only posting materials relevant to the wider brics though the article id about china russia friendship, most of it is regurgitation from the past
The difference lies in Russia’s diminished enthusiasm for the UN following its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and the use of UN institutions by other states to articulate condemnation of the war and Moscow’s broader conduct. As a result, Russia’s focus has narrowed to the work of the UNSC. China’s priorities and interests in the UN are more comprehensive, and its willingness to participate in the full spectrum of UN institutions is greater. Moreover, China actively promotes the work of the UN, for example initiating a dispute with the US in the World Trade Organization over additional duties imposed on Chinese goods by Trump in April 2025.17
The friendship between the two states has a strong impact on their voting patterns at the UN. In most cases, this voting is perfectly aligned, though there are important areas of divergence that highlight the limits of friendship and discrepancies in strategic priorities. Below are three areas at the UN where China and Russia diverge, and where their friendship has less bearing on their BRICS allies.
The key test for China and Russia’s friendship came immediately after Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. At the time, four BRICS members were on the UNSC – China and Russia (permanent), and Brazil and India (non-permanent). Russia was alone in voting against, and as a result vetoing, resolutions concerning the war. For instance, Russia vetoed draft resolution S/2022/160 in February 2022 on convening an emergency special session of the UN General Assembly (UNGA), while China and India abstained. Brazil supported the resolution.
In September 2022, Russia was again the only permanent member to veto draft resolution S/2022/720, condemning Russia’s referendums in the occupied territories and violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, proposed by Albania and the US. This time, the other BRICS members of the UNSC – China, Brazil, and India – all abstained.
These voting results underscored the lack of support for Russia’s invasion and the limits of its ability to leverage friendships on the global stage. It managed to secure favorable votes from a few of its satellite states and allies in the UNGA – Belarus, North Korea, Eritrea, and Syria voted with Russia against the draft UNGA resolution condemning the invasion and calling for an end to Russia’s unlawful use of force. India abstained, while Brazil voted in favor.
Previous research has shown that the China-Russia alignment and the BRICS alignment are usually reflected in voting patterns at UNGA, but BRICS countries have refrained from offering even symbolic support to Russia for the war in Ukraine.20 Since 2022, China has abstained on UNGA resolutions condemning Russia’s aggression, even when, in 2025, the US voted against such a resolution. China’s UN mission has consistently explained that it advocates for the restoration of peace, and at no point has it expressed support for Russia’s policy towards Ukraine. Chinese ambassadors to the UN have repeatedly said that, while “the legitimate security concerns of all countries must be taken seriously,” the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states must be respected. 21
Moscow’s BRICS leverage has also appeared limited in the UN Human Rights Council, which adopted Resolution A/HRC/RES/51/25 appointing a special rapporteur on the human rights situation in Russia. The rapporteur has since produced two annual reports documenting the deterioration of human rights protections in the country. Brazil and India abstained on the resolution, while China voted against, in line with its commitment to the principle of non-interference in the domestic political affairs of states
Both China and Russia regard their permanent seats on the UNSC as central to their global roles. For the Kremlin, this status has become part of the state ideology and it is used to uphold the legacy of victory in World War II and justify its ambition to shape global affairs. Both states use UNSC votes to project their perspectives on contemporary international issues and governance more broadly. In recent years, Since 2000s, their voting alignment has been nearly complete — whether in support of resolutions or expressing discontent with specific framings through abstention. This pattern has remained unchanged since 2022. They even jointly vetoed several resolutions, although China, unlike Russia, is more restrained in wielding its veto power. They vetoed a US resolution on North Korea in 2022, and US-sponsored resolutions on Gaza in 2023 and 2024. This pattern illustrates a significant level of diplomatic coordination in asserting the two states’ global aspirations.
While coordination is strong, important divergences in voting have occurred. Closer scrutiny of these instances reveals nuance in Moscow and Beijing’s positions that reflects distinct strategic and normative concerns. Most are related to Africa and reflect both countries’ interest in expanding their influence on the continent. The voting on resolutions on Mali, Somalia and Sudan illustrates the issues on which the two states diverge
In its efforts to win support among African states, Russia has used “protectionist” logic to shield its “allies” from international scrutiny. 22 In August 2023, for example, it vetoed a draft resolution on the situation in Mali (S/2023/638). The resolution proposed maintaining the sanctions regime and renewing the mandate of the Panel of Experts, a UN mechanism supporting peace efforts. Moscow objected, citing the demand of the Malian government, which was actively collaborating with Russian Wagner Group mercenaries. China abstained and Brazil voted in favor of the resolution.
China’s position often echoes Russia’s stance toward African states, emphasizing non-interference and the importance of national sovereignty. But China also seems to expect more from governments and insists on a greater role for the African Union (AU) in regional crises. On several Somalia-related resolutions the two states voted similarly, but in October 2022 diverged when China abstained and Russia voted in favor of Resolution 2657, which extended the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia’s mandate. The Chinese representative said Beijing wished to see more effort by the Somali government in capacity building to enhance humanitarian action, protect vulnerable populations, and manage weapons. The Russian representative, speaking after China, briefly acknowledged the humanitarian dimension but avoided discussion of governance. This example also pointed to a difference in the way the two states approach climate adaptation: while Russia occasionally notes climate impacts, China elevates the issue, blaming developed countries for insufficient financial contributions, as it did during discussion of the Secretary-General’s report on Somalia in 2023.23
n contrast to Russia, China wants international organizations to have oversight and conflict engagement functions. While emphasizing respect for sovereignty, Beijing does not treat it as an absolute constraint on multilateral action. It also does not have stakes in Mali, Sudan, or Libya comparable to Russia’s, which might help explain Beijing’s “mildly” interventionist posture. At the same time, China is clearly invested in preserving the UNSC’s credibility among countries in the Global South, particularly in the face of growing frustration over abuse of the veto.
Ensuring the UNSC remains engaged in African crises contributes to China’s reputation on the continent. China also continues to promote the African Union’s role, inviting its deeper involvement in managing regional affairs and supporting the organization at the China-Africa summits. While Russia also hosted an Africa summit in July 2023, it fell short of the scale and development pledges of its Chinese counterpart.
These divisions reflect broader disagreements over the future of global governance. Within the BRICS grouping, Brazil and India — key members of the bloc — have expressed their desire for more ambitious reform than China and Russia are prepared to support, especially concerning institutional practices and UNSC membership.
Despite BRICS’s growing prominence in recent years, its members have not shied away from public disagreements over UN reform. India has openly criticized “a non-Western power” for obstructing reforms, including the expansion of UNSC membership, and accused China of shielding its rival Pakistan. 30 China responded by saying UNSC reforms should not cater to “the selfish interests of a few,” a veiled reference to India. 31 Russia, for its part, expressed rhetorical support for Brazil and India’s bids for permanent membership, but China remained opposed —particularly to India’s inclusion. 32 China also opposed a Brazilian proposal that suggested expanding the permanent membership to include Japan, Germany, India, and Brazil.
That members of the grouping refrained from antagonizing Russia was a diplomatic achievement for Moscow, showing that UNGA condemnation did not translate into isolation by the key rising powers. However, BRICS did not become an amplifier for Russia’s anti-Western and anti-Ukrainian rhetoric, leaving the permanent seat on the UNSC as Russia’s only international tribune on the issue.
The ideological diversity of the bloc has neither prevented political efforts to intensify joint policy-making nor slowed its organizational development. Both China and Russia seem to have realized that seeking ideological alignment across a broad set of issues would be counter-productive, and that the global image and impact of BRICS could best be enhanced through less contentious policy initiatives that work for a broad coalition. The last three years have seen a stronger push for such initiatives and their institutional development and, as a result, BRICS has demonstrated an outstanding degree of policy convergence among members across various issues.
The increase in cooperation between BRICS states after 2021 can be seen in the scope of the declarations from annual BRICS summits. While the 2021 New Delhi and 2022 Beijing declarations included 74 and 75 articles respectively, the 2023 Johannesburg Declaration grew to 94 articles, and the 2024 Kazan Declaration to 131. The growth in cooperation is a result of the intensification of ministerial meetings, expert groups and sub-summits, which laid the ground for further advances in trade, finance, climate, and cultural policies. Developing common cause between ideologically diverse members became a more pronounced practice after 2022, and amounted to building a political bloc through logrolling and prioritizing issues that would be less politically divisive than the war in Ukraine or anti-Westernism. 36 This approach also created room for tweaking issues to advance member state’s own agendas.
