Challenge of China_ Political, Economic & Military Responses

[sanman]

Why have we not campaigned internationally for accountability from China on COVID?
USA may be worried about its complicity in China's Wuhan Lab -- but we have no such similar constraints.

We suffered hundreds of thousands of dead, as well as massive economic disruption, and had to spend vast amounts of money.
All because some crooks in China's ruling apparatus decided to behave recklessly?

Why are we not owed some liability, along with the rest of the world?
Why are we so silent on this important issue?

What's to prevent all of this from happening again in the future?

[sanman]

[Mollick.R]

China youth unemployment rises to record 20.8% in May: official data
AFP Last Updated: Jun 15, 2023, 08:31 AM IST

......
....
Beijing: China on Thursday reported a series of weak economic indicators, with youth unemployment hitting a record high for the second consecutive month as the economy's post-Covid growth spurt fades.

The unemployment rate for Chinese between the ages of 16 and 24 rose to
20.8 percent, up from what was already a record 20.4 percent in April, the National Bureau of Statistics said.
Overall urban unemployment remained at 5.2 percent, the NBS said in a statement.



Read Full News Article From Here//
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/ne ... 006469.cms

[RaviB]

Though this story is about the origin of Covid-19, I think it fits better here.

Patient zero was in Wuhan Lab
https://twitter.com/shellenberger/statu ... 9727150081

Public officials in the U.S. and other countries have repeatedly suggested that uncovering the pandemic’s origin may not be possible. “We may never know,” said Anthony Fauci, the former director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, who oversaw pandemic response for two administrations.

Now, answers increasingly look within reach. Sources within the US government say that three of the earliest people to become infected with SARS-CoV-2 were Ben Hu, Yu Ping, and Yan Zhu. All were members of the Wuhan lab suspected to have leaked the pandemic virus.

As such, not only do we know there were WIV scientists who had developed COVID-19-like illnesses in November 2019, but also that they were working with the closest relatives of SARS-CoV-2, and inserting gain-of-function features unique to it.

When a source was asked how certain they were that these were the identities of the three WIV scientists who developed symptoms consistent with COVID-19 in the fall of 2019, we were told, “100%”

“Ben Hu is essentially the next Shi Zhengli,” said Alina Chan, a molecular biologist at the Broad Institute of MIT and Harvard. Shi is known as “the bat woman of China,” and led the gain-of-function research at the WIV. “He was her star pupil. He had been making chimeric SARS-like viruses and testing these in humanized mice. If I had to guess who would be doing this risky virus research and most at risk of getting accidentally infected, it would be him.”
...
On Dec. 29, 2017, two years before the pandemic began, Chinese state-run television aired a video that includes a scene of Ben Hu watching a lab worker handle specimens. Neither are wearing protective gear.

The full thread is worth a read and shows that this is more about biological warfare than just another pandemic from China's wet markets.

Additional news story https://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/arti ... eport.html

[ramana]

Two articles on the same subject

https://www.yahoo.com/news/look-closely ... 00542.html

While the UK and US, each embroiled in democracy’s perverse consequences, struggle to thwart Putin’s mad ambitions in Ukraine, their respective China strategies face forceful challenge from Beijing. Xi Jinping is pushing brinkmanship to the edge in the Taiwan Straits and doubling down, as in Honduras, on its global efforts to isolate Taiwan.

Meanwhile, leading Western technology companies, alarmed by geopolitical uncertainty and facing hostile data “legislation,” are marching out of China in droves. Microsoft has already taken LinkedIn out and is moving an expert AI team to Canada to avoid local pressure on them.

Sub-par performance by the best-known Chinese stocks are compelling some seasoned Western asset managers to cut their exposure. Where is this debacle leading, and where might it end?

Risk has been defined as exposure to hostile intentions and capabilities. This dictum omits one vital issue: whether the party at risk is aware of what is going on. Arguably much of the “free” world is either ignorant, or in denial, about Xi Jinping’s policy drivers, intentions and capabilities.

This in itself is acutely risky. A tipping point in China Risk is rapidly approaching, and with it an opportunity to turn this to the West’s advantage.

Xi Jinping is forging ahead with plans for a revisionist New Era in which China becomes the sole super-power in an authoritarian, post-democratic world order. His immediate tactics include expedient alliances with other enemies of the West to defeat sanctions and other preemptive counter-measures short of military conflict.

He is striving to exploit Western political and economic division and disarray, not least through his tacit support for Putin’s illegal invasion of Ukraine. His spuriously neutral Ukraine peace initiative lacks substance – indeed, this may be deliberate – but it symbolises his ultimate aspiration to global authority.

However, Xi is still a long way from achieving this. Though propaganda trumpets China’s triumph over the Covid virus and prospects for renewed growth, part of Xi’s aggressive haste stems from the realisation that the Chinese Communist Party state remains riddled with vulnerabilities.

http://finance.yahoo.com/amphtml/news/t ... 45735.html

BEIJING (Reuters) - Strikes at Chinese factories have surged to a seven-year high and are expected to become more frequent as weak global demand forces exporters to cut workers' pay and shut down plants, one rights group and economists say.

Exports and factory output in the world's second-largest economy tumbled in May, as looming downturns force the United States and Europe to pare back orders for goods made in China.

Some factories closed or are struggling to pay wages or severance for laid-off workers as a result, according to Chinese labour researchers. That has led to a spike in labour disputes that hurts consumer and business confidence just as it was recovering from three years of COVID-19 curbs, they said.

"We believe that the drop in manufacturing orders and that factory closures will continue," said Aidan Chau, researcher at Hong Kong-based rights group China Labour Bulletin (CLB).

"Bosses want to cut costs by simply dumping workers."

CLB recorded over 140 strikes at factories across the country in the first five months of this year, the highest since the 313 recorded during the same period in 2016.

The rights group's data is mostly based on protests reported on social media, some of which CLB has been able to verify through contact with unions or the factories, although not all reports are verified.

Many of the strikes are concentrated in China's manufacturing heartland of Guangdong province and the Yangtze River Delta, and involve exporters, including from garment, shoe and printed circuit board factories, CLB said.

In one video referenced in CLB's mapped log of nationwide strikes, dozens of female workers at Zhong Min Sportswear Goods Shenzhen Ltd. Co. walk out of a factory compound.

The video was published on May 24 on Douyin, China's version of TikTok, and captioned "this boss paid off law enforcement and is cheating workers' money".

Another video posted by the same user shows a factory manager reading a document denying workers compensation, while workers demand that an independent third party intervene.

....

[ramana]

Broad Institute is in Cambridge next to Harvard.

[mappunni]

Not sure where to post this link to Youtube video of young children as young as kindergarten being brainwashed and put thru training.

Please move it to the right area if it is not meant for here.

[SSridhar]

^ Of course, Cold War 2.0 is very different from the earlier version, but some aspects remain the same, just as the above video shows.

[sanman]

Some commentators are pointing out that the Modi visit to Washington is taking place exactly at the same time that Blinken is visiting Beijing to meet with Chinese officials for talks. Has the Modi visit been set up by Washington to gain extra leverage with China during these US-China talks?

Also, I notice that China has suddenly started inserting itself into Middle Eastern politics - first with the Saudi-Iran peace deal, and now with its Palestine initiative. How much fresh alarm in Washington could this be causing?

[SSridhar]

^ The State Visit should have been in the making for quite some time now as both Modi & Biden are two of the busiest world leaders.

Blinken’s visit to China was planned at the Indonesian G20 meet and should have taken place earlier but got disrupted by the spy balloon saga. Blinken & Qin Gang also have busy schedules.

Shouldn’t read too much into coincidence.

[SSridhar]

^^ One can insert into all these civilisational issues, but the insertion has to produce some result. The matter doesn’t end with photo-ops, does it?

[sanman]

I feel like the more China is in distress, the farther westward it tries to push with the aim of bailing itself out.

When Mao's ill-conceived "reforms" led to famines, he resorted to the stunt of invading Tibet (the "Great Western Treasurehouse")
Likewise, when China faced strong pushback from US (especially Trump) over one-way trade imbalances, China decided to push westwards with Belt-and-Road Initiative.

Now China is in further distress, as BRI isn't working out, and meanwhile Xi's govt had gone out of its way to impose extra COVID lockdowns as a means of consolidating political power and ousting domestic political rivals from the party, which has nevertheless taken its toll on China's economy.

So that's why we see China now making even further westward forays into the Middle East, hoping to snag further opportunities for itself.

[sanman]

[ramana]

Depends on which satellites they are launching.
China is building own network of satellites to match Starlink and One Web. And this requires a large number of satellites in low earth orbit.

[Manish_P]

The basic lesson is not to trust China

Concluding part of interview with - Lieutenant General Rakesh Sharma, retired, former commander of the Leh-based Fire and Fury Corps

Q: In your opinion, is a diplomatic solution still possible?

A: There has been limited progress in the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination meetings.

If you look at the statements ensuing from the visit of Chinese diplomats to India in the last six months -- Foreign Minister Qin Gang, Defence Minister Li Shangfu, former FM Wang Yi, including the consul general in Calcutta and the ambassador in Delhi -- all of them convey an institutional position.

They only repeat one typical sentence, which is the 'maintenance of normal border management and control', but from the Indian point of view, the situation is grossly abnormal!

There are forces arrayed across both sides of the border, buffers are being created, stand-offs have occurred at two places at least, infrastructure is being scaled and there is a grave distrust.

Hence, the situation is absolutely abnormal and has been pointed out often by the Indian foreign minister.

There is no matching of minds on this issue. We cannot accept this situation as it will cause immense strain on our nation to maintain such a large deployment of forces.

How can we inflict the same kind of pressure on the Chinese elsewhere? Perhaps amassing allies in the Pacific and Africa, Latin America, wherever China has appeared and angered local governments?

India's leadership role in the global south is one attempt to reach out to these countries -- especially ASEAN.

However, 127 countries conduct maximum trade with China. They have invested heavily in the Belt and Road Project and are building 100 ports -- 13 in Indian Ocean Rim countries itself.

The BNS Sheikh Hasina port in Bangladesh built by China can accommodate six submarines and eight frigates. The Bangladesh Navy doesn't even have six submarines!

The Chinese purchasing influence has tied down all these countries, despite the fact that India has a great relationship with these nations.

...India's benign cultural role is acknowledged, but then the Chinese also have a large diaspora in Southeast Asia and huge investments across Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam etc, and these countries have to balance their relationship between India and China.

China is indulging in cheque book diplomacy which is completely different from the diplomacy practised by India.

Q: What are the military lessons that India has learnt from this stand-off?

A: The basic lesson is not to trust China.
..
Three decades of intensive discussions, protocols and Confidence Building Measures were jettisoned one fine morning in 2020. Therefore, the primary lesson that has been learnt is that that there is no reliability about the Chinese.

We have to learn to distrust the Chinese because their intent is not clear.

They announced the changed names of certain places in Arunachal Pradesh when there is a 2005 treaty which states that it is a settled area and Arunachal Pradesh is our territory.

The McMahon Line was signed between Tibet and British India in 1914-1915 when Tibet was not a part of China. The treaties signed by sovereign nations cannot be rescinded by China.

China's expansionist ambitions are clear and we have learned it the hard way. We have to ensure that their quest for expansionism is denied.

[SSridhar]

China is building own network of satellites to match Starlink and One Web. And this requires a large number of satellites in low earth orbit.

Yes, the 'Guowang' satellites of LEO mega constellation (~13000) for satellite broadband are China's answer to StarLink. But, they plan to start launching them towards the end of the year. They may be sending a number of satellites now to fine tune management & operations of the constellation. They claim that they have AI-enabled their staellites.

The other possibility is that China intends to have a constellation of very low-earth orbiting (~150 Kms) EO satellites, covering the whole Earth, for military purposes.

[SSridhar]

China blocks proposal at UN to blacklist Pak-based LeT terrorist and 26/11 accused Sajid Mir - ToI

China on Tuesday blocked a proposal by India and the US at the United Nations to designate Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorist Sajid Mir, wanted for his involvement in the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks, as a global terrorist.

Beijing blocked the proposal that had been moved by the US and co-designated by India to blacklist Mir under the 1267 Al Qaeda Sanctions Committee of the UN Security Council as a global terrorist and subject him to assets freeze, travel ban and arms embargo.

In September last year, it was learnt that China had put a hold on the proposal to designate Mir at the UN. Beijing has now blocked the proposal.
Mir is one of India's most wanted terrorists and has a bounty of USD 5 million placed on his head by the US for his role in the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks.

In June, Mir was jailed for over 15 years in a terror-financing case by an anti-terrorism court in Pakistan.

Pakistani authorities had in the past claimed Mir had died, but Western countries remained unconvinced and demanded proof of his death. This issue became a major sticking point in FATF's assessment of Pakistan's progress on the action plan late last year.

[ramana]

There is no question that China is our primary enemy over the next 20 years. USA can be the competitor from 2040 on and perhaps a counterpole from 2050 on.

There should not be any aversion on our part to have a cautious friendship with US, to help us counter China in the meantime.
There is a lot to learn from China itself. They promised friendship and a way to balance USSR to the Americans and implicitly a transition to democracy during the Nixon era. They profited heavily from it and now have become a near peer adversary. China had a lot more reason to distrust the USA back then (compared to India right now) but it was a strategically brilliant manoeuvre that has paid off great dividends for them. They would never have become near-peer without the pretense of harmless friendliness. There is no reason for us to not throw money and friendly words at USA and even have carefully calibrated democracy theater and such, while keeping the long term in sight.

Overt friendliness now, combined with a healthy distrust will get us quicker to the goal of becoming an equal of the US in the 2050-70 timeline. In the meantime it will help us balance China until demographic collapse removes them from the picture around 2050.

Between nations, there are permanent interests. No permanent friends or enemies.
UK despite being the best friend of the US has stabbed them often and vice versa.

[ramana]

BTW Sumit Ganguly and others are writing books on conflict-prone India-China relations.
Haven't read the book as it is just published.
One of the authors posted a few tweets summarizing the book.

https://twitter.com/manjeetsp/status/16 ... 27265?s=20

[RaviB]

I had posted this on another thread regarding the military implications of China's coming demographic collapse but it is more relevant here.

If you look at China's projected population for 2050, they will have approximately 50 million men between 20-30 years old (India will have 130 million in the same cohort at that time). I would say that this is the cohort their military would primarily have to be drawn from. If you think of an armed strength of 1 million, this is 2% of this population. It is highly unlikely that this would be feasible, especially because of the high dependency ratio, so a drop in the army strength is guaranteed. In terms of territorial conflict, I think it is unlikely that the importance of infantry in holding ground is likely to disappear. Maybe unmanned drones and robots take over by then but it's unlikely. So ultimately they will have to reduce the number of soldiers, maybe focus on navy and air force, which will continue to be a challenge for India.

Very big BUT, they go for a Taiwan invasion, in which case they will suffer massive losses and be overstretched. If they lose, they lose soldiers and kit. If they win, they will need PLA stationed in Taiwan and kit. Regardless of what happens, smaller threat to us. And they will bankrupt themselves with the expenses unless Uncle Sam plays along.

With a decline in working age population will also come a decline in GDP, there will be less money to spend.

The projected numbers are based on official data, which are almost certainly overstated. The fertility rate is declining even faster than before, so the number of young people will decline. This is just a back of the envelope kind of calculation but still the demographics are headed in that direction, maybe the collapse happens in 2045, maybe in 2055, depends on past fudging and future developments.

China's projected population pyramid https://www.populationpyramid.net/china/2050/

China's fertility rate change, notice the lack of effect of policy changes. Things won't improve for them

[Anoop]

[ramana]

I would like people to discuss what this means to China and more importantly to India.
Thanks for the cooperation.

https://www.cbsnews.com/news/wagner-gro ... y-company/
What is the Wagner group, and who is Yevgeny Prigozhin? What to know about the Russian private military company
HALEY OTT, KERRY BREEN, JUNE 24, 2023
For years, it was shrouded in secrecy, then infamy. Now, as an apparent power struggle brings confusion and claims of an insurrection in Russia, questions about the notorious Wagner group and the intentions of its leader Yevgeny Prigozhin are swirling.
The group has been a key piece of Russia's strategy in Ukraine, with Wagner forces being used to hold cities like Bakhmut. Prigozhin has sharply criticized Russian military leadership for weeks, calling top brass incompetent, even traitorous. He has also refused to sign a contract to cooperate with the Russian Defense Ministry.
Tensions between Russia's defense ministry and Wagner escalated dramatically Friday when Prigozhin alleged that Russian forces had attacked Wagner field camps in eastern Ukraine. Late Friday, Prigozhin issued video taped remarks that appeared to call for a rebellion against Russian military leadership, but he was characteristically vague in defining his plans.
Prigozhin said early Saturday that Wagner forces had left Ukraine for Russia and had reached the city of Rostov-on-Don, which is home to the Russian military headquarters for the southern region and oversees the fighting in Ukraine. In an intelligence meeting, Britain's Ministry of Defense said Prigozhin's forces appeared to control the military headquarters.
Wagner boss, "Putin's butcher," says Russia at risk of facing "revolution"
Russian President Vladimir Putin called the uprising "a stab in the back" in a televised address Saturday morning.
"All those who prepared the rebellion will suffer inevitable punishment," Putin said. "The armed forces and other government agencies have received the necessary orders."
What is the Wagner group?
The Wagner group is a group of entities that operate as a private military company, or PMC. These PMCs can be hired by governments for security or combat services.
They aren't uncommon: The United States has used private military companies during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, there are differences between the commonly accepted definition of a PMC and Russia's version of the companies.
"In NATO countries, in Western countries, the main logic behind using private contractors when it comes to security and defense policy has been the flexibility of resources," said Dr. András Rácz, a Russian expert at the German Council on Foreign Relations. "However, on the Russian side, the logic has been different. Russia, from the beginning, perceived these companies as a way of exerting state power in a covert way."
......
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66006860
Russia: Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin calls halt to Moscow advance
24/06/2023
The boss of Russia's Wagner group has said on his Telegram channel that he has agreed to "stop" the advancement of his troops towards Moscow.
In a surprise move, Yevgeny Prigozhin said his fighters were returning to field camps in Ukraine and did not want to "spill Russian blood".
Hours earlier, he had called for a rebellion against the Russian army.
In response, President Vladimir Putin had pledged to punish those who had "betrayed" Russia.
The Wagner Group is a private army of mercenaries that has been fighting alongside the regular Russian army in Ukraine.
Tension had been growing between them over how the war has been fought, with Prigozhin launching vocal criticisms of Russia's military leadership in recent months.
The agreement to dramatically de-escalate the situation came after Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko held talks with Prigozhin, according to Russian TV channel Rossiya 24.
......
Gautam

[sanman]

[ramana]

The Wagner 'insurrection' is reminiscent of the Tsarist troops that went back to Russia after the defeat in 1917 and powered the coup that ended the Tsar.

Countries that seek military adventures need to be careful that their snakes don't come back to a bit.
Not everyone has a Belarus to exile the snakes.

Xi should ponder.

[sanman]

[bala]

The Dragons Bite I Chinese War Strategy and Tactics I Indian Concern I Maj Gen Rajiv Narayanan

Decoding China's Warfare Strategies and Tactics. How should India read into Chinese tactics. A book by Maj Gen Rajiv Narayanan.

[sanman]

[sanman]

Here's what Vinod Khosla thinks:

https://twitter.com/vkhosla/status/1680786528346447872

[g.sarkar]

Why China's Artificial Islands are Now Sinking

In 2019, US media accused China of “bullying” in the South China Sea due to its giant terraforming operations to create artificial islands. One of the major consequences of these islands being built up, according to the press, is the possibility of an all-out war with the USA. That’s not how China explains things, nor does it admit things could presently be going wrong with those islands.
As you’ll see in this video today, China might have a major problem on its hands which could turn into a supremely expensive catastrophic failure.
.......
Gautam

[ramana]

Hudson Institute talk on how "China Prepares for War". The talker is a financial guru and is looking from non-military point of view.

https://www.hudson.org/events/china-pre ... -kyle-bass

I am wondering if the China Studies Groups in India look at XJP and WTC exercises to see what kind of preparation wrt LAC has already been seen.

ricky_v can you get hold of that Kyle Bass presentation?

[ramana]

Looks like some one tweeted the slides:

https://twitter.com/ianellisjones/statu ... 27393?s=20

[ramana]

Jamestown China Brief:

https://jamestown.org/programs/cb/

Do follow as it puts in one place news about China.

[ramana]

https://jamestown.org/program/the-20th- ... ter-stage/

The 20th Shangri-La Dialogue: US-China Great Power Rivalry Takes Center Stage
Publication: China Brief Volume: 23 Issue: 12
By: Amrita Jash
July 7, 2023, 04:27 PM Age: 2 weeks


Chinese Defense Minister General Li Shangfu at the Shangri-La Dialogue, source: AFP

Introduction

The 20th Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD), organized by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), was held in Singapore from June 2 to 4. Having earned its reputation as one of Asia’s premier defense summits since it was founded in 2002, the forum serves as a platform to discuss and debate regional security issues in the Indo-Pacific. In addition to the Shangri-La’s main summit, another important role of the dialogue is for countries to engage in bilateral security talks on the sidelines. The gathering of multiple high-ranking military officials in one location presents governments with the rare opportunity to engage in bilateral security exchanges with numerous countries of interest.

Against the backdrop of escalating tensions and growing mistrust between the US and China, one of the SLD’s most highly anticipated bilateral talks were supposed to feature US Secretary of Defense Llyod J. Austin and China’s State Councilor and Defense Minister General Li Shangfu. Expectations regarding a possible meeting were especially high, given the US and Chinese presidents’ agreement in their November 2022 Bali meeting to “maintain strategic communication and conduct regular consultations” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China [PRC], November 14, 2022).

As Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese emphasized during his keynote address at the 2023 Dialogue, closed diplomatic and military lines of communication between Washington and Beijing, the world’s two foremost great powers, poses serious concerns for the international community. Albanese reasoned that “big powers have a heavy responsibility to maintain stable and workable relations with one another. Because the alternative, the silence of the diplomatic deep freeze, only breeds suspicion, only makes it easier for nations to attribute motive to misunderstanding, to assume the worst of one another” (IISS, June 2).

With US-China relations deteriorating to their lowest point in decades, the SLD’s plenary addresses by the American and Chinese defense chiefs garnered significant international attention. Notably, it marked Austin’s second address at the SLD, while for Li, it was his inaugural international address since his appointment as China’s defense minister in March 2023. As such, analysts were closely monitoring Li’s remarks to see if they would reflect a tonal shift in Chinese foreign policy that could recalibrate the acrimonious state of US-Sino relations. However, after the SLD convened, the prevailing consensus was that no such reset took place. Not only did Li decline to meet with Austin, but he also expressed several thinly veiled criticisms towards Washington during his address, alluding to what Beijing perceived as a “Cold War mentality” and accusing the US of actively seeking alliances and blocs with the intention of encircling China. While ardent rebuttals between both countries’ defense ministers were present, the highly anticipated dialogue between the US and China was altogether absent from the SLD. Instead, what transpired at the SLD was a clear manifestation of strained US-China ties and great power rivalry.

No Talks, Only a Handshake

Going into the SLD, Washington aimed to conduct bilateral talks with Beijing to serve two key objectives. First, the US wished to set a floor to the rapid decline of US-China relations. Second, Washington expressed interest in restoring a direct line of communication with Beijing’s military to reduce the risk of conflict escalation. China, identifying Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan as the primary impetus, suspended military-to-military talks with the US as of August 2022 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China [PRC], August 5, 2022). [1] More recently, the “Chinese Spy Balloon” incident culminated in US-China ties spiraling to a new low. Referring to the incident as “an irresponsible act and a clear violation of US sovereignty and international law that undermined the purpose of the trip”, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken postponed his visit to China, a trip that was originally planned for February but was not rescheduled until June 18 (U. S. Department of State, February 3). [2]

In an effort to resume communication prior to the SLD, Washington proposed a meeting between the two defense chiefs in Singapore, which Beijing declined. Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning stated that China would not resume talks until the US satisfied the following conditions: “[1] earnestly respect China’s sovereignty, security and interest concerns, [2] immediately correct wrong practice, [3] show sincerity and create necessary atmosphere and conditions for dialogue and communication between Chinese and US militaries” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, May 30). Beijing further justified their decision to decline the meeting by citing the ongoing sanctions imposed on Li in 2018. At the time, Li was the director of the Chinese military’s Equipment Development Department (EDD) and consequently was targeted under section 231 of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) (U. S. Department of State, September 20, 2018).

On balance, Beijing’s rejection can be viewed from two distinct perspectives. First, the PRC’s refusal to hold a meeting with Austin signifies a continuation of Beijing’s recent practice of rejecting talks with the American defense minister, to punish Washington for its alleged “wrongdoings”. During February’s spy balloon incident, China refused the US’ proposal for a call between the two defense chiefs, citing that “Washington’s irresponsible wrongdoings failed to create an atmosphere for communication between the militaries of the two countries” (Global Times, February 9).

Second, Beijing’s refusal can be seen as a nationalistic appeal to stand up to the US and the hegemonic West. According to the view widely espoused by Chinese state media, Beijing’s rejection of US-proposed meetings are reasonable and justified, as agreeing to a meeting equates to acknowledging accountability for previous transgressions. For instance, during the spy balloon incident, Li Haidong posited that the US is “not sincere in hoping for ‘communication’ but instead… [is displaying] a disguised form of ‘coercion’” intended to portray China as an aggressor (Global Times, February 9). While at the SLD meeting, Song Zhongping argued that China’s decline of the US invitation is justified as “the ultimate goal [of the US] is not about the meeting itself, but making a hypocritical show for audiences both at home and abroad” (Global Times, May 30).

Ultimately, with no formal talks being held, only a brief handshake between Austin and Li was exhibited. In response to Beijing’s rejection, Austin, in his plenary address, criticized China by stating that “dialogue is not a reward. It is a necessity. A cordial handshake over dinner is no substitute for a substantive engagement.” Moreover, he argued “the more that we [the US and China] talk, the more that we can avoid the misunderstanding” (IISS, June 3). Meanwhile, General Li asserted that the US “needs to act with sincerity, match its words with deeds and take concrete actions together with China to stabilize the relations and prevent further deterioration” (China Daily, June 5).

With the US-China antagonism taking center stage, the SLD showcased the two countries’ ongoing great power rivalry, exhibited through the lens of two competing narratives to a broader international community. When directly juxtaposed, the plenary addresses of both Austin and Li represent an expression of their respective country’s grievances, positions, and warnings to the other party (see Table 1). Their speeches highlight the growing polarization between the two countries as it pertains to Indo-Pacific security, Taiwan, and the Russia-Ukraine War among other issues.

Table 1: Juxtaposing US and China’s Positions at SLD


Source: Author
Crossfire between US and China

Speaking at the first plenary session of the SLD on June 3, U. S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin categorically outlined America’s vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific “without coercion, intimidation, or bullying” (IISS, June 3). While countries such as Australia, India, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, and Vietnam were mentioned as America’s allies and partners, China was accused of conducting “an alarming number of risky intercepts of US and allied aircraft flying lawfully in international airspace”, as well as engaging in “coercion and bullying” (IISS, June 3).

However, the Chinese regarded these incursions as “a must to safeguard China’s national interests and security” (Global Times, June 3), stating that the US portrayal of China as a “bully” and “coercer” aims to enable and justify American interventionism. The Chinese side argued that the US seeks to promote an agenda of interference in China’s internal affairs by meddling in “domestic” issues such as the “Taiwan question” (Global Times, June 6). According to Senior Colonel Tan Kefei of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the US should be regarded as “solely responsible” for the “difficulty of communication”, arguing that “dialogue cannot be done without principles” (The South China Morning Post, June 1).

Taiwan was a reoccurring topic during the US-China crossfire. Austin’s address conveyed a clear message to Beijing, suggesting that while the American government “[does not] seek conflict or confrontation… [the US] will not flinch in the face of bullying or coercion.” He reaffirmed this principle as “especially important in the Taiwan Strait,” maintaining that a cross-Strait “conflict…would be devastating” (IISS, June 3). China refuted Austin’s statements by accusing the American side of “ignoring facts and distorting the truth” on Taiwan. Lieutenant General Jing Jianfeng of the PLA stated that “the US has continuously weakened and hollowed out the one-China principle, strengthened the so-called official exchanges with Taiwan, and condoned ‘Taiwan independence.’” Jing underscored that due the US’ allegedly revisionist behavior and intent to contain China, the PRC’s military operations around the Taiwan Strait are especially justified (Xinhua, June 4).

On June 4, General Li Shangfu’s SLD address should be contextualized as Beijing’s justification for refusing Washington’s invitation, as well as Li’s response to Austin’s speech. Refuting Austin’s allegations of “coercion and bullying”, Li indirectly criticized the US by positing three questions. First, “who is disrupting peace in the Asia-Pacific?” Second, “what are the root causes of chaos and instability?” Third, “what should we stay vigilant and guard against?” (Ministry of National Defense of the PRC, June 4). Here, a link can be drawn between the “who” and “what” in Li’s reference to China’s position paper on “US Hegemony and Its Perils,” which accused the US of acting boldly to “pursue, maintain and abuse hegemony” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, February 2023).

In opposition to the purported US-led hegemonic order, Li promoted Xi Jinping’s proposed “Global Security Initiative” (GSI) as a “new path to security, featuring dialogue over confrontation, partnership over alliances, and win–win [cooperation] over zero-sum [logic]” (Xinhua, June 5). The GSI represents the CCP’s latest endeavor to promote a constructive image of China, serving a similar role to China’s previously employed “peaceful rise” narrative, albeit with a broader scope and greater ambition. [3] Through the GSI, Beijing seeks to frame a Sinocentric world order as a viable alternative to the international security framework established by the US (China Brief, March 3). Under this initiative, China brokered the Saudi-Iran peace deal (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, March 10), comparable to the US-led Abraham Accords to uphold peace in the Middle East. In addition, the PRC is the only country to have issued a position paper on advocating for the “Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, February 24). Both these cases exemplify China’s interest in challenging what it sees as the US-led international order.

Conclusion

Overall, China’s rejection of Austin’s proposed meeting and Li’s subsequent plenary address underscore Beijing’s non-conciliatory stance towards the US, and its overarching suspicion of a US-led order. Chinese state media has claimed that the SLD has been hijacked as an international forum for US-led diplomatic and military containment of China, arguing that the dialogue has become “a platform for the US defense secretary to expound on the US’ regional security strategy” (Global Times, June 1). Furthermore, during his address, Li repeatedly accused the US of a “Cold War mentality” and rebuked the American-led Indo-Pacific Strategy for “provoking bloc confrontation” and promoting “self-interest” (IISS, June 4). Much of these statements reflect a prominent and longstanding theme in CCP discourse, namely an underlying assumption that the US and its allies seek to “encircle” China under the auspice of an international liberal order (Global Times, 2022).

According to the view consistently espoused by Li and Chinese state media, the responsibility for repairing bilateral mistrust lies squarely with the US. However, despite Washington’s repeated proposals to initiate bilateral talks, Beijing readily dismissed these dialogues under the pretense of American coercion, bullying and containment. It appears that, at least at present, the PRC has minimal interest in restoring US-Sino relations to a semblance of normalcy.



Notes

[1] Cancelled the China-US: Theater Commanders Talk, Defense Policy Coordination Talks (DPCT), and Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) meetings.

[2] To note, from June 18-19, Anthony Blinken visited China. For details, see US Department of State, ‘Secretary Blinken’s Visit to the People’s Republic of China (PRC)’, June 19, 2023. https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinken ... china-prc/

[3] On February 21, China issued a position paper on GSI. For details see, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, ‘The Global Security Initiative Concept Paper’, February 21, 2023. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/ ... 28348.html

[ramana]

Shyam Saran in Beijing

https://www.tribuneindia.com/columnist/shyam-saran-74

Comment

India-China ties at a crossroads

Beijing apparently feels that Delhi has proved to be adept and agile in advancing its interests


Dubious: No clarity on the LAC enables China to play on supposed ambiguities to encroach upon Indian-held territory. ANI

Shyam Saran

Former Foreign Secretary and Honorary Fellow, CPR

I was in Beijing earlier this month to participate in the annual World Peace Forum. On the sidelines, there was a closed-door interaction on the India-China border issue, at which several Chinese scholars were present. There were also opportunities for conversations with some current and former Chinese officials. These provided a window to a range of Chinese perceptions about India and the prospects for India-China relations.

One Chinese complaint was that India ‘downgraded’ the SCO by hosting a brief online summit rather than holding an in-person meeting.

The Chinese continue to insist that the border issue should be properly situated as only one component in the full range of relations, that it should not be allowed to define their overall character. This is an implicit rejection of the Indian position that the situation on the border is ‘abnormal’ and this cannot but adversely impact bilateral relations. According to the Chinese, the border situation is ‘stabilised’. The Indian side acknowledges that progress has been achieved in resolving some areas of friction but others remain. One did not perceive any willingness on the part of China to return to the status quo prevailing before the violent clashes at Galwan in eastern Ladakh in June 2020.

Despite the two sides having agreed in several peace and tranquillity agreements — including the Political Parameters and Guiding Principle for the Settlement of the India-China Border Question (2005) — to undertake a joint exercise to clarify the Line of Actual Control (LAC), the Chinese have refused to do so. When the charge is made that India has been ‘nibbling’ away at Chinese territory, one has countered this by pointing out that such ‘nibbling’ could be prevented precisely through a clarification of the LAC, which India is prepared to undertake. The answer to this is that at the meeting in 2004, when this exercise commenced, the Indian side had put forward ‘exaggerated’ claims in the western sector, which could compromise Chinese territorial claims. That China could have rejected these so-called exaggerated claims in its response is not answered. Not clarifying the LAC enables China to play on supposed ambiguities to encroach upon Indian-held territory. The Indian side has a precise idea of the LAC’s alignment. We should not keep saying that there are ‘differing perceptions’ concerning the LAC in some areas. This implicitly concedes that the Chinese side has some justification in contesting the LAC as India claims. Let the Chinese side contest what we consider the alignment of the LAC. We should not even remotely suggest that we have any doubt about where the LAC lies. We don’t.

There was acknowledgement that with improved infrastructure on both sides, Indian and Chinese patrols were encountering each other more frequently and in areas where only occasional patrols were seen earlier. Both sides agreed that the peace and tranquillity agreements concluded earlier may need to be updated.

Overall, the standoff at the border is likely to continue and there seems to be no prospect of disengagement of the heavy troop deployment on both sides. It is also unlikely that the fresh permanent and semi-permanent structures that China has built on its side of the LAC will be dismantled and removed. They represent an enhanced capability which India will need to match.

There were two straws in the wind. A former Chinese PLA officer, who has often commented on the border issue, conveyed to me that the Indian perception that the Galwan clashes were a premeditated and planned operation on the part of Chinese forces was wrong, that it was an ‘accident’. I had not heard this before. If that is indeed the case, why not restore status quo ante?

More recently, during his meeting with Foreign Minister S Jaishankar in Jakarta, Wang Yi, who is now the Director of the Office of the Chinese Communist Party Commission for Foreign Affairs, reportedly said that “both sides should find a mutually acceptable solution to the border problem without letting specific issues define the overall relationship”. This is a restatement of the Chinese position.

But he went on to say that he hopes “the Indian side will meet China halfway and find a solution to the border issue that is acceptable to both sides”.

This seems to be relatively conciliatory language since in the wake of the Galwan incident, Chinese statements were claiming that the area was China’s sovereign territory, which it would defend. This left no room for meeting each other ‘halfway’. Perhaps one is overinterpreting the changed language, but time will tell.

My conversations in Beijing took place soon after Prime Minister Modi’s high-profile and successful state visit to Washington. Chinese anxiety over progress in the Indo-US relations was palpable. There were concerns that India was becoming part of the US strategy of containing China. One question put to me was whether India supported a NATO role in Asia. I said that in my opinion, NATO is concerned with European security and that Asia has several mechanisms to maintain peace and security in the region, including through ASEAN-led mechanisms. There was also anxiety over whether India was trying to exclude China from the Global South. I said it was for China to decide whether it was part of the Global South. The fact that PM Modi took the initiative to convene a meeting of the Global South as part of preparations for the forthcoming G20 summit seems to have caught China by surprise. A reference was made to US attempts to deny ‘developing country’ status to China, which may have economic implications.

One other Chinese complaint was that India had ‘downgraded’ the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) by hosting a brief online summit rather than holding an in-person meeting. The suspicion was that this had been done under US influence.

Overall, one had the impression that China was feeling more unsure of itself and felt that India had proved to be adept and agile in advancing its interests. This may also be related to a certain pessimism one found about China’s economic prospects, even as India seems to have become the new destination for capital and technology flow. Does this presage a shift in the stance towards India? Let us see how events unfold hereafter.

[ramana]

Basically a waste of time in this meeting.
Only useful item is the economic squeeze

[sanman]

[sanjayc]

Dubious: No clarity on the LAC enables China to play on supposed ambiguities to encroach upon Indian-held territory.

Using the same lack of clarity, can't India encroach upon China-held territory, or does ambiguity lie only on one side?

[drnayar]

Dubious: No clarity on the LAC enables China to play on supposed ambiguities to encroach upon Indian-held territory.

Using the same lack of clarity, can't India encroach upon China-held territory, or does ambiguity lie only on one side?

why are you thinking it has not happened ? also would you think GOI would want to advertise that ?

Other countries know.

That's why India is now THE counter to China.

[yensoy]

Shyam Saran in Beijing

https://www.tribuneindia.com/columnist/shyam-saran-74

India-China ties at a crossroads
Beijing apparently feels that Delhi has proved to be adept and agile in advancing its interests
Dubious: No clarity on the LAC enables China to play on supposed ambiguities to encroach upon Indian-held territory. ANI
Shyam Saran
Former Foreign Secretary and Honorary Fellow, CPR
...
One other Chinese complaint was that India had ‘downgraded’ the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) by hosting a brief online summit rather than holding an in-person meeting. The suspicion was that this had been done under US influence.
...

Yeah, I thought so as well. I hope some leaks/comments emerge from those in the know.

Did we just massively devalue SCO by hosting the annual meeting online instead of having a massive in-person congregation? Did we dodge a bullet by not having to deal with the fallout of potentially hosting Putin? Did we prefer to go online because emperor Xi didn't want to attend in person maybe to cut us to size, and we ended up cutting SCO to size instead? So many questions...

China is in a very difficult situation now. Its economy is in a self-inflicted mess, the CPC knows nothing else than to pump money for supposed GDP growth which itself is dubious. The so-called nation of savers it turns out is a nation of consumers of crap housing which has no market and zero scarcity because these matchboxes can be built at will on the infinite land available to developers. Demographics are in steep decline. If CPC is to survive they need to immediately transform the country into a welfare state which will be good for the people and good for the world, but will reduce their iron hold, so they will not.

[ramana]

The online meeting was XJP choice as he did not want to visit India for SCO meet.

What bullet for hosting Putin? His energy lifeline is a savior for the Indian economy.
Besides EU is buying Russian energy anyway.