Kargil War Thread - V
Kg, That might be the proper epitah for the Kargil Gamble. The defeated foe knows he has been defeated, yet the victorius one is forced to do intorspection and feel that he was the defeated one. Such are the prils of social enigneering. The whole intorspection stuff is due to the fact that the NDA was the caretaer govt. The DIE and media wont acknowldege their legitimacy and make them introspect. They carry it farther and make the forces and services pay for the political games.
If the PA's role in the Kargil war are examined in any serious detail Musharraf ends up looking like a bloody fool. He cant have that, given how intimately Kargil was tied to his coup against Nawaz, who is now free to speak from safety in the Gulf.
PA Chief of Staff did not survive the disappointment of 1965 and the disaster of 1971. Musharraf cant survive real scrutiny.
That would completely outweigh the feel-good glow about the nuclear factor role in deterring India from crossing the LoC or IB in forces as it did in 1965.
PA Chief of Staff did not survive the disappointment of 1965 and the disaster of 1971. Musharraf cant survive real scrutiny.
That would completely outweigh the feel-good glow about the nuclear factor role in deterring India from crossing the LoC or IB in forces as it did in 1965.
quote="Sharma"]
It is Battalion and not Regiments. At least you should get that right since you are so knowledgeable about everyone else messing up the issue because of total lack of knowledge and incompetence.
Further are you aware of the terrain, the avalanche conditions, the rapid change of weather, the depth of snow etc?
Let's just inform you that even the routine routes for administration are flagged and roped for kms so that one does not step off the route and hurtle down missing the path because the snow deceptively covers the edges!
Those out there are not concerned that should there be an infiltration, they will have to evict the same and in the bargain die!
Joy rides in the biting cold, is it?
there are many IFs which alone could have avoided the Kargil. Atleast the way intrusion came to light and hasty reaction. Kargil was a complete failure at strategic level. And indian defnce forces were again caught offguard and ill prepared ( due to themselves, Babu's , Neta's or erstwhile Track-2 diplomacy).[/quote]
Total failure to those who feel Merlin (not the member, but the wizard) is at hand!
Anoop wrote:How?Sharma wrote: Kargil could have been avoided easily.
And what makes you feel otherwise?If all the routine patrols sent my 121 Bde's regts would have gone on ridges and height instead of taking easier routes i.e. river bed or nallah or valleys.
It is Battalion and not Regiments. At least you should get that right since you are so knowledgeable about everyone else messing up the issue because of total lack of knowledge and incompetence.
Further are you aware of the terrain, the avalanche conditions, the rapid change of weather, the depth of snow etc?
Let's just inform you that even the routine routes for administration are flagged and roped for kms so that one does not step off the route and hurtle down missing the path because the snow deceptively covers the edges!
And who says they don't?If they were allowed to go upto LoC for patrolling and just not a walk upto the suitable terrain.
That's a good one.If WASO patrols were taken seriously and not as formality to complete flying hours.
Those out there are not concerned that should there be an infiltration, they will have to evict the same and in the bargain die!
Joy rides in the biting cold, is it?
Indeed!If Bde Surinder Singh had thought twice before issuing "No-Intrusion" certificates to his higher formations.
Indeed.If RAW could have noticed movement of all reserve and additional battlions to forward area of FCNA.
there are many IFs which alone could have avoided the Kargil. Atleast the way intrusion came to light and hasty reaction. Kargil was a complete failure at strategic level. And indian defnce forces were again caught offguard and ill prepared ( due to themselves, Babu's , Neta's or erstwhile Track-2 diplomacy).[/quote]
Total failure to those who feel Merlin (not the member, but the wizard) is at hand!
I've said before and i'll say again...India's NFU policy is the most idiotic thing in the world of geopolitics...It lets pakis get away with bluffing..
http://ia.rediff.com/news/2006/sep/23ka ... &file=.htm
http://ia.rediff.com/news/2006/sep/23ka ... &file=.htm
What's interesting is that mushy says TSP's nuke capability wasn't operational a year after chagai...On reports that during the conflict, Pakistan had prepared to carry out a nuclear strike against India, Musharraf says in the book, "I can say with authority that in 1999, our nuclear capability was not yet operational. Any talk of preparing for a nuclear strike is preposterous.'
He has to say that for the entire Clinton Admin tilt was based on the activation of the missiles while Badmash was in DC. That showed the rogue nature of the RATS.(Rogue Army of Terrorists) i.e. is out of civilian control. For crisis stability nuclear powers need separation of decision makers and those implementing those decsions.
Meanwhile Pioneer reports on 26 Sept., 2006
Meanwhile Pioneer reports on 26 Sept., 2006
No truth in revelations: Army
Pioneer News Service | New Delhi
Claims made by Pakistan President General Pervez Musharraf in his book In the Line of Fire that only five battalions(about 5,000 men) managed to hold on four divisions(45,000 men) of the Indian Army during the Kargil war in 1999 were rejected by the Army here on Monday.
Rubbishing General Musharraf's "so-called revealations in the book, sources said here facts, on the contrary, pointed out that Pakistan had deployed many more troops including Pakistani regulars and Special Services Group (SSG) commandoes.
They said documents like identity cards, pay books and other identification papers revealed that as many as six to seven Northern Light Infantry(NLI) battalions (more than 7,000 troops) of Pakistan were involved in Kargil operations besides regular Pakistani regular Army troops. The NLI, a para-military organisation of Pakistan was later inducted into the regular Pakistan Army. The NLI units which took part in the Kargil operations included the 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th, 11th and 12th battalions.
Moreover, Pakistan refused to take back the bodies of 245 of its soldiers except five including a captain and the Indian Army performed the last rites. Inputs also indicated that 725 Pakistani soldiers died in the nearly 45-day long operations in the inhospitable terrain and the dead included 45 officers and 68 commandoes of the elite SSG, sources said. It may be mentioned here that about 560 Indian solidiers died in the operations
As regards General Musharraf's claim about a few thousand Pakistani soldiers facing the might of the Indian Army, sources said in any conventional operation the ratio of defenders and attackers was generally one is to three. Elaborating upon this, they said the ratio goes up in the case of moutainous and rugged terrain and can go up to one is to five and even more and it was the case in the Kargil war.
The Indian Army had to launch operations in the hills of Kargil and Drass to drive out well entrenched Pakistanis and it had to be done with superior strength given the situation and terrain, sources said denying that four divisions were deployed.. They said about two and half divisions took part in the operations.
Thanks for reminding me the differnce between regt and battlion but please be careful with what you said after that. I have never pretended to be more knowledgeable than anyone here. There are some good manners to correct some body.RayC wrote:And what makes you feel otherwise?If all the routine patrols sent my 121 Bde's regts would have gone on ridges and height instead of taking easier routes i.e. river bed or nallah or valleys.
It is Battalion and not Regiments. At least you should get that right since you are so knowledgeable about everyone else messing up the issue because of total lack of knowledge and incompetence.
My father was with 22 Grenadiers at that time and came back alive. So may be I know the terrain little bit. By patroling in the valleys and river beds you just can not establish whats happening on the ridges. I know conditions are very tough there but we could have saved many lifes and resources if they have followed the flagged routes instead of convenient tracks.RayC wrote: Further are you aware of the terrain, the avalanche conditions, the rapid change of weather, the depth of snow etc?
Let's just inform you that even the routine routes for administration are flagged and roped for kms so that one does not step off the route and hurtle down missing the path because the snow deceptively covers the edges!
Official Kargil Report and erstwhile COAS.RayC wrote:If they were allowed to go upto LoC for patrolling and just not a walk upto the suitable terrain.
And who says they don't?
I do not know what they though but they did not do what they should have. Poor machines and IMGINT equipments may be the reasons. If they could not detect the intrusion than what else we should understand other than mere formality of Flying hours. And please tone down your sarcasm. I do not post here to get responnses like that. May be you are more knowledgable than me but you need to respect other's view.RayC wrote:If WASO patrols were taken seriously and not as formality to complete flying hours.
That's a good one.
Those out there are not concerned that should there be an infiltration, they will have to evict the same and in the bargain die!
Joy rides in the biting cold, is it?
Due to all this blunders Brig Surinder Singh continued to issue "No-Intrusuion" certificate and you agreed on that. He must be getting same from his battalions.
I get the feeling that most people don't stop at being "slightly critical". Words like "strategic failure", "incompetence", "penchant for golf" etc. are bandied about from the comfortable reclines of an arm chair.
Sharma, you might want to ask your father who the Dy. GOC of 8 Mtn. Div. was during the Kargil war. So yes, RayC knows a lot more about Kargil than the rest of this board put together. Maybe you will learn a lot more if you avoid coming across as the COAS.
Sharma, you might want to ask your father who the Dy. GOC of 8 Mtn. Div. was during the Kargil war. So yes, RayC knows a lot more about Kargil than the rest of this board put together. Maybe you will learn a lot more if you avoid coming across as the COAS.
Sharma,
I am not trying to be rude. But when one sees phrases thrown about which has grave connotation, then obviously one would like to know the reason and the logic behind them. After all, how does one know who is on the forum? It could be someone very knowledgeable being close to the powers that be in Delhi. Hence, one would like to know the thinking at that level too.
BTW, I have commanded my Battalion in another operation also in the same area and have walked the heights from Dras to Chorbatla. Therefore, the terrain of 121 I surely know very well and better than most!
As far as WASO goes, I have done enough of helicopter movement and in all weather and I assure you that it is not as easy as one would like to make out. Yes, you can see the terrain, but it is very difficult to pick up the very minor details. After the ceasefire, I purposely flew with the specific purpose quite a few times to find the answer to the same doubt that you have as to why WASO failed!
As far as Brig Surinder Singh is concerned, it reminds me of a comment on Shylock - he is more sinned against than sinning!
Let me not deter you. I sure enjoy your and others comments since it also makes me think as to if I was wrong in hindsight.
Nobody is perfect.
As far as coming back alive being worn as a badge of courage, well if that be so, then should I say I came back alive twice?! I however would not take any extra credit for it because alive or dead, in very materialistic term I can say I was being paid to do what I was did and if it meant dying for the country, so be it. After all, I did take the Oath! And no one forced me to join the Army!
And as far as my being ready to die for the country, I presume I can't take credit for it. Its in my genes. My father was also in the Army and was in World War II who was wounded in the Burma Campaign too! Did he get a medal? Guess. Did I also get a medal? Guess. But did my GOC like me? Guess. And yet I got a medal!
I loathe to talk of personal details, but then I thought I should share it with you.
I wouldn't have known of your post since I frequent the Board less these days, but then a friend, another Brigadier alerted me to your post and wondered if I should share some thoughts.
No offence intended.
I am not trying to be rude. But when one sees phrases thrown about which has grave connotation, then obviously one would like to know the reason and the logic behind them. After all, how does one know who is on the forum? It could be someone very knowledgeable being close to the powers that be in Delhi. Hence, one would like to know the thinking at that level too.
BTW, I have commanded my Battalion in another operation also in the same area and have walked the heights from Dras to Chorbatla. Therefore, the terrain of 121 I surely know very well and better than most!
As far as WASO goes, I have done enough of helicopter movement and in all weather and I assure you that it is not as easy as one would like to make out. Yes, you can see the terrain, but it is very difficult to pick up the very minor details. After the ceasefire, I purposely flew with the specific purpose quite a few times to find the answer to the same doubt that you have as to why WASO failed!
As far as Brig Surinder Singh is concerned, it reminds me of a comment on Shylock - he is more sinned against than sinning!
Let me not deter you. I sure enjoy your and others comments since it also makes me think as to if I was wrong in hindsight.
Nobody is perfect.
As far as coming back alive being worn as a badge of courage, well if that be so, then should I say I came back alive twice?! I however would not take any extra credit for it because alive or dead, in very materialistic term I can say I was being paid to do what I was did and if it meant dying for the country, so be it. After all, I did take the Oath! And no one forced me to join the Army!
And as far as my being ready to die for the country, I presume I can't take credit for it. Its in my genes. My father was also in the Army and was in World War II who was wounded in the Burma Campaign too! Did he get a medal? Guess. Did I also get a medal? Guess. But did my GOC like me? Guess. And yet I got a medal!
I loathe to talk of personal details, but then I thought I should share it with you.
I wouldn't have known of your post since I frequent the Board less these days, but then a friend, another Brigadier alerted me to your post and wondered if I should share some thoughts.
No offence intended.
Every army man who served in Kargil before and during Op Vijay has more or less same reaction whenever somebody discussu Kargil with him. I know no body allowed intrusion deliberatley but a laid back attitude was developed over the years among all rank and files.
I agree that extensive patroling was not possible as it was also with occupying all posts in winter. Air surveillence was not as effective as it was meant to be. IMGINT through satellites was not existing. And IA knew all that in the wake of very hostile neighbour and did not escalated the inefectiveness of all those methods. Even if they did it was held back by higher formations to reach highest level.
Gen Vij and Padmanabhan continued to tell govt that there were no sign of any slow down in Pakistan's support to militancy and we can not trust Pakistan even after Lahore agreement. In principal Indian Army was not in agreement with BJP govt about Pakistan. But IA did very little on ground.
Though RAW and other intelligence agencies goofed up, so as our political leadership but Indian Army also played a substantial role in the fiasco.
I know no body is perfect. Being coming back alive is indeed not a big thing to boast about. I just used that line to let you know that I got some first hand SITREP about Op Vijay.
I agree that extensive patroling was not possible as it was also with occupying all posts in winter. Air surveillence was not as effective as it was meant to be. IMGINT through satellites was not existing. And IA knew all that in the wake of very hostile neighbour and did not escalated the inefectiveness of all those methods. Even if they did it was held back by higher formations to reach highest level.
Gen Vij and Padmanabhan continued to tell govt that there were no sign of any slow down in Pakistan's support to militancy and we can not trust Pakistan even after Lahore agreement. In principal Indian Army was not in agreement with BJP govt about Pakistan. But IA did very little on ground.
Though RAW and other intelligence agencies goofed up, so as our political leadership but Indian Army also played a substantial role in the fiasco.
I know no body is perfect. Being coming back alive is indeed not a big thing to boast about. I just used that line to let you know that I got some first hand SITREP about Op Vijay.
If you have access or are in possession of SITREPS, then there is something drastically wrong with the IA wherein classified info is available everywhere. An inquiry is necessary before someone uses this for a J'Accuse of "strategic blunder" of the IA and the govt!Sharma wrote:What reaction? That they are touchy? Indeed they are. After all, they were there. Indeed, everything was not picture perfect, but when one hears/ sees unsubstantiated accusations without realising the ground realities, it does causes sadness and concern.Every army man who served in Kargil before and during Op Vijay has more or less same reaction whenever somebody discussu Kargil with him. I know no body allowed intrusion deliberatley but a laid back attitude was developed over the years among all rank and files.
Likewise, if someone who has been in Op Vijay hears of Musharraf's false boasts and lies in his book, will his blood not boil? Should such a person just sit back and not rebut the same?
Since you say your father was in Op Vijay, just ask him how large was the area of responsibility for the unit. Ask him if he was to patrol every inch of the AOR, how many patrols and how many men would be required. Then ask him, if it was possible to send so many patrols. Thereafter, ask him, if so many patrols were sent out, would there be the men available to man the posts as per the strength? He will provide you the answer that you are searching.I agree that extensive patroling was not possible as it was also with occupying all posts in winter. Air surveillence was not as effective as it was meant to be. IMGINT through satellites was not existing. And IA knew all that in the wake of very hostile neighbour and did not escalated the inefectiveness of all those methods. Even if they did it was held back by higher formations to reach highest level.
Satellite imagery was not there.
India is has this hostile neighbour for ever since independence. Is it feasible to be on combat alert for 24x365x the number years since the first war with Pakistan?
Why don't you ask your father as to why one cannot be 24x365 on combat alert? You accuse Brig Surinder about giving the No Intrusion Certs. Is it his sole responsibility to be the one who walks around the LC to check for intrusions? It is the task of the Battalions, like the one in which you father was/is. Army works on a chain of command and more importantly. on trust. Therefore, I am sure you would understand who let Brig Surinder down when he signed those No Intrusion Cert.
I remember when my battalion was in a Terrorist area and I, as the CO, had to give a cert that I personally have counted all the weapons and ammunition and give a cert every month. It was a most idiotic order and so I gave a cert to state that I counted the weapons which I did and as far as the ammunition, they were in sealed containers and packs, I certified I have counted the number of containers and packages and the seals were intact, but I was not too sure if it contained the same number as should be in the ledger It raised a stink! It took me four days to honestly do it and for those four days, I has no time to do what was my job as the CO since I had become the QM and the Amn JCO and NCO rloled in one!
These Certs are the height of bureaucracy, but can't blame anyone since there will be people later who will declare that how incompetent people are and so the whole lot will be blamed. Therefore, these certs are basically aimed for selective blame!
You were there when they spoke or wrote to the govt? I don't go by hearsay evidence. If indeed they did, then why did Malik go on a foreign tour and not be at his post? And anyway the Army Commander then was not Padmanabhan but HM Khanna. If indeed they had said and the IA did nothing, then it is a commentary of the importance that they themselves gave to what they said. However, the moot point is, did they say it? Or are you stating it for the sake of prolonging the discussion? Please remember, Musharraf is also stating a lot of things in hindsight which is not quite the truth!Gen Vij and Padmanabhan continued to tell govt that there were no sign of any slow down in Pakistan's support to militancy and we can not trust Pakistan even after Lahore agreement. In principal Indian Army was not in agreement with BJP govt about Pakistan. But IA did very little on ground.
We all goofed off right from accepting Partition. But what ho? We must move on. However, I sure would loved to know how IA added to the fiasco. I don't know higher than the Corps HQ and so I would love to know more. For all you know I may also write a book. It is just that Minder Puri is being plumb lazy.Though RAW and other intelligence agencies goofed up, so as our political leadership but Indian Army also played a substantial role in the fiasco.
I know no body is perfect. Being coming back alive is indeed not a big thing to boast about. I just used that line to let you know that I got some first hand SITREP about Op Vijay.
I do not have any SITREPS as my father was a professional soldier like you. By SITREPS I meant only some informal informations I use to get while talking to my Dad. I only used the word SITREPS as I like this word and I even use this word in my official presentations along with some words like ORBAT( resource deployment) , MT Park( offiice parking), Qaurter Guard( boss's cabin) etc. I do not think mere usage of these words make me guilty of leaking classified information. Please do not jump the gun.RayC wrote:Sharma wrote: Please cool down. I am not Gen Musharaf and nor did I quoted him anywhere. Moreover I do not regard him as any source. I do not know what else I should say here than sorry?
A serving major in British Army in duty in the ongoing operations in Afghanistan says
"The RAF is utterly useless, We were nearly hit by our own RAF when we called for CAS"
Taken in context the IAF has done exceedingly well compared to the super duper HMs forces in much difficult terrain and objectives.
The IA is no less in its valour and commitment to the defense of India.
If only the leadership were matching and pitching in.....
"The RAF is utterly useless, We were nearly hit by our own RAF when we called for CAS"
Taken in context the IAF has done exceedingly well compared to the super duper HMs forces in much difficult terrain and objectives.
The IA is no less in its valour and commitment to the defense of India.
If only the leadership were matching and pitching in.....
In The Line Of Fire
So what is common to the Indian army, DOAE, BJP, PML, ISI, US Department of State and many others? Why, they all are deeply upset and outraged at the General's memoirs described variously as "fiction", "a pack of lies", "stingy with the truth", "selective memory"...
On Kargil
Brajesh Mishra, former National Security Advisor:
All that he is saying is a pack of lies. He attacked us and then lost. That's the reality. According to some estimates, the loss of Pakistani Army personnel was between 1,000 and 2,000....In order to maintain the fiction, these were so called 'freedom fighters' and Pakistan could not even give a decent burial to its soldiers. Is this tactical victory?
***
Gen. VP Malik, former Indian Army chief:
The book is stingy with truth. From the accounts I have read, it appears to be a narration with no references and there appears to be a lot of fabrication about facts.... Everything went wrong for them and it turned out to be a poorly worked out intrusion plan for them. In his book Musharraf comes across as a timid general and seems to be passing the buck on Sharif. Though Musharraf ordered the operation in mid-January 1999 and seems to take credit for it, yet he does not spare opportunity in passing the buck.
As regards casualties of Pakistani soldiers, immediately after the war ended, our intelligence put these numbers at between 730 and 750. However, we have seen some retired Pakistan Army generals giving accounts of this figure varying between 3000 and 4000.. Musharraf's claim of a victory in Kargil makes me laugh
On Musharraf's claim that India had planned an offensive against Pakistan: This is not true. Either he had very poor intelligence or thinks that others are too naive
***
Chaudhry Ihsan Iqbal, Central Information Secretary, Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz)
If General Musharraf is the hero of Kargil than why doesn’t he form a commission on it?
So what is common to the Indian army, DOAE, BJP, PML, ISI, US Department of State and many others? Why, they all are deeply upset and outraged at the General's memoirs described variously as "fiction", "a pack of lies", "stingy with the truth", "selective memory"...
On Kargil
Brajesh Mishra, former National Security Advisor:
All that he is saying is a pack of lies. He attacked us and then lost. That's the reality. According to some estimates, the loss of Pakistani Army personnel was between 1,000 and 2,000....In order to maintain the fiction, these were so called 'freedom fighters' and Pakistan could not even give a decent burial to its soldiers. Is this tactical victory?
***
Gen. VP Malik, former Indian Army chief:
The book is stingy with truth. From the accounts I have read, it appears to be a narration with no references and there appears to be a lot of fabrication about facts.... Everything went wrong for them and it turned out to be a poorly worked out intrusion plan for them. In his book Musharraf comes across as a timid general and seems to be passing the buck on Sharif. Though Musharraf ordered the operation in mid-January 1999 and seems to take credit for it, yet he does not spare opportunity in passing the buck.
As regards casualties of Pakistani soldiers, immediately after the war ended, our intelligence put these numbers at between 730 and 750. However, we have seen some retired Pakistan Army generals giving accounts of this figure varying between 3000 and 4000.. Musharraf's claim of a victory in Kargil makes me laugh
On Musharraf's claim that India had planned an offensive against Pakistan: This is not true. Either he had very poor intelligence or thinks that others are too naive
***
Chaudhry Ihsan Iqbal, Central Information Secretary, Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz)
If General Musharraf is the hero of Kargil than why doesn’t he form a commission on it?
Just what I was trying to state.ORBAT( resource deployment) , MT Park( offiice parking), Qaurter Guard( boss's cabin)
Stating things without total understanding of an issue and its nuances and basing on hearsay can lead to erroneous conclusions.
ORBAT is Order of Battle.
MT Park is not the office parking, but the garage where ALL the vehicles of the unit are parked. MT stands for Mechanical Transport.
Quarter Guard is not the Boss's Cabin. And God forbid it if it were. It is where the defaulter are locked up and is sort of a jail amongst under things. Basically it is a guard room and the hub of security arrangements of the unit. The regimental colours, and the treasury would be kept in this building. The Kotes would either be inside this building or adjacent to it.
All the keys to offices and kotes and other areas are also kept here at the end of the day.
A cabin is a naval term. In the Army it is the CO's Office.
It may sound nice and it may exhilarating to use military terms, but used for the sake of using it to sound good and informative is not conducive to others' comprehension.
Anyway it is enough for me. Might as well get back to the main topic.
http://www.indianexpress.com/story/13450.html
Heights of deception
K. Subrahmanyam
Posted online: Wednesday, September 27, 2006 at 0000 hrs IST
[quote]
It has taken seven years after the event for General Pervez Musharraf to come out with his version of the Kargil war. What an imaginative version! He tells us now that it was a great victory. It helped to internationalise the Kashmir issue. It was undertaken because the Indian side was preparing an offensive operation. He expects the Pakistanis and the rest of the world to accept this version after dozens of books have been written on the war, an overwhelming number of which give a very different version of the event. The general either has very great confidence in his persuasive powers or harbours utter contempt for the people of Pakistan, who are the primary audience of this book.
If India was preparing for an offensive action and this move was undertaken as a countermeasure, why was this charge not made earlier when the then Pakistani foreign minister, Sartaj Aziz, visited India in June 1999? Why did it not feature in the conversations of the director-generals of military operations? Why did not Prime Minster Nawaz Sharif raise the issue in his conversations with Atal Bihari Vajpayee? The general claims it was a great victory for his army. Why then is it that the officers and men of the Pakistan army who fought valiantly and got killed did not get the decent burial that was their due? Why were their bodies abandoned on Indian territory? There is no precedent in the history of warfare of a victorious army behaving this way. Why did Pakistan not own up to this victory? Why was it not advertised to the great pride of the Pakistani people till this book was published?
If Pakistan’s action was a preventive or preemptive action against a planned Indian offensive, there should have been no difficulty in it owning up to the presence of its Northern Light infantrymen across the LoC. But the myth of “mujahideenâ€
Heights of deception
K. Subrahmanyam
Posted online: Wednesday, September 27, 2006 at 0000 hrs IST
[quote]
It has taken seven years after the event for General Pervez Musharraf to come out with his version of the Kargil war. What an imaginative version! He tells us now that it was a great victory. It helped to internationalise the Kashmir issue. It was undertaken because the Indian side was preparing an offensive operation. He expects the Pakistanis and the rest of the world to accept this version after dozens of books have been written on the war, an overwhelming number of which give a very different version of the event. The general either has very great confidence in his persuasive powers or harbours utter contempt for the people of Pakistan, who are the primary audience of this book.
If India was preparing for an offensive action and this move was undertaken as a countermeasure, why was this charge not made earlier when the then Pakistani foreign minister, Sartaj Aziz, visited India in June 1999? Why did it not feature in the conversations of the director-generals of military operations? Why did not Prime Minster Nawaz Sharif raise the issue in his conversations with Atal Bihari Vajpayee? The general claims it was a great victory for his army. Why then is it that the officers and men of the Pakistan army who fought valiantly and got killed did not get the decent burial that was their due? Why were their bodies abandoned on Indian territory? There is no precedent in the history of warfare of a victorious army behaving this way. Why did Pakistan not own up to this victory? Why was it not advertised to the great pride of the Pakistani people till this book was published?
If Pakistan’s action was a preventive or preemptive action against a planned Indian offensive, there should have been no difficulty in it owning up to the presence of its Northern Light infantrymen across the LoC. But the myth of “mujahideenâ€
-
cbelwal
Errr... do you realize you are an armchair general who loves to use military terms and bombastic words to impress others ? Rather than arguing with people who have been in the field I suggest you trythis to get your adrelin pumping.
Sharma wrote: I do not have any SITREPS as my father was a professional soldier like you. By SITREPS I meant only some informal informations I use to get while talking to my Dad. I only used the word SITREPS as I like this word and I even use this word in my official presentations along with some words like ORBAT( resource deployment) , MT Park( offiice parking), Qaurter Guard( boss's cabin) etc. I do not think mere usage of these words make me guilty of leaking classified information. Please do not jump the gun.
So what does Kammandu really care about - other than self-preservation?India has to deal with General Musharraf as a ruler of neighbouring Pakistan. There is no alternative to that. In doing that we have to bear in mind the mindset of the leader we are dealing with. In this case, he seems to be a person who is not highly concerned about his own credibility.
Perhaps, that is what we use to get what we want - if we know what we want!!
No need to be insulting. He has been polite in his replies & has debated in a polite manner with RayC. He comes from a military family & has nowhere indicated that he was being impolite to the profession of arms or disrespectful of RayC's experience and knowledge. Debate his points and answer them if you will, his usage of military terms was not meant to impress if one reads into the context, but just as a bit of info.cbelwal wrote:Errr... do you realize you are an armchair general who loves to use military terms and bombastic words to impress others ? Rather than arguing with people who have been in the field I suggest you trythis to get your adrelin pumping.
Sharma wrote: I do not have any SITREPS as my father was a professional soldier like you. By SITREPS I meant only some informal informations I use to get while talking to my Dad. I only used the word SITREPS as I like this word and I even use this word in my official presentations along with some words like ORBAT( resource deployment) , MT Park( offiice parking), Qaurter Guard( boss's cabin) etc. I do not think mere usage of these words make me guilty of leaking classified information. Please do not jump the gun.
Furthermore, he reviewed Gen Maliks book decently & sparked off this discussion as well. And its been a pretty good one- RayC's comments in particular address some of the very doubts periodically addressed in this forum & if you take it along with Anoops post and Sharma's queries, they address the issue of the "why" issue in Kargil quite well, with reference to the terrain & surveillance limitations.
Last edited by JCage on 27 Sep 2006 23:12, edited 1 time in total.
HI guys, a very interesting discussion indeed. I had to put in my 2 paisa worth, but in a sort of different note. Last night for some odd reason I started reading the BR section on the first kashmir war--1948 (for the 3rd time) and it seemed to me some of the battles fought to recover lost ground were the same as that during the kargil war and it made me think of the quote from the TV series "Tamas"(some old timers may remember it)"Those who forget history are condemned to repeat it".
I know they were both different situations but maybe there was something forgotten from '48.
I know they were both different situations but maybe there was something forgotten from '48.
JCAge,
Apparently, you have missed the issue at hand.
Words like "strategic failure", "incompetence" if stated, must be proved. They have serious connotations and in turn are serious accusations and cannot stated in a loose manner of speaking.
May I ask as to what comprises a "strategic failure"?
Also could it be amplified as to how those accused of "incompetence" were "incompetent"?
Or for that matter, Kargil could have been avoided? I, for one, who lost my friends and my colleagues am sure keen to know how it could have been avoided and the same maybe indicated without the all encompassing loose terminology.
If anyone makes a J' Accuse, it should be factually proved or thrown up for debate without being categorical. One can be categorical if one has irrefutable facts (as is K. Subrahmanyam in his article above) or if one is a person of acknowledged authority and know how like Raman, Subrahmanyam, Kapila etc.
To blame Surinder Singh alone for the No Intrusion Certs in such a categorical manner is most unfair. I take cognisance of such a comment since it is appears that the system may not have been understood in it totality and hence the comment is factually a trifle skewed.
Let us take the book of Musahrraf which I used as an example. Can one call Musharraf a clot without debunking him with facts? If one has to expose a person or an event for what it is worth, one must debunk it with facts and with terminology that is as is understood.
It is not my intention to be critical of anyone. Yet, BRF is taken as a benchmark in many circles and therefore one has to maintain the image and credibility that it has and hence my humble effort to intervene to put the facts in the correct perspective or should I say, near correct perspective since I am, nor was, privy to the actuals in echelons beyond Srinagar at that time.
I maybe aware of many personal opinions, but then if I were to quote them, I would indicate them so for what they are and then give my comments if any. Obviously, such comments would be on hearsay and my comments would underine this fact, so that it is not taken as authority for quotes or discussion.
Apparently, you have missed the issue at hand.
The issue that I am trying to point out is that loose use of terminology causes confusion. Above was just an example of it being totally contrary to the correct usage and can lead to confusion.Sharma wrote:
I do not have any SITREPS as my father was a professional soldier like you. By SITREPS I meant only some informal informations I use to get while talking to my Dad. I only used the word SITREPS as I like this word and I even use this word in my official presentations along with some words like ORBAT( resource deployment) , MT Park( offiice parking), Qaurter Guard( boss's cabin) etc. I do not think mere usage of these words make me guilty of leaking classified information. Please do not jump the gun.
Words like "strategic failure", "incompetence" if stated, must be proved. They have serious connotations and in turn are serious accusations and cannot stated in a loose manner of speaking.
May I ask as to what comprises a "strategic failure"?
Also could it be amplified as to how those accused of "incompetence" were "incompetent"?
Or for that matter, Kargil could have been avoided? I, for one, who lost my friends and my colleagues am sure keen to know how it could have been avoided and the same maybe indicated without the all encompassing loose terminology.
If anyone makes a J' Accuse, it should be factually proved or thrown up for debate without being categorical. One can be categorical if one has irrefutable facts (as is K. Subrahmanyam in his article above) or if one is a person of acknowledged authority and know how like Raman, Subrahmanyam, Kapila etc.
To blame Surinder Singh alone for the No Intrusion Certs in such a categorical manner is most unfair. I take cognisance of such a comment since it is appears that the system may not have been understood in it totality and hence the comment is factually a trifle skewed.
Let us take the book of Musahrraf which I used as an example. Can one call Musharraf a clot without debunking him with facts? If one has to expose a person or an event for what it is worth, one must debunk it with facts and with terminology that is as is understood.
It is not my intention to be critical of anyone. Yet, BRF is taken as a benchmark in many circles and therefore one has to maintain the image and credibility that it has and hence my humble effort to intervene to put the facts in the correct perspective or should I say, near correct perspective since I am, nor was, privy to the actuals in echelons beyond Srinagar at that time.
I maybe aware of many personal opinions, but then if I were to quote them, I would indicate them so for what they are and then give my comments if any. Obviously, such comments would be on hearsay and my comments would underine this fact, so that it is not taken as authority for quotes or discussion.
Sir,
I get your point and its a very valid one. All I was referring to was that tarring and feathering Sharma for his statements without bringing in the kind of analysis that you were doing was detracting from the message. In other words, if everyone were to follow your lead & show exactly what was wrong with his statements without resorting to merely yelling at him, we would learn more in the process. The problem is that we (or most of us) are not military men- so if Gen Malik or someone says "x" with the meaning of "x" patently clear to him & I daresay others, an ordinary civvie may well get alarmed & jump to conclusions. So we might press upon your patience, but you can rest assured we are listening to what you say, and understanding more in the process.
I get your point and its a very valid one. All I was referring to was that tarring and feathering Sharma for his statements without bringing in the kind of analysis that you were doing was detracting from the message. In other words, if everyone were to follow your lead & show exactly what was wrong with his statements without resorting to merely yelling at him, we would learn more in the process. The problem is that we (or most of us) are not military men- so if Gen Malik or someone says "x" with the meaning of "x" patently clear to him & I daresay others, an ordinary civvie may well get alarmed & jump to conclusions. So we might press upon your patience, but you can rest assured we are listening to what you say, and understanding more in the process.
Last edited by JCage on 28 Sep 2006 01:58, edited 1 time in total.
To add: Sharma's J'accuse may well be incorrect, but I read the details on WASO and Brig. Singh provided by you with keen interest.
Its been quite some time since we had any movement on this topic, and your first hand view on why the usual shibboleths reiterated time and again in the media-
- Improper patrolling
- Strategic failure, preventable lapse
-etc etc
..are wrong are indeed welcome.
Its been quite some time since we had any movement on this topic, and your first hand view on why the usual shibboleths reiterated time and again in the media-
- Improper patrolling
- Strategic failure, preventable lapse
-etc etc
..are wrong are indeed welcome.
-
cbelwal
The question is not about insulting. Someone made a big claim that Kargil could have been avoided if .. blah.. blah. The 'If' part has been very well addressed by the KRC. So whats new here ? And then he backs up his awareness with the news that he had SITREPS of the ops, and when confronted he backtracks that those sitreps were personal meetings with his father. Making wild claims should be discouraged at all costs whether here of any other place.
No one has been able to give proof yet that there was a delibrate ignorance of information or delibrate lack of action. The closest I heard on this was in the Tehelka tapes where one of the officers when asked on Kargil casually remarked "Kargil hua, kyonki bhai saheb ( Vajpayee ) ko lahore jaana tha". System failures were addressed by the KRC and some action has been taken on them.
RayC thank you for clarifications on the op. details.
No one has been able to give proof yet that there was a delibrate ignorance of information or delibrate lack of action. The closest I heard on this was in the Tehelka tapes where one of the officers when asked on Kargil casually remarked "Kargil hua, kyonki bhai saheb ( Vajpayee ) ko lahore jaana tha". System failures were addressed by the KRC and some action has been taken on them.
RayC thank you for clarifications on the op. details.
JCage wrote:No need to be insulting. He has been polite in his replies & has debated in a polite manner with RayC.
WASO. Winter Air Surveillance Operation. The helicopter comes from place X. Picks up the Officer who is to do the surveillance. This surveillance is done visually, assisted by a binocular. I have used a digital camera as also a movie camera (both my personal items) since I did not believe that my eyes would see it all. And even that is not foolproof. The weather is cold, everything is numb and everything inside the helicopter is cold. This numbness does slow reactions, mental and physical, say what you want. The aircraft can fly till 1300 hours since after that, there is turbulence, and the it is dangerous to fly. It is also to be noted that the helicopter has to return to base by 1300 hours. Therefore, the surveillance time is not endless. It is also to be noted that aviation fuel is not an endless commodity. Therefore, only certain number of sorties for WASO can be made available in peacetime during the month, and in that number of sorties one has to surveil the complete area in the month. The number of sorties are decided at a very high HQ since they control the meagre helicopter assets. While a subordinate HQ may want to have a whole lot of sorties, the HQ controlling the air assets at a very high HQ gives only that much and no more that can be given since it has to be distributed to all formations. Then there is the serviceability factor too. Like this, there are many issues (tactical, operational and administrative) that are there and considered to allocate helicopter effort to the various subordinate formations.
It must be remembered that the IA is not the US Army and therefore, one must not have ideas based on what one may have read about US operations and used that as the benchmark.
Therefore, WASO in peacetime is not a limitless activity, but an activity that has to be planned with care so that all the area can be covered; and if not feasible to do so with the effort made available, at least the more dangerous approaches must be covered.
Then the problem is that if one covers an area on Z day, there is no guarantee that there will be no infiltration on Zplus One day. So, WASO is no magic wand that guarantees anything. It is just one more tool and that is about all.
To explain it in lay man's terms let us say just because you crossed Connaught Place at 1200 hours, there is no guarantee that an accident may not take place at 1230 hours and which you will not see.
Footprints unless freshly made fades with time and there are ways how one can obliterate footprints, even if they are laborious and tedious.
Patrolling I have explained the issue. Note that there has to be adequate men on the post so that in case of an attack, it is adequate to man the weapons and defeat that attack. Then there has to be adequate men to undertake administrative duty to maintain the post ie. get water (not available at the higher reaches), go to the HQ to collect dak or chaps who are sick to go and get treatment, attend various cadres etc etc. Each post does not have a doctor or a Nursing Assistant and so the sick has to go to the area where there is one. Patrolling is not only to the front and to the side but also to the rear since there is always the threat of terrorists. In short, every point of the compass must be surveiled and as far as the eyes can see and beyond. Possible? I wonder. Therefore, the patrolling has to be as per the availability of manpower as also on the tactical dictates and the turnaround time. There are also Long Range Patrols that are undertaken and which span a couple of day and they are kitted and organised to be self sufficient.
Strategic Failure. I have not understood the same and so no comments.
Kargil could have been easily prevented. How?
Intelligence. It must be remembered that the agents who give info, especially at the lower level have very low IQ and are mere locals with hardly any education except that they have experience in the job and can count and give very basic info. Its a mugs game. They could also be double agents and so one requires corroboration. Then there have been instances that one agent is operating for two agencies and so obviously it gets corroborated since the info is from the same man. It is easy to say that intelligence would have helped, but intelligence is also a tricky field, especially at the lower level intelligence. I believe this was a failure at all levels, but since I was not involved directly in this sphere when the Kargil Ops intially took place (we were inducted later from the CI grid) I would not know.
It must be remembered that the IA is not the US Army and therefore, one must not have ideas based on what one may have read about US operations and used that as the benchmark.
Therefore, WASO in peacetime is not a limitless activity, but an activity that has to be planned with care so that all the area can be covered; and if not feasible to do so with the effort made available, at least the more dangerous approaches must be covered.
Then the problem is that if one covers an area on Z day, there is no guarantee that there will be no infiltration on Zplus One day. So, WASO is no magic wand that guarantees anything. It is just one more tool and that is about all.
To explain it in lay man's terms let us say just because you crossed Connaught Place at 1200 hours, there is no guarantee that an accident may not take place at 1230 hours and which you will not see.
Footprints unless freshly made fades with time and there are ways how one can obliterate footprints, even if they are laborious and tedious.
Patrolling I have explained the issue. Note that there has to be adequate men on the post so that in case of an attack, it is adequate to man the weapons and defeat that attack. Then there has to be adequate men to undertake administrative duty to maintain the post ie. get water (not available at the higher reaches), go to the HQ to collect dak or chaps who are sick to go and get treatment, attend various cadres etc etc. Each post does not have a doctor or a Nursing Assistant and so the sick has to go to the area where there is one. Patrolling is not only to the front and to the side but also to the rear since there is always the threat of terrorists. In short, every point of the compass must be surveiled and as far as the eyes can see and beyond. Possible? I wonder. Therefore, the patrolling has to be as per the availability of manpower as also on the tactical dictates and the turnaround time. There are also Long Range Patrols that are undertaken and which span a couple of day and they are kitted and organised to be self sufficient.
Strategic Failure. I have not understood the same and so no comments.
Kargil could have been easily prevented. How?
Intelligence. It must be remembered that the agents who give info, especially at the lower level have very low IQ and are mere locals with hardly any education except that they have experience in the job and can count and give very basic info. Its a mugs game. They could also be double agents and so one requires corroboration. Then there have been instances that one agent is operating for two agencies and so obviously it gets corroborated since the info is from the same man. It is easy to say that intelligence would have helped, but intelligence is also a tricky field, especially at the lower level intelligence. I believe this was a failure at all levels, but since I was not involved directly in this sphere when the Kargil Ops intially took place (we were inducted later from the CI grid) I would not know.
Last edited by RayC on 28 Sep 2006 03:37, edited 1 time in total.
-
Raj Malhotra
- BRFite
- Posts: 997
- Joined: 26 Jun 2000 11:31
Did that happen?Raj Malhotra wrote:Assuming that there was one accident in C.P. it may not be noticed but if there are 1500 accidents everyday with ambulances going back and forth, then should it remain undetected for months on end.
Were the Pakistanis going up and down regularly?
Or did they hunker down once the infiltration phase was over?
-
Raj Malhotra
- BRFite
- Posts: 997
- Joined: 26 Jun 2000 11:31
Did 1500 soldiers moved in one nice (or cloudy day) and hunkre down. Not to mention building up supplies of food, ammo and construction material.
For one fighting man to hunker down for 6 months, how much supplies are needed? How may trips are required to carry that supplies?
So after multilying all the numbers how manu intrusions were made? Lets us take a rough estimate 15000? How may were detected- Nil??
For one fighting man to hunker down for 6 months, how much supplies are needed? How may trips are required to carry that supplies?
So after multilying all the numbers how manu intrusions were made? Lets us take a rough estimate 15000? How may were detected- Nil??
RayC wrote:Did that happen?Raj Malhotra wrote:Assuming that there was one accident in C.P. it may not be noticed but if there are 1500 accidents everyday with ambulances going back and forth, then should it remain undetected for months on end.
Were the Pakistanis going up and down regularly?
Or did they hunker down once the infiltration phase was over?
Three things that are being ignored:Raj Malhotra wrote:Did 1500 soldiers moved in one nice (or cloudy day) and hunkre down. Not to mention building up supplies of food, ammo and construction material.
For one fighting man to hunker down for 6 months, how much supplies are needed? How may trips are required to carry that supplies?
1. Infiltration was spread over 4-5 months - supplies would have been continuous, even after fighting broke out.
2. PA artillery and forward observation posts that interdicted NH-1A traffic prevented IA from entirely disrupting Pak supply routes even after fighting broke out.
3. Pak helicopter supply to bases like Muntho Dalo that point to air-defence gaps.
To think that the entire intrusion was fully supplied at one go is to be woefully ignorant of military logistics.
Last edited by Anoop on 28 Sep 2006 05:13, edited 1 time in total.
Even if 15000 intrusions (though they would not have come in one man team) were made, can you detect a man moving unless you know that he is using the route. Even with the fence and the surveillance equipment there is still infiltration by terrorists. In short, there can be nothing called "sealing the border".Raj Malhotra wrote:When Inflilration is done, it is not done in one nice and sunny day or even a cloudy day, whether it be Kargil or anywhere. It is done preferably in foul weather and always during night.Did 1500 soldiers moved in one nice (or cloudy day) and hunkre down. Not to mention building up supplies of food, ammo and construction material.
Infiltration is done in small group and through more than one route. The more the routes the less is the length of the column and the 'time taken past a point'!
This mode is what is done and the tactical raison d'etre for it is that it minimise detection!
Likewise the food and amn is carried on man and they would have used the mujahideens as porters who would have exfiltrated again at night in penny packets or move into hinterland India to join the terrorists in Kashmir.
The sangars made by the Pakistani were not of cement construction nor was wood used. They used crevices in the mountains and very ingenuously made space to hide during the day or for rest. Therefore, no construction material was lugged.
They did not use the weapons or use amn until the battle was joined.
If the Indian Army can complete its winter stocking in 3 months of a whole battalion and that too with Kerosene and other items that is not merely rations, you take a guess how long it would take and with how many men.For one fighting man to hunker down for 6 months, how much supplies are needed? How may trips are required to carry that supplies?
A man can carry 20 kgs at a stretch in the High Altitude. Ifthe ideal ration scales with Kerosene is what the Pakistanis had, then they would be like ants moving and tell tale marks howling for detection which even the blind would have seen. It is obvious that they were not on ideal rations. And in any case ideal ration scale is what the doctors prescribe, when in actuality one can hardly eat in the HAA owing to loss of apetite. Therefore, a low scale suffices and which one would apply if the situation so demands. Further if one notices, they located themselves well away from Indian posts.
These are of course conjectures.
Over time mujahideens moving into Kashmir as their goal could have dropped rations and amn and then melted with the locals and thereafter moved to the Valley.
So after multilying all the numbers how manu intrusions were made? Lets us take a rough estimate 15000? How may were detected- Nil??
Wiil see you later. Got to sleep. It 0441 here.
.Sharma wrote:Every army man who served in Kargil before and during Op Vijay has more or less same reaction whenever somebody discussu Kargil with him. I know no body allowed intrusion deliberatley but a laid back attitude was developed over the years among all rank and files.
I agree that extensive patroling was not possible as it was also with occupying all posts in winter. Air surveillence was not as effective as it was meant to be. IMGINT through satellites was not existing. And IA knew all that in the wake of very hostile neighbour and did not escalated the inefectiveness of all those methods. Even if they did it was held back by higher formations to reach highest level.
Gen Vij and Padmanabhan continued to tell govt that there were no sign of any slow down in Pakistan's support to militancy and we can not trust Pakistan even after Lahore agreement. In principal Indian Army was not in agreement with BJP govt about Pakistan. But IA did very little on ground.
Though RAW and other intelligence agencies goofed up, so as our political leadership but Indian Army also played a substantial role in the fiasco.
I know no body is perfect. Being coming back alive is indeed not a big thing to boast about. I just used that line to let you know that I got some first hand SITREP about Op Vijay.
Sharma
I am with you on it. Everyone is responsible for kargil fiasco. Indian Politicians are always looking for their legacy, they are not here to server the nation they elected to rule. Being a JAT from Haryana and that too from ROHTAK, I can attest to the fact how many young man gave their lives. IIRC wasn't it the BJP gov't that tried to play down kargil incidence initially untill media hyped it up to such an extent that there was no way out left except military action. All these god damn netas jumped on band wagon to kick pakis out, they had all the slogans but never the substance...none of their bhatijas, bhanjas were there to fight. So they didn't care about some dumb hick rural folks regardless of where they were from, it didn't matter to them if som tamil farmers son dies or some jat farmers son died or some naga farmers son died.
Regardless of what Kishan Pal Singh said no politician listened to him, his hand was forced as the Area Commander that led to the death of so many.
I have to say though in some sick twisted mindset, kargil gave indians a wakeup call, they cannot keep ignoring national security with "Chalta hai" attitude. Ever since kargil few good things have happened.
Ray SahibLet us take the book of Musahrraf which I used as an example. Can one call Musharraf a clot without debunking him with facts? If one has to expose a person or an event for what it is worth, one must debunk it with facts and with terminology that is as is understood.
Musharraf got the book deal, got the upper hand. The man who throws the first punch is held in higher regard regardless of winning and losing. He threw first punch, these dhotiwala blinked and paid heavy price.
RayC, JCage, Karan, Forum Admins and all others.
First of all I must tell you that I am not backing out. I am only sorry for wrong use of some military terms but nothing more.
I see that some people here are deliberately trying to deviate from my main concern. I thought every body here would understand what I was trying to say but to my great disappointment many people here extracted something else from my posts.
And that is my knowledge about military admin and jargons. RayC specialy tried to explain me all the expansions of the terms I use at my office. I am a civvie and works in a private firm. I started using these terms in fun and now every body uses that. They asked me the meanings and I explained in simplest terms. This way I continue my attachment with the institution I lived with for my first 17 years. I deeply regret telling that here and very sorry for myself.
This forum is best among all alike and I must say all people here are maintaining very high standards to keep that. But again it has now BRs moral responsibility to help people to know more about our Defence matters. Many people here started pelting me with whatever way they liked. And these people alwys cry whenever our majority of citizens do not understand defence matters. I request you to please be little patient with such people and give them some time to come upto your level. I am here with BR since 2004 and never poked my nose in here in any thread. I have posted only 130 messages and majorty of that are my pictures. I kept coming here to read all you people. This way I am trying to get to a optimum level to post here. I did that as my moral responsibility to mainitain high standard of BR. Even if you think that I am ruining its image than I am ready to leave this place. But we need to remember that all fives can not be equal.
Now back to topic. My main concern was that IA is also responsible for the kargil inrusion to go undetected. IA's role should not be seen only during Op Vijay but before that also. What intelligence agencies and Pol leaders were doing has been debated in every lenght and breadth. But never about army.
I am not asking why IA could not detect intrusion. And I was quoting the facts from KCR that beside others IA ( Both higher and battalion level) was also responsible.
First of all I must tell you that I am not backing out. I am only sorry for wrong use of some military terms but nothing more.
I see that some people here are deliberately trying to deviate from my main concern. I thought every body here would understand what I was trying to say but to my great disappointment many people here extracted something else from my posts.
And that is my knowledge about military admin and jargons. RayC specialy tried to explain me all the expansions of the terms I use at my office. I am a civvie and works in a private firm. I started using these terms in fun and now every body uses that. They asked me the meanings and I explained in simplest terms. This way I continue my attachment with the institution I lived with for my first 17 years. I deeply regret telling that here and very sorry for myself.
This forum is best among all alike and I must say all people here are maintaining very high standards to keep that. But again it has now BRs moral responsibility to help people to know more about our Defence matters. Many people here started pelting me with whatever way they liked. And these people alwys cry whenever our majority of citizens do not understand defence matters. I request you to please be little patient with such people and give them some time to come upto your level. I am here with BR since 2004 and never poked my nose in here in any thread. I have posted only 130 messages and majorty of that are my pictures. I kept coming here to read all you people. This way I am trying to get to a optimum level to post here. I did that as my moral responsibility to mainitain high standard of BR. Even if you think that I am ruining its image than I am ready to leave this place. But we need to remember that all fives can not be equal.
Now back to topic. My main concern was that IA is also responsible for the kargil inrusion to go undetected. IA's role should not be seen only during Op Vijay but before that also. What intelligence agencies and Pol leaders were doing has been debated in every lenght and breadth. But never about army.
I am not asking why IA could not detect intrusion. And I was quoting the facts from KCR that beside others IA ( Both higher and battalion level) was also responsible.
Last edited by Sharma on 28 Sep 2006 11:36, edited 1 time in total.
Amit,
Dont let the rough & ready bit in forum discussions get to you. We can learn a lot from RayC, Anoop & all the other posters who have contributed seriously. FWIW, I have read your 130 posts and I do remember your excellent pics & videos from Defexpo as well. So hang around & discuss whatevers on your mind!
Dont let the rough & ready bit in forum discussions get to you. We can learn a lot from RayC, Anoop & all the other posters who have contributed seriously. FWIW, I have read your 130 posts and I do remember your excellent pics & videos from Defexpo as well. So hang around & discuss whatevers on your mind!
Karan,
Musharraf's book is no coup de grace. He has turned himself into an international laughing stock, since each of his claim is being debunked with facts, not only in India, but also abroad. Watch the space!
Sharma,
I did not know that you are such a young chap. It was not my intention to hurt you. But I am seriously concerned as much as you are about not why Kargil happened (since such things can always happen, there being nothing is failsafe), but because there are many areas, even to me, quite grey.
Also, don't use those terms in office because the other chaps will take you as the expert and use it for wrong meanings and then at places get tough with people that what they are saying is right, when they are actually wrong.
That apart, I have nothing to state about the politicians or the national strategy. In the public domain, the lament is that there is NO national strategy. It was never there and still it is not there! That much, they say, for national strategy.
Kargil is not a strategic disaster. The whole Kashmir is a strategic disaster I would say if one uses it in a loose form as everyone seems to be using. In fact, everything is a strategic disaster. The influx of illegals, the stand off with Bangladesh, the confusion over Myanmar, Sri Lanka, String of Pearls et al. And yet it may not be! There maybe some positive spin offs too!
Kargil has always been a low threat area in the 'strategic' perception. First of all, the area was said to be glaciated and so none would be able to cross. Then the terrain towards Mushko and Kaobal Gali was treacherous apart from real heavy snowfall making movement impossible. Indeed it is. Then, this is a Shia area and the Sunni majority of Pakistan was not interested in any worthwhile gains here. (Please see the problems of this area on the net and you will get a fair idea). Hence, it was felt that an independent Brigade would suffice.
If you have time, visit the SASE establishments to realise the dangers of this area in so far as movement in winter is concerned. There are avalanche warning that come up at regular intervals. Then after a snowfall, since there after there are good possibility of avalanches, all movements are frozen for a certain number of days. Add all what I have written earlier about patrolling and then try to balance all the issues and make out your patrolling plan. More often than not, it can never be the ideal. Everyone tries his best since heads roll! And today's Army is highly professional and very, very ambitious.
Much is said about poor kitting of troops and lack of equipment. Now, look at it from the national perspective. The national priorities cannot be forsaken. Therefore, a balance is made. In this realm, even the US troops are complaining about poor kitting and lack of equipment. Therefore, if it is a problem for the US, India is surely not a special case. If they can't manage, one wonders if it is fair to feel that people are not concerned and are merely incompetent. IA has always been short in these areas from time immemorial and that is why the IA is known for its improvisation and stoic!
Yes, thing could have and should have been better, but then if wishes were horses, then beggars would ride.
Another issue that should be borne in mind is that the newspapers love sensationalisation. Therefore, read their report intelligently and try to sift the wheat from the chaff.
An example:
Chhoro, mat Maro
and
Chhoro mat, Maro.
It is just a question of the comma. The media is great to move the comma for sensationalising.
Thereafter, please see the terrain. Even if you are sitting right on top, you cannot see beyond the next ridgeline and even on the next ridgeline you don't know what lurks behind each boulder. I wish I had a scanner so that I could post the terrain to show the ridgelines, as also the boulders strewn one after the other on the ridgeline. Therefore, unless one moves and checks each inch of ground, anything can be lurking within them.
I would also like to state that no matter how motivated the troops maybe and how well trained the troops maybe, one cannot remain combat ready 24 x 7.
The terrain, the weather and the isolation is quite a challenge to even stay robust both mentally and physically.
An example: In Dalunang, when as a Battalion commander I visited one of the posts, one could not move out of the bunkers (in those days) since the enemy was sitting on top of you practically, and could shoot you down by day or even in a moonlit night. We remained in the bunker with the other chaps and we were packed like sardines! When we slept (those not on duty) we were all legs and arms over each other and mind you, I was the CO and a leg was resting on my head! To answer natures call we had to perk our bottoms out and do it and be careful that our bottoms were not shot at. Such were the conditions. If the IA was not the dedicated people that we are supposed to be, we would have howled like the way they howl these days. The good part is that things have improved.
Are you aware that troops had to march from the Bengal plains to the mountains of Sikkim since there were no proper roads for the TCVs (Troop carrying vehicles). We have improved and we will continue to do so. There have been times when I would have loved to cry blue murder, but then Tennyson's words are important to soldier along.
It is the right of every citizen to question the Army or anyone or any organisation, and one must do so. After all it is the taxpayer's money including ours. Therefore, I am not against questioning. All I say, enunciate each issue and discuss it threadbare rather than state an all encompassing word that can mean many thing to many different individuals.
National strategic, geo strategy cannot be divorced from geo politics and national politics. Strategy is a byproduct of geo politics. Therefore, Kargil should not be looked at merely from a military standpoint unless one is looking at the tactical and operational art issues. If perceived in the overall context it must also address itself in the ambit of the overall geostrategic and geopolitical continuum.
I would like to think that because of Kargil, the US realised the maturity of India and hence it shed its anti Indian stance. Kargil, to my mind, is the turning point. Earlier, Pakistan used to have a field day against India with both China and the US supporting the Pakistanis. India was always shoved into the corner. Today, the situation is different. In fact today's newspaper states that Kashmir is no longer on the list of festering disputes at the UN!
Notwithstanding, don't back out. Just list the issues with the rationale behind what you to say. Maybe I will be educated and I say that with all humility at my command.
Musharraf's book is no coup de grace. He has turned himself into an international laughing stock, since each of his claim is being debunked with facts, not only in India, but also abroad. Watch the space!
Sharma,
I did not know that you are such a young chap. It was not my intention to hurt you. But I am seriously concerned as much as you are about not why Kargil happened (since such things can always happen, there being nothing is failsafe), but because there are many areas, even to me, quite grey.
Also, don't use those terms in office because the other chaps will take you as the expert and use it for wrong meanings and then at places get tough with people that what they are saying is right, when they are actually wrong.
That apart, I have nothing to state about the politicians or the national strategy. In the public domain, the lament is that there is NO national strategy. It was never there and still it is not there! That much, they say, for national strategy.
Kargil is not a strategic disaster. The whole Kashmir is a strategic disaster I would say if one uses it in a loose form as everyone seems to be using. In fact, everything is a strategic disaster. The influx of illegals, the stand off with Bangladesh, the confusion over Myanmar, Sri Lanka, String of Pearls et al. And yet it may not be! There maybe some positive spin offs too!
Kargil has always been a low threat area in the 'strategic' perception. First of all, the area was said to be glaciated and so none would be able to cross. Then the terrain towards Mushko and Kaobal Gali was treacherous apart from real heavy snowfall making movement impossible. Indeed it is. Then, this is a Shia area and the Sunni majority of Pakistan was not interested in any worthwhile gains here. (Please see the problems of this area on the net and you will get a fair idea). Hence, it was felt that an independent Brigade would suffice.
If you have time, visit the SASE establishments to realise the dangers of this area in so far as movement in winter is concerned. There are avalanche warning that come up at regular intervals. Then after a snowfall, since there after there are good possibility of avalanches, all movements are frozen for a certain number of days. Add all what I have written earlier about patrolling and then try to balance all the issues and make out your patrolling plan. More often than not, it can never be the ideal. Everyone tries his best since heads roll! And today's Army is highly professional and very, very ambitious.
Much is said about poor kitting of troops and lack of equipment. Now, look at it from the national perspective. The national priorities cannot be forsaken. Therefore, a balance is made. In this realm, even the US troops are complaining about poor kitting and lack of equipment. Therefore, if it is a problem for the US, India is surely not a special case. If they can't manage, one wonders if it is fair to feel that people are not concerned and are merely incompetent. IA has always been short in these areas from time immemorial and that is why the IA is known for its improvisation and stoic!
Yes, thing could have and should have been better, but then if wishes were horses, then beggars would ride.
Another issue that should be borne in mind is that the newspapers love sensationalisation. Therefore, read their report intelligently and try to sift the wheat from the chaff.
An example:
Chhoro, mat Maro
and
Chhoro mat, Maro.
It is just a question of the comma. The media is great to move the comma for sensationalising.
Thereafter, please see the terrain. Even if you are sitting right on top, you cannot see beyond the next ridgeline and even on the next ridgeline you don't know what lurks behind each boulder. I wish I had a scanner so that I could post the terrain to show the ridgelines, as also the boulders strewn one after the other on the ridgeline. Therefore, unless one moves and checks each inch of ground, anything can be lurking within them.
I would also like to state that no matter how motivated the troops maybe and how well trained the troops maybe, one cannot remain combat ready 24 x 7.
The terrain, the weather and the isolation is quite a challenge to even stay robust both mentally and physically.
An example: In Dalunang, when as a Battalion commander I visited one of the posts, one could not move out of the bunkers (in those days) since the enemy was sitting on top of you practically, and could shoot you down by day or even in a moonlit night. We remained in the bunker with the other chaps and we were packed like sardines! When we slept (those not on duty) we were all legs and arms over each other and mind you, I was the CO and a leg was resting on my head! To answer natures call we had to perk our bottoms out and do it and be careful that our bottoms were not shot at. Such were the conditions. If the IA was not the dedicated people that we are supposed to be, we would have howled like the way they howl these days. The good part is that things have improved.
Are you aware that troops had to march from the Bengal plains to the mountains of Sikkim since there were no proper roads for the TCVs (Troop carrying vehicles). We have improved and we will continue to do so. There have been times when I would have loved to cry blue murder, but then Tennyson's words are important to soldier along.
It is the right of every citizen to question the Army or anyone or any organisation, and one must do so. After all it is the taxpayer's money including ours. Therefore, I am not against questioning. All I say, enunciate each issue and discuss it threadbare rather than state an all encompassing word that can mean many thing to many different individuals.
National strategic, geo strategy cannot be divorced from geo politics and national politics. Strategy is a byproduct of geo politics. Therefore, Kargil should not be looked at merely from a military standpoint unless one is looking at the tactical and operational art issues. If perceived in the overall context it must also address itself in the ambit of the overall geostrategic and geopolitical continuum.
I would like to think that because of Kargil, the US realised the maturity of India and hence it shed its anti Indian stance. Kargil, to my mind, is the turning point. Earlier, Pakistan used to have a field day against India with both China and the US supporting the Pakistanis. India was always shoved into the corner. Today, the situation is different. In fact today's newspaper states that Kashmir is no longer on the list of festering disputes at the UN!
Notwithstanding, don't back out. Just list the issues with the rationale behind what you to say. Maybe I will be educated and I say that with all humility at my command.