1965 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

[ramana]

On Friday 7th April 2023 had the honor and privilege to meet Wg Cdr. S. K. Kapoor (Retd) along with a few BRF members.
He is a very active spry gentleman with a keen memory. He is quite familiar with BRF and read the archives on the Night raid on Peshawar.

Wg Cdr S.K. Kapoor is a graduate of JSW later known as NDA of the 1952- 54 batch. He joined the navigator branch and was assigned to transport aircraft. In 1958 he was shifted to Canberra as they were just coming online at Agra. He joined No 5 Tuskers right from the beginning. In those days they flew many training sorties to airfields to practice. The bomber force was quite big with about 90 Canberras of all types(Bombers, Trg, PR), and had their own airbases to disperse and seek shelter. In 1962 the Canberra squadron was on standby but the orders to move to Tezpur were never given by higher-ups. (This confirms what ACM S.K. Mehra (Retd.) told us in 2000 about Hunters all gassed up and loaded but no orders).

The squadron was alerted in April 1965 when Rann of Kutch was going on but it fizzled out. There was ongoing tension since then. Finally, on 1 September 1965, they learned about Pak Army's attack on Chamb under Operation Grand Slam and that the 4 Vampires lost.

He credits Lal Bahadur Shastri for the decision to cross IB and send in the military. The squadron was engaged since 6 September 1965 in attacks on PAF bases. Here he told us the two types of attack planes: bomber (can carry 8x1000 lb or 2x 4000 lb), air interdiction (these carry 4- 20mm Gun-packs and 68mm rocket pods in their wings), and Photo Reconnaissance (PR). Then he described various flight profiles hi-lo-hi, lo-lo-hi, etc based on the target location. To gain range they fly high, and go low to avoid radar, and after attack go back high to escape as fast as possible.

High means up to 45000 feet though they have gone higher. Low meant 1000 ft, but they usually flew much lower at 300 ft or even treetop 100ft in combat. A navigator in Canberra has a very tight space. There is a small table for doing calculations and plotting courses and there is a track on which the navigator lies prone up to the nose. They have a navigation system (Green Satin https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Green_Satin_radar) but it goes dead often. So the course is plotted on the ground and the navigator takes visuals to see how they are doing and makes bearing corrections to the pilot on the intercom. For most of the flights, radio silence is there for the surprise. Only the flight leader is authorized to break radio silence or in a real emergency.

He had participated in six plane raids on Chaklala, Mainwali, Chakjhumra, etc. His biggest moment was the Peshwar raid on the night of Sept 13/14. They were called in for briefing of the select few and the rest were shooed away. The ops room was sanitized to ensure no lurkers. They were told the target and each plane was assigned its attack target and the ammo they will carry. Red 3,4,5,6,7 and 8 were to carry 8x1000. Red-1 and Red-2 were to carry 2x4000 lbs. Only the pilot and the navigator knew their own targets. The others did not know what each plane was assigned. They took off and went to Chandigarh and stopped for refueling. And took off on a low level (low-low-hi) all the way to the Initial Point and climbed to 4k feet height. Squadron Leader P. Gautam was the Target indicator pilot and dropped flares and TI bombs. He was the ninth plane but the first to arrive. The ack-ack opened up they had to climb higher. All the calculations were off and had to redo them on the fly. The release point is earlier than at the calculated height as the parabola arc is higher. Any way he aimed at his target and dropped them at 02:02 am. He turned his head to see two big flashes and his plane shook from the shock wave. Way back was flying high at 16,000 ft via Srinagar, he set the course to Banihal pass (10000 ft), and suddenly he saw two very bright balls of fire pass over his plane coming from behind. Realizing it was an Air-to-Air missile, he ordered the pilot to dive down to 14,000 and cross Banihal. In retrospect apparently, they were jumped by missile-armed Starfighters (the only PAF fighter that could carry missiles in 1965).

The original plan was to do a fuel stop at Chandigarh but realized they had enough to fly back home to AFS Agra, which they did.

He could not participate in the last raid as he had a heavy duty to inform the family of his roommate who died in another raid on Sargodha. He got the onerous duty to inform them and was quite devastated. Normally the squadron leader has to do that job but he was part of another planned raid.

He got Mention in Dispatches as the youtube video linked above shows for the Peshawar raid.

Much later Sq Ldr Goodwin who was Red-6 got to AHQ and saw reports of targets that got destroyed and one of them was that attacked by Red-2.
After 1965 he transferred to the SAM squadron and also attended DSSC, Wellington. based on his experience he asked for a delayed action fuze* and was admonished. He was transferred to Training Command and in 1971 was assigned to a SAM squadron stationed near Mumbai. He had some adventures as a Range officer in the Tilpat range in 1980. He took early retirement later in the 1980s.

Refs:

https://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/hist ... eshawar/4/

and

https://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/hist ... r/goodwin/

Description of the Painting by Gp Capt Gohain:
https://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/Gall ... 5.jpg.html

Wg Cdr S.K. Kapoor was good friends with both Gp Captain Ahuluwalia, who recently passed away in California, and Wg Cdr Goodwin.

* His request for delayed action fuze was to drop the bomb at a low altitude for accuracy but it could lead to fragments hitting the plane. The safe distance was 3000 feet above the blast. So delayed action fuze would give time to escape.

[ramana]

https://theprint.in/defence/1965-sargod ... ft/288878/

Good summary of raids on Sargodha

[wig]

https://www.msn.com/en-in/news/other/he ... 78de&ei=23

Hero of Sardar Post battle of 1965 war felicitated
excerpted

At 87, retired hawaldar Kishan Singh, a resident of Jhunjhunu’s Gudha Gorji village, is the lone surviving hero of the 1965 battle, which has since then come to be known as the Battle of Sardar Post. He was among the seven who were awarded the gallantry medal for his heroic act that day.

In a gun battle that lasted nearly 15 hours, Singh had volunteered to deliver the much-needed ammunition in a jeep to his troops, which he did successfully three times while facing fire from the Pakistani army for almost 800 yards.

On Sunday afternoon, Singh was felicitated by CRPF director general Sujay Thaosen. Home minister Amit Shah also paid tributes to the six CRPF personnel who laid down their lives while fighting off the enemy’s attempt to breach India’s border in 1965.

“The Pakistani army had hidden behind camels when it came to the post. When the firing started, seeing their numbers, we did not expect to live. The good thing was their bombs were dropping in a water body near our post and losing their impact. Most casualties that happened were a result of firing and hand to hand combat. We were less than 300 in number, but were determined to do everything to stop the enemy from taking over our post,” Singh said over the phone.

Detailing Singh’s heroic act while announcing the President’s Gallantry Award, a July 7, 1965, government typewriter written notification, said that on April 9, 1965, the CRPF post at Sardar and Tak in the Rann of Kutch were attacked by the brigade strength Pakistani force, supported by artillery.

“The posts returned the enemy fire which continued throughout the day. While the firing was going on the post commander was asked to rush MMG ammunition to Sardar Post. Constable Kishan Singh promptly volunteered to ferry the ammunition in a jeep to the Sardar Post, 800 yards away despite the heavy shelling of the area by the enemy. He ran the gauntlet of enemy fire three times in order to deliver the much needed ammunition to Sardar Post. Constable Kishan Singh displayed selfless gallantry, courage and devotion to duty of high order in circumstances of danger to his own life,” the notification said.

“My Major told me to get ammunition, as it was exhausted and the firing from the other side continued. I loaded four MMG belts and six boxes of ammunition in the car and drove. I closed my eyes to the bullets flying and did not bother about them because I knew it had to be done. Much later, I realised I had done three rounds. Even today, I remember every detail about it,” Singh said, describing the attack.

Hours after being felicitated, Singh said he missed his friends who died in the battle. “We used to live together in the camp. All of a sudden they (Pakistani army) came and my friends were taken. Even today I miss them like it was yesterday. But we taught a lesson that Pakistan will never forget,” he added.

According to the CRPF’s official website, which lists the Battle of Sardar Post as one of the “milestones of bravery,” 3,500 men of 51st Infantry Brigade of Pakistan, comprising 18 Punjab Battalion, 8 Frontier Rifles and 6 Baluch Battalion, stealthily launched operation Desert Hawk to attack Indian border posts. There were only two platoons guarding the post manned by around 300 personnel, which fought the invading enemy forces. Another two platoons were out on patrol.

[ramana]

A few things that came up after meeting the Tusker Warrior
The IAF Canberra warload of 8000 lbs was quite impressive. RAF usually carried 6000 lbs.
IAF usage of the 4000 lb bomb was unique. Yes its old ordnance but it had a big bang.
I calculated the beta for both the 1000 lb MC and the 4000 lb MC.
Its 9.8 Lbs/Sq in and 14.14 lbs/sq in which means the heavier bomb beta is 1.44 times the lighter bomb.
What this means is it's 1.44 times slower as to be expected.
But it also has a higher mass moment of inertia. IOW words it has less tendency to be swayed by wind effects that can affect its accuracy.
Next, the 4000 lb explosive is 4.6 times the 1000 lb and gives a greater bang.

I wonder if this stock was bought for the B-24 Liberator.
But he did not think so.

Next, the trajectory of Low(300 feet) ingress, lower(100 feet) travel to IP, and pull up to 8000 feet for bomb run, and high 40000 feet egress is unique for IAF. The Canberra books all talk of a high approach, low travel to IP, and pull up to 4000 feet drop and egress at high.

However PAF radar and ground-to-air defenses dictated the IAF mission.

[Tanaji]

Thanks ramanaji for the write up of your meeting

[Roop]

...he asked for a delayed action fuze and was admonished.

Why was he admonished? Why was it considered a bad thing to ask for a delayed-action fuse?

Thanks for all the write-ups about the war. Much appreciated.

[ramana]

An Australian pilot writes about the Canberra quite freely.

https://www.friendsofoddbods.com/p/the- ... pilot.html

[disha]

TWhy was he admonished?...

Me and my friend were visiting zoo. There was this lion majestically perched on the high ground, like he was king of the jungle (and was he!), and then the tourists were photographing with all the oohs and aahs. Once in a while the lion will get up, stroll as if there is no tomorrow and again settle down, sometimes facing the other way or showing the other side.

My friend, whispered to me that he has a question for the Lion. That will definitely make the lion run away. I asked him what the question was. He gave me a written note with the promise that I open it only later, lest I steal his idea. And immediately he jumps in the wide enclosure, goes to the majestic lion and whispers something in his ear.

The lion looks stunned. Gets up. The rest I cannot describe.

Oh the note! Years later, precisely several decades later, I open the note. What my friend wrote down and whispered in the ears of the Lion was:

"As a king of the jungle, showing yourself gloriously to all the tourists, aren't you ashamed that you are naked?"

Alas, I had forewarned him. Some questions are not to be asked. Unless you want your head to be chewed off.

[disha]

^ The above meetup was great. And the Peshawar bomb run is one of the most epochal moment of the 1965 war and the least discussed. In terms of strategic importance, I would say it surpasses Asal Uttar (Battle of Khem Karan '65).

1965 was a major epoch as well for India. An entire movie or series can be made out of it.

[vsunder]

A short write up of mine

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

WHEN JESUS CHRIST FOUGHT FOR INDIA

The 1965 Indo-Pak war saw some of the fiercest tank battles since WW2. WW2 is littered with tank and artillery duels like the Kursk salient battle between German and Soviet forces with very large scale tank and infantry maneuvers against a backdrop of intense artillery barrages.
The Indo-Pak war was envisaged as a four phase attack by Pakistani Army commanders to wrench Kashmir from India. Bolstered by superior weaponry supplied to it by the US under its alliance with Turkey, Iran, UK and the US called the CENTO pact, the Pakistanis were confident that they would drive through and envelope and cut-off Amritsar and gain the GT road and then drive towards Delhi to negotiate a humiliating surrender. It was a tactically brilliant maneuver but failed miserably. Eventually the war was a tactical stalemate but a great strategic victory for India and never after that would Pakistan ever be able to threaten India to capture territory.
The Pakistani plan was to drive their 1st Armored Division equipped with the latest M-47 and M-48 US supplied Patton tanks with a couple of Shermans and Chaffee tanks through the village of Assal Uttar(that translates to True Answer or True North) in Punjab. Thus was set the stage of the Assal Uttar tank battle September 8-10,1965.

On the Indian side, Maj-Gen Gurbaksh Singh GOC 4 Mountain Div. was in charge and ordered the division to fall back and assume a horse shoe defensive position. The Indian battle strategy was over all the brainchild of Brigadier Theograj. Using the terrain and superior tactics and strategy the Indian victory after hard fighting was assured. The Pakistani commander Maj-Gen Nasir Ahmed Khan was killed and Pakistani armor was decimated with the loss of 100 tanks plus 40 more captured intact in mint condition. The Pakistani dream of getting to the GT road was shattered forever.
The battle took place in India about 5-6 km from the international border. 3 Cavalry under Lt-Colonel Salim Caleb and Deccan Horse provided the armor component of the Indian defence. The attached video will tell you more of the role of 3 Cavalry and how they repulsed the Pakistani attack. The bunds and embankments of various irrigation canals were breached and irrigation water allowed to flow out into the fields and when the Pakistani tanks entered the horseshoe, they found a slushy mess that made movement a mess. They were just sitting ducks after that.
But our story concerns the artillery component of the Indian Army. The guns for the battle were provided by 91 Mountain Regiment raised in Ambala on April 1963 by Lt-Col Jesus, that is correct. Gadepalli Prakash Rao was born into a Telugu Brahmin family in Warangal, current Telangana in 1920. The father a bit dismayed with the religious divide threatening the Indian sub-continent, named his son Jesus Prakash Rao. Jesus initially took to studying Zoology, but around 1940 gave up his studies and joined the Indian Army to take part in WW2. Some British Army clerk intimidated with writing down a name like Prakash Rao, enrolled Rao as PR Jesus. So that is how he was known in his Army career. Jesus fought the Japanese at Kohima in WW2. But his shining moment came at Assal Uttar in 1965 in the Indo-Pak war, where along with the Indian tanks, the medium guns of 91 Mountain regiment commanded by Jesus, wreaked havoc on the Pakistani armored thrust leading to a rout. Since battle field communications were in the clear, the Pakistanis were heard to say over their radio that Jesus Christ was giving them hell and pounding their tanks. So indeed Jesus Christ had fought for India.

About "Jesus Christ"
https://www.thequint.com/.../battle-of-asal-uttar-indo...


Lt.-Col Salim Caleb and 3 Cavalry at Assal Uttar---a Documentary
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e32IFuu7pEA
Caleb rose to Major-general and passed away at the Command hospital at Jutogh outside Shimla. In recognition for his gallantry and outstanding command of 3 Cav. Salim Caleb was honored with a Maha Vir Chakra, India's second highest gallantry award. Only 10 Indian tanks were lost in the battle of Assal Uttar.

[Rakesh]

1965 Sargodha attack: How IAF hit Pakistan’s most protected base & destroyed 10 aircraft
https://theprint.in/defence/1965-sargod ... ft/288878/
09 September 2019

[ramana]

Shiv has tweeted the balance of forces in 1965

https://x.com/shiv_cybersurg/status/170 ... 01623?s=20

Armies:



Air forces:

https://x.com/shiv_cybersurg/status/170 ... 32204?s=20

[ramana]

The much-vaunted agreement between the Air Chiefs

https://x.com/shiv_cybersurg/status/170 ... 61593?s=20



As you see it was just rhetoric as it was not observed in practice.

[nachiket]

Shiv has tweeted the balance of forces in 1965
https://x.com/shiv_cybersurg/status/170 ... 01623?s=20

Nice. In addition to qualitative superiority in armour, pakis also had qualitative superiority and quantitative parity with India in Artillery. This is an excerpt from this article on the Battle of Asal Uttar.

Both countries inherited an effective artillery arm with the excellent tradition of british artillery.On paper India entered the war with 628 artillery pieces and Pakistan with 552 artillery pieces.On the ground,Pakistan had a decided superiority.All of India’s guns were WW2 vintage british guns .The bulk being 450 odd QF-25-pounders(87 mm),66 of 3.7 Inch (93 mm) howitzers and around 100 of 140mm british heavy howitzers.Pakistan too deployed 240 odd 25-pounders,72 of 3.7 inch howitzers as well as 72 of 105 mm guns.But its main advantage rested in the excellent american artillery pieces it had acquired — 126 of the 155mm M114 Heavy Howitzers and around 50 of the 203 mm M110 very heavy howitzers with greater range and punching weight than the indian guns. The redoubtable 25-pounder ,a veteran of the second world war was reliable and efficient if somewhat dated and used in bulk by both armies.

Furthermore Pakistani artillery was trained to use the american method of using pre-timed fuzes ,so that projectiles fired at different trajectories would arrive at a target at very short interval for maximum destruction.This also allowed Pakistani artillery to disperse their guns a bit more and they also had better weapon locating equipment.

[ramana]

Th Official War History by MoD states 75% of all casualties were caused by Pak.artillery fire.

Something to ponder.

[nachiket]

Th Official War History by MoD states 75% of all casualties were caused by Pak.artillery fire.

Something to ponder.

We as a nation have had innumerable lessons on the importance of artillery on the battlefield dating all the way back to the first battle of Panipat in 1526. We shouldn't need new ones every decade. Even during Kargil most casualties on both sides were due to artillery and the power of the Bofors guns helped us win that war. Over 20 years later we are still showing no urgency in replacing them and increasing the numbers.

Our lethargy and disinterest in acquiring self-propelled and mounted artillery is even worse. Pakis were operating the M110 self-propelled howitzer in 1965. We only started looking for them after the 1971 war and didn't actually acquire anything till the M46 Catapult solution in the 80's, and only a 100 of those. Pakis have operated M109's for ages now and even got upgraded ones back in 2010. They have also got truck mounted SH-15's from China. We bought 100 K9's and sat twiddling our thumbs even letting the production line remain idle. Pakis have always outnumbered us in self-propelled artillery from the 60's till today. Absolutely shameful.

[fanne]

But low numbers of SPGs were there for a reason (not valid anymore now). In the past, SPG was needed to keep up with the armour thrust. So we ever dashed to say Lahore or say 100 KMs inside TSP, SPG was needed to keep up with the armour. The military leadership concluded, that was never going to happen, we would mostly fight defensive war and maybe just one axis of thrust to disbalance TSP (hence 100 numbers of SPG) if that. The deep territory war was also made redundant with the advent of new clear detergent. Why TSP needed it, who knows, maybe they had dream of still capturing Delhi, 1 mullah =10 dhoti shivering kafirs.

Now the rule of engagement have changed. Due to WLR, accurate counter battery fire, aerial drones, it is important to shoot and scoot, hence more mobile artillery.

[Rakesh]

https://x.com/DefenceReview/status/1705 ... 45677?s=20 ---> Former American diplomat Dennis Kux and British historian John Keay both have said that India clearly was the winner in all metrices of war such as key territory captured, enemy soldiers killed, tanks destroyed. Pakistan didn’t gain anything from the conflict it initiated while the Indians came perilously close to Lahore and Sialkot. In the North, India clearly defeated the Pakistan’s attempt to seize Kashmir by force. This was a significant strategic gain for India. Indian military analysts and thinkers also need to come out of the self loathing and accept the 1965 War as it was – a clear victory. Another important lesson that we can learn today when we see the coverage of the Ukraine Russia conflict and compare it with the events of 1965 India Pakistan war is to command the narrative from the beginning not only at the operational level but at the international level as well.

India-Pakistan War 1965: A Reappraisal
http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news ... appraisal/
22 Sept 2023

[Rakesh]

https://x.com/IndiaHistorypic/status/17 ... 67285?s=20 ---> Man showing his daughter Pakistani tanks which were destroyed by the Indian Army in the Battle of Asal Uttar In Khemkaran, Punjab.

[Manish_P]

"Dekho bitiya, humari fauj ne inhey kaise Patton se Pandubi bana diya "

[bala]

Did India REALLY Win the 1965 War against Pakistan? Shiv Kunal Verma



3:05 1962 Vs 1965 war
6:00 General Chaudhary’s role
9:10 Mountbatten Returns with his Evil Plan
14:48 Major General DK Palit
19:00 Pakistani misread Shastri
20:55 Bhutto’s rise & his importance
23:12 Bhutto & Rann of Kutch connection
24:20 Mao gave Op Gibraltar plan to Bhutto
26:01 Role of Indian Navy in 1965 war
29:17 Understanding Rann of Kutch
32:13 Pak had better weaponry in 1965 war
38:16 India stops Pak in Rann
40:12 Rann is worse than Siachen
45:02 India responded in Kargil
47:50 Operation Ablaze that didn’t happen
49:47 General Harbaksh Vs General Chaudhary
51:48 Was Major General Niranjan Prasad incompetent?
55:31 No intelligence about Ichogil Canal
57:13 Jaggi Nath’s exploits
1:03:22 Operation Gibraltar plan & execution
1:08:48 Why Op Gibraltar failed
1:12:24 Pakistan launches Op Grand Slam
1:16:07 Bhaskar Roy deserved PVC
1:18:50 Why Army Chief delayed air support
1:21:58 Role of Air Force in 1965 war
1:28:52 The tragedy of Lahore
1:38:00 Situation at ceasefire
1:39:15 Army chief lied to PM Shastri
1:43:14 Civilian bombing by Pak Air Force
1:45:52 What happened in Tashkent
1:48:58 Who REALLY won the 1965 war

Note: Shiv Kunal Verma asserts that Mao gave Operation Gibraltar plan to Bhutto

[ramana]

Rohit vats on Twitter

https://twitter.com/KesariDhwaj/status/ ... EKaAA&s=19

The fine print of the 1965 War
If you're trying to understand the Indo-Pak 1965 War and reading/listening on the subject, please be advised on the following to understand the big picture -

--
Overall:
- India did not have the numerical or technical superiority to defeat Pakistan in detail.
- The Indian Army was bigger in terms of infantry and number of artillery guns, but it had to take care of the Chinese border as well.
- And its artillery was mainly of WW2 vintage as compared to modern, US supplied artillery of the Pakistan Army.
- The Pakistan Army had more tanks and more tank regiments as compared to the Indian Army
- Pakistan had 18 tank regiments (806 tanks) versus the Indian Army with 14 tank regiments (712 tanks)
---
(A) Pakistan
1) In 1965, Pakistan Army and the PAF were at the peak of their preparedness in terms of equipment, training and manpower.

2) Both PA and PAF had the latest weaponry then operational in the US Army and the USAF.
3) Pakistani officers had been trained in the West, US primarily on these weapons and how to exploit them.
4) Pakistan Army's Artillery was at its best - again, both in terms of equipment and training. Many a times during the 1965 war, Pakistan Artillery was the deciding factor and stood between Indian victory or loss.
5) While overall India may have had same number or slightly more numbers as compared to Pakistan, these overall numbers are misleading.
6) Pakistan has more tanks (and much more modern tanks) and more modern artillery as compared to India.
[India: 628 artillery pieces (some of this was also deployed in the east)
Pakistan: 552 artillery pieces (including 176 modern, long range American howitzers)]
7) In instances when Pakistan launched offensive against India (Chamb-Jaurian and Asal Uttar), Pakistan Army had OVERWHELMING superiority in terms of tanks and artillery.
---
-> Exhibit 1: Chamb-Jaurian
-> Ratio of Pakistan Army to Indian Army
- Tanks Squadrons - 6:1 (PA tanks were superior)
- Artillery Batteries - 6:1 (18 PA Artillery batteries to 3.5 Indian Artillery batteries)]

-----
-> Exhibit 2: Khemkaran - Asal Uttar
-> Pakistan Army to Indian Army tank regiments
- Pakistan:
- 5 x Patton regiments
- 1 x Chafee Recon Regiment
- 1 x Sherman Regiment.
- India:
- 1 x Centurion Regiment
- 1 x Sherman Regiment (understrength)
- 1 x light AMX regiment(understrength)
- Ratio:
- 3 :1 advantage in favor of Pakistan
- And 5:1 ratio if we consider 1 x Centurion Regiment against 5 x Patton Regiments (only Centurions were capable of taking on the Patton tanks)


---
(B) India
1) The Indian Army and IAF were on an expansion spree after the 1962 war with China.
2) So, technically, IAF may have more aircraft than PAF, but IAF also had a lot of lesser experienced pilots.
3) Further, IAF may have had same or slightly a greater number of experienced pilots as compared to Pakistan but in case of PAF, their pilots were concentrated in lesser squadrons while our pilots were all spread out amongst new squadrons which had been newly raised.
4) This is true for the army as well - the IA was on a massive expansion spree after 1962 and a lot of trained manpower was spread thin over new raisings.
5) Compared to the Pakistan Army which had two armored divisions, India had only one armored division (we did not know PA had raised a new armored division before the war)
---
- I've maintained this for quite some time now that 1965 was the last major effort to change the map of Indian sub-continent through arms and it had all the makings of the 4th Battle of Panipat.
- It did not turn out that way because of our decisive political leadership (PM Shashtri ji), Indian Army leadership (especially the Western Army Commander, Lt General Harbax Singh and some of his amazing sub-ordinates) and the strong will of the humble Indian soldiers.

[ramana]

Pictures one can see.in the tweet.

[Rakesh]

VIDEO: https://x.com/Maverickmusafir/status/17 ... 25029?s=20 ---> 1966: Indian tanks begin to move out of the Sialkot area of Pakistan.

[Manish_P]

Strictly speaking this would be non-military, but then it is relevant..

How India Almost Gave Away Parts Of J&K To Pakistan

India agreed to give up the Poonch salient as well as Uri. To the north India also proposed to give up land in the Gurez sector giving the entire Neelam/Kinshanganga valley to Pakistan. In return, India sought control of the post dominating Kargil town, points out Colonel Anil A Athale (retd).
..
We nearly suffered a similar disaster in 1963, when in the wake of the Chinese aggression of 1962, the United States pressured us to give up land in Kashmir to Pakistan.
..
Ironically, we have to thank Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the then foreign minister of Pakistan, who rejected this outright as he wanted the whole of the Kashmir Valley and territory up to the Chenab river in Jammu division.
..
No sooner that the fighting on the Chinese front ended on November 21, 1962, the US on the promptings of the UK pressured India to begin talks with Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir issue.

In the third round of talks held in Karachi on February 9, 1963, India offered a partition line. Swaran Singh called it a 'Line of Peace and Collaboration' (LOPC).

In this proposal India agreed to give up the Poonch salient as well as Uri. To the north India also proposed to give up land in the Gurez sector giving the entire Neelam/Kinshanganga valley to Pakistan. In return, India sought control of the post dominating Kargil town (these were captured in 1965 and again in 1971 and are currently with India). These proposals were kept secret even within the Government of India. Not just this, Bhutto also requested that India should also not know that Pakistan has leaked these proposals to the Americans and British.

It was and is treated as TOP SECRET in India to date.

The diplomatic telegram that gives details of this Indian offer was declassified by the Americans as per their law.

[ramana]

Link: https://www.usiofindia.org/publication- ... attle.html

Chhamb 1965 - The Artillery Battle
Author : Brigadier MS Chowdhury, VSM (Retd),
Chhamb 1965 - The Artillery Battle

Brigadier MS Chowdhury, VSM (Retd)*

The area Chhamb – Jaurian is bounded by the Kalidhar Range in the North and River Chenab in the South. Both in 1965 and 1971, Indian Army was caught unprepared in this sector, suffered reverses and lost valuable territory. This state of unpreparedness in two successive wars appears to be inexplicable. The area consists largely of flat plains. Flank protection is provided by hills in the North and River Chenab in the South. The only obstacle is River Manawar Tawi which is fordable by tanks in dry season. The sector is in close proximity to the important Pakistani bases of Sialkot and Kharian. The Indian town of Akhnur with its vital bridge is within easy reach. In short it was the ideal area in which Pakistan could have flaunted its newly acquired Patton tanks, artillery and other military equipment under the SEATO and CENTO treaties. From India’s point of view this sector posed many problems – which should have made us all the more wary. It did not! Later we learnt that one of the tasks given to Pakistani forces was to capture Akhnur Bridge earliest.

Taking advantage of the Indian debacle of 1962 and a visibly weak political leadership after Pandit Nehru, Pakistan under the leadership of Ayub Khan and advised by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto planned and launched Operation Gibraltor in the valley followed by Operation Grand Slam in the Akhnur Sector. Pakistan’s infiltration operations- Operation Gibraltor- had failed. The area of Haji Pir bulge had been captured by us. It was clear that Ayub Khan must respond. This took the form of Operation Grand Slam. And as Pakistani preparations proceeded, UN observers did alert India. Our response was somewhat less than the minimum required. 191 Infantry Brigade was deployed in the Sector. 14 Field Regiment was located in Pathankot and was under XV Corps. It was placed in direct support of 191 Infantry Brigade. Later one troop (4 guns) of a medium battery was also made available.

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The following narration is a record of the personal experiences of Captain MS Chowdhury [later Brigadier, VSM (Retired)] as Adjutant and observation post officer of 14 Field Regiment during the 1965 operations, in the Chhamb – Jaurian Sector. Please refer to Sketch P.

14 Field Regiment had been located in Punch from 1960 onwards. On completion of my Young Officers Course I reported to the unit in Dec 1961. Life was difficult as our picquets were on very high features approachable only along steep pathways. This was a difficult start to a career but an ideal grounding for the future.

Towards the end of 1964 excitement built up. We were due for turnover and were to be moved to Pathankot, which did come to pass in Jan 1965. However, the euphoria of a peace posting dissipated speedily as a representative from station headquarters showed a scrubby piece of ground where we were required to pitch our tents. After some haggling we were allotted two houses for captains. One was for the CO and the second one was to be used as a mess. Besides from Mar onwards we started receiving alerts putting us on four hours notice. In effect we had exchanged a field posting for a posting which had all the tensions of a field area with the added irritations of peace time soldiering. Large working parties were required on a daily basis and there was insistence on starting the much disliked family welfare centre.

In Mar 1965 our somewhat less than idyllic existence was sharply interrupted as we were rushed to and deployed in Akhnur. The area of the Rann was hotting up. Wisdom prevailed and this spat was peacefully resolved and we were back in Apr. By now I had taken over as Adjutant and my first challenge was to find a suitable reply to a letter on my table demanding an explanation for not conducting the laid down training cycles.

In the succeeding few months we were able to settle down well and get into the rhythm of training cycles. But this was too good to last. In Jul we rushed back to Akhnur to redeploy in the same gun area vacated by us earlier. This time our intelligence was bang on. Pakistan began infiltrating Gibraltar Force (9000 men) across the Cease Fire Line on 1 Aug from Kargil to Chhamb.

The tasks allotted to these infiltrating columns are well known. As far as we were concerned the infiltrators began to create confusion, disrupt communications, lay ambushes and attack isolated locations and troops. Our response was astounding. As soon as any information from any source, whether reliable or not, was received, some troops with three guns were rushed post haste to the area of reported infiltration. After a few hours of combing the area and guns firing indiscriminately, this force was pulled back. This happened over several days. Each night the CO, unmindful of the risk (the infiltrators were laying ambushes along the roads) and fatigue accompanied one selected column in order to be with the men. This was well appreciated. Our one notable success was liquidating of some individuals and the capture of one infiltrator. He would have been barely 20 years old, tall and tough with no sign of fear or fatigue on his face. He wore a green shirt and white salwar. He spoke confidently and said, “Saab ek request hai. Humko izzat ki maut dena”.

Round about 8 Aug the regiment was moved forward. Regiment less one battery was deployed below Mandiala Heights and one battery near Dewa. From the new locations we continued our random firing in response to any request made. One such request was, “fire at that grove just to rattle them”. All this while not one shell was fired at us from the other side. This made us complacent and we failed to take normal commonsense precautions. Later we learnt that Pakistan was concentrating 4 Corps Artillery against us in addition to the artillery already deployed and dumping huge amounts of ammunition.

While not one Pakistani gun opened up, their observation post (OP) officers in civilian clothes infiltrated into our area, established a grid, carried out silent registration and selected several advantageous OP positions. They also established contact with selected locals.

15 Aug 1965, a Day of days ! It was pleasant, sunny and cheerful. Happily, with no premonition of the morrow, a Mandir function had been planned. Our Mandir squad was active and on a high. It was planned to utilise our piggery resources for the evening meal along with a special issue of rum. At about 0730 hours without the slightest warning a ferocious artillery assault hit 191 Infantry Brigade with 14 Field Regiment being singled out for special treatment. The enemy had concentrated four batteries of medium guns (155 mm howitzers), four batteries of field guns (105 mm guns), possibly one super heavy gun battery along with a huge amount of ammunition including a disproportionate quantity of airburst shells against three batteries of the obsolescent 25 Pounder guns with limited ammunition. Controlled by the infiltrated OP officers and an airborne observer, this artillery assault of about three hours was a demonstration of masterful technical gunnery and artillery tactics. Each position was dealt with telling accuracy – the air burst ammunition inflicting considerable additional casualties. The gun position at Mandiala was in shambles. Guns were damaged, ammunition was exploding, gun towers were on fire and bedlam reigned supreme. The gallant second in command (2IC), who is incharge of the gun position), unmindful of his own safety rushed about attempting to restore order but to no avail. I put all my efforts to succour the wounded. One of the gun position officers had been hit by a flat saucer sized splinter (possibly from a super heavy shell). The front half of his face had been neatly sliced off. Squashed human parts and splashed gore were a ghastly sight.

My own ‘H’ shaped command post had received a direct hit (there was no overhead cover much less an overhead protection). One technical assistant and an operator on one side of the ‘H’ were blown to bits. On the other side one technical assistant, one operator and I got away with minor injuries. I was temporarily blinded.

One battery was deployed near Dewa to support operations in the hill sector to the North. I went there on 14 Aug to see how additional protection could be provided to the guns and ammunition. On the nearby Dewa feature preparations were in full swing for the Brigade Commander’s Orders the next day. Even under the prevailing circumstances the ‘chuna-geru’ routine had not been overlooked! Brigadier Masters, Commander 191 Infantry Brigade, was a fine soldier who retained his poise in the all pervasive chaos. Did the enemy get to know about the ‘O’ group at Dewa? On 15 Aug with uncanny timing and accuracy the ‘O’ group and the guns were hit. The Brigadier was killed probably by a direct hit from a medium shell. There were other casualties and the gun position was battered with several guns receiving direct hits and the ammunition blowing up.

The ensuing chaos was incredible. Positions were abandoned, command and control broken with no effort to restore order succeeding. In his book,‘September 65’, Pakistani Brigadier AAK Chaudhri writes, “Fire was directed with such telling effect that this regiment (14 Field) never recovered from the punishment”. It would be difficult to dispute this assertation. Yet the unit continued to function against great odds.

Intermittent shelling continued for the next two days. We vacated many localities, some of which were promptly occupied by the enemy. Additional troops were rushed in to recapture our lost localities. I was the OP officer with 2 SIKH which recaptured two lost localities. It was amazing to see the CO, Colonel Khanna, lead his men by the sheer force of his personality. He led – literally led – his unit in the recapture of Red Hill and Green Hill. Each time the battalion went to ground due to heavy fire, the brave CO was on his feet urging his men on. That is how he lost his life a few days later and was awarded the MVC. One learnt how deceptive initial impressions could be. Colonel G S Sangha (CO 3 MAHAR) and Major Bhaskar Roy (20 LANCERS) appeared to be easy, genial and jolly nice officers. Both were to go on to win the MVCs. But as it often happens in battle, there were many many acts of gallantry which went unrewarded. In the next few days, all the lost positions had been recaptured by us.

We were facing a shortage of manpower, ammunition, spares and defence stores. I was tasked to go back to Pathankot to see what could be done. My arrival at Pathankot had been well advertised. Immediately on entry into the cantonment I was mobbed by families and rear parties of several units. It appeared that gross rumours were afloat, such as, ‘CO had gone over to Pakistan; the whole brigade had been wiped out; and that Pakistani forces were racing towards Pathankot, having taken Akhnur’. It appeared that the main culprits behind these rumours were the men who had left their positions and had fled to Pathankot. That day I learnt yet another important lesson pertaining to operations: “rumours are a natural collorary to the fog of war”. Very active measures are required to control the corrosive effect of this menace.

The final result of this trip was positive. Not only did I return with some men of my unit, but other units as well; plus the prized booty of defence stores! Much later I was amazed to read in General Musa’s book, ‘My Version’, that ‘Indian defences in Chhamb were strongly held, with barbed wire, were heavily mined and the automatics were located in three tiered concrete pill boxes’.

The unit was reorganised and redeployed with the regiment less one battery in area Chhamb (near Mandiala) and one battery further North to support the hill sector. Soon thereafter we received the bad news that the CO (in his substantive rank) and the 2IC had been removed. A wave of dismay swept across the unit. It was clear that they had been made scapegoats since the Brigade Commander was not within easy reach (having probably occupied his place in Valhalla).

Enemy artillery continued to batter us. Our gun area had acquired such a bad reputation as the most dangerous spot on earth that very few visitors ventured upto it. Even senior officers who came to castigate our performance, did so from the safety of our wagon lines (WL). This is a secure area where the gun towing vehicles are located to prevent them from being hit.

In view of these unhappy circumstances I had devised a unique way of briefing those who required it but were not inclined to savour the delights of an infamous gun area. A mirror map was kept in the WL and briefing was carried out on the line from gun area to WL using this map.

Towards the last few days of Aug enemy artillery action decreased to a tolerable level. After the travails of the past few weeks the euphoria was delightful. Pleasant sun shine, carefree swims in Manawar Tawi, an odd shikar and good quality rations made our existence highly cheerful. But what were our intelligence orgainsations doing? Chhamb was an ideal area for operations for Pakistan with the vital prize of Akhnur within easy reach. Pakistan was smarting from the failure of its infiltration operation and could not have been expected to idly let bygones be bygones.

In the early morning hours of 1 Sep we were once again subjected to a ferocious artillery assault. And yet again we were caught with our pants down. Enemy artillery fire lasted for a good three hours after which came the assault by infantry and armour. Soon enemy armour was swarming in the area. Later it broke through at Mandiala and came close to HQ 191 Infantry Brigade. Frantic calls for air support were made at about 1000 hours. The response materialised at around 1800 hours in the shape of four aircraft. These aircraft may or may not have annoyed the enemy but they hit us well and proper. Armour, guns and ammunition were attacked and damaged by them. Later all four aircraft were shot down by Pakistani aircraft within our sight. During the next two days of battle the IAF did not make an appearance.

By the evening of 1 Sep troops in the area were ordered to withdraw to Akhnur. Our unit withdrew in good order and was redeployed in the area of Akhnur.

On 4 Sep the situation was:-

(a) 10 Infantry Division which was under raising was made responsible for this sector.

(b) 41 Infantry Brigade had partially prepared its defences at Jaurian and was already under heavy enemy pressure.

(c) 28 Infantry Brigade which was the Corps reserve was at Fatwal Ridge (about 10 km West of Akhnur) preparing a hasty delaying position.

(d) Area of Kalidhar Ridge was strongly held by us.

(e) 191 Infantry Brigade was preparing defences in the area of Akhnur.

At Akhnur we got the news that 161 Field Regiment at Jaurian had abandoned their guns and had been decimated. From where we were, we saw the men streaming back in disorder. There was strong criticism against the unit. And there was sharp unease in our unit. We were probably the next who would face the fire storm. We pondered over the issue of how to control the situation in the face of the ferocious artillery assaults we had been subject to inside semi prepared defences. We got plenty of uninformed ciriticism from the senior officers and very little inspirational leadership. The main reliance was on threats of sacking and court martial. This technique of leadership of “You better do it ….. or else” is not the best thing to do, especially when troops are facing an adverse situation in battle.

6 Sep was a happy day. Our own offensives commenced and enemy artillery activity declined perceptibly! That very night we were ordered to advance and recapture the lost area upto Chhamb. This operation could not make much headway due to heavy enemy fire. Thereafter 10 Infantry Division was reorganised and plans cast afresh.

By the time cease fire was declared we had succeeded in recapturing most of the lost area. However, parts of Kalidhar were still held by the enemy. We were involved in the recapture of these areas post cease fire. Thus 14 Field Regiment which was among the first units to be involved in operations was among last ones which continued to operate even after cease fire. But we got precious little credit for it.

In summation, my own view is that we had been soundly trounced by our Pakistani counterparts. Not only they had better equipment, they used it to best effect. They executed the principle of surprise and concentration in a masterful way – we being the main victims. They showed superior technical gunnery chiefly in predicted fire and accuracy. Occupation and vacation of gun areas was expertly done. Though short of ammunition, which was imported and its resupply in jeopardy, they fired enormous quantity of ammunition to make a telling impact in the initial battles. They appeared to have an abnormally large quantity of airburst ammunition. We were lucky in that quite a few rounds had failed to explode. They showed special skill in the delivery of harassing fire to make it acutely damaging. The emphasis was on a jagged pattern of firing, irregular timing, skillful choice of targets and in firing the right quantity of ammunition. At the end of few days quite a few men in the gun positions were nervous wrecks. We had a job on our hands in preventing the spread of this infection. They used more modern means of communications to great advantage vis-à-vis our good old Radio Set 62. The survey was speedy and accurate which added to the efficacy of predicted fire. Another area where great damage was done to us was in preparatory bombardment. This fire was delivered before every assault and it relied chiefly on the heavy artillery.

Their chief forte was in counter bombardment with retaliatory fire hitting our guns speedily and with accuracy. They had the advantage of availability of gun locating radars which were supplemented by flash spotting, sound ranging, survey, silent registration and innovative and daring OP officers. Such was the effect of their counter bombardment that at a critical stage of battle 41 Infantry Brigade was denied vital fire support. Every major operation began with a heavy counter bombardment and then the fire was shifted to the objectives. Subsequently, during lull in battle and between phases, our guns were again hit-repeatedly.

In all honesty it has to be admitted that Pakistani air OP and ground OP officers were a class apart. They showed high skill in the direction and control of artillery fire. They worked in an unconventional manner which we were not able to emulate. So high was their resolve that they were willing to operate outside the protection of Geneva Convention. Many wore civil clothing and established contact with the locals. They lived in abandoned houses and called for fire from atop trees and houses. They showed special skill and spirit in operating as stay behind OPs. This is not to suggest that our OP officers showed less courage. But they did lack that feeling of elitism as well as training in tactical aspects of gunnery. Up to this point our emphasis had been largely on the technical aspects of gunnery.

Without doubt artillery was their key arm and it did outclass us by a good margin. Happily by 1971 this trend had been reversed and we battered them round for round and in most cases established fire superiority. We had learnt our lessons well!



*Brigadier MS Chowdhury, VSM (Retd) was commissioned in the Regiment of Artillery in 1961 and retired as Sub Area Commander, Jharkhand, Orissa and Bihar in 1994. He has been Chief Instructor at the USI since 11 Sep 2000.

Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CXLIII, No. 592, April-June

[Manish_P]

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Chhamb 1965 - The Artillery Battle
Author : Brigadier MS Chowdhury, VSM (Retd),
Chhamb 1965 - The Artillery Battle

Brigadier MS Chowdhury, VSM (Retd)*

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Without doubt artillery was their key arm and it did outclass us by a good margin. Happily by 1971 this trend had been reversed and we battered them round for round and in most cases established fire superiority. We had learnt our lessons well!
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..only to be almost forgotten again?