two contrasting articles from two different beedi newspapers
Bangladesh stands sovereign and expects to be treated as such
The message from Chief Advisor Muhammad Yunus to Narendra Modi was blunt: The age of subservient deference to New Delhi is over
16 Apr 2025,
Sideline meetings at regional or transnational summits like BIMSTEC are typically treated as ceremonial rituals -- plenty of pomp and fluff, little substance. Leaders smile for the cameras, exchange pleasantries, and issue vague talking points about cooperation. But the recent, much-hyped meeting between Bangladesh Chief Advisor Dr Muhammad Yunus and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was anything but business as usual. It was a reset. It broke through the icy awkwardness that had gripped bilateral ties -- and carried the unmistakable air of reckoning.
This was the meeting Dhaka had been pursuing since the early days after Yunus assumed stewardship of a shattered state apparatus, following the mass uprising that toppled former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and sent her pitifully fleeing to India. And it was the meeting New Delhi had been avoiding -- principally because it meant confronting a disquieting reality: India’s usually nimble and sure-footed South Block had miscalculated both the bandwidth and the illusion of control that the Awami League government actually held over Bangladesh.
For over a decade, India’s diplomatic posture towards Bangladesh was built not on the foundation of mutual state interests but on a narrow-minded devotion to an autocrat whose grip on power grew increasingly illegitimate. By blindly backing Hasina -- who governed for 10 of her 15 years without a credible electoral mandate, through a reign marked by corruption, repression, and authoritarian drift -- India forfeited the trust of the Bangladeshi people. Worse, it became seemingly complicit in the very machinery of control that subjugated them.
Within Bangladesh, India is no longer viewed as a neutral partner or traditional ally. It is seen as the silent architect behind Hasina’s excesses. What was once whispered in activist circles on social media has become rallying cries in public squares. For many, New Delhi did not merely enable a dictator -- it was the power behind the throne, reaping disproportionate benefits while turning a blind eye to systemic abuses. India had become part of the problem.
For many, New Delhi did not merely enable a dictator -- it was the power behind the throne, reaping disproportionate benefits while turning a blind eye to systemic abuses
Yunus confronts India with the truth it tried to ignore
This meeting did not erase that legacy, but it marked a turning point -- in tone, posture, and geopolitical consequences. It did three things, each of which reverberates far beyond diplomatic choreography.
First, Yunus said what needed to be said -- and said it without blinking: The Hasina era is over. India must engage with the new Bangladesh not as a benefactor dealing with a client, but as a peer engaging an equal. There will be every effort made to ensure that there is no return to the old arrangement. New Delhi’s long-standing habit of viewing its relationship with Dhaka as an extension of its ties to the Awami League was a strategic misstep -- one that now leaves it vulnerable, even though the Modi government will be the last to admit it.
In today’s world -- where American unpredictability is redrawing geopolitical alliances and international political institutions -- India can no longer afford to be tethered to a fallen autocrat. Engagement with Dhaka’s new leadership -- and with whomever follows, as per the mandate given by Bangladesh’s voters -- is not optional. It is imperative.
Second, Yunus did not sidestep the ugly truths of the past decade. He confronted them head-on. He drew Modi’s attention to the UN investigation outlining the human rights abuses that defined Hasina’s premiership -- over 1,400 state-sanctioned killings during the July--August protests, enforced disappearances throughout her terms in office, and a regime of terror that snuffed out dissent. He reminded Modi that these were not just allegations from within Bangladesh -- they were validated by the international community.
The UN has already floated the possibility that Hasina may face charges for crimes against humanity. In shielding her, India now risks being seen as sheltering someone under reliable global scrutiny. While New Delhi is not a party to the Rome Statute, the optics of offering refuge to an ousted authoritarian leader accused of mass atrocity crimes leave a bad taste in the mouths of those who celebrate India as the world’s largest democracy.
But Yunus did not stop there. He confronted Modi directly over the disinformation and misinformation being pumped out from Indian soil -- propaganda aimed at discrediting the interim government and destabilizing Bangladesh’s fragile transition. He was incisive: The propaganda does not just represent cheap theatrics or noise masquerading as discourse. It is sabotage. Trust cannot be rebuilt while lies flow freely across the border.
And the problem is bigger than bad headlines. A sizable bloc of Hasina’s loyalists -- from former members of parliament and cabinet ministers to a coterie of mafia-styled grassroots activists -- many facing serious criminal allegations -- have found safe haven in India. From there, they -- along with a section of the Indian media -- are weaponizing fake news to poison public discourse. It is hardly surprising. India is now the world’s largest hub of disinformation and misinformation -- and these fugitives are plugging directly into that ecosystem.
Third, in a moment of wry but pointed symbolism, Yunus flipped the script. He resurfaced a photograph from 2015 -- one in which Modi is seen awarding him a medal. The image, now circulating widely online, undercut the conspiracies spun by certain Indian media outlets and intellectual circles portraying Yunus as a foreign-backed agitator or a stooge for American and Pakistani interests. The subtext was razor-sharp: If Yunus is the villain, then Modi once decorated the villain. The irony was devastating.
Dhaka will act in its own self-interest in shaping its foreign policy agenda, while remaining willing to enter into a genuinely good-faith-based, mutually beneficial strategic partnership with India that seeks to deliver a win-win outcome for both countries
A strategic realignment
Yunus is no ideologue. He is no populist. He is an economist by training. He is a globally revered Nobel Laureate with deep ties to Indian academia and civil society -- including friendships with well-respected figures like Amartya Sen and the now-deceased Manmohan Singh. He is not staging a revolution but navigating a sensitive, high-stakes evolution. And he is doing so by attempting to build the widest possible coalition -- from leftists to centrists to rightists -- to pull Bangladesh out of a decade-long democratic coma.
Strategically, India now faces a recalibrated neighbour -- confident, clear-eyed, and unafraid to assert its interests. The timing of Yunus’ visit to China ahead of the BIMSTEC summit was deliberate. It was a signal: Bangladesh will act on its own terms, as sovereign nations must. If India will not engage on equal terms, others will. Still, the door to partnership remains open. Yunus indicated readiness to collaborate on shared challenges -- water sharing, trade, border management -- if India approaches the relationship with the seriousness and parity it demands.
Domestically, the political symbolism of the meeting was equally striking. Anti-India sentiment is running high in Bangladesh -- fuelled by years of perceived interference, most notably the 2014 incident when then-Indian Foreign Secretary Sujatha Singh pressured former President Hussein Muhammad Ershad to contest a one-sided election he had no intention of joining. Such meddling is now seen as emblematic of Indian overreach and foreign interference. Canada, the United States, and, closer to home, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and Nepal have all pushed back against covert and overt Indian interference in their electoral and other domestic processes.
And yet, Yunus made the politically risky -- but statesmanlike -- decision to meet with Modi a priority. He understands that foreign policy cannot be dictated by street-level rage, no matter how justified. His message to Bangladeshis: This government will have spine -- but also strategy. And in doing so, Yunus is leaving a template of sorts for how to deal with India once he hands over the steering of the ship of state to his successor in the coming nine to seventeen months or so.
Trust cannot be rebuilt while lies flow freely across the border
Walking a tightrope between reform and restraint
Modi, for his part and as expected, struck familiar chords -- invoking people-to-people ties and voicing concern over minority rights. Yunus responded with clarity. He acknowledged unfortunate incidents against minority groups since the mass uprising but challenged the inflated figures and alarmist narratives circulating in Indian media. He countered fiction with fact -- not deflection -- and, in doing so, created room for a more grounded and honest bilateral dialogue.
The interim government has, to a certain degree, engaged in appeasement politics with hardline Islamist groups. The decision to revert the name of the Mongol Shobhajatra to its original form -- almost certainly in response to pressure -- is troubling. One can only hope this was a calculated concession to maintain calm during a volatile transition, not a signal of ideological compromise. There is still reason to take Yunus at his word when he says Bangladesh will not stray from the pluralistic values on which it was founded. This is not a Taliban-style state, and it will not become one -- especially given the realities of electoral politics.
Meanwhile, Yunus’ interim government has secured meaningful diplomatic wins in the past month. A tangible way forward on Rohingya repatriation -- beginning with 180,000 refugees -- is gaining traction. The UN Secretary-General’s visit and renewed engagement with Beijing have further boosted Dhaka’s international standing. A successfully organized and refreshingly competent investment summit to draw foreign direct investment from Europe, the Middle East, ASEAN countries, the United States, and others -- and most importantly, the way in which Bangladesh was presented and the people who pitched Bangladesh -- has been admired across the board. That credibility is hard for India to dismiss.
The big picture is this: Yunus and his team are trying to steer Bangladesh back from the brink. The derailment came last August. The train is inching back onto the tracks. And once the train is firmly back on the tracks -- with foundational reforms implemented through political consensus, not imposition -- elections will be held, and a new government will take the wheel.
India--Bangladesh relations -- complex, uneven, and historically asymmetrical -- remain essential to both nations’ futures. But the terms are changing. The balance is no longer tilted solely in India’s favour. Dhaka’s new leadership is speaking with unflinching conviction. It expects to be treated as an equal. And if the Yunus-Modi meeting is any indication, that expectation is finally being heard.
This was no ordinary sideline meeting. It was both an invitation -- and a warning. The question now is whether India is ready to listen and act as a strategic ally, and not as a hegemon. India’s first move after the Yunus-Modi meeting was to revoke the transshipment facility previously extended to Bangladesh. Advisors of the interim government quickly dismissed it, saying the decision would have little real impact.
The tit-for-tat between New Delhi and Dhaka will continue. Bangladesh’s political reality remains in flux -- volatile, contested, and fluid. But the country’s diplomatic direction has shifted. Yunus and his team have made it clear that this is a government working for the people, not for foreign interests. Criticism at home is necessary -- and expected. But on the global stage, Yunus has stood firm, and Bangladesh has made it clear that it will no longer be pushed around -- with his personal reputation now tightly bound to that stance.
Trade, trust and transit between Bangladesh and India
Yunus Modi meeting BIMSTEC 2025
Chief Adviser Professor Muhammad Yunus and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi met on the sidelines of the BIMSTEC summit in Thailand on April 4, 2025.
India's withdrawal of the transshipment facility for Bangladesh—which allowed Bangladeshi exports to reach third countries through India—could potentially cause a significant setback in bilateral relations between the neighbouring nations. Launched in 2020, the facility had allowed Bangladeshi goods, particularly RMG, to move through Indian land to reach their global destinations, thereby enhancing trade efficiency and saving costs.
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Jaishankar’s remarks on Bangladesh: A deeper understanding is necessary
Undoubtedly, the abrupt withdrawal of this facility, without a phase-down period, undermines the progress made in bilateral trade facilitation over the past few decades. The experience also highlights the exposed nature of South Asian regional cooperation and the need for resilient, mutually reinforcing and beneficial trade arrangements that can withstand political and economic shocks. In fact, South Asia has already been ranked as the least economically integrated region in the world, with intra-regional trade constituting only 5 percent of the region's total trade volume, compared to ASEAN's 25 percent, North America's 40-50 percent, and the European Union's 60-65 percent. The low degree of integration has been caused by a legacy of perceived political tensions, divergent perceptions on bilateral and mutual security affairs, absence of infrastructure, and non-tariff barriers, which have been stifling regional trade potential for the past couple of decades.
The recent withdrawal by India also does not help alleviate diplomatic tensions that have been brewing between Bangladesh and India for some time. In the aftermath of the unexpected political shift in Bangladesh on August 5, 2024—which saw the fall of the Awami League-led government through a student-led democratic uprising—the bilateral relationship entered a new phase of uncertainty. A notable manifestation of this transition was the visible rise in acrimonious rhetoric, a proliferation of misinformation from the Indian media, and an uptick in nationalistic posturing from various quarters in both countries. However, the strategic imperatives and the socio-economic interdependencies that underpin the relationship between the neighbours continue to provide a strong justification for recalibrating bilateral engagement through dialogue, diplomacy, and pragmatic cooperation.
Bangladesh-India's deep historical linkages—particularly the role India played during the 1971 Liberation War—serve as a strong basis for sustained cooperation, especially in areas such as cultural exchange, people-to-people connectivity, and trade. The geographical contiguity and ethnic ties across the borders further cement the relationship, facilitating an exceptional level of social interaction uncommon elsewhere in South Asia. Additionally, the two countries share a wide range of mutual interests in domains including disaster management, basin-wide river management, forest conservation, cross-border security, and marine resource governance. Yet, despite these historical and structural advantages, the relationship is not without its complexities. Periodic border skirmishes and killings, water-sharing disputes, and unresolved political sensitivities have, at times, strained this strategic partnership. The current phase, marked by the political transition in Dhaka, is one such inflection point where diplomacy must be agile and empathetic. Several issues, such as cross-border killings, the long-pending Teesta water-sharing agreement, and the status of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina—now residing in India—have become flashpoints, complicating the diplomatic environment.
In such a fraught context, it remains imperative to separate state-level policies from populist or partisan narratives. The volatility of the current moment, while challenging, also offers an opportunity: a chance to reassess and reinvigorate bilateral relations based on shared interests and mutual respect.
Against this backdrop, one noteworthy development was the meeting between the Chief Adviser of the Bangladesh interim government Professor Dr Muhammad Yunus and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on the sidelines of the BIMSTEC Summit on June 4 in Thailand. This represented a diplomatic milestone. The unexpected nature of this engagement, being the first high-level dialogue since the regime change in Dhaka, made it particularly significant. The meeting not only provided a platform for a direct exchange of views but also symbolised a mutual willingness to acknowledge the complexities at hand. While the public statements issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bangladesh and India's Ministry of External Affairs appeared to diverge in tone and emphasis, the very act of dialogue signalled a step towards constructive engagement. The Bangladeshi side reportedly prioritised concerns over border violence, water-sharing issues, and the call for the extradition of Sheikh Hasina. Meanwhile, India expressed concerns over regional security, particularly the rise of extremist forces and the persecution and protection of minorities in Bangladesh. Despite these divergent priorities, both sides acknowledged the necessity of continued dialogue—a crucial step towards building a conflict-resilient diplomatic framework.
Another important factor in increasing dialogue and cooperation between the two nations is the security dynamics of Eastern South Asia, which highlight the necessity for close cooperation between Dhaka and New Delhi. The rise of the Arakan Army along the Bangladesh-Myanmar border, the protracted Rohingya refugee crisis, and the latent threat posed by non-state insurgent actors represent shared security challenges. These threats are transnational in nature and cannot be effectively addressed in isolation. Political and security cooperation, underpinned by mutual recognition of each other's sovereignty and core interests, becomes not just desirable but essential. The current instability in Myanmar, combined with the potential for radicalisation among displaced communities, has the capacity to destabilise the broader Bay of Bengal region. A robust, trust-based Bangladesh-India partnership is therefore a critical pillar in ensuring regional peace and stability.
A defining feature of Bangladesh-India relations over the past two decades has been the development of multi-tiered institutional frameworks for dialogue and cooperation. These include joint working groups, border management coordination mechanisms, and shared intelligence platforms. Reinvigorating these structures in the current political climate is vital for managing misunderstandings, preventing escalation, and fostering predictability. However, rebuilding the structures to better bilateral relations must follow a new template—not that of the past regime, whose cooperation between the two nations served India's national and economic interests in a lopsided manner. Bangladesh's chief adviser has reiterated that rebuilding the relations must be done to benefit both nations equally.
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A setback for Bangladeshi exporters
Moreover, a key challenge in the digital age is the weaponisation of information. The spread of disinformation and fabricated narratives through social media has emerged as a potent destabilising force, fuelling mistrust and animosity at the grassroots level. Even after the meeting between the two leaders, hostile rhetoric in sections of the Indian media has continued towards the current government of Bangladesh. Both governments must prioritise cyber diplomacy and information hygiene by establishing fact-checking protocols, digital literacy campaigns, and cross-border communication frameworks to combat this emerging threat.
The present uncertainty in Bangladesh-India relations, while concerning, also offers a rare opportunity to redefine the terms of engagement, and it is imperative that both nations seize it. The political transition in Bangladesh has altered the dynamics of bilateral diplomacy, but it has not diminished the strategic logic that binds the two nations. In fact, the challenges of the current moment underscore the need for more—not less—engagement. The Yunus-Modi meeting serves as a beacon of cautious optimism, a reminder that even in moments of political flux, diplomacy can prevail. To ensure a stable and prosperous South Asia, it is imperative for both nations to transcend short-term disagreements and invest in a long-term, cooperative framework grounded in mutual respect, historical solidarity, and shared aspirations. Only through sustained dialogue, robust institutional cooperation, and an unwavering commitment to truth and transparency can Bangladesh and India chart a course through this testing time and emerge with a stronger, more resilient partnership.
), and familial relationship when we offer transactional ones (eg. when the nepalis were spazzing about the gorkhas during the agniveer introduction), point being these will never be satisfied, so why not try something different to your usual strategy of mollycoddling that has blown in your face every time without fail?
