1965 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

[ramana]

On Friday 7th April 2023 had the honor and privilege to meet Wg Cdr. S. K. Kapoor (Retd) along with a few BRF members.
He is a very active spry gentleman with a keen memory. He is quite familiar with BRF and read the archives on the Night raid on Peshawar.

Wg Cdr S.K. Kapoor is a graduate of JSW later known as NDA of the 1952- 54 batch. He joined the navigator branch and was assigned to transport aircraft. In 1958 he was shifted to Canberra as they were just coming online at Agra. He joined No 5 Tuskers right from the beginning. In those days they flew many training sorties to airfields to practice. The bomber force was quite big with about 90 Canberras of all types(Bombers, Trg, PR), and had their own airbases to disperse and seek shelter. In 1962 the Canberra squadron was on standby but the orders to move to Tezpur were never given by higher-ups. (This confirms what ACM S.K. Mehra (Retd.) told us in 2000 about Hunters all gassed up and loaded but no orders).

The squadron was alerted in April 1965 when Rann of Kutch was going on but it fizzled out. There was ongoing tension since then. Finally, on 1 September 1965, they learned about Pak Army's attack on Chamb under Operation Grand Slam and that the 4 Vampires lost.

He credits Lal Bahadur Shastri for the decision to cross IB and send in the military. The squadron was engaged since 6 September 1965 in attacks on PAF bases. Here he told us the two types of attack planes: bomber (can carry 8x1000 lb or 2x 4000 lb), air interdiction (these carry 4- 20mm Gun-packs and 68mm rocket pods in their wings), and Photo Reconnaissance (PR). Then he described various flight profiles hi-lo-hi, lo-lo-hi, etc based on the target location. To gain range they fly high, and go low to avoid radar, and after attack go back high to escape as fast as possible.

High means up to 45000 feet though they have gone higher. Low meant 1000 ft, but they usually flew much lower at 300 ft or even treetop 100ft in combat. A navigator in Canberra has a very tight space. There is a small table for doing calculations and plotting courses and there is a track on which the navigator lies prone up to the nose. They have a navigation system (Green Satin https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Green_Satin_radar) but it goes dead often. So the course is plotted on the ground and the navigator takes visuals to see how they are doing and makes bearing corrections to the pilot on the intercom. For most of the flights, radio silence is there for the surprise. Only the flight leader is authorized to break radio silence or in a real emergency.

He had participated in six plane raids on Chaklala, Mainwali, Chakjhumra, etc. His biggest moment was the Peshwar raid on the night of Sept 13/14. They were called in for briefing of the select few and the rest were shooed away. The ops room was sanitized to ensure no lurkers. They were told the target and each plane was assigned its attack target and the ammo they will carry. Red 3,4,5,6,7 and 8 were to carry 8x1000. Red-1 and Red-2 were to carry 2x4000 lbs. Only the pilot and the navigator knew their own targets. The others did not know what each plane was assigned. They took off and went to Chandigarh and stopped for refueling. And took off on a low level (low-low-hi) all the way to the Initial Point and climbed to 4k feet height. Squadron Leader P. Gautam was the Target indicator pilot and dropped flares and TI bombs. He was the ninth plane but the first to arrive. The ack-ack opened up they had to climb higher. All the calculations were off and had to redo them on the fly. The release point is earlier than at the calculated height as the parabola arc is higher. Any way he aimed at his target and dropped them at 02:02 am. He turned his head to see two big flashes and his plane shook from the shock wave. Way back was flying high at 16,000 ft via Srinagar, he set the course to Banihal pass (10000 ft), and suddenly he saw two very bright balls of fire pass over his plane coming from behind. Realizing it was an Air-to-Air missile, he ordered the pilot to dive down to 14,000 and cross Banihal. In retrospect apparently, they were jumped by missile-armed Starfighters (the only PAF fighter that could carry missiles in 1965).

The original plan was to do a fuel stop at Chandigarh but realized they had enough to fly back home to AFS Agra, which they did.

He could not participate in the last raid as he had a heavy duty to inform the family of his roommate who died in another raid on Sargodha. He got the onerous duty to inform them and was quite devastated. Normally the squadron leader has to do that job but he was part of another planned raid.

He got Mention in Dispatches as the youtube video linked above shows for the Peshawar raid.

Much later Sq Ldr Goodwin who was Red-6 got to AHQ and saw reports of targets that got destroyed and one of them was that attacked by Red-2.
After 1965 he transferred to the SAM squadron and also attended DSSC, Wellington. based on his experience he asked for a delayed action fuze* and was admonished. He was transferred to Training Command and in 1971 was assigned to a SAM squadron stationed near Mumbai. He had some adventures as a Range officer in the Tilpat range in 1980. He took early retirement later in the 1980s.

Refs:

https://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/hist ... eshawar/4/

and

https://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/hist ... r/goodwin/

Description of the Painting by Gp Capt Gohain:
https://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/Gall ... 5.jpg.html

Wg Cdr S.K. Kapoor was good friends with both Gp Captain Ahuluwalia, who recently passed away in California, and Wg Cdr Goodwin.

* His request for delayed action fuze was to drop the bomb at a low altitude for accuracy but it could lead to fragments hitting the plane. The safe distance was 3000 feet above the blast. So delayed action fuze would give time to escape.

[ramana]

https://theprint.in/defence/1965-sargod ... ft/288878/

Good summary of raids on Sargodha

[wig]

https://www.msn.com/en-in/news/other/he ... 78de&ei=23

Hero of Sardar Post battle of 1965 war felicitated
excerpted

At 87, retired hawaldar Kishan Singh, a resident of Jhunjhunu’s Gudha Gorji village, is the lone surviving hero of the 1965 battle, which has since then come to be known as the Battle of Sardar Post. He was among the seven who were awarded the gallantry medal for his heroic act that day.

In a gun battle that lasted nearly 15 hours, Singh had volunteered to deliver the much-needed ammunition in a jeep to his troops, which he did successfully three times while facing fire from the Pakistani army for almost 800 yards.

On Sunday afternoon, Singh was felicitated by CRPF director general Sujay Thaosen. Home minister Amit Shah also paid tributes to the six CRPF personnel who laid down their lives while fighting off the enemy’s attempt to breach India’s border in 1965.

“The Pakistani army had hidden behind camels when it came to the post. When the firing started, seeing their numbers, we did not expect to live. The good thing was their bombs were dropping in a water body near our post and losing their impact. Most casualties that happened were a result of firing and hand to hand combat. We were less than 300 in number, but were determined to do everything to stop the enemy from taking over our post,” Singh said over the phone.

Detailing Singh’s heroic act while announcing the President’s Gallantry Award, a July 7, 1965, government typewriter written notification, said that on April 9, 1965, the CRPF post at Sardar and Tak in the Rann of Kutch were attacked by the brigade strength Pakistani force, supported by artillery.

“The posts returned the enemy fire which continued throughout the day. While the firing was going on the post commander was asked to rush MMG ammunition to Sardar Post. Constable Kishan Singh promptly volunteered to ferry the ammunition in a jeep to the Sardar Post, 800 yards away despite the heavy shelling of the area by the enemy. He ran the gauntlet of enemy fire three times in order to deliver the much needed ammunition to Sardar Post. Constable Kishan Singh displayed selfless gallantry, courage and devotion to duty of high order in circumstances of danger to his own life,” the notification said.

“My Major told me to get ammunition, as it was exhausted and the firing from the other side continued. I loaded four MMG belts and six boxes of ammunition in the car and drove. I closed my eyes to the bullets flying and did not bother about them because I knew it had to be done. Much later, I realised I had done three rounds. Even today, I remember every detail about it,” Singh said, describing the attack.

Hours after being felicitated, Singh said he missed his friends who died in the battle. “We used to live together in the camp. All of a sudden they (Pakistani army) came and my friends were taken. Even today I miss them like it was yesterday. But we taught a lesson that Pakistan will never forget,” he added.

According to the CRPF’s official website, which lists the Battle of Sardar Post as one of the “milestones of bravery,” 3,500 men of 51st Infantry Brigade of Pakistan, comprising 18 Punjab Battalion, 8 Frontier Rifles and 6 Baluch Battalion, stealthily launched operation Desert Hawk to attack Indian border posts. There were only two platoons guarding the post manned by around 300 personnel, which fought the invading enemy forces. Another two platoons were out on patrol.

[ramana]

A few things that came up after meeting the Tusker Warrior
The IAF Canberra warload of 8000 lbs was quite impressive. RAF usually carried 6000 lbs.
IAF usage of the 4000 lb bomb was unique. Yes its old ordnance but it had a big bang.
I calculated the beta for both the 1000 lb MC and the 4000 lb MC.
Its 9.8 Lbs/Sq in and 14.14 lbs/sq in which means the heavier bomb beta is 1.44 times the lighter bomb.
What this means is it's 1.44 times slower as to be expected.
But it also has a higher mass moment of inertia. IOW words it has less tendency to be swayed by wind effects that can affect its accuracy.
Next, the 4000 lb explosive is 4.6 times the 1000 lb and gives a greater bang.

I wonder if this stock was bought for the B-24 Liberator.
But he did not think so.

Next, the trajectory of Low(300 feet) ingress, lower(100 feet) travel to IP, and pull up to 8000 feet for bomb run, and high 40000 feet egress is unique for IAF. The Canberra books all talk of a high approach, low travel to IP, and pull up to 4000 feet drop and egress at high.

However PAF radar and ground-to-air defenses dictated the IAF mission.

[Tanaji]

Thanks ramanaji for the write up of your meeting

[Roop]

...he asked for a delayed action fuze and was admonished.

Why was he admonished? Why was it considered a bad thing to ask for a delayed-action fuse?

Thanks for all the write-ups about the war. Much appreciated.

[ramana]

An Australian pilot writes about the Canberra quite freely.

https://www.friendsofoddbods.com/p/the- ... pilot.html

[disha]

TWhy was he admonished?...

Me and my friend were visiting zoo. There was this lion majestically perched on the high ground, like he was king of the jungle (and was he!), and then the tourists were photographing with all the oohs and aahs. Once in a while the lion will get up, stroll as if there is no tomorrow and again settle down, sometimes facing the other way or showing the other side.

My friend, whispered to me that he has a question for the Lion. That will definitely make the lion run away. I asked him what the question was. He gave me a written note with the promise that I open it only later, lest I steal his idea. And immediately he jumps in the wide enclosure, goes to the majestic lion and whispers something in his ear.

The lion looks stunned. Gets up. The rest I cannot describe.

Oh the note! Years later, precisely several decades later, I open the note. What my friend wrote down and whispered in the ears of the Lion was:

"As a king of the jungle, showing yourself gloriously to all the tourists, aren't you ashamed that you are naked?"

Alas, I had forewarned him. Some questions are not to be asked. Unless you want your head to be chewed off.

[disha]

^ The above meetup was great. And the Peshawar bomb run is one of the most epochal moment of the 1965 war and the least discussed. In terms of strategic importance, I would say it surpasses Asal Uttar (Battle of Khem Karan '65).

1965 was a major epoch as well for India. An entire movie or series can be made out of it.

[vsunder]

A short write up of mine

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

WHEN JESUS CHRIST FOUGHT FOR INDIA

The 1965 Indo-Pak war saw some of the fiercest tank battles since WW2. WW2 is littered with tank and artillery duels like the Kursk salient battle between German and Soviet forces with very large scale tank and infantry maneuvers against a backdrop of intense artillery barrages.
The Indo-Pak war was envisaged as a four phase attack by Pakistani Army commanders to wrench Kashmir from India. Bolstered by superior weaponry supplied to it by the US under its alliance with Turkey, Iran, UK and the US called the CENTO pact, the Pakistanis were confident that they would drive through and envelope and cut-off Amritsar and gain the GT road and then drive towards Delhi to negotiate a humiliating surrender. It was a tactically brilliant maneuver but failed miserably. Eventually the war was a tactical stalemate but a great strategic victory for India and never after that would Pakistan ever be able to threaten India to capture territory.
The Pakistani plan was to drive their 1st Armored Division equipped with the latest M-47 and M-48 US supplied Patton tanks with a couple of Shermans and Chaffee tanks through the village of Assal Uttar(that translates to True Answer or True North) in Punjab. Thus was set the stage of the Assal Uttar tank battle September 8-10,1965.

On the Indian side, Maj-Gen Gurbaksh Singh GOC 4 Mountain Div. was in charge and ordered the division to fall back and assume a horse shoe defensive position. The Indian battle strategy was over all the brainchild of Brigadier Theograj. Using the terrain and superior tactics and strategy the Indian victory after hard fighting was assured. The Pakistani commander Maj-Gen Nasir Ahmed Khan was killed and Pakistani armor was decimated with the loss of 100 tanks plus 40 more captured intact in mint condition. The Pakistani dream of getting to the GT road was shattered forever.
The battle took place in India about 5-6 km from the international border. 3 Cavalry under Lt-Colonel Salim Caleb and Deccan Horse provided the armor component of the Indian defence. The attached video will tell you more of the role of 3 Cavalry and how they repulsed the Pakistani attack. The bunds and embankments of various irrigation canals were breached and irrigation water allowed to flow out into the fields and when the Pakistani tanks entered the horseshoe, they found a slushy mess that made movement a mess. They were just sitting ducks after that.
But our story concerns the artillery component of the Indian Army. The guns for the battle were provided by 91 Mountain Regiment raised in Ambala on April 1963 by Lt-Col Jesus, that is correct. Gadepalli Prakash Rao was born into a Telugu Brahmin family in Warangal, current Telangana in 1920. The father a bit dismayed with the religious divide threatening the Indian sub-continent, named his son Jesus Prakash Rao. Jesus initially took to studying Zoology, but around 1940 gave up his studies and joined the Indian Army to take part in WW2. Some British Army clerk intimidated with writing down a name like Prakash Rao, enrolled Rao as PR Jesus. So that is how he was known in his Army career. Jesus fought the Japanese at Kohima in WW2. But his shining moment came at Assal Uttar in 1965 in the Indo-Pak war, where along with the Indian tanks, the medium guns of 91 Mountain regiment commanded by Jesus, wreaked havoc on the Pakistani armored thrust leading to a rout. Since battle field communications were in the clear, the Pakistanis were heard to say over their radio that Jesus Christ was giving them hell and pounding their tanks. So indeed Jesus Christ had fought for India.

About "Jesus Christ"
https://www.thequint.com/.../battle-of-asal-uttar-indo...


Lt.-Col Salim Caleb and 3 Cavalry at Assal Uttar---a Documentary
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e32IFuu7pEA
Caleb rose to Major-general and passed away at the Command hospital at Jutogh outside Shimla. In recognition for his gallantry and outstanding command of 3 Cav. Salim Caleb was honored with a Maha Vir Chakra, India's second highest gallantry award. Only 10 Indian tanks were lost in the battle of Assal Uttar.

[Rakesh]

1965 Sargodha attack: How IAF hit Pakistan’s most protected base & destroyed 10 aircraft
https://theprint.in/defence/1965-sargod ... ft/288878/
09 September 2019

[ramana]

Shiv has tweeted the balance of forces in 1965

https://x.com/shiv_cybersurg/status/170 ... 01623?s=20

Armies:



Air forces:

https://x.com/shiv_cybersurg/status/170 ... 32204?s=20

[ramana]

The much-vaunted agreement between the Air Chiefs

https://x.com/shiv_cybersurg/status/170 ... 61593?s=20



As you see it was just rhetoric as it was not observed in practice.

[nachiket]

Shiv has tweeted the balance of forces in 1965
https://x.com/shiv_cybersurg/status/170 ... 01623?s=20

Nice. In addition to qualitative superiority in armour, pakis also had qualitative superiority and quantitative parity with India in Artillery. This is an excerpt from this article on the Battle of Asal Uttar.

Both countries inherited an effective artillery arm with the excellent tradition of british artillery.On paper India entered the war with 628 artillery pieces and Pakistan with 552 artillery pieces.On the ground,Pakistan had a decided superiority.All of India’s guns were WW2 vintage british guns .The bulk being 450 odd QF-25-pounders(87 mm),66 of 3.7 Inch (93 mm) howitzers and around 100 of 140mm british heavy howitzers.Pakistan too deployed 240 odd 25-pounders,72 of 3.7 inch howitzers as well as 72 of 105 mm guns.But its main advantage rested in the excellent american artillery pieces it had acquired — 126 of the 155mm M114 Heavy Howitzers and around 50 of the 203 mm M110 very heavy howitzers with greater range and punching weight than the indian guns. The redoubtable 25-pounder ,a veteran of the second world war was reliable and efficient if somewhat dated and used in bulk by both armies.

Furthermore Pakistani artillery was trained to use the american method of using pre-timed fuzes ,so that projectiles fired at different trajectories would arrive at a target at very short interval for maximum destruction.This also allowed Pakistani artillery to disperse their guns a bit more and they also had better weapon locating equipment.

[ramana]

Th Official War History by MoD states 75% of all casualties were caused by Pak.artillery fire.

Something to ponder.

[nachiket]

Th Official War History by MoD states 75% of all casualties were caused by Pak.artillery fire.

Something to ponder.

We as a nation have had innumerable lessons on the importance of artillery on the battlefield dating all the way back to the first battle of Panipat in 1526. We shouldn't need new ones every decade. Even during Kargil most casualties on both sides were due to artillery and the power of the Bofors guns helped us win that war. Over 20 years later we are still showing no urgency in replacing them and increasing the numbers.

Our lethargy and disinterest in acquiring self-propelled and mounted artillery is even worse. Pakis were operating the M110 self-propelled howitzer in 1965. We only started looking for them after the 1971 war and didn't actually acquire anything till the M46 Catapult solution in the 80's, and only a 100 of those. Pakis have operated M109's for ages now and even got upgraded ones back in 2010. They have also got truck mounted SH-15's from China. We bought 100 K9's and sat twiddling our thumbs even letting the production line remain idle. Pakis have always outnumbered us in self-propelled artillery from the 60's till today. Absolutely shameful.

[fanne]

But low numbers of SPGs were there for a reason (not valid anymore now). In the past, SPG was needed to keep up with the armour thrust. So we ever dashed to say Lahore or say 100 KMs inside TSP, SPG was needed to keep up with the armour. The military leadership concluded, that was never going to happen, we would mostly fight defensive war and maybe just one axis of thrust to disbalance TSP (hence 100 numbers of SPG) if that. The deep territory war was also made redundant with the advent of new clear detergent. Why TSP needed it, who knows, maybe they had dream of still capturing Delhi, 1 mullah =10 dhoti shivering kafirs.

Now the rule of engagement have changed. Due to WLR, accurate counter battery fire, aerial drones, it is important to shoot and scoot, hence more mobile artillery.

[Rakesh]

https://x.com/DefenceReview/status/1705 ... 45677?s=20 ---> Former American diplomat Dennis Kux and British historian John Keay both have said that India clearly was the winner in all metrices of war such as key territory captured, enemy soldiers killed, tanks destroyed. Pakistan didn’t gain anything from the conflict it initiated while the Indians came perilously close to Lahore and Sialkot. In the North, India clearly defeated the Pakistan’s attempt to seize Kashmir by force. This was a significant strategic gain for India. Indian military analysts and thinkers also need to come out of the self loathing and accept the 1965 War as it was – a clear victory. Another important lesson that we can learn today when we see the coverage of the Ukraine Russia conflict and compare it with the events of 1965 India Pakistan war is to command the narrative from the beginning not only at the operational level but at the international level as well.

India-Pakistan War 1965: A Reappraisal
http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news ... appraisal/
22 Sept 2023

[Rakesh]

https://x.com/IndiaHistorypic/status/17 ... 67285?s=20 ---> Man showing his daughter Pakistani tanks which were destroyed by the Indian Army in the Battle of Asal Uttar In Khemkaran, Punjab.

[Manish_P]

"Dekho bitiya, humari fauj ne inhey kaise Patton se Pandubi bana diya "

[bala]

Did India REALLY Win the 1965 War against Pakistan? Shiv Kunal Verma



3:05 1962 Vs 1965 war
6:00 General Chaudhary’s role
9:10 Mountbatten Returns with his Evil Plan
14:48 Major General DK Palit
19:00 Pakistani misread Shastri
20:55 Bhutto’s rise & his importance
23:12 Bhutto & Rann of Kutch connection
24:20 Mao gave Op Gibraltar plan to Bhutto
26:01 Role of Indian Navy in 1965 war
29:17 Understanding Rann of Kutch
32:13 Pak had better weaponry in 1965 war
38:16 India stops Pak in Rann
40:12 Rann is worse than Siachen
45:02 India responded in Kargil
47:50 Operation Ablaze that didn’t happen
49:47 General Harbaksh Vs General Chaudhary
51:48 Was Major General Niranjan Prasad incompetent?
55:31 No intelligence about Ichogil Canal
57:13 Jaggi Nath’s exploits
1:03:22 Operation Gibraltar plan & execution
1:08:48 Why Op Gibraltar failed
1:12:24 Pakistan launches Op Grand Slam
1:16:07 Bhaskar Roy deserved PVC
1:18:50 Why Army Chief delayed air support
1:21:58 Role of Air Force in 1965 war
1:28:52 The tragedy of Lahore
1:38:00 Situation at ceasefire
1:39:15 Army chief lied to PM Shastri
1:43:14 Civilian bombing by Pak Air Force
1:45:52 What happened in Tashkent
1:48:58 Who REALLY won the 1965 war

Note: Shiv Kunal Verma asserts that Mao gave Operation Gibraltar plan to Bhutto

[ramana]

Rohit vats on Twitter

https://twitter.com/KesariDhwaj/status/ ... EKaAA&s=19

The fine print of the 1965 War
If you're trying to understand the Indo-Pak 1965 War and reading/listening on the subject, please be advised on the following to understand the big picture -

--
Overall:
- India did not have the numerical or technical superiority to defeat Pakistan in detail.
- The Indian Army was bigger in terms of infantry and number of artillery guns, but it had to take care of the Chinese border as well.
- And its artillery was mainly of WW2 vintage as compared to modern, US supplied artillery of the Pakistan Army.
- The Pakistan Army had more tanks and more tank regiments as compared to the Indian Army
- Pakistan had 18 tank regiments (806 tanks) versus the Indian Army with 14 tank regiments (712 tanks)
---
(A) Pakistan
1) In 1965, Pakistan Army and the PAF were at the peak of their preparedness in terms of equipment, training and manpower.

2) Both PA and PAF had the latest weaponry then operational in the US Army and the USAF.
3) Pakistani officers had been trained in the West, US primarily on these weapons and how to exploit them.
4) Pakistan Army's Artillery was at its best - again, both in terms of equipment and training. Many a times during the 1965 war, Pakistan Artillery was the deciding factor and stood between Indian victory or loss.
5) While overall India may have had same number or slightly more numbers as compared to Pakistan, these overall numbers are misleading.
6) Pakistan has more tanks (and much more modern tanks) and more modern artillery as compared to India.
[India: 628 artillery pieces (some of this was also deployed in the east)
Pakistan: 552 artillery pieces (including 176 modern, long range American howitzers)]
7) In instances when Pakistan launched offensive against India (Chamb-Jaurian and Asal Uttar), Pakistan Army had OVERWHELMING superiority in terms of tanks and artillery.
---
-> Exhibit 1: Chamb-Jaurian
-> Ratio of Pakistan Army to Indian Army
- Tanks Squadrons - 6:1 (PA tanks were superior)
- Artillery Batteries - 6:1 (18 PA Artillery batteries to 3.5 Indian Artillery batteries)]

-----
-> Exhibit 2: Khemkaran - Asal Uttar
-> Pakistan Army to Indian Army tank regiments
- Pakistan:
- 5 x Patton regiments
- 1 x Chafee Recon Regiment
- 1 x Sherman Regiment.
- India:
- 1 x Centurion Regiment
- 1 x Sherman Regiment (understrength)
- 1 x light AMX regiment(understrength)
- Ratio:
- 3 :1 advantage in favor of Pakistan
- And 5:1 ratio if we consider 1 x Centurion Regiment against 5 x Patton Regiments (only Centurions were capable of taking on the Patton tanks)


---
(B) India
1) The Indian Army and IAF were on an expansion spree after the 1962 war with China.
2) So, technically, IAF may have more aircraft than PAF, but IAF also had a lot of lesser experienced pilots.
3) Further, IAF may have had same or slightly a greater number of experienced pilots as compared to Pakistan but in case of PAF, their pilots were concentrated in lesser squadrons while our pilots were all spread out amongst new squadrons which had been newly raised.
4) This is true for the army as well - the IA was on a massive expansion spree after 1962 and a lot of trained manpower was spread thin over new raisings.
5) Compared to the Pakistan Army which had two armored divisions, India had only one armored division (we did not know PA had raised a new armored division before the war)
---
- I've maintained this for quite some time now that 1965 was the last major effort to change the map of Indian sub-continent through arms and it had all the makings of the 4th Battle of Panipat.
- It did not turn out that way because of our decisive political leadership (PM Shashtri ji), Indian Army leadership (especially the Western Army Commander, Lt General Harbax Singh and some of his amazing sub-ordinates) and the strong will of the humble Indian soldiers.

[ramana]

Pictures one can see.in the tweet.

[Rakesh]

VIDEO: https://x.com/Maverickmusafir/status/17 ... 25029?s=20 ---> 1966: Indian tanks begin to move out of the Sialkot area of Pakistan.

[Manish_P]

Strictly speaking this would be non-military, but then it is relevant..

How India Almost Gave Away Parts Of J&K To Pakistan

India agreed to give up the Poonch salient as well as Uri. To the north India also proposed to give up land in the Gurez sector giving the entire Neelam/Kinshanganga valley to Pakistan. In return, India sought control of the post dominating Kargil town, points out Colonel Anil A Athale (retd).
..
We nearly suffered a similar disaster in 1963, when in the wake of the Chinese aggression of 1962, the United States pressured us to give up land in Kashmir to Pakistan.
..
Ironically, we have to thank Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the then foreign minister of Pakistan, who rejected this outright as he wanted the whole of the Kashmir Valley and territory up to the Chenab river in Jammu division.
..
No sooner that the fighting on the Chinese front ended on November 21, 1962, the US on the promptings of the UK pressured India to begin talks with Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir issue.

In the third round of talks held in Karachi on February 9, 1963, India offered a partition line. Swaran Singh called it a 'Line of Peace and Collaboration' (LOPC).

In this proposal India agreed to give up the Poonch salient as well as Uri. To the north India also proposed to give up land in the Gurez sector giving the entire Neelam/Kinshanganga valley to Pakistan. In return, India sought control of the post dominating Kargil town (these were captured in 1965 and again in 1971 and are currently with India). These proposals were kept secret even within the Government of India. Not just this, Bhutto also requested that India should also not know that Pakistan has leaked these proposals to the Americans and British.

It was and is treated as TOP SECRET in India to date.

The diplomatic telegram that gives details of this Indian offer was declassified by the Americans as per their law.