https://asiasociety.org/policy-institut ... y-congress
Scenario 1: Xi’s protégé takes the Premiership – In this scenario, Xi’s protégé Li Qiang (current Shanghai Party Secretary and Politburo member) or a similarly loyal dark horse ally wins the day. Li seems to be Xi’s first preference for Premier (leader of the State Council). However, Li’s competitiveness has been undermined by Shanghai’s serious and embarrassing difficulties in containing outbreaks of COVID-19 earlier this year. Should Li nonetheless take the position, it would therefore indicate that Xi remains in a very powerful political position. This could however increase the likelihood that Li Keqiang stays within the PBSC in the position of NPC Chairman, while Politburo member Hu Chunhua (who is part of Li’s CYL faction) might replace Han Zheng as Executive Vice Premier (#2 at the State Council), as something of a factional compromise. However, the CYL faction might not be powerful enough to maintain both Li and Hu in critical PBSC positions. Either way, one or two current PBSC members among Wang Yang, Wang Huning, and Zhao Leji would likely remain (possibly shuffling positions). There is also a fair chance, however, that an additional one or more of them might also retire and a Xi-loyalist like Ding Xuexiang, Huang Kunming, Li Xi, or Chen Min’er be handed Zhao Leji’s current position as head of the CCP’s feared internal anti-corruption force, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI).
Scenario 2: Wang Yang becomes Premier – In this compromise scenario Wang Yang (also connected to the CYL faction, if more loosely) becomes Premier. This would almost certainly squeeze Li Keqiang out of the PBSC and into retirement entirely. Younger CYL contender Hu Chunhua would also be kept out of the PBSC (as Xi would hardly allow two CYL members to dominate the State Council, unless he is far weaker than conventionally expected). In this scenario Li Qiang would likely take Han Zheng’s position as Executive Vice Premier, while one of Xi’s other protégés such as Ding Xuexiang, Chen Min’er, Li Xi, or Cai Qi would take over from Zhao Leji as head of CCDI. Zhao Leji and Wang Huning would each become head of one of China’s legislative bodies (the NPC and CPPCC), while another close Xi ally (probably Huang Kunming) would take over ideology tsar Wang Huning’s position as head of the Central Secretariat.
Scenario 3: Han Zheng becomes Premier – In this less likely scenario, in which the age limit norm is abandoned, and Xi’s influence is revealed to be significantly more circumscribed, Han Zheng would remain on the PBSC and take the position of Premier, while Li Keqiang would also remain but become Chair of the NPC. Wang Yang would then likely also remain as Chair of the CPPCC, meaning two CYL faction members would make it onto the PBSC alongside Jiang Zemin’s man Han Zheng. Wang Huning would likely retire, and Zhao Leji would take his position. In this case, Xi’s protégé Li Qiang might still then become Executive Vice Premier, while other protégés like Chen Min’er, Ding Xuexiang, Li Xi, Cai Qi, or Huang Kunming would battle for the seat of CCDI head.
Scenario 4: Xi unbound – In this scenario, Xi’s influence proves to be unconstrained and he takes full advantage to set up his ideal PBSC. Li Keqiang, Han Zheng, Wang Yang, Wang Huning, and Li Zhanshu are all replaced by younger, absolutely loyal Xi allies. Ding Xuexiang, Li Qiang, Chen Min’er, Huang Kunming, and Li Xi are all potential candidates here. Xi may also demonstrate some magnanimity under this scenario by promoting someone from another interest group, such as Hu Chunhua, to the PBSC. This scenario appears to remain relatively unlikely, but it is hardly impossible.
Scenario 5: Packing the PBSC – In this wildcard scenario, the PBSC is enlarged from seven to nine seats. This seems most likely to occur if Xi is out-maneuvered and a non-Xi factionalist is set to become Premier, in which case Xi might push to expand the PBSC to compensate by creating new room for more factional appointments. Alternatively, Xi could receive intense pressure (including from his own allies) to set up a next generation of leadership by appointing a greater number of younger leaders to PBSC positions. In this case, Xi might choose to expand the PBSC rather than attempt to oust additional older members, making a strategic move to reward and temporarily satisfy his political base.
Scenarios 4 and 5 are unlikely.
They are saying that #3 is less likely.
So most likely it will be a combination of #1& #2.
Xi is not so powerful to implement #1 and his opponents are not so powerful to implement #2.
It is not a compromise but the best option to preserve the CPC.
Let us see.