... In recent years, Indian Army seems to have settled into a fatalistic acceptance that, "If a conflict between two nuclear-powers goes on for more than a few weeks, it will turn nuclear. After a nuclear war, we will all be dead or wishing we were dead. So why worry about scaling-up our manpower reserves? Jo hoga, so hoga!" In a strange way, for all kinds of bureaucratic one-upmanship and social-engineering bull$#!+ reasons, the CAPFs actually have made more progress on this issue than the Indian Army.

Sir, can you please expand on a few points?

1. If attrition of a large standing army like the IA were to occur, the amount of firepower used must be so massive that the escalation would be significant and bring a lot more non-traditional targets into play on the adversary's side. So, what is the advantage of the PLA preparing for a war of lower probability than a skirmish of much higher probability? Especially one that they are provoking?

2. Isn't the role of the CAPF and the Territorial Army to free up the IA's manpower from roles like rear area security, supply line security etc at a pinch? So are we losing anything (apart from money) by continuing our current model of recruitment and training?

[ramana]

In contrast, Indian Army's recruitment, training and organization were originally geared for colonial-policing, and they excel at small-scale wars; their difficulties in scaling up to large-scale modern wars are well-documented during the World Wars and the 1961-67 expansion. Repeated attempts to change this have failed because of electoral, economic and internal-security considerations. In recent years, Indian Army seems to have settled into a fatalistic acceptance that, "If a conflict between two nuclear-powers goes on for more than a few weeks, it will turn nuclear. After a nuclear war, we will all be dead or wishing we were dead. So why worry about scaling-up our manpower reserves? Jo hoga, so hoga!" In a strange way, for all kinds of bureaucratic one-upmanship and social-engineering bull$#!+ reasons, the CAPFs actually have made more progress on this issue than the Indian Army.

ParGha,
On the contrary, and Vidur can attest hopefully, Galwan has reinforced the reality that two nuclear powers with borders can at most have skirmishes.
In 1999, Kargil was a sector skirmish.
In 2002 Operation Parakram was just mobilization.
In 1969, FSU and PRC had Ussuri River clashes/ skirmishes.
On the other hand two nuke powers with out borders will have proxy wars like FSU and US.

The peace in Kashmir was due to the large RR contingent which got combat experience short of war.

[nam]

This is erroneous.
Pak has been hit very effectively since 5 August 2019.

I was referring to artillery deployed on reverse slope, which cannot be hit with regular artillery. Even if you manage to get the round nearly vertically, the fuze wouldn't know when to explode. Mortar's cannot reach artillery guns.

We need a Azeri style campaign where loitering drone, NLOS ATGM with video feeds targeting Pak artillery guns & 155 howitzer, to hammer Pak morale. Given the civilians losses we have faced, it is imperative IA go after Pak artillery.

We have had haroop drone for almost a decade now.. The sad thing is it is a matter of time before Pak kicks off such an PGM action. We will as always react.

[Kakkaji]

Goa Shipyard to build 12 patrol boats for Pangong deployment

New Delhi: Goa Shipyard Limited (GSL) has bagged the Rs 65-crore contract to build 12 anti-ramming patrol boats that would be deployed at Pangong Lake in Ladakh to thwart Chinese aggression.

The PSU is expected to roll out the patrol boats by May 2021, by when snow would have melted at the lake and a face-off between India and China troops could resume.

The Defence sector Public Sector Undertaking will also carry out maintenance of these boats for four years.

[brar_w]

I was referring to artillery deployed on reverse slope, which cannot be hit with regular artillery.

The IA now has Excalibur which is capable of this. See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1zDtd8ajSvI

But yes, more options the better. Perhaps some smaller, lower cost man-portable loitering systems can be developed that sit in below the Harop in terms of cost sensors and payload and are thus more optimized for that target type.

[ParGha]

... what is the advantage of the PLA preparing for a war of lower probability than a skirmish of much higher probability?

The PLA grew up preparing for wars with the United States (1948-69) and the Soviet Union (1969-91); it is in their institutional memory and culture to think of large-scale warfare. Small-scale wars are higher probability, but lower impact.

... are we losing anything (apart from money) by continuing our current model of recruitment and training?

You are actually saving money with the currently model of recruitment and training Long Service troops; hence I noted "economics" as one of the three considerations for the current model. What you are actually losing is that scaling mindset and culture.

[Anoop]

Sir,

I don't understand the economics argument with long service troops, especially in light of our revenue budget straining our capital budget. Isn't that the reason the Services are pushing for nore Short Service Commissions? How is a model of 2 year conscription, with the soldiers going on to non-military jobs, more expensive than 19 years or 15 years of colour service?

Thank you.

[Vidur]

In contrast, Indian Army's recruitment, training and organization were originally geared for colonial-policing, and they excel at small-scale wars; their difficulties in scaling up to large-scale modern wars are well-documented during the World Wars and the 1961-67 expansion. Repeated attempts to change this have failed because of electoral, economic and internal-security considerations. In recent years, Indian Army seems to have settled into a fatalistic acceptance that, "If a conflict between two nuclear-powers goes on for more than a few weeks, it will turn nuclear. After a nuclear war, we will all be dead or wishing we were dead. So why worry about scaling-up our manpower reserves? Jo hoga, so hoga!" In a strange way, for all kinds of bureaucratic one-upmanship and social-engineering bull$#!+ reasons, the CAPFs actually have made more progress on this issue than the Indian Army.

ParGha,
On the contrary, and Vidur can attest hopefully, Galwan has reinforced the reality that two nuclear powers with borders can at most have skirmishes.
In 1999, Kargil was a sector skirmish.
In 2002 Operation Parakram was just mobilization.
In 1969, FSU and PRC had Ussuri River clashes/ skirmishes.
On the other hand two nuke powers with out borders will have proxy wars like FSU and US.

The peace in Kashmir was due to the large RR contingent which got combat experience short of war.

Purely on point of nuclear powers will only skirmish - thats buying into the nuclear bogey and blackmail argument that we have been attempting to wean India away from. I strongly disagree with this nuclear bogey and will take the liberty of calling it wrong and illogical. Don't want to get into the concepts of nuclear weapons and their use here but I wanted to unambiguously counter this bogey.

Galwan has no connection. Surprised to see it mentioned. It was an ambush that was broken by our bravehearts despite all odds. Crushing defeat was inflicted on enemy. No connection whatsoever to nuclear doctrine or policy. Lets be very clear.

I believe there will be a full fledged conventional war between 2 nuclear states within the next 10 years.

[nam]

The IA now has Excalibur which is capable of this. See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1zDtd8ajSvI

But yes, more options the better. Perhaps some smaller, lower cost man-portable loitering systems can be developed that sit in below the Harop in terms of cost sensors and payload and are thus more optimized for that target type.

This would require the target position to be known, static and preferably on a relatively flat surroundings. The himalayans ranges have positions with 1000ft+ valleys nearby. So it will be a guess work to time the fuse correctly. Most of the rounds would just explode in the valley below.

The positions needs to be "seen". I was hoping for high flying ISR platforms which is able to see on the other side of the mountains and provide positional updates to counter battery teams. Or delegate the ISR with cheap tactical 40-50KM loitering drones coupled with WLR, which will allow it to chase scooting artillery teams.

Another option is MBRL rockets with IIR, to rapidly reach the position, once WLR gives you the bearings. I believe DRDO is working on this solution.

[Vidur]

Having made the above very important point about the nuclear bogey I will address Pargha's point about manpower

1. We have 9 Divs in Eastern Command which are adequate. We have 2 Divs deployed in Eastern Ladakh (3 Div reinforced by 1 more). We have adequate forces in Northern Command for Pakistan. We have a Mountain Strike Corps which can carry out ops both in NC and EC. We have 3 Strike Corps against Pak + 6 Pivot Corps. Our entire strenght against Pak is the size of entire Pak army + we have adequate forces against China.

2. I believe we can with these forces fight a 2 front war - being defensive in one front and offensive in another. We cannot be offensive in both fronts. But do we need to be ? I don't think so. Even if you want to take Aksai Chin and GB at same time the constraint is not so much troops but air mobility. You need to be able to air assault with atleast 2 full divisions and then build an air birdge that can bring another 2/3 Divs into theatre. I believer we can rejig our forces to rustle up the troops but the limoting factor will be transport a/c, light guns etc. We have only 1 Para Brigade now.

3. So I believe our troop strength is adequate even for a 2 front war with 1 front offensive. We can move up 1/2 divs from WC/SWC/SC to NC if needed

[brar_w]

Any precision-guided artillery requires third part targeting, either in the form of providing coordinates or laser designation.

[nam]

As much we would like, India is not going to capture any part of Pakistan or PoK or AC. There are no real gains. Even if we do, we will just be continuing with a high intensity conflict as Pak & China will throw the kitchen sink to get these regions back.

Why do we need PoK, where people don't like us anyways? or invade in to a failed state like Pak?

My personal view is that we need to reduce Pak facing strike corps from 3 to 2 and move those saved kit in to IBG. Our objective should be to smash Pak Army on IB & LC, not take over Lahore or Pindi.

Money saved should be put in to getting modern kit. Even if Pak manages to take some Indian areas, use airpower and make it another Longewala.

The perfect situation for us to have another Assal Uttar, where Pak Army is allowed to come inside India and is smashed to pieces with the help of airpower.

[hemant_sai]

The perfect situation for us to have another Assal Uttar, where Pak Army is allowed to come inside India and is smashed to pieces with the help of airpower.

Sorry but this is rubbish. I can understand argument not to capture their territory for whatever reasons, but to smash them why we need to wait till they capture our territory.
After being on this forum if we get such ideas then what is left to say...

[manjgu]

As much we would like, India is not going to capture any part of Pakistan or PoK or AC. There are no real gains. Even if we do, we will just be continuing with a high intensity conflict as Pak & China will throw the kitchen sink to get these regions back.

Why do we need PoK, where people don't like us anyways? or invade in to a failed state like Pak?

My personal view is that we need to reduce Pak facing strike corps from 3 to 2 and move those saved kit in to IBG. Our objective should be to smash Pak Army on IB & LC, not take over Lahore or Pindi.

Money saved should be put in to getting modern kit. Even if Pak manages to take some Indian areas, use airpower and make it another Longewala.

The perfect situation for us to have another Assal Uttar, where Pak Army is allowed to come inside India and is smashed to pieces with the help of airpower.

Smash Pak army and then? Can this be a reasonable war objective?

[Deans]

Hari Nair, Manjugu, Philip, jamwal, rohitvats, chola, Deans,

What did 2020 reveal to each of you about the Chinese you did not know earlier?

I always thought the Chinese were playing the long game (keep a low profile till you're ready to beat the US). Xi was more impatient than
I believed (which is surprising, as he is leader for life) and perhaps wants to accelerate the timetable for global domination.
As a consequence, the Global anti China sentiment has accelerated in width (more countries) and depth (stronger) more than I thought
possible. A US led NATO like grouping in East Asia, aimed at countering China is a real possibility.

[nam]

Sorry but this is rubbish. I can understand argument not to capture their territory for whatever reasons, but to smash them why we need to wait till they capture our territory.
After being on this forum if we get such ideas then what is left to say...

It is called making the enemy walk in to the trap. Just like what was done at Assal Uttar.

Was IA planning to let Pak capture territory, when they let through PA till Assal Uttar?

Another reason in killing PA in to our territory is to prevent them using nukes, which they might in case we are deep in to Pak.

[Vidur]

The Chinese have been very clear in their own writings about the War Zone concept that Vietnam, India, Taiwan will be subdued by force first. They have never talked about taking on US. Its only logical that they take on US After they become undisputed hegemons in Asia.

We should read their doctrines carefully and look at issue objectively without our cognitive biases.

China has merely executed their stated doctrine. We should not be surprised

[nam]

Smash Pak army and then? Can this be a reasonable war objective?

Why not? Why do we want to take over any part of that rabid nutcase of a nation? And feed those jokers on Indian tax payer money? The moment you capture PoK, half of Pakistan will start streaming in to PoK wanting to be Indian citizens. Who wouldn't like to build large mansions using Indian tax money and selling apples? like they do in Kashmir. Not to mention the privilege of constant victimhood.

Decimation of Pak Army, the puppet master of everything in Pak, should be our primary objective. Every action of Pak is done on the delusional belief of PA superiority and to maintain this delusion!

One of the reason J&K is quite after Aug 2019 is due to the Balakot strike, which killed Pak's invincibility narrative using nuke shield.

[chetak]

trump is a master at the strategy of creating chaos and benefiting from it.

I highly doubt Trump is master of anything, his strategy is focused on benefiting him financially, politically or to help out his boss ( Putin). He wanted to keep a amicable relationship with Xi remember all the comments downplayed Chinas' handling of Covid19, HK protests and China human right violations. Trump Jr ramped up his china trips and we're hoping to expand this buisness in China.

But after Trump handling of Covid19 he found it better to get aggressive On China and so he can shift the narrative and blame them. Rather than use that to their advantage and portray Trump as the bully Xi decided to pick on other nations around him giving much needed credibility to Trumps assertions.

trump hasn't been voted the most popular in the US today after he dethroned obama's straight and unbroken 12 year run because he is a master at nothing. The ameriki people have reposed faith in him even after he "lost" the elections

trump has done what most ameriki presidents did/could not do but he is right wing hence the khujli in the nether regions of most woke "liberals"

Modi is the most successful of all Indian PMs to date, bar none, but he is portrayed as a rabid sanghi and hateful hindutawadi so in the eyes of the impotent liberals he has failed.

time and again Modi has put his entire political capital at risk and on the line which no other Indian PM has had the guts to do repeatedly and he has pulled through.

neither trump nor Modi have cared for anyone's approval and nor have they sought it and yet, people are hell bent on with holding this so called approval, as though it mattered to either of them.

Both have spawned an international industry of woke commies who earn their daily bread by denigrating Modi and Trump

the commies, lefties and the woke liberals are all in the same s(t)inking boat.

They destroy because they can't create. They abuse because they can't debate.

wokes like pappu are politically constipated. They are used to sitting on their family pot and straining mightily but with no result. The can neither go nor will they get off the pot and yet they continue to gorge off the public trough out of sheer genetic habit and the instinct of inherited entitlement.

[Adrija]

Why do we need PoK, where people don't like us anyways? or invade in to a failed state like Pak?

Wow... this is a most surprising statement Nam-ji.......... we need POK for linking to the CARs and ensuring an overland and safe route for them being able to evacuate their oil & gas deposits so that they can develop an alternate to their current dependence to China ..... right now they are landlocked and their only economic lifeline is selling their mineral wealth to China... so they remain bound to it inspite of not liking the Hans.

And yes, they don't like the Hans at all... the main reason why Kazakhs developed a new capital (Astana) as an alternate to Almaty right in the middle of the steppes with absolutely no shelter from the winds is that is pretty much the farthest point from the China border

The Great Game has not changed much since the time the British, after having having looted India's wealth, shifted the fulcrum of their entire foreign policy to safeguarding the Wells of Power in the Mideast in the 1910s...... which the US inherited after WWII. Fracking and the resulting abundance of energy sources in continental US has made the MidEast rulers insecure in the US' continued stake in their stability, and they look to China as the second guarantor. So China becomes a fulcrum for Mideast, CARs as well as RU now. India is the only (potential) alternate, but will be unable to play a full alternate role till either its economy crosses say ~ USD 10 trn mark, and/or at least starts offering the CARs an economic alternate for their minerals... then China gets pressurised on its western and northern flanks as well in addition to the lock the US has on their first and second island chains to their east

China is well aware of the strategic value of the Gilgit Baltistan belt for both it AND India... hence the CPEC

[nam]

Helping CAR offload their oil and gas is not our problem. They can sell it to Europe. With batteries on it's way, oil & gas will be cheaper in the middle east. Similarly connecting to a failed country like Afghanistan is not out problem either. We can pay them to continue their civil war and keep Pak eastern border busy.

These objectives are not worth the men, resources, a bigger insurgency, moving our LoC defenses to Pak Punjab border, which will follow our capture of PoK.

If China plans to move in to GB, announce it will mean war and create the deterrent. There are enough missiles and air power with us to create serious destruction in GB if China moves in. There is no need to capture the entire place. We just need to claim it with a threat to use force. It is our taiwan...

We could have taken PoK in 48 or 71. We didn't because we don't want more people who don't like us.