Well in my defence Admiral saab I wouldn't have got my BP up if it was some random defence twitter account or DDM journo who brought this up first. But it was HVT sir himself who asked this question about the MK2 being left out and he know a lot of what goes on behind the scenes. That set all my alarm bells ringing.Rakesh wrote:Can some of you please go visit your doctor or local pharmacy and check your blood pressure?
110/70 is considered normal. Just saying...
Tejas Mk2 Medium Weight Fighter: News & Discussion - 23 February 2019
Re: Tejas Mk2 Medium Weight Fighter: News & Discussion - 23 February 2019
Re: Tejas Mk2 Medium Weight Fighter: News & Discussion - 23 February 2019
Basant the M88-4E is not the same as the proposed M88-3/4 which were supposed to be higher thrust verisons. The 4E was originally named TCP pack (Total Cost of Ownership) as that link itself says. It is meant to reduce maintenance cost, increase service life and have longer inspection intervals for the hot section components. There is no M88 version in the same class as the F414 and EJ200 as of now.basant wrote:I am not very sure, though. See this article from 2010. Probably it was not developed further:nachiket wrote: Both the M88-3 and M88-4 are proposed developments of the M88. They do not exist as of now. Considerable resources including time will need to be put into the requisite development program to actually get a working engine. Same is the case with the GE-F414EPE.
Source: Rafale Fighter Flies with Upgraded M88-4E Engine
The above was quoted in some forums with link to a Aero-India specific pdf file on Snecma website that is no more available.
Re: Tejas Mk2 Medium Weight Fighter: News & Discussion - 23 February 2019
No Saab pleasenachiket wrote:Well in my defence Admiral saab I wouldn't have got my BP up if it was some random defence twitter account or DDM journo who brought this up first. But it was HVT sir himself who asked this question about the MK2 being left out and he know a lot of what goes on behind the scenes. That set all my alarm bells ringing.Rakesh wrote:Can some of you please go visit your doctor or local pharmacy and check your blood pressure?
110/70 is considered normal. Just saying...
I would be alarmed as well, if the choice was between 114 MRFA and 100+ Tejas Mk2. But the situation is quite dire. What Nambi Sir is saying is quite alarming, but that is the situation the IAF is facing. Even 114 MRFA is not going to be enough to stem the tide. So there is room for the Tejas Mk2. Nothing will come on time though. Not MRFA or Tejas Mk2.
The last of the four MiG-21 squadrons will retire by 2025. Those four will be replaced by the 83 Mk1As only by 2029, when the last batch is set to arrive. I do believe additional Rafales will come - 36 at bare minimum - for sure. That is another two squadrons. By the 2032, the Mirage 2000s (3 units), MiG-29s (3 units) and Jaguars (6 units ?) will start to retire. That is 12 squadrons right there. Room is there for Tejas Mk2 and easily 100+ or even higher.
The IAF needs to get that Super Sukhoi upgrade going ASAP.
Re: Tejas Mk2 Medium Weight Fighter: News & Discussion - 23 February 2019
Yes too many chickens are coming home to roost at the same time. Starting with govt. refusal of buying M2k's in 2001 and insisting on MRCA, the entire decade+ long MRCA fiasco, dekhonomoney situation during UPA, IAF dithering on LCA believing it to be just an annoyance that will go away and then ordering only 40 Mk1s, our usual delays in taking decisions on developing Mk2, dekhonomoney situation in last 2-3 years, delay in Mk1A order, the list is endless. There is no way out of this now. IAF will have to live with being understrength for another 15-20 years at least and current and future governments will have to keep in mind the IAF's situation when making any strategic decisions.Rakesh wrote: I would be alarmed as well, if the choice was between 114 MRFA and 100+ Tejas Mk2. But the situation is quite dire. What Nambi Sir is saying is quite alarming, but that is the situation the IAF is facing. Even 114 MRFA is not going to be enough to stem the tide. So there is room for the Tejas Mk2. Nothing will come on time though. Not MRFA or Tejas Mk2.
The last of the four MiG-21 squadrons will retire by 2025. Those four will be replaced by the 83 Mk1As only by 2029, when the last batch is set to arrive. I do believe additional Rafales will come - 36 at bare minimum - for sure. That is another two squadrons. By the 2032, the Mirage 2000s (3 units), MiG-29s (3 units) and Jaguars (6 units ?) will start to retire. That is 12 squadrons right there. Room is there for Tejas Mk2.
The IAF needs to get that Super Sukhoi upgrade going ASAP.
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Re: Tejas Mk2 Medium Weight Fighter: News & Discussion - 23 February 2019
I'm not sure how SS upgrade will help numbers situation. In terms of performance, the mki retains an advantage over almost everything that PAF, PLAAF can throw at it. This explains why they're not pushing the upgrade. They're probably waiting for more powerful gizmos from the OEM/DRDO. Possible better radar, sensors, weapons and even engines. Until then regular upgrades to sub systems will keep the rambha ahead of the game.Rakesh wrote:The IAF needs to get that Super Sukhoi upgrade going ASAP.
Re: Tejas Mk2 Medium Weight Fighter: News & Discussion - 23 February 2019
Rakesh, nothing will stave off the dip in strength starting 23/24. We will see the IAF strength go to 24-25 squadrons plus the Jaguars. This is cast in stone.
Issue is that most of the Jaguar fleet of 6 squadrons close to 2 squadrons of Mig29s will also be due to retire by end of the decade. MK1 A will fill some of the gap with around 4 squadrons coming in but there is a pressing need for 6 squadrons of an aircraft that can be begin induction by 25.
Either a mix of more Su30s, Rafales etc. or a single platform. IAF is loving the Rafale but costs (operating costs) are really high at nearly 2 x the Su30. Doubt we will see 6-8 squadrons of the Rafale in service (I think the French Air Force has 6 or so squadrons).
Mk 2 will not solve any if these issues - it’s a solution for the 2030+ time frame when all the Mig 29s and Mirage 2000s will need replacement. It’s critical because no country other than Russia will make a single engined fighter as part of the lower end mix. Russia, hopefully - 30% chance will make the Mig 35.Other than that there is a near universal move to twin engines and stealth.
If the 414 is denied to us, the blow is severe - we will have to choose between a twin engined config using lower rated engines (TEDBF - land version) or a Al 31/41 option with a much higher thrust and weigh for the Tejas MK2.
Either way it adds many years and much uncertainty to the program.
Buy the J 10 ?
Issue is that most of the Jaguar fleet of 6 squadrons close to 2 squadrons of Mig29s will also be due to retire by end of the decade. MK1 A will fill some of the gap with around 4 squadrons coming in but there is a pressing need for 6 squadrons of an aircraft that can be begin induction by 25.
Either a mix of more Su30s, Rafales etc. or a single platform. IAF is loving the Rafale but costs (operating costs) are really high at nearly 2 x the Su30. Doubt we will see 6-8 squadrons of the Rafale in service (I think the French Air Force has 6 or so squadrons).
Mk 2 will not solve any if these issues - it’s a solution for the 2030+ time frame when all the Mig 29s and Mirage 2000s will need replacement. It’s critical because no country other than Russia will make a single engined fighter as part of the lower end mix. Russia, hopefully - 30% chance will make the Mig 35.Other than that there is a near universal move to twin engines and stealth.
If the 414 is denied to us, the blow is severe - we will have to choose between a twin engined config using lower rated engines (TEDBF - land version) or a Al 31/41 option with a much higher thrust and weigh for the Tejas MK2.
Either way it adds many years and much uncertainty to the program.
Buy the J 10 ?
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Re: Tejas Mk2 Medium Weight Fighter: News & Discussion - 23 February 2019
Agar import karna hi hai toh lets atleast get the Gripen..
Re: Tejas Mk2 Medium Weight Fighter: News & Discussion - 23 February 2019
I disagree. It is not cast in stone.ShivS wrote:Rakesh, nothing will stave off the dip in strength starting 23/24. We will see the IAF strength go to 24-25 squadrons plus the Jaguars. This is cast in stone.
If the IAF is really concerned about numbers, what stops them going to the government and doubling the number of LCA Mk1A and funding HAL to double the production?
It would be much more cheaper than any other MMRCA fiasco - both money and timewise.
The main problem is about honestly taking a look at possible solutions to the problem. There is a possibility of imports being allowed by a panicky political leadership and I am afraid that route is being tried at the cost of nation's security.
Re: Tejas Mk2 Medium Weight Fighter: News & Discussion - 23 February 2019
Beautifully put. Fully agree.nachiket wrote:Yes too many chickens are coming home to roost at the same time. Starting with govt. refusal of buying M2k's in 2001 and insisting on MRCA, the entire decade+ long MRCA fiasco, dekhonomoney situation during UPA, IAF dithering on LCA believing it to be just an annoyance that will go away and then ordering only 40 Mk1s, our usual delays in taking decisions on developing Mk2, dekhonomoney situation in last 2-3 years, delay in Mk1A order, the list is endless. There is no way out of this now. IAF will have to live with being understrength for another 15-20 years at least and current and future governments will have to keep in mind the IAF's situation when making any strategic decisions.
A good way to stem the tide of the numbers would be to increase the serviceability of the squadrons in service right now. Greater serviceability will obviously result in a greater sortie rate. In addition, if they can add a few more MK1A units, I would be happy. Also any update on what is happening to those 21 MiG-29s? For an air force that is acutely short on squadrons, what seems to be the hold up? Are the Russians back to their usual price gouging? I know they were asking for an arm-and-a-leg for those 12 Su-30MKIs, not sure if the same was true for those 21 MiG-29s.
The irony of this situation is the Qatari offer of their Mirage 2000s was turned down as being too expensive, but no problem in asking for more expensive phoren toys i.e. 114 MRFA. Pay whatever price the Russians are asking for those 21 MiG-29s and 12 Su-30MKIs. While the latter is only to replace the attrition losses, still get them. This is the not the time to nickle-and-dime.
Rupak had made this post a few weeks back and perhaps the IAF should consider this...
I am not sure of the UAE, but Qatar should have no problems sparing her Mirage 2000 fleet with their new triumvirate of F-15QA, Rafale and Eurofighter Typhoon. Combine that with an offer of new build Rafales to make up the number of 114 perhaps? Might give some breathing room for the IAF. Obviously the UAEAF will have to sell their Mirage 2000s, but I doubt that will happen. The UAEAF wanted a more powerful M88 turbofan, which has yet to materialize.Rupak wrote:Now they need to buy up the entire Qatari and UAE fleets so that they can have 3-4 new squadrons.
Re: Tejas Mk2 Medium Weight Fighter: News & Discussion - 23 February 2019
I am not sure how much longer the Rambha can rest on that laurel of Bars radar being the most powerful. Perhaps KaranM can answer that one. But if the Rambha wants to continue wearing the moniker of air-dominance fighter, then an upgrade should happen sooner than later. But the upgrade alone will not help. What is the serviceability rate of the Rambha fleet right now? Any parliamentary or CAG releases on that info? The last I heard that from 55% it went to near 70% after Manohar Parrikar intervened.Cain Marko wrote:I'm not sure how SS upgrade will help numbers situation. In terms of performance, the mki retains an advantage over almost everything that PAF, PLAAF can throw at it. This explains why they're not pushing the upgrade. They're probably waiting for more powerful gizmos from the OEM/DRDO. Possible better radar, sensors, weapons and even engines. Until then regular upgrades to sub systems will keep the rambha ahead of the game.
Re: Tejas Mk2 Medium Weight Fighter: News & Discussion - 23 February 2019
I hope you meant that as a joke. That will kill Mk2 for sure.Bala Vignesh wrote:Agar import karna hi hai toh lets atleast get the Gripen..
Re: Tejas Mk2 Medium Weight Fighter: News & Discussion - 23 February 2019
See this. Perhaps an outright ban on the F404/F414 may not materialize, but even a *mild* set of CAATSA sanctions will cast some serious doubt on continuing to involve GE in the Tejas program. The lack of investing in our turbofan program is the result of this mess.ShivS wrote:If the 414 is denied to us, the blow is severe - we will have to choose between a twin engined config using lower rated engines (TEDBF - land version) or a Al 31/41 option with a much higher thrust and weigh for the Tejas MK2.
The unreliability of the US political system makes it challenging for the Tejas program to rest on. The Biden administration may give a waiver, but what is the guarantee that the next US administration will not rescind that waiver?
With eye on China, US thinks twice about sanctioning India for Russian missile system
https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics ... ia-russian
07 Oct 2021
Sanctions under CAATSA can range from America denying visas to individuals to choking off a country’s ability to get loans or procure goods internationally.
Captain (retired) Vikram Mahajan, the director of Aerospace and Defence at the US-India Strategic Partnership Forum, said any sanctions would have a “very limited scope”.
“But what the US needs to realise is that its ramifications on ties between the two nations would be far more significant,” Mahajan added.
The sanctions, if approved, would also cast a shadow on joint military engagements and arms deals, said Mahajan.
Re: Tejas Mk2 Medium Weight Fighter: News & Discussion - 23 February 2019
Mango man post alert.
As a mango man, I do not see any issues. With some good planning, we can do the production and get the numbers.
First, increase our production capacity to 32/40 fighters a year. We need another 2/3k Cr investment for production facilities for that. Increase the order of mk1a to fill the immediate gaps as an interim solution. buy a huge number of mk2 immediately it is available. Once mk2 is available in large numbers mk1a can be used for the CAS role or can be sold to countries like Vietnam or Srilanka if khan approves as we have their engine etc. If we start now we can increase 32/40 units production level in 3/4 years. So what is the issue?
Sorry for the mango post.
As a mango man, I do not see any issues. With some good planning, we can do the production and get the numbers.
First, increase our production capacity to 32/40 fighters a year. We need another 2/3k Cr investment for production facilities for that. Increase the order of mk1a to fill the immediate gaps as an interim solution. buy a huge number of mk2 immediately it is available. Once mk2 is available in large numbers mk1a can be used for the CAS role or can be sold to countries like Vietnam or Srilanka if khan approves as we have their engine etc. If we start now we can increase 32/40 units production level in 3/4 years. So what is the issue?
Sorry for the mango post.
Re: Tejas Mk2 Medium Weight Fighter: News & Discussion - 23 February 2019
To increase production capacity, you will have to increase the total number of orders. There is no incentive for HAL or any private player to increase production numbers for an order of just 83 aircraft. At 83 aircraft, the delivery rate is 16+ aircraft for five years (2024 - 2029). Using your conservative figure of 32 aircraft per year, the entire delivery will take a little over 2.5 years for just 83 aircraft. To achieve that production rate, you need an order book of well over 100 aircraft (and that is a low estimate).
Increase the orders and you can increase the delivery rate. But at no point should the 83 Mk1A deal be revisited. Re-opening that deal will be to reopen a can of worms. Leave it closed forever. If more Mk1As are being looked at, best to look at negotiating a new deal with HAL. Yes it would have been cheaper for a 100+ Mk1A order, than a mere 83 Mk1As...but that is how procurement is done MoD style
Increase the orders and you can increase the delivery rate. But at no point should the 83 Mk1A deal be revisited. Re-opening that deal will be to reopen a can of worms. Leave it closed forever. If more Mk1As are being looked at, best to look at negotiating a new deal with HAL. Yes it would have been cheaper for a 100+ Mk1A order, than a mere 83 Mk1As...but that is how procurement is done MoD style
Re: Tejas Mk2 Medium Weight Fighter: News & Discussion - 23 February 2019
Dip or not - IAF is currently flying outdated aircraft in the Bisons and the Jags. So the dip is actually in their fleet for the past several years. If they want to continue to try to hide this weakness, India will have to pay a costly price in a 2 front war. Ideally, India should have increased LCA production to 50 aircraft per year in the 2016-18 timeframe. Even now the production capacity seems less than 6-10 aircraft per year.
If orders for Rafales are placed today, it will take 3-5 years for delivery. Any MRFA/MMRCA cannot come in less than a decade. So India is staring down the barrel because of the foolishness of its planners/procurement brass. History will hold successive IAF leadership responsible for pooh poohing the LCA when it was ready for induction in 2016. Squandering the past 5 years may be something India may have to regret, God forbid. By all measures, India should have pressed 100 LCAs into service by now.
Even today, HAL seems to be on vacation, with not a single delivery in the past 3-6 months. India needs a genuine domestic MIC - not a fake one that is only adept at helping IAF brass create favorable conditions to allow import of their favorite toys.
If orders for Rafales are placed today, it will take 3-5 years for delivery. Any MRFA/MMRCA cannot come in less than a decade. So India is staring down the barrel because of the foolishness of its planners/procurement brass. History will hold successive IAF leadership responsible for pooh poohing the LCA when it was ready for induction in 2016. Squandering the past 5 years may be something India may have to regret, God forbid. By all measures, India should have pressed 100 LCAs into service by now.
Even today, HAL seems to be on vacation, with not a single delivery in the past 3-6 months. India needs a genuine domestic MIC - not a fake one that is only adept at helping IAF brass create favorable conditions to allow import of their favorite toys.
Re: Tejas Mk2 Medium Weight Fighter: News & Discussion - 23 February 2019
We have a serious issue on sqd numbers, but then if IAF itself is not bothered, who are we to loose sleep.
If things were serious, IAF would have ordered more FOC version until MK1A is available. But then it wants only 16 of them, despite it being superior to anything PAF has, bar the F16.
I was given the reasoning of unavailability of SPJ. I wondered if it was that critical, why was it left out, when we manage to put in a IFR. We could have easily put a Israel jammer.
If things were serious, IAF would have ordered more FOC version until MK1A is available. But then it wants only 16 of them, despite it being superior to anything PAF has, bar the F16.
I was given the reasoning of unavailability of SPJ. I wondered if it was that critical, why was it left out, when we manage to put in a IFR. We could have easily put a Israel jammer.
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Re: Tejas Mk2 Medium Weight Fighter: News & Discussion - 23 February 2019
Should have said HAL Grippen E/F.. my bad!!Rakesh wrote:I hope you meant that as a joke. That will kill Mk2 for sure.Bala Vignesh wrote:Agar import karna hi hai toh lets atleast get the Gripen..
Re: Tejas Mk2 Medium Weight Fighter: News & Discussion - 23 February 2019
I hope you still mean that as a joke. The Mk1 LCA itself is a potent platform. Anything other than the LCA as our idli and chutney will mean that we will be vassals.Bala Vignesh wrote:Should have said HAL Grippen E/F.. my bad!!Rakesh wrote: I hope you meant that as a joke. That will kill Mk2 for sure.
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Re: Tejas Mk2 Medium Weight Fighter: News & Discussion - 23 February 2019
I think subsystems will play a great role. Add meteor in the LCA and it will take out anything in the neighbourhood.Vivek K wrote:...
That would be something.
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Re: Tejas Mk2 Medium Weight Fighter: News & Discussion - 23 February 2019
In the future, yes mki will need the upgrade, esp. when the j20 types come along. In the near term though, it still rules as an air dominance fighter for the most part. Esp with recent upgrades of weapons and ew. In any case even with the full upgrade it'll find the going difficult against a j20 type if the Chinese get it right. As things currently stand only the su35 and rafale possibly have an edge.Rakesh wrote:I am not sure how much longer the Rambha can rest on that laurel of Bars radar being the most powerful. Perhaps KaranM can answer that one. But if the Rambha wants to continue wearing the moniker of air-dominance fighter, then an upgrade should happen sooner than later. But the upgrade alone will not help. What is the serviceability rate of the Rambha fleet right now? Any parliamentary or CAG releases on that info? The last I heard that from 55% it went to near 70% after Manohar Parrikar intervened.Cain Marko wrote:I'm not sure how SS upgrade will help numbers situation. In terms of performance, the mki retains an advantage over almost everything that PAF, PLAAF can throw at it. This explains why they're not pushing the upgrade. They're probably waiting for more powerful gizmos from the OEM/DRDO. Possible better radar, sensors, weapons and even engines. Until then regular upgrades to sub systems will keep the rambha ahead of the game.
Mki Servicibilty averaged 70% and they were shooting for 80% not too long ago.
Re: Tejas Mk2 Medium Weight Fighter: News & Discussion - 23 February 2019
Everyone finds reasonable here that we should be producing 40-50 LCAs per year. Get MIG29/SU30MKI from roos. If we had added 100 Mk1s by now, we could have pressed them for western borders, taking care of bandars & other old world species in PAF.
Yet we aint - The only reason I can see is that IAF is trying to save money and create even more urgency for 114MRFAs. Much to my dismay, the import lobby is working overtime. It will not let anything move forward till it gets its pound of flesh.
See this example: Train18 another indigenous semi-high-speed rail project was given a ISRO-nambi treatment - by putting anti corruption charges on top team; simultanously import orders of 25K crores were being planned. You can see what a top level subterfuge. It took Ashwini Vaishnaw to order train18 & bring back the project.
But the govt has to save itself, the closer 2024 draws, less time GoI will have to babysit defence procurements. Most of the decisions will be left to babooze & defence top brass. The import lobby will then go into top gear. You can start to sorely miss a defence minister who will be fulltime defence minister liek parrikar.
Yet we aint - The only reason I can see is that IAF is trying to save money and create even more urgency for 114MRFAs. Much to my dismay, the import lobby is working overtime. It will not let anything move forward till it gets its pound of flesh.
See this example: Train18 another indigenous semi-high-speed rail project was given a ISRO-nambi treatment - by putting anti corruption charges on top team; simultanously import orders of 25K crores were being planned. You can see what a top level subterfuge. It took Ashwini Vaishnaw to order train18 & bring back the project.
But the govt has to save itself, the closer 2024 draws, less time GoI will have to babysit defence procurements. Most of the decisions will be left to babooze & defence top brass. The import lobby will then go into top gear. You can start to sorely miss a defence minister who will be fulltime defence minister liek parrikar.
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Re: Tejas Mk2 Medium Weight Fighter: News & Discussion - 23 February 2019
Yes sir, I am. Hence the re-badging of the Mk2 as HAL Grippen E/F..ks_sachin wrote:I hope you still mean that as a joke. The Mk1 LCA itself is a potent platform. Anything other than the LCA as our idli and chutney will mean that we will be vassals.Bala Vignesh wrote: Should have said HAL Grippen E/F.. my bad!!
Re: Tejas Mk2 Medium Weight Fighter: News & Discussion - 23 February 2019
The French should not have any objections mating the Meteor to a LCA with UTTAM aesa .. they did make some noises integrating it with the Israeli EL/M-2052 AESA.Rishirishi wrote:I think subsystems will play a great role. Add meteor in the LCA and it will take out anything in the neighbourhood.
That would be something.
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Re: Tejas Mk2 Medium Weight Fighter: News & Discussion - 23 February 2019
Be assured that even if they acquiesce to this, they will get their pound of flesh by making it extremely costly. They won't let their golden goose go for nothing.kit wrote:The French should not have any objections mating the Meteor to a LCA with UTTAM aesa .. they did make some noises integrating it with the Israeli EL/M-2052 AESA.
Re: Tejas Mk2 Medium Weight Fighter: News & Discussion - 23 February 2019
How far is SFDR &Astra 2 in development cycle? If Astra-2 does 160km and SFDR does more than that, we don't need Meteor. But for all these to make sense, first just double the order and thus production rate of LCA MK-1A.
Re: Tejas Mk2 Medium Weight Fighter: News & Discussion - 23 February 2019
They will offer it once SFDR draws closer and their window to sell another 250 meteors fleet wide starts to close.Bala Vignesh wrote:Be assured that even if they acquiesce to this, they will get their pound of flesh by making it extremely costly. They won't let their golden goose go for nothing.kit wrote:The French should not have any objections mating the Meteor to a LCA with UTTAM aesa .. they did make some noises integrating it with the Israeli EL/M-2052 AESA.
Re: Tejas Mk2 Medium Weight Fighter: News & Discussion - 23 February 2019
https://twitter.com/rhinohistorian/stat ... 62694?s=20 ---> My piece in the latest India Today:- Indian Air Force: The need to embrace new-age technologies.
*Article in the link above is behind a paywall. But check out the replies from HVT Sir below.
Perhaps a way to partially address the squadron shortage?
https://twitter.com/hvtiaf/status/14470 ... 24194?s=20 ---> Superb article sir. I'd be keen to see air power getting more focused on MUM-Team, so piloted fighters can prosecute the battle from slightly behind, using unpiloted fighters at the frontline. The tech is available to create unpiloted, high-performance fighters. Indigenously.
https://twitter.com/MarwarWarrior/statu ... 65061?s=20 ---> What would the advantages of this combination vs all unmanned?
https://twitter.com/hvtiaf/status/14470 ... 51073?s=20 ---> Most air-to-ground roles can be executed by unpiloted aircraft efficiently. Whereas, air-to-air combat is more fuzzy & abstract. Autonomy has not reached the level where Unpiloted machines can out-maneuver piloted fighters. With regards to that, MUM-Team provides path breaking solutions.
https://twitter.com/themave7/status/144 ... 10788?s=20 ---> During DARPA trials - AI did beat piloted F-16 in simulated aerial combat. We are not far from the day when AI enabled unmanned aircraft will be a reality. China & US have made considerable progress.
https://twitter.com/hvtiaf/status/14470 ... 49760?s=20 ---> DARPA trials involve theoretical gun combat at close ranges, whereas, fighters of today executed Large Force Engagements using BVR missiles. Variables are totally different. We need to traverse our path ourselves, & not necessarily align with any theoretical experiments.
*Article in the link above is behind a paywall. But check out the replies from HVT Sir below.
Perhaps a way to partially address the squadron shortage?
https://twitter.com/hvtiaf/status/14470 ... 24194?s=20 ---> Superb article sir. I'd be keen to see air power getting more focused on MUM-Team, so piloted fighters can prosecute the battle from slightly behind, using unpiloted fighters at the frontline. The tech is available to create unpiloted, high-performance fighters. Indigenously.
https://twitter.com/MarwarWarrior/statu ... 65061?s=20 ---> What would the advantages of this combination vs all unmanned?
https://twitter.com/hvtiaf/status/14470 ... 51073?s=20 ---> Most air-to-ground roles can be executed by unpiloted aircraft efficiently. Whereas, air-to-air combat is more fuzzy & abstract. Autonomy has not reached the level where Unpiloted machines can out-maneuver piloted fighters. With regards to that, MUM-Team provides path breaking solutions.
https://twitter.com/themave7/status/144 ... 10788?s=20 ---> During DARPA trials - AI did beat piloted F-16 in simulated aerial combat. We are not far from the day when AI enabled unmanned aircraft will be a reality. China & US have made considerable progress.
https://twitter.com/hvtiaf/status/14470 ... 49760?s=20 ---> DARPA trials involve theoretical gun combat at close ranges, whereas, fighters of today executed Large Force Engagements using BVR missiles. Variables are totally different. We need to traverse our path ourselves, & not necessarily align with any theoretical experiments.
Re: Tejas Mk2 Medium Weight Fighter: News & Discussion - 23 February 2019
Older article, but ties into the tweets above....
HAL looks to the future with unmanned drones
https://www.deccanherald.com/business/t ... 47633.html
05 Feb 2021
HAL looks to the future with unmanned drones
https://www.deccanherald.com/business/t ... 47633.html
05 Feb 2021
Re: Tejas Mk2 Medium Weight Fighter: News & Discussion - 23 February 2019
DARPA's trials do not just focus on gun combat. The public competition held with competing teams over a the first few days did that. The program has already expanded to include longer range within and beyond visual range combat scenarios. MUM-T isn't a DAPRA problem (the term originates from the US Army but the concept has broadly been employed by other US and non US services though it is inherently unscalable). That's something that is mature (and used operationally) and not an area that requires DARPA's attention. ACE is about developing, testing and demonstrating trusted AI across the complete range of air-air combat scenarios which, outside of SEAD, are the most complex scenario in terms of individual and collective decision making particularly if your intention is to have dozens of autonomous air-combat capable aircraft mixed in with manned fighters and strike packages. MUM-T w/o full autonomy is not going to fly against a peer opponent that has Counter ISR and good EW/EA capability and the ability to contest the RF spectrum, and space operations. This is why the leap to full autonomy is an absolute requirement to enable large UAS combat operations and MUM-T at scale.
Re: Tejas Mk2 Medium Weight Fighter: News & Discussion - 23 February 2019
See this tweet from Saurav Jha below. My notes in his tweet are in red.
The four MiG-21 Bison squadrons will be replaced one-to-one with four Tejas Mk1A units. Even if 114 MRFA comes in one go, it will only fill 6+ squadrons. 114 MRFA will not even be enough to replace the three MiG-29 units, the three Mirage 2000 units and the 6.5 HAL Jaguar units (12+ units in all). The remaining 6+ units will have to go to the Tejas Mk2. And assuming all 12 squadrons are replaced on a one-to-one basis with MRFA and Tejas Mk2, the IAF still has a shortage of ~ 10 more squadrons. What will take its place?
So the IAF will have to import another fourth generation fighter. But what would be the point of that and even more importantly, when would it come? Or continue with Tejas production. The other option is induct a fifth generation fighter. Unless Unkil drops the insistence of the S-400 and the F-35 operating side-by-side, there is no other viable fifth generation fighter out there. Su-57 and Su-75 do not count as of yet.
Moral of the story is that there is enough room for Tejas Mk2 and even AMCA. But the latter is way down the road. To be very honest, I even am seeing room for more Tejas Mk1A units in the breakdown below.
https://twitter.com/SJha1618/status/144 ... 84179?s=20 ---> Right now, we have:
* 13 x Su-30MKI
* 2 x HAL Tejas (one is under strength)
* 2 x Dassault Rafale (one is under strength)
* 3 x Mig-29UPG
* 3 x Mirage 2000I/TI (No 9 squadron is under strength, unless some new airframes have been added)
* 6.5 x BAE-HAL Jaguar
* 4x Mig-21 Bison
Or 33.5 squadrons.
The four MiG-21 Bison squadrons will be replaced one-to-one with four Tejas Mk1A units. Even if 114 MRFA comes in one go, it will only fill 6+ squadrons. 114 MRFA will not even be enough to replace the three MiG-29 units, the three Mirage 2000 units and the 6.5 HAL Jaguar units (12+ units in all). The remaining 6+ units will have to go to the Tejas Mk2. And assuming all 12 squadrons are replaced on a one-to-one basis with MRFA and Tejas Mk2, the IAF still has a shortage of ~ 10 more squadrons. What will take its place?
So the IAF will have to import another fourth generation fighter. But what would be the point of that and even more importantly, when would it come? Or continue with Tejas production. The other option is induct a fifth generation fighter. Unless Unkil drops the insistence of the S-400 and the F-35 operating side-by-side, there is no other viable fifth generation fighter out there. Su-57 and Su-75 do not count as of yet.
Moral of the story is that there is enough room for Tejas Mk2 and even AMCA. But the latter is way down the road. To be very honest, I even am seeing room for more Tejas Mk1A units in the breakdown below.
https://twitter.com/SJha1618/status/144 ... 84179?s=20 ---> Right now, we have:
* 13 x Su-30MKI
* 2 x HAL Tejas (one is under strength)
* 2 x Dassault Rafale (one is under strength)
* 3 x Mig-29UPG
* 3 x Mirage 2000I/TI (No 9 squadron is under strength, unless some new airframes have been added)
* 6.5 x BAE-HAL Jaguar
* 4x Mig-21 Bison
Or 33.5 squadrons.
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Re: Tejas Mk2 Medium Weight Fighter: News & Discussion - 23 February 2019
IAF's view on MK2 by Sandeep Unnithan
-Ankit
-Ankit
Re: Tejas Mk2 Medium Weight Fighter: News & Discussion - 23 February 2019
France will be eager to sign a large mil eqpt deal after the Aus submarine set back. Dassault and Naval group are totally different companies, but India should push France for MRFA to produce Rafale under make in India, not just assembly but also engine and lot of components to be made in India. It may reduce the cost to some extent, but Indian industry will benefit overall and make it "affordable".
French Govt can push the price down in a Govt to Govt deal - France presidential election next year and Macron will need that.
Imagine 6-7 more squadrons of Rafale instead of 2 years of RFP + 3 years of MoD negotiations....
French Govt can push the price down in a Govt to Govt deal - France presidential election next year and Macron will need that.
Imagine 6-7 more squadrons of Rafale instead of 2 years of RFP + 3 years of MoD negotiations....
Re: Tejas Mk2 Medium Weight Fighter: News & Discussion - 23 February 2019
Grand Admiral Sir,Rakesh wrote:....
Can you please apply for the Advisor Emeritus role at the Weapons & Equipment directorate equivalent in Air HQ!!
Re: Tejas Mk2 Medium Weight Fighter: News & Discussion - 23 February 2019
ks_sachin wrote:Grand Admiral Sir,Rakesh wrote:....
Can you please apply for the Advisor Emeritus role at the Weapons & Equipment directorate equivalent in Air HQ!!
Sirjee, I am still distributing the mithai. Too busy with that.
Re: Tejas Mk2 Medium Weight Fighter: News & Discussion - 23 February 2019
Now that the Akula has gone back, will the people who got the mithai have to return it?Rakesh wrote: Sirjee, I am still distributing the mithai. Too busy with that.
Re: Tejas Mk2 Medium Weight Fighter: News & Discussion - 23 February 2019
Hold on to it Sirjee. Two more are comingnachiket wrote:Now that the Akula has gone back, will the people who got the mithai have to return it?Rakesh wrote: Sirjee, I am still distributing the mithai. Too busy with that.
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Re: Tejas Mk2 Medium Weight Fighter: News & Discussion - 23 February 2019
People got to taste the mithai??nachiket wrote:Now that the Akula has gone back, will the people who got the mithai have to return it?Rakesh wrote: Sirjee, I am still distributing the mithai. Too busy with that.
I am under the impression that it never materialized only!!
Re: Tejas Mk2 Medium Weight Fighter: News & Discussion - 23 February 2019
I did not receive it either but the Admiral claims to be still distributing it. So I just assumed others had been luckier.Bala Vignesh wrote: People got to taste the mithai??
I am under the impression that it never materialized only!!
Re: Tejas Mk2 Medium Weight Fighter: News & Discussion - 23 February 2019
Indian Air Force: The need to embrace new-age technologies
Whether in standalone offensive mode or by enabling instruments such as special forces, the IAF is crucial in less than war situations
With a new chief in the saddle, the Indian Air Force, which turned 89 on October 8, faces a plethora of challenges that demand great tact and strategic vision to surmount. Embracing the concept of parallel operations in its doctrine almost a decade ago to impact the tactical, operational and strategic domains simultaneously through the application of air power, this time around, the IAF confronts a situation wherein it must adapt to manoeuvring on parallel fronts during a period of transformational change. Of these fronts, five merit serious reflection by the IAF and the policy-makers within India’s national security establishment.
With a new chief in the saddle, the Indian Air Force, which turned 89 on October 8, faces a plethora of challenges that demand great tact and strategic vision to surmount. Embracing the concept of parallel operations in its doctrine almost a decade ago to impact the tactical, operational and strategic domains simultaneously through the application of air power, this time around, the IAF confronts a situation wherein it must adapt to manoeuvring on parallel fronts during a period of transformational change. Of these fronts, five merit serious reflection by the IAF and the policy-makers within India’s national security establishment.
First, the IAF must step up efforts to sensitise the political establishment and the joint war-fighting leadership of the value that air power, particularly offensive air power, offers as a first-mover in the business of inflicting combat attrition on adversaries. When this impact is felt across the spectrum of conflict before engaging in friction on the ground or on maritime spaces, there is a distinct possibility of causing temporal shock and psychological dislocation, all of which offer potential for speedy conflict termination and favourable political outcomes. The coercive impact of air power in the realm of no-war-no-peace situations was effectively validated by the IAF in the Balakot strike, albeit with some capability gaps to address. However, the broader lesson is that unless a rising power such as India is willing to take risks, adversaries will always have a first-mover advantage in this genre of conflict. Whether it is in a stand-alone offensive mode, or by enabling instruments such as Special Forces to execute similar missions, or in maintaining the tempo of its robust non-kinetic capabilities as instruments of statecraft, the IAF offers tremendous value in less-than-war situations.
Second, the depleting strength of offensive combat assets in the form of 4th Gen and 4th Gen + multi-role combat aircraft is exerting enormous pressure on both the capacity and the capability of the IAF to train and prepare for combat against collusive adversaries across the spectrum of conflict. While the IAF enjoyed a competitive advantage over the PLAAF (People’s Liberation Army Air Force) in several realms, including air combat, air-to-ground weapon delivery and other enabling functions, this advantage is fast eroding. When this asymmetry is seen both qualitatively and quantitatively, there is cause for serious concern. While the emphasis on indigenisation and the boost given to the various variants of the LCA (Light Combat Aircraft) and AMCA (Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft) programmes is laudable and must be fully supported by all stakeholders, the yawning gap in current capability must be speedily plugged. It is in this context that the pending acquisition of 114 MRFA (Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft) must be expedited along with the possibility of giving a meaningful mid-course correction through the various offset clauses of leapfrogging the Kaveri fighter engine quagmire that India finds itself in. Plugging both these gaps even as frontline combat aircraft such as the MiG-21 Bison are being phased out is essential for the IAF.
Third, the stellar performance of the IAF in all its roles over Eastern Ladakh following the Galwan clashes indicates that if unshackled and allowed to operate with flexibility, the IAF has significant coercive potential. However, this capability will be severely stretched if the IAF is expected to impact several sectors over a prolonged period and across extended combat zones that could be separated by over a thousand kilometres. In such diffused scenarios, the IAF must plan to embrace a philosophy of centralised command and distributed control that empowers lower levels of IAF leadership with greater operational decision-making, particularly in sudden escalation during no-war-no-peace situations.
Fourth, there is little doubt that the IAF is the ‘odd man’ out in the bitter debate on jointmanship and integration. This was bound to happen as air power enabled by space straddles across all domains of war-fighting and is hence coveted by all without the necessary technologically enabled core competencies that are so essential for the optimum exploitation of platforms and weapons with a mind-boggling range of capabilities in the span of one mission. Amongst the several issues that merit resolution before parcelling out aerial assets across the proposed theatres, two stand out for their complexity. The first is the absence of a common communication and data transfer network to support seamless operations. The second is the operational orchestration of scarce resources, particularly when it comes to switching resources and the long decision chain that would involve competing theatre commanders and the current apex operational decision-making authority in Delhi comprising the three chiefs and the CDS as the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Instead of shrinking the OODA (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) loop, the time-sensitive and first-responder capabilities of air power will take a hit. On its part, the IAF must shed its ‘siege mentality’ that often forces it into rigid positions such as pitching for the ‘primacy of air power’ in an era where only a combined manoeuvre and firepower approach can offer a winning proposition. The need of the hour for the IAF is to create joint narratives that stress on the core competencies and ‘decisive impact of air power’ in multiple domains; and exploiting scarce resources under centralised command and distributed control for optimum effectiveness.
The last area of concern is in the realm of embracing new-age technologies such as AI, miniaturisation, hypersonic weapons, and drone swarms in a hotly contested aerial environment unlike the testing grounds of the West where all these have been developed in uncontested aerial spaces. Consequently, the IAF must not lose focus on traditional instruments such as better Beyond Visual Range (BVR) capability for its entire range of weapons; better capabilities to punch a hole in robust adversarial air defence networks, and increased focus on how to inflict serious combat attrition against adversaries who seek more to ‘win without fighting’.
Tackling the present set of challenges requires more skillful manoeuvring by the IAF in the cognitive and intellectual domain. The power of persuasive but simple arguments regarding the current force levels, the coercive impact of air power and the debilitating impact of splitting scarce resources would serve the IAF well in these trying times.
Air Vice Marshal Arjun Subramaniam is a retired fighter pilot from the IAF and is currently the President’s Chair of Excellence at National Defence College, New Delhi
https://www.indiatoday.in/amp/magazine/ ... ssion=true
Whether in standalone offensive mode or by enabling instruments such as special forces, the IAF is crucial in less than war situations
With a new chief in the saddle, the Indian Air Force, which turned 89 on October 8, faces a plethora of challenges that demand great tact and strategic vision to surmount. Embracing the concept of parallel operations in its doctrine almost a decade ago to impact the tactical, operational and strategic domains simultaneously through the application of air power, this time around, the IAF confronts a situation wherein it must adapt to manoeuvring on parallel fronts during a period of transformational change. Of these fronts, five merit serious reflection by the IAF and the policy-makers within India’s national security establishment.
With a new chief in the saddle, the Indian Air Force, which turned 89 on October 8, faces a plethora of challenges that demand great tact and strategic vision to surmount. Embracing the concept of parallel operations in its doctrine almost a decade ago to impact the tactical, operational and strategic domains simultaneously through the application of air power, this time around, the IAF confronts a situation wherein it must adapt to manoeuvring on parallel fronts during a period of transformational change. Of these fronts, five merit serious reflection by the IAF and the policy-makers within India’s national security establishment.
First, the IAF must step up efforts to sensitise the political establishment and the joint war-fighting leadership of the value that air power, particularly offensive air power, offers as a first-mover in the business of inflicting combat attrition on adversaries. When this impact is felt across the spectrum of conflict before engaging in friction on the ground or on maritime spaces, there is a distinct possibility of causing temporal shock and psychological dislocation, all of which offer potential for speedy conflict termination and favourable political outcomes. The coercive impact of air power in the realm of no-war-no-peace situations was effectively validated by the IAF in the Balakot strike, albeit with some capability gaps to address. However, the broader lesson is that unless a rising power such as India is willing to take risks, adversaries will always have a first-mover advantage in this genre of conflict. Whether it is in a stand-alone offensive mode, or by enabling instruments such as Special Forces to execute similar missions, or in maintaining the tempo of its robust non-kinetic capabilities as instruments of statecraft, the IAF offers tremendous value in less-than-war situations.
Second, the depleting strength of offensive combat assets in the form of 4th Gen and 4th Gen + multi-role combat aircraft is exerting enormous pressure on both the capacity and the capability of the IAF to train and prepare for combat against collusive adversaries across the spectrum of conflict. While the IAF enjoyed a competitive advantage over the PLAAF (People’s Liberation Army Air Force) in several realms, including air combat, air-to-ground weapon delivery and other enabling functions, this advantage is fast eroding. When this asymmetry is seen both qualitatively and quantitatively, there is cause for serious concern. While the emphasis on indigenisation and the boost given to the various variants of the LCA (Light Combat Aircraft) and AMCA (Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft) programmes is laudable and must be fully supported by all stakeholders, the yawning gap in current capability must be speedily plugged. It is in this context that the pending acquisition of 114 MRFA (Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft) must be expedited along with the possibility of giving a meaningful mid-course correction through the various offset clauses of leapfrogging the Kaveri fighter engine quagmire that India finds itself in. Plugging both these gaps even as frontline combat aircraft such as the MiG-21 Bison are being phased out is essential for the IAF.
Third, the stellar performance of the IAF in all its roles over Eastern Ladakh following the Galwan clashes indicates that if unshackled and allowed to operate with flexibility, the IAF has significant coercive potential. However, this capability will be severely stretched if the IAF is expected to impact several sectors over a prolonged period and across extended combat zones that could be separated by over a thousand kilometres. In such diffused scenarios, the IAF must plan to embrace a philosophy of centralised command and distributed control that empowers lower levels of IAF leadership with greater operational decision-making, particularly in sudden escalation during no-war-no-peace situations.
Fourth, there is little doubt that the IAF is the ‘odd man’ out in the bitter debate on jointmanship and integration. This was bound to happen as air power enabled by space straddles across all domains of war-fighting and is hence coveted by all without the necessary technologically enabled core competencies that are so essential for the optimum exploitation of platforms and weapons with a mind-boggling range of capabilities in the span of one mission. Amongst the several issues that merit resolution before parcelling out aerial assets across the proposed theatres, two stand out for their complexity. The first is the absence of a common communication and data transfer network to support seamless operations. The second is the operational orchestration of scarce resources, particularly when it comes to switching resources and the long decision chain that would involve competing theatre commanders and the current apex operational decision-making authority in Delhi comprising the three chiefs and the CDS as the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Instead of shrinking the OODA (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) loop, the time-sensitive and first-responder capabilities of air power will take a hit. On its part, the IAF must shed its ‘siege mentality’ that often forces it into rigid positions such as pitching for the ‘primacy of air power’ in an era where only a combined manoeuvre and firepower approach can offer a winning proposition. The need of the hour for the IAF is to create joint narratives that stress on the core competencies and ‘decisive impact of air power’ in multiple domains; and exploiting scarce resources under centralised command and distributed control for optimum effectiveness.
The last area of concern is in the realm of embracing new-age technologies such as AI, miniaturisation, hypersonic weapons, and drone swarms in a hotly contested aerial environment unlike the testing grounds of the West where all these have been developed in uncontested aerial spaces. Consequently, the IAF must not lose focus on traditional instruments such as better Beyond Visual Range (BVR) capability for its entire range of weapons; better capabilities to punch a hole in robust adversarial air defence networks, and increased focus on how to inflict serious combat attrition against adversaries who seek more to ‘win without fighting’.
Tackling the present set of challenges requires more skillful manoeuvring by the IAF in the cognitive and intellectual domain. The power of persuasive but simple arguments regarding the current force levels, the coercive impact of air power and the debilitating impact of splitting scarce resources would serve the IAF well in these trying times.
Air Vice Marshal Arjun Subramaniam is a retired fighter pilot from the IAF and is currently the President’s Chair of Excellence at National Defence College, New Delhi
https://www.indiatoday.in/amp/magazine/ ... ssion=true
Re: Tejas Mk2 Medium Weight Fighter: News & Discussion - 23 February 2019
nachiket wrote:I did not receive it either but the Admiral claims to be still distributing it. So I just assumed others had been luckier.Bala Vignesh wrote: People got to taste the mithai??
I am under the impression that it never materialized only!!
He is also the Grand Admiral of the StarFleet so all mithai is cloaked and only available in a different dimension.