I came across a chat that Sumy got hit by one missile. And, that there was build up across the border (from Sumy), **also** a "large" build up in Belarus. The target - they claim - is Cherkasy - and south from there following the river.Cyrano wrote:In an interview with French channel TF1/LCI yesterday, Lavrov was repeatedly asked what are Russia's plans after Donbass. He didn't answer at all, didn't deflect, but said whatever else he wanted to say. Felt something else altogether is afoot.
Today there are detailed reports of Russian forces re-igniting a large new front north of Kharkiv on the Belgorod border today. They don't need it to secure Donbass so then why? Why now? Happy guessing!
Or may be US Intel already predicted this a week from now
There is lot of BS in telegram channels remember those supposed ex NATO generals holed in Azov plant or how M777 where all destroyed.NRao wrote:I came across a chat that Sumy got hit by one missile. And, that there was build up across the border (from Sumy), **also** a "large" build up in Belarus. The target - they claim - is Cherkasy - and south from there following the river.Cyrano wrote:In an interview with French channel TF1/LCI yesterday, Lavrov was repeatedly asked what are Russia's plans after Donbass. He didn't answer at all, didn't deflect, but said whatever else he wanted to say. Felt something else altogether is afoot.
Today there are detailed reports of Russian forces re-igniting a large new front north of Kharkiv on the Belgorod border today. They don't need it to secure Donbass so then why? Why now? Happy guessing!
Or may be US Intel already predicted this a week from now
Will post on the "US Intel" l8r. It is more complex than those posts, and the current results are not surprising.
Cyrano, only as a FYI:Cyrano wrote: Today there are detailed reports of Russian forces re-igniting a large new front north of Kharkiv on the Belgorod border today. They don't need it to secure Donbass so then why? Why now? Happy guessing!
https://twitter.com/ArmchairW/status/15 ... 6294765568Provocative questions by Dave Johnson. I share his concern about too much validation and back-patting in our defense community, especially based on early takes that skew heavily towards desirable interpretations.
https://twitter.com/AntDisgruntled/stat ... 8782494724By the way: the arrogant, absolutely unearned assumption of battlefield superiority you see sometimes around the US military is one of the most distasteful aspects of the organization.
It's the big man who's never actually been punched in the face before.
1/ I've done plenty of battlegroup level exercises conducting wet gap crossings in armoured formations in the British army and 6 times out of 10, it is a total cluster ******. If we was doing this against any semi competent army in a modern conventional war fighting environment
2/on such a large scale, we'd take just as heavy losses except for Britain, it would be far more punishing because we have such limited equipment. However, heavy losses are expected on these operations. With all the modern tech like drones, satellite, acoustics, EW, this task
3/ becomes incredibly more difficult to carry out successfully. Also, pontoon bridges take more time to set up, further increasing risk. I very much doubt we'd pull it off better IMHO.
Israel turned down a U.S. request to allow Berlin to supply Ukraine with anti-tank missiles produced in Germany with Israeli technology under an Israeli license, two U.S. and Israeli officials said.
.........
True, My point in previous posts has been that a river crossing is a difficult operation at the best of times - more so when the enemy has full visibility of your move and can oppose the crossing with accurate fire. There are similarly failed Ukrainian river crossings. Keeping the military tactics aside, if all the Ukrainians are boasting about for days is that river crossing (along with counter attacks that no on hears of 2 days later) then they have a serious problem.NRao wrote:1/ I've done plenty of battlegroup level exercises conducting wet gap crossings in armoured formations in the British army and 6 times out of 10, it is a total cluster ******. If we was doing this against any semi competent army in a modern conventional war fighting environment2/on such a large scale, we'd take just as heavy losses except for Britain, it would be far more punishing because we have such limited equipment. However, heavy losses are expected on these operations. With all the modern tech like drones, satellite, acoustics, EW, this task3/ becomes incredibly more difficult to carry out successfully. Also, pontoon bridges take more time to set up, further increasing risk. I very much doubt we'd pull it off better IMHO.
Apparently It's quid pro quo. Russia hinted at tech escalation of whats deployed in Syria vs any Israeli attack. They are good.NRao wrote:Feb, 2022 :: Israel torpedoed sale of Iron Dome to Ukraine, fearing Russian reaction — report
May 25, 2022 :: Scoop: Israel rejects U.S. request to approve missile transfer to Ukraine
Israel turned down a U.S. request to allow Berlin to supply Ukraine with anti-tank missiles produced in Germany with Israeli technology under an Israeli license, two U.S. and Israeli officials said.
.........
Good to see a realistic assessment from an officer, who has some understanding of Russia, rather than journos who have never served in uniform.Cyrano wrote:Some sobering thoughts from a retired US Army Col:
https://warontherocks.com/2022/05/would ... n-ukraine/
While Russia (in my opinion) made a strategic error in assuming a best case scenario - repeat of the Crimea operation, I think NATO made a similar mistake based on its incorrect assumptions.John wrote:Sticking to military not politics/economy all those assumptions are right.Deans wrote:
US /NATO made a series of assumptions about Russia and most look being completely wrong.
Russia did run out of missiles to some extent they been forced to use expensive and inaccurate AshM to help extend it and we haven’t seen any bombing runs since March let alone with LGB. Even supposed Kalbir missiles being fired now are reportedly Klub Ashm.
All indications are casualties in Donbas are quite high, Igor discussed that in great extent a week ago how they need full mobilizations in Russian side as Seperatists cannot sustain this level of fighting themselves.
US Intel predicted in Feb, Russia would overrun the east in two weeks with heavy casualties hence Russia went with Kyiv and complex encirclement approach in the beginning as Russia believe they could do that quicker and US Intel predicted they do that in a week. So they were wrong in that.
In Russia and Ukraine, a Presidential decree is taken more seriously than for e.g. a Parliament resolution that POK is ours. As far as Russia wasdnivas wrote:Been out for a while. I believe BRAR asked me for source of info that Ukr was planning to invade Crimea and DNR/LPR.
here is source from Ukr presidents website
https://translate.yandex.com/translate? ... lang=uk-en
point 39 and point 83,84
Unlike Zelensky's office which regularly announces the date and strength of their next counter attack.Cyrano wrote:In an interview with French channel TF1/LCI yesterday, Lavrov was repeatedly asked what are Russia's plans after Donbass. He didn't answer at all, didn't deflect, but said whatever else he wanted to say.
By Christopher Caldwell
Mr. Caldwell is a contributing Opinion writer and the author of “The Age of Entitlement: America Since the Sixties” and “Reflections on the Revolution in Europe: Immigration, Islam and the West.”
In the Paris daily Le Figaro this month, Henri Guaino, a top adviser to Nicolas Sarkozy when he was president of France, warned that Europe’s countries, under the shortsighted leadership of the United States, were “sleepwalking” into war with Russia. Mr. Guaino was borrowing a metaphor that the historian Christopher Clark used to describe the origins of World War I.
Naturally, Mr. Guaino understands that Russia is most directly to blame for the present conflict in Ukraine. It was Russia that massed its troops on the frontier last fall and winter and — having demanded from NATO a number of Ukraine-related security guarantees that NATO rejected — began the shelling and killing on Feb. 24.
But the United States has helped turn this tragic, local and ambiguous conflict into a potential world conflagration. By misunderstanding the war’s logic, Mr. Guaino argues, the West, led by the Biden administration, is giving the conflict a momentum that may be impossible to stop.
He is right.
In 2014 the United States backed an uprising — in its final stages a violent uprising — against the legitimately elected Ukrainian government of Viktor Yanukovych, which was pro-Russian. (The corruption of Mr. Yanukovych’s government has been much adduced by the rebellion’s defenders, but corruption is a perennial Ukrainian problem, even today.) Russia, in turn, annexed Crimea, a historically Russian-speaking part of Ukraine that since the 18th century had been home to Russia’s Black Sea Fleet.
One can argue about Russian claims to Crimea, but Russians take them seriously. Hundreds of thousands of Russian and Soviet fighters died defending the Crimean city of Sevastopol from European forces during two sieges — one during the Crimean War and one during World War II. In recent years, Russian control of Crimea has seemed to provide a stable regional arrangement: Russia’s European neighbors, at least, have let sleeping dogs lie.
But the United States never accepted the arrangement. On Nov. 10, 2021, the United States and Ukraine signed a “charter on strategic partnership” that called for Ukraine to join NATO, condemned “ongoing Russian aggression” and affirmed an “unwavering commitment” to the reintegration of Crimea into Ukraine.
That charter “convinced Russia that it must attack or be attacked,” Mr. Guaino wrote. “It is the ineluctable process of 1914 in all its terrifying purity.”
This is a faithful account of the war that President Vladimir Putin has claimed to be fighting. “There were constant supplies of the most modern military equipment,” Mr. Putin said at Russia’s annual Victory Parade on May 9, referring to the foreign arming of Ukraine. “The danger was growing every day.”
Whether he was right to worry about Russia’s security depends on one’s perspective. Western news reports tend to belittle him.
The rocky course of the war in Ukraine thus far has vindicated Mr. Putin’s diagnosis, if not his conduct. Though Ukraine’s military industry was important in Soviet times, by 2014 the country barely had a modern military at all. Oligarchs, not the state, armed and funded some of the militias sent to fight Russian-supported separatists in the east. The United States started arming and training Ukraine’s military, hesitantly at first under President Barack Obama. Modern hardware began flowing during the Trump administration, though, and today the country is armed to the teeth.
Since 2018, Ukraine has received U.S.-built Javelin antitank missiles, Czech artillery and Turkish Bayraktar drones and other NATO-interoperable weaponry. The United States and Canada have lately sent up-to-date British-designed M777 howitzers that fire GPS-guided Excalibur shells. President Biden just signed into law a $40 billion military aid package.
In this light, mockery of Russia’s battlefield performance is misplaced. Russia is not being stymied by a plucky agricultural country a third its size; it is holding its own, at least for now, against NATO’s advanced economic, cyber and battlefield weapons.
And this is where Mr. Guaino is correct to accuse the West of sleepwalking. The United States is trying to maintain the fiction that arming one’s allies is not the same thing as participating in combat.
In the information age, this distinction is growing more and more artificial. The United States has provided intelligence used to kill Russian generals. It obtained targeting information that helped to sink the Russian Black Sea missile cruiser the Moskva, an incident in which about 40 seamen were killed.
And the United States may be playing an even more direct role. There are thousands of foreign fighters in Ukraine. One volunteer spoke to the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation this month of fighting alongside “friends” who “come from the Marines, from the States.” Just as it is easy to cross the line between being a weapons supplier and being a combatant, it is easy to cross the line from waging a proxy war to waging a secret war.
In a subtler way, a country trying to fight such a war risks being drawn from partial into full involvement by force of moral reasoning. Perhaps American officials justify exporting weaponry the way they justify budgeting it: It is so powerful that it is dissuasive. The money is well spent because it buys peace. Should bigger guns fail to dissuade, however, they lead to bigger wars.
A handful of people died in the Russian takeover of Crimea in 2014. But this time around, matched in weaponry — and even outmatched in some cases — Russia has reverted to a war of bombardment that looks more like World War II.
Even if we don’t accept Mr. Putin’s claim that America’s arming of Ukraine is the reason the war happened in the first place, it is certainly the reason the war has taken the kinetic, explosive, deadly form it has. Our role in this is not passive or incidental. We have given Ukrainians cause to believe they can prevail in a war of escalation.
Thousands of Ukrainians have died who likely would not have if the United States had stood aside. That naturally may create among American policymakers a sense of moral and political obligation — to stay the course, to escalate the conflict, to match any excess.
The United States has shown itself not just liable to escalate but also inclined to. In March, Mr. Biden invoked God before insisting that Mr. Putin “cannot remain in power.” In April, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin explained that the United States seeks to “see Russia weakened.”
Noam Chomsky warned against the paradoxical incentives of such “heroic pronouncements” in an April interview. “It may feel like Winston Churchill impersonations, very exciting,” he said. “But what they translate into is: Destroy Ukraine.”
For similar reasons Mr. Biden’s suggestion that Mr. Putin be tried for war crimes is an act of consummate irresponsibility. The charge is so serious that, once leveled, it discourages restraint; after all, a leader who commits one atrocity is no less a war criminal than one who commits a thousand. The effect, intended or not, is to foreclose any recourse to peace negotiations.
The situation on the battlefield in Ukraine has evolved to an awkward stage. Both Russia and Ukraine have suffered heavy losses. But each has made gains, too. Russia has a land bridge to Crimea and control of some of Ukraine’s most fertile agricultural lands and energy deposits, and in recent days has held the battlefield momentum. Ukraine, after a robust defense of its cities, can expect further NATO support, know-how and weaponry — a powerful incentive not to end the war anytime soon.
But if the war does not end soon, its dangers will increase. “Negotiations need to begin in the next two months,” the former U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger warned last week, “before it creates upheavals and tensions that will not be easily overcome.” Calling for a return to the status quo ante bellum, he added, “Pursuing the war beyond that point would not be about the freedom of Ukraine but a new war against Russia itself.”
In this, Mr. Kissinger is on the same page as Mr. Guaino. “To make concessions to Russia would be submitting to aggression,” Mr. Guaino warned. “To make none would be submitting to insanity.”
The United States is making no concessions. That would be to lose face. There’s an election coming. So the administration is closing off avenues of negotiation and working to intensify the war. We’re in it to win it. With time, the huge import of deadly weaponry, including that from the newly authorized $40 billion allocation, could take the war to a different level. President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine warned in an address to students this month that the bloodiest days of the war were coming.
yes completely agree. The problem we have is to get important nuggets from Russ perspective. A lot of behind the scenes conversations are going on with Putin's top advisors [One being that the conflict will not just stop with donbass, it will go on until there is not even one foot of free Ukr territory left]. There is a whole lot of info on Ukr websites regaarding NATO collaboration. The problem is translation.Deans wrote:In Russia and Ukraine, a Presidential decree is taken more seriously than for e.g. a Parliament resolution that POK is ours. As far as Russia wasdnivas wrote:Been out for a while. I believe BRAR asked me for source of info that Ukr was planning to invade Crimea and DNR/LPR.
here is source from Ukr presidents website
https://translate.yandex.com/translate? ... lang=uk-en
point 39 and point 83,84
concerned, there could not be a clearer statement that Ukraine, with the help of NATO, was going to invade Crimea & LPR/DPR. This was coupled with an increasing number of ceasefire violations in the Donbass. Russian doctrine in such a situation is for pre-emptive war.
Deans from what I understand with April peace talks all Ukraine asked for is stop of all operations not withdrawal which Russia didn’t agree to as they wanted to capture Kharkiv and Mariupol, at the same time Russia didn’t want Ukraine to launch any operations. I can’t see anyone agreeing to that. Looks like Putin made push to capture as much territory before next round. Here is what Russian FM saidDeans wrote:
While Russia (in my opinion) made a strategic error in assuming a best case scenario - repeat of the Crimea operation, I think NATO made a similar mistake based on its incorrect assumptions.
When Russia pulled back from Kiev & the area west of Kharkov, at the end of March, Ukraine assumed it had won phase 1.
NATO's assumptions were that Putin would have to stop the war, without gaining anything, because of Anti war protests / sanctions / heavy casualties/ running out of hi tech weapons etc. The US objective then changed from preventing the invasion of Ukraine, to the defeat of Russia
Ukraine broke off talks and their precondition to resume them was that Russia withdraw to the pre-war positions, which wasn't going to happen.
Western heavy weapons started moving into Ukraine.
I think NATO's actions actually strengthened Putin's domestic support, rather than weaken it. Russians are more convinced they are fighting NATO, whose stated objective is to defeat Russia.
If talks happen now, Russia is in a far stronger position than it was on 1st April, when Ukraine effectively broke off talks.
I think the chronology of talks that was relevant is the following:John wrote: Deans from what I understand with April peace talks all Ukraine asked for is stop of all operations not withdrawal which Russia didn’t agree to as they wanted to capture Kharkiv and Mariupol, at the same time Russia didn’t want Ukraine to launch any operations. I can’t see anyone agreeing to that. Looks like Putin made push to capture as much territory before next round. Here is what Russian FM said
“ After we became convinced that the Ukrainians were not planning to reciprocate, a decision was made that during the next rounds of talks, there would be no pause (in military action) so long as a final agreement is not reached," Lavrov said.
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ru ... 022-04-11/Cyrano wrote:There was a reported call from BoJo to elensly right after the 15 points came out and they pulled everything back.
I haven't come across the version John is alluding to. An official source would be good.
How do you know who is operating them? Ukraine gov has a web site for foreigners to register to fight on behalf of Ukraine.Tanaji wrote:^^ Its not easy to train MQ1C operators so quickly, plus having the infra in place to support this. This is about 60-70% similar to inducting a new aircraft type. Unless the drones are going to be operated remotely from Creech AFB I am not sure how the Ukranians are going to use it.
US has already provided drones like Switchblade…which are armed in a way.
#Severodonetsk - The mayor of Severodonetsk has stated that only 20% of city still under #Ukrainian control. #Ukrainian troops will soon be forced across the river. The surrounding villages are likely already evacuated. New maps soon.
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As President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine has said, ultimately this war “will only definitively end through diplomacy.” Every negotiation reflects the facts on the ground. We have moved quickly to send Ukraine a significant amount of weaponry and ammunition so it can fight on the battlefield and be in the strongest possible position at the negotiating table.
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Deployment of these rockets in Kharkiv would enable Ukranian forces to target Russian supply lines to fronts down south which are approx 30 km from international border.Tanaji wrote:Biden has decided to give the HiMARS system to the Ukranians
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/ ... ng-ukraine
The Pakranians have pinky promise not to use it against targets inside Russia. Apparently only 50 mile range rockets are being Given. Wonder how much of an actual impact this will have.
Deployment of these rockets in Kharkiv would enable Ukranian forces to target Russian supply lines to fronts down south which are approx 30 km from international border.Tanaji wrote:Biden has decided to give the HiMARS system to the Ukranians
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/ ... ng-ukraine
The Pakranians have pinky promise not to use it against targets inside Russia. Apparently only 50 mile range rockets are being Given. Wonder how much of an actual impact this will have.
The problem is Zenensky can only get a better negotiating position by launching counterattacks to regain territory. All so far failed. The casualties and reduced morale from each failed attack worsen his position, as the surviving troops are more reluctant to defend hopeless positions.NRao wrote:Reuters I am told is reporting that UKR is fighting to get a better position at the negotiation table. I am unable to read the article but can see it in the search results. So, cannot confirm it.
It would also enable Russian conscripts to be activated (within Russia's borders) with enough artillery to send Kharkiv into the stone age.Thakur_B wrote:Deployment of these rockets in Kharkiv would enable Ukranian forces to target Russian supply lines to fronts down south which are approx 30 km from international border.Tanaji wrote:Biden has decided to give the HiMARS system to the Ukranians
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/ ... ng-ukraine
The Pakranians have pinky promise not to use it against targets inside Russia. Apparently only 50 mile range rockets are being Given. Wonder how much of an actual impact this will have.
Russian made those claims in Irpin, Sumy and Kharkiv before they retreated I would wait for dust to settle where as Ukr side their command usually doesn’t release any statements till op is complete which means you have lot of social media confusion.Deans wrote:The problem is Zenensky can only get a better negotiating position by launching counterattacks to regain territory. All so far failed. The casualties and reduced morale from each failed attack worsen his position, as the surviving troops are more reluctant to defend hopeless positions.NRao wrote:Reuters I am told is reporting that UKR is fighting to get a better position at the negotiation table. I am unable to read the article but can see it in the search results. So, cannot confirm it.
The Kherson counterattack was an example. What was hyped as an attack by several brigades to retake Kherson, was a push by a small force (albeit across a weakly held sector) of just 5km, across a narrow front. Caught in the open with no air support, they took heavy casualties and lost all the ground they had taken.