We could export them across the world, even maybe to the US and Russia both
And we could have regular quality testing across our Western border

1) Scary? First of all, stop dhoti shivering.
Admiral sir, doesn't seem like 'dhoti-shivering' per se on part of the posters. Some clearly mention about factoring in the propaganda multiplier parameter. A continually updated honest assessment about what we are facing and how to counter it is in our interest.
Minimum deterrence stockpile will obviously not be static. It directly co-relates to what your opponents are able to bring to bear (both offensive and defensive).
That exactly, seems to be the point the posters are making (IMHO of course).
Saar, I was referring to the term 'scary' used by YashG. That is why I said not to dhoti shiver.
Indeed. But if we are hoping to match what the Chinese have in terms of numbers, then that will not work.
It is precisely because we have not met the minimum deterrence force capability, we are in the disjointed mess.Manish_P wrote: ↑03 Apr 2024 20:58On a tangent but IMVHO this habit of relying on 'minimum deterrence' and relying (hoping) on our Government to bring the opponents to the negotiating table seems to have tied down the thinking of our top brass. This effect seems to be directly visible in our fragmented and disjointed procurement process.
Saar, we have posters (in other threads) talking about a 200 squadron strength for the IAF, when we are struggling to hit 42.
I agree. I didn't say that.
We have grown over the past few decades, our opponents have grown as well. Has our defence budget grown in proportion? Then add to that our currency devaluation vis a vis the USD (the universal currency of arms trade). Can the current budget allocation meet the minimum deterrence requirements?...
So there has to be a balance between what is required and what the budget can realistically afford...
Admiral there is a thin line between dhoti-shiver and to be concerned about the preparations of our adversary. You want your country also to prepare well.
Lets say we cancel gold plated western bloatware and go all in on Tejas. So 27 squadrons of Tejas in multiple variants ---> Mk1, Mk1A, Mk2, etc. At an average of 20 aircraft per squadron, we are looking at 540 aircraft. Add another 272 Su-30MKIs, which at present is 13 squadrons and the two Rafale squadrons of 36 aircraft. That is 42 squadrons or 848 combat aircraft. 42 is the bare minimum that is required by the IAF.YashG wrote: ↑04 Apr 2024 10:11Admiral there is a thin line between dhoti-shiver and to be concerned about the preparations of our adversary. You want your country also to prepare well.
Regarding matching number for number to China- what Ukraine war has shown is that beyond a point your industrial capacity becomes the winning factor. So it is fine that cheen produces 300K and we only 30K (that is also a 10X difference) but during war you capacity should be able to go up by 10X. We need to put in that capacity in place. We need to get out of mindset of buying double digit gold plated western bloatware and instead buy but also setup 10X scalable production lines of khurdura desi maal.
^^^Rakesh wrote: ↑04 Apr 2024 20:12Lets say we cancel gold plated western bloatware and go all in on Tejas. So 27 squadrons of Tejas in multiple variants ---> Mk1, Mk1A, Mk2, etc. At an average of 20 aircraft per squadron, we are looking at 540 aircraft. Add another 272 Su-30MKIs, which at present is 13 squadrons and the two RafaleYashG wrote: ↑04 Apr 2024 10:11Admiral there is a thin line between dhoti-shiver and to be concerned about the preparations of our adversary. You want your country also to prepare well.
Regarding matching number for number to China- what Ukraine war has shown is that beyond a point your industrial capacity becomes the winning factor. So it is fine that cheen produces 300K and we only 30K (that is also a 10X difference) but during war you capacity should be able to go up by 10X. We need to put in that capacity in place. We need to get out of mindset of buying double digit gold plated western bloatware and instead buy but also setup 10X scalable production lines of khurdura desi maal.
.........
much present on both occasions, but yet the Chinese have been unable to dislodge India from the heights. Why? They certainly have the military might and the industrial output to push India out of there. So what is stopping them? Do it.
It will be a while before we close that gap ---> https://statisticstimes.com/economy/chi ... conomy.phpYashG wrote: ↑04 Apr 2024 21:37 1. Can india match numerical superiority.
In PPP terms we are only half the chinese economy - but we are closing the gap. (we are growing at 6-7% while china is at ~5%) In 4-5 years that gap will be less. Indian GDP = 65% of Chinese GDP. So our numbers can and should match up the GDP size. Any less, means we are just dozing off and not preparing well. So just by GDP logic, we can afford more. If we had trouble buying 83 tejas, that was our own making. Like I say the real 0.5 front is inside MoD hollowing out our war preparedness before even a single bullet is fired and all nationalists should focus on this internal enemy.
How long do you think a war - not a low intensity conflict, but a full blown war - between India and China will last?YashG wrote: ↑04 Apr 2024 21:372. How long india china war last.
China is a not a country, it is basically a group of businessmen. They will attack india not because they have any ideological issue but purely if they think India has become a problem to their business. When companies like Apple move out production to India. (right now its a trickle and they hardly care) But they will care if we become better at production or just simply have way too many mor ehands to carry out production. So they can try for a quick sharp war but war is unpredictable and last. It will not be good for China but status quo will also not be as good for them, especially if they keep seeing their economic heft sliding towards India. It will mirror the logic that Russia had for attacking Ukraine. It was bad short-term but Russia didnt want to see Ukraine slide away.
On the other hand the west will not only not intervene but they will be actively benefited if India and China go to dogs by fighting. It will stop and perhaps re-shift the economic centroid of the world back to transatlantic region - away from China.
Okay, lets play this game...YashG wrote: ↑04 Apr 2024 21:373. China's mass production threat to wear down their adversaries
This video is not a trap. It is Schrodinger's cat. It would be a trap only if China was not capable of doing mass production. It is Schrodinger's cat because we will not know how good is Chinese production and what their stockpiles are really until we fight them. The only way to handle this situation is prepare for the worst.
I say again - China has the military might and the industrial output to push India out of heights. In fact, it will be a nice and welcome warm-up exercise for Xi Pooh Bear, prior to the invasion of Taiwan. Why wait? Just send those drones and end the suspense. In fact, China will not even need to station J-10s, J-11s, J-16s and J-20s in Tibet. Everything can be done with drones alone. Once all the Indian troops and bases end up as dust, then the mighty PLA can walk into the heights akin to a Saturday afternoon stroll, singing The East Is Red.YashG wrote: ↑04 Apr 2024 21:374. China's low bar of sustaining body bags
I agree. But given China can anyway produce 100X or 1000X more drones than us while we do school projects on drone in our forces. They will wipe off Indian soldiers with drones in hordes, like in Russia-Ukraine war. China is the original drone producer. They will produce astronomic quantities, adapt them quickly to any defense we have against them. Our numerical superiority will count but not as much if a drone operator 20kms away can kill our infantry. Videos will be brutal.
It boils down to priorities. In a country that has countless Yojanas, Schemes and Missions for the population, national security ranks very low. It does not affect a large section of the population directly or daily, so this is not an issue that is on the forefront of people's mind. And from this very pool of people come our politicians. And for our Babus, the Ministry of Defence is like any other Ministry in the Govt i.e. The Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution OR The Ministry of Fisheries, Animal Husbandry and Dairying. To a Babu (who gets transferred from one Ministry to the next during his/her tenure), purchasing weapons is no different - administratively speaking - than animal husbandry or purchasing grains.Manish_P wrote: ↑04 Apr 2024 00:07 We have grown over the past few decades, our opponents have grown as well. Has our defence budget grown in proportion? Then add to that our currency devaluation vis a vis the USD (the universal currency of arms trade). Can the current budget allocation meet the minimum deterrence requirements?
Very true and very accurately pinpointed. IMHO you have put the spot light on the very source of the issue. Rest all follows from this..Rakesh wrote: ↑07 Apr 2024 00:57 It boils down to priorities. In a country that has countless Yojanas, Schemes and Missions for the population, national security ranks very low. It does not affect a large section of the population directly or daily, so this is not an issue that is on the forefront of people's mind....
There is no long term thinking or vision, so then how can the defence budget grow in proportion to the economy?
That is the worrying part.National Security is not a priority for the citizenry, including for some in the armed forces. See this ---> viewtopic.php?p=2616650#p2616650
How long depends upon what the aggressor's motive are = China's motives.
Lets follow your advice ---> The only way to handle this situation is prepare for the worst.YashG wrote: ↑07 Apr 2024 18:59 How long depends upon what the aggressor's motive are = China's motives.
If it is to decisively destroy India's industrial capacity or disarm India. In either cases, It can be a long campaign unless India capitulates. So how long will India hold. I believe as long as it takes. So it will become a war of attrition. The otherway round is India defeats china - that will also require that India builds huge & decisive stockpiles
War of attrition vs war of manouevre
https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/p ... ar-ukraine
So it could last long enough that industrial production capacity & stockpiles will come into question.
Saar, I asked you this before and I ask again...YashG wrote: ↑07 Apr 2024 18:59Admiral I understand your point, that Indian politics, economics & social situation does allow india to do the stockpiles or build up military strength proportion to its GDP. If thats a limit you're pointing. I Agree.
But that is the problem, ideally that a problem to be solved and if we are not solving it - we are simply not preparing well. Jingos shouldn't be ready to accept that we are preparing anything less than 100%.
Very interesting info and a good question to end it. How good will the Chinese Navy be, in actual combat?The job of commanding a nuclear submarine should go to smart and well-qualified officers. Or at least that's the case in Western navies.
Not so in the Chinese navy. Chinese submarine officers — except for engineers — tend to come from candidates with the lowest college entrance test scores, according to a US analyst. This suggests that People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) sub commanders are not the best and the brightest officers most poised to cope with the stresses and challenges endemic to submarine warfare.
"Based on Gaokao national college entrance exam scoring information for PLA [People's Liberation Army] academic institutions, the PLAN Engineering University on average ranks number two on test scores across PLA academic institutions," according to a paper written by Roderick Lee, an expert on the Chinese military, for the China Maritime Studies Institute at the US Naval War College. "Meanwhile, the Submarine Academy consistently ranks among the bottom three of all PLA institutions."
"Assuming a student's Gaokao score is generally indicative of overall performance potential, this suggests that PLAN submarine officer cadets tracking towards non-engineering department positions are inferior to their engineering brethren," Lee said.
Rivalry between the engineers on the lower decks who keep the ship's engines running, versus bridge officers such as captains, navigators and weapons officers, isn't unusual in any navy; in the US, by contrast, all submarine officers and commanders are trained in nuclear engineering. By the time a Chinese officer reaches submarine command, they've had more than a decade of training and fleet experience since taking their college entry tests.
Still, the selectivity disparity inside the Chinese navy is remarkable, given that submarines would be one of China's most important weapons in a conflict with the US, Japan or Taiwan. The PLAN currently operates around 60 submarines, including 6 armed with nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles, plus 6 nuclear- and 46 diesel-powered attack subs armed with a variety of anti-ship missiles and torpedoes.
Whether academic prowess equates to military competence has always been up for debate. History is full of commanders — such as George McClellan in the American Civil War — who proved more impressive in the classroom than on the battlefield. On the other hand, the legendary George Patton nearly flunked out of West Point.
Regardless, the Chinese navy seems to have had doubts about those commanding its surface ships and submarines: higher-level officers would often sail with them to supervise. "Historically, a PLAN submarine captain's authority could be eroded by the presence of more senior officers onboard," Lee noted. "The issue of flotilla-level leadership deploying to single-ship formations and 'babysitting' ship captains was such an issue for the PLAN surface fleet that the PLAN explicitly prohibited the practice in 2019."
It is not clear to what degree senior officers continue to babysit submarine skippers, who already have to share authority with a political commissar aboard each vessel. There is evidence that having a senior officer effectively take command of a submarine breeds resentment among a sub's crew. Perhaps not coincidentally, Lee notes that flotilla commanders and staff were aboard when the Ming-class diesel sub SS-361 sank in 2003, as well the near-loss of the Kilo-class SS-372 in 2014.
Submarine duty is already arduous and isolating, and command conflicts only exacerbate what appears to be a mental health crisis among Chinese commanders and crews. When researchers from China's Second Military Medical University conducted a survey in 2021 of submarine crews in the PLAN's South China Sea fleet crews, 21 percent reported experiencing mental health issues. Sailors and officers "in the submarine force in the South China Sea are facing mental health risks and suffering from serious psychological problems," concluded the study, which listed education — along with age and experience — as the best predictors of mental health for sub crews.
"Life in the PLAN submarine service is difficult," Christopher Sharman, director of the China Maritime Studies Institute, told Business Insider. "Conditions are challenging and China has suffered submarine accidents in the past. These variables contribute to making a life in the submarine force less attractive."
The thought of a submarine — especially one powered by a nuclear reactor or even armed with nuclear missiles — being commanded by an officer with a low SAT score is less than reassuring. Nonetheless, Lee believes that China's submarine fleet is still a capable force. There are "no clear and glaring flaws in how the PLAN leads its submarine force. Although its educational system underwent some turmoil in the beginning of the 21st century and continues to encounter challenges today, these challenges do not appear to be substantial enough to dramatically affect operational performance."
Yet the poor educational qualifications of Chinese sub skippers may be a vulnerability that US anti-submarines can exploit, Lee suggests. China's submarine force is more likely to make mistakes since it "draws its leaders from some of the worst-performing officer cadets," Lee said. "Even if the Gaokao score is not indicative of overall human performance, it does reflect some level of intelligence and individual dedication. The PLAN submarine force must therefore rely on its least talented officers to lead forces that may be cut off for days if not weeks at a time."
By stressing Chinese submarine commanders, such as confronting them with multiple or unexpected challenges, they could be goaded into making a mistake. "This may make PLAN submarine officers more likely to suffer from the error precursors of poor proficiency, poor problem-solving skills, inappropriate attitudes towards tasks, imprecise communication habits, and inability to handle stress."
On the other hand, a Chinese submarine captain will have had years of experience and additional training before assuming command. It remains to be seen if his college test scores impact his combat performance.
This looks to be the first time a WZ-7 has been seen near the Philippines and follows the deployment of a new U.S. Army missile system there.
-Source#China PLA has disbanded the Strategic Support Force and announced a new "Information Support Force" responsible for network information systems -- a new step in dominance of the info domain but many questions remain mod.gov.cn/gfbw/sy/tt_214…
I'm only looking at indigenous single engine plane LCA for India & J10 for china.
Which Tejas variant would you like to fill up the 520 number with? The Mk1A or the Mk2?YashG wrote: ↑22 Apr 2024 19:54 Purely on GDP PPP basis & 2028 horizon (next 4 years - for a likely war by 2028 or before), we should be making 80 per year, to match & cover the backlog of 450+ planes. This will leave us with exactly half of chinese inventory. But china would have also added a lot more J20 and we would have added very few AMCAs. So lets add another 40 LCAs to cover up that. SO I would say we should (Although we cant)
This gives me atleast 120 LCAs to be added per year till 2028 = 480+ 40 currently = 520. Since we havent groomed our MIC for this so these numbers are not achievable. But there should atleast be a plan to groom our MIC for this kind of scale up.
And whose fault is that? IAF!!! So IAF really can't complain about not having enough fighters because of their apathy and harebrain refusal to support the local economy of producing planes in scale.Rakesh wrote: ↑22 Apr 2024 20:40
The real issue lies with our apathy in placing timely orders for the existing local maal that we have. The real issue lies with our piecemeal ordering process (i.e. 83 first, then 97 later). The real issue lies with us not investing in flying test beds for the Kaveri turbofan. These are the issues that need to be addressed. The MRFA is a nice punching bag to employ, to cover up the real issues.
When we say Tejas is good, but gold plated western bloatware is bad...we need to put that into perspective.
Retiring Admiral John Aquilino accuses Beijing of gradually raising pressure in South China Sea.
China’s first domestically designed aircraft carrier will introduce the People’s Liberation Army Navy to ‘cat and trap’ naval air operations.