Operation Sindoor - Post Conflict Analysis

[A_Gupta]

OK, watch it on Times of India:

At Oxford University, an Indian student delivered a sharp reality check that has since gone viral. Debating India’s policy towards Pakistan in the aftermath of the Pahalgam terror attack, Viraansh Bhanushali dismantled Pakistani arguments with facts, history, and blunt clarity. Defending India’s Operation Sindoor, he argued that New Delhi acted with clear objectives and restraint, stopping once its goals were achieved. Calling out Pakistan’s repeated denial of terror sponsorship, Bhanushali declared, “You cannot shame a state that has no shame,” drawing applause across the hall. He also highlighted how weak responses and hollow dossiers after 26/11 emboldened terror networks, leading to attacks like Uri and Pulwama. The Oxford debate turned into a defining moment where India’s strategic clarity stood tall against Pakistan’s familiar deflections.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_n5-Dmdg040

[Rakesh]

Indian Armed Forces Are NDTV Indian Of The Year 2025

Following a phenomenal display of valour, coordination and pinpoint precision during Operation Sindoor, the Indian Armed Forces have been named NDTV's Indian Of The Year for 2025. In May, the Armed Forces struck terror bases in at least nine locations in Pakistan - including the headquarters of the Lashkar-e-Taiba in Muridke and Jaish-e-Mohammed in Bahawalpur - as part of the Operation, which was a response to the terror attack in Jammu and Kashmir's Pahalgam, in which 26 people were killed.

[Amber G.]

This must be mentioned here:

Saudi Arabia has awarded its highest national honor to Pakistan’s army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, during his visit to Riyadh, Pakistan’s military said Monday, underscoring deepening ties between the two countries, including cooperation on counterterrorism.



Saudi Arabia awards Pakistan's powerful army chief highest national honor after defense pact

[SSridhar]

How India 'rewrote' Pakistan's nuclear doctrine in 2025 - Economic Times

For more than two decades, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons have functioned as a strategic equaliser against India’s growing conventional superiority. Islamabad’s nuclear posture was never designed primarily for battlefield use; but it sought to impose psychological and political constraints on India by raising the perceived risk of escalation. This posture aimed to deter not just major conventional invasions, but even limited punitive action, thereby enabling Pakistan to pursue sub-conventional strategies with relative impunity.

Operation Sindoor marked a significant departure from this long-standing dynamic. By demonstrating the ability to conduct sustained, precise conventional operations without triggering nuclear signalling or escalation, India effectively 'rewrote' Pakistan's nuclear doctrine, altering the assumed relationship between conventional force employment and nuclear thresholds. The operation did not dismantle Pakistan’s nuclear capability, but it diluted its coercive value as a blanket deterrent against Indian action.

Pak’s nuclear ambiguity

Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine evolved in response to India’s conventional advantages. Concepts such as full-spectrum deterrence were explicitly intended to close the gap between conventional and nuclear conflict by creating ambiguity at every rung of escalation. The underlying logic was if India could not be certain where Pakistan’s nuclear red lines lay, it would exercise restraint even at lower levels of conflict.

This ambiguity served a specific strategic purpose. It provided Pakistan with space to employ sub-conventional tools such as proxy terror war and deniable violence, while counting on the nuclear shadow to deter Indian retaliation. Over time, this dynamic constrained India’s responses, reinforcing a perception that any meaningful conventional action risked uncontrollable escalation. Also, Pakistan's development of tactical nuclear weapons was a clear warning to India that small conventional conflicts too can attract nuclear attacks at smaller scale.

What changed with Operation Sindoor

Operation Sindoor disrupted this logic by demonstrating that large-scale, overt conventional actions could be undertaken without crossing Pakistan’s nuclear thresholds. India’s strikes, conducted openly, challenged the assumption that air power and deep strikes were inherently escalatory. The absence of nuclear signalling or extraordinary escalation from Pakistan during and after the operation was as consequential as the strikes themselves.

What emerged was a clearer delineation between conventional punishment and nuclear retaliation. Rather than triggering nuclear brinkmanship, the conflict revealed that Pakistan’s decision-makers continued to operate within a rational cost-benefit framework, even under pressure. This effectively expanded the conventional warfare space below the nuclear threshold, weakening the deterrent value of nuclear ambiguity.

One of the most significant outcomes of Operation Sindoor was the normalisation of air power. Historically, air strikes were viewed as crossing a psychological red line, particularly in a nuclearised environment. Operation Sindoor demonstrated that when paired with precision, restraint, and clear political messaging, air power could be employed without provoking nuclear escalation.

This shift matters because air power offers speed, reach, and reversibility, the qualities well suited to limited objectives. Its use during the operation reframed Indian air strikes not as precursors to total war, but as instruments of measured response. In doing so, India reduced the escalatory risk attached to air operations, further widening the space for conventional action.

Statements by India’s senior military leadership following the operation reinforced this recalibration. By emphasising rationality on both sides and highlighting the existence of ample space below the nuclear threshold, Indian officials publicly rejected the idea that nuclear weapons automatically render conventional conflict uncontrollable. This messaging was directed as much at international audiences as at Pakistan itself.

Weeks after Operation Sindoor, Chief of defence staff General Anil Chauhan had dismissed any fears over the conflict with Pakistan escalating to a nuclear war, saying a lot of “rationality” was displayed by both sides during the fight. "It's my personal view that the most rational people are people in uniform when conflict takes place," he added. "During this operation, I found both sides displaying a lot of rationality in their thoughts as well as actions. So why should we assume that in the nuclear domain there will be irrationality on someone else's part?"

"I think there's a lot of space before that nuclear threshold is crossed, a lot of signalling before that, I think nothing like that happened," General Chauhan said. "There's a lot of space for conventional operations which has been created, and this will be the new norm."

By acting decisively without triggering nuclear consequences, India weakened the effectiveness of Pakistan’s strategy of deliberate ambiguity. If nuclear threats are not invoked, or are implicitly discounted, during significant conventional punishment, their credibility as a deterrent against future action erodes.

In this sense, Operation Sindoor effectively “rewrote” Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine by challenging its practical utility. The operation suggested that nuclear weapons cannot indefinitely shield sub-conventional warfare from conventional retaliation, especially when that retaliation is carefully calibrated. In this altered strategic grammar, nuclear weapons remain relevant, but they are no longer omnipotent. The space for conventional warfare has expanded.

[Amber G.]

How India 'rewrote' Pakistan's nuclear doctrine in 2025 - Economic Times,,
<article>

Thanks. Nice Article - My take, It (in my opinion_:

-- Correctly identifies erosion of nuclear coercion
- Correctly notes expansion of conventional space

But IMO if slightly overstates permanence of the shift.
- Understates future risks of credibility restoration attempts

From a nuclear professional’s standpoint, I am afraid this is not the end of nuclear deterrence for us but a transition from myth-based deterrence to behavior-tested deterrence.

Impressive Progress, no doubt — but not complete safety.

A more precise claim — and harder to dispute would be:

Operation Sindoor exposed the gap between doctrinal ambiguity and operational reality. In doing so, it reduced the deterrent value of nuclear threats as a blanket shield for sub-conventional warfare. (But It did NOT eliminate it - As I have said in this forum many times before - We did not 'destroy all their nukes').

If it will be okay I may put some of my thoughts in details here...

[drnayar]

How India 'rewrote' Pakistan's nuclear doctrine in 2025 - Economic Times,,
<article>

Thanks. Nice Article - My take, It (in my opinion_:

-- Correctly identifies erosion of nuclear coercion
- Correctly notes expansion of conventional space

But IMO if slightly overstates permanence of the shift.
- Understates future risks of credibility restoration attempts

From a nuclear professional’s standpoint, I am afraid this is not the end of nuclear deterrence for us but a transition from myth-based deterrence to behavior-tested deterrence.

Impressive Progress, no doubt — but not complete safety.

A more precise claim — and harder to dispute would be:

Operation Sindoor exposed the gap between doctrinal ambiguity and operational reality. In doing so, it reduced the deterrent value of nuclear threats as a blanket shield for sub-conventional warfare. (But It did NOT eliminate it - As I have said in this forum many times before - We did not 'destroy all their nukes').

If it will be okay I may put some of my thoughts in details here...

Amber G., it would be useful to put "pushing the nuclear threshold" between NATO and Russia in Ukraine in context .. how far can you go without reaching the ambiguous "threshold"

Does "clarity" or "ambiguity" help in a nuclear doctrine

also it seems to make sense to have "dual purpose" nuclear delivery vehicles rather than standalone multi billion dollar vessels , for example SSBNs., repurposing or having modular conventional weapons options for our SSBNs say for example.. one S4+ can easily carry enough cruise missiles to waste paki land

[S_Madhukar]

Can someone also put this in context of game theory.. do we now have 2 rational or irrational actors and hence a temporary detente?

[SSridhar]

From a nuclear professional’s standpoint, I am afraid this is not the end of nuclear deterrence for us but a transition from myth-based deterrence to behavior-tested deterrence.

Impressive Progress, no doubt — but not complete safety.

A more precise claim — and harder to dispute would be:

Operation Sindoor exposed the gap between doctrinal ambiguity and operational reality. In doing so, it reduced the deterrent value of nuclear threats as a blanket shield for sub-conventional warfare. (But It did NOT eliminate it - As I have said in this forum many times before - We did not 'destroy all their nukes').

If it will be okay I may put some of my thoughts in details here...

Let me begin by saying that I agree with your more precise articulation.

So long as even a single nuclear weapon with its delivery platform exists, it will have a deterrence value. We can never underestimate a NWS. Having said that, I do not think that the posted article said that deterrence has ended.

Ultimately, a significant portion of deterrence is in the state-of-mind because an adversary's capabilities are already known and only his behaviour is unknown or speculative. Is the enemy a rational player? Will there be enough and credible nuclear signalling before a nuclear strike? What are the enemy's red-lines and how sacrosanct are they to the enemy or in other words how much of it is husk and where is the grain? Etc...

If we look at how India has handled TSP so far, it has been a carefully calibrated gradual increase in retaliatory violence. In every instance, we have carefully upped the ante, mindful of Pakistan's NWs, and pushed the envelope to where we came in May 2025. Whether this was a carefully planned orchestra or it was all fortuitous to which we are retrofitting a theory, is debatable. If Kargil 1999 was the first operation by TSP after becoming a declared NWS, Indian response took into account the deterrence posture and Vajpayee ordered no crossing by IAF of even the LoC in aerial attacks, even though we took more casualties in the process. The 2016 'surgical strike' retaliation was a cross-border incursion by our Army into POK to destroy some terrorist launch pads. The 2019 retaliation was aerial (considered extremely provocative especially in the India-TSP context) and went far deeper into TSP territory unlike in 2016 (when we after all went into only our land), and destroyed Balakot, a place which has great reverence in jihadi narrative. The 2025 episode smashed everything literally and came very close to destroying their nuclear command structure, some nuclear storage facilities, and bases important for TSP's strategic forces. It gave the clear & unmistakable message that TSP had nowhere to hide.

On the other hand, TSP hasn't been able to retaliate meaningfully against any of these audacious Bhartiya attacks. They are well and truly scared of BrahMos (for example, how Shah Mahmood Qureshi reacted in their National Assembly in Feb. 2019 on the ultimatum given by Bharat over the release of Abhinandan or the flourish of his hand indicating 'All was over', by Shahbaz Sharif in a press meet in Azerbaijan when referring to the massive wave of BrahMos attacks on the night of May 9-10).

How did TSP flaunt its NWs in each of these incidents? During Kargil 1999, the Pakistani chatter on employing nuclear weapons was at its highest, a crescendo that has not been reached by Pakistan in subsequent conflicts. In 2016, there was only some talk of Pakistan also being a NWS etc. In 2019, after a very escalatory IAF attack inside proper Pakistani territory on 26th Feb 2019, PM IK convened the NCA only the next day more in a show of strength rather than with any real purpose. Neither during May 7-10 nor subsequently, has there been any nuclear sabre rattling by TSP. The first glimpse of this came only when the Pakistani CDS, spoke at Shangri La Dialogue in Singapore three weeks later. All that he said was "the threshold of an escalatory war has come dangerously low." He only vaguely referred to 'deterrence' and 'strategic stability' in the course of Q&A, not in his main speech. Evidentially therefore, TSP is behaving much more normally in matters of nuclear weaponry, than ever before.

Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai has given the redlines more than a decade back (and which still stand as there has been no articulation of any revision), whose breach would lead to employment of NWs by TSP and these are:

• A significant territory of Pakistan is captured by India
• A significant portion of the PA or PAF is destroyed by India
• India strangulates Pakistan economically
• India causes political destabilization of Pakistan through subversion

While these are all ambiguous in terms of what constituted a violation by India (the fourth being a totally egregious condition for TSP to launch a NW strike), the Indian retaliation so far has been nowhere near any of these markers and yet inflicted enough punishment, especially to an honour-based Jihadi country, without inviting significant retaliation.

It looks like therefore that while India has to be always wary of the NWs of TSP, never letting down the guard ('letting our guard down' having been a malady which we are afflicted with and proven time and again since 1947), the Pakistanis are also finding out slowly but surely the limits of their nuclear sabre-rattling.

There is deterrence, a universal no-escape phenomenon, and then there is nuclear sabre-rattling which is built on top of the deterrence. The TSP bluff of the latter has effectively and increasingly been called in every outing by Bharat. Deterrence, as always, holds. But India is succeeding in making Pakistan realize where it might actually start, rather than letting them make us believe otherwise.

[SRajesh]

^^ My take is that we have two rational actors.
The Jihadis for all the brouhaha, at the upper echelons of power still have rational actors.
The noise is for purely internal consumption and the 'Sabre Rattling' is for the Western Audience: a. for maintain restrain request b. for for quid pro quo.
It was our political will ( and not the Military/Intelligence thinking) as to "Log kya Kahenge' and unwillingness to take necessary steps. This was to a large extent also fostered by the South Block.
The Jihadis to the point of May 2025 had not anticipated this quantum leap in the thinking of South Block.
One thing you might have notice that since Dr SJ has taken over as the EAM, the FS's role has become more behind the scene and not upfront and vocal!.
And also the NSA has become Less Talk More Work type.
Selective leaks to the so called 'Independent Press' either by the FS or NSA has become zero.
This has not only upset the Jihadi Planning but also the Western Response.
Hence my views will be a total rethink on the part of Jihadis.
Maybe more homegrown Yahoos will be activated to make more Red Fort type Fidayeen attacks.
Hmm Not far before we 'Burqa Begums' blowing themselves up.

[RCase]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EEEWW4TcnVE

Beidou problems... Though the above video is not about Op Sindoor, it is interesting to note that the Beidou signal got spoofed for their civilian population. Their traffic was in a disarray. Seems like the Beidou technology is not as robust as claimed to be by the Chinese. Might explain why the Chinese missiles failed to reach their intended targets and landed harmlessly. This comes on the heels of other Chinese military maal that has brochure wonders, but fails when the rubber meets the road.

[SSridhar]

'80 drones in 36 hours': Pakistan's big admission on Operation Sindoor; confirms damage to Nur Khan airbase - ToI

Pakistan has once again found itself on the defensive after a senior government official publicly acknowledged the impact of India’s precision strikes on a key military installation during the escalation in May, following Operation Sindoor.

The admission came from Pakistan’s foreign minister and deputy Prime Minister Ishaq Dar, who, during a year-end press briefing on Saturday, confirmed that India had targeted the Nur Khan Air Base in Rawalpindi’s Chaklala area. Dar acknowledged that the strike caused damage to the military installation and injured personnel stationed there.

Addressing reporters, Dar said India had launched multiple drone incursions into Pakistani territory within a short span, underlining the scale of the operation. “They (India) send drones towards Pakistan. In 36 hours, at least 80 drones were sent... We were able to intercept 79 drones out of 80, and only one drone damaged a military installation and personnel were also injured in the attack,” he claimed, according to news agency ANI.

The foreign minister went on to describe the sequence of events following the strikes, saying that Pakistan’s civil and military leadership, led by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, held an emergency meeting on the night of May 9 to respond to the evolving situation.

He added that India “made the mistake” of attacking the Nur Khan Air Base in the early hours of May 10, a remark that further acknowledged the strike and its impact.

Dar’s comments amount to a rare public admission by a top Pakistani official of India’s military action on Pakistani air bases in May. The strikes came after Operation Sindoor, launched by the Indian Armed Forces to target nine terror camps in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir, in retaliation for the April 22 terror attack in Pahalgam that killed 26 civilians.

The Pakistan Air Force’s Nur Khan Air Base in Chaklala suffered significant damage during the Indian precision strikes. India had launched Operation Sindoor in the early hours of May 7 as a direct response to the Pahalgam attack.

The escalation that followed saw increased cross-border shelling by Pakistan and retaliatory action by Indian forces. The situation later took an unexpected turn when Pakistan’s Director General of Military Operations contacted his Indian counterpart to propose a ceasefire, which India accepted. The outreach from the Pakistani side was later confirmed by Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri, who said both sides agreed to halt all military operations on land, at sea and in the air.

Satellite imagery released by Maxar Technologies on May 13 showed significant damage to multiple Pakistani air bases, including Nur Khan Air Base. The images revealed damage at four installations: Nur Khan Air Base in Rawalpindi, PAF Base Mushaf in Sargodha, Bholari Air Base and PAF Base Shahbaz in Jacobabad. A comparison of satellite images taken on April 25 and May 10 showed clear damage to air base facilities, corroborating the strikes.

This is not the first time a senior Pakistani leader has acknowledged the attack on Nur Khan Air Base. In May, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif admitted that Indian ballistic missiles had hit the base and other locations, breaking from Pakistan’s usual practice of denying Indian military action.

Addressing a ceremony at the Pakistan Monument on May 16, Sharif said, “At around 2:30 am on May 10, General Syed Asim Munir called me on a secure line and informed me that India's ballistic missiles had hit Nur Khan Airbase and other areas. Our Air Force used homegrown technology to save our country, and they even used modern gadgets and technology on Chinese jets,” Geo News reported.

[Amber G.]

Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi claims that Beijing mediated between Pakistan & India during the May conflict.

Transcript from Chinese foreign ministry:

[Lisa]

Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi claims that Beijing mediated between Pakistan & India during the May conflict.

It's a bit over the top but I will also like to claim credit!

https://www.youtube.com/shorts/4NKu-KFIuMI

[ritesh]

This must be mentioned here:

Saudi Arabia has awarded its highest national honor to Pakistan’s army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, during his visit to Riyadh, Pakistan’s military said Monday, underscoring deepening ties between the two countries, including cooperation on counterterrorism.



Saudi Arabia awards Pakistan's powerful army chief highest national honor after defense pact

Just goes to show... It's just a toi-let paper

[saip]

And they did not demand a Nobel for Eleven for all these mediations? Surprising.

[V_Raman]

I dont think India will have AFG style burqa clad blowups - that will totally make the IM population socially isolated/ostracized and there will be intense shame.

[Vayutuvan]

And they did not demand a Nobel for Eleven for all these mediations? Surprising.

Ombaba was given Nobel to start the Pukraine revolution.

[chetak]

This must be mentioned here:

Saudi Arabia has awarded its highest national honor to Pakistan’s army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, during his visit to Riyadh, Pakistan’s military said Monday, underscoring deepening ties between the two countries, including cooperation on counterterrorism.



Saudi Arabia awards Pakistan's powerful army chief highest national honor after defense pact

Just goes to show... It's just a toi-let paper

ritesh ji,

Its just one way of purchasing him

these guys have so many other ways because their tradition and culture has always been open about such things.

he was already on retainer and now this "honor" has cemented his place in the local hierarchy. even while giving him, status and social heft by acknowledging his closeness to the power structure

[Amber G.]

1st January: Every year, on this day, India-Pakistan exchange list of nuclear installations (1988/1991) & prisoners (2008 agreement). 35th consecutive exchange of Nuclear Installations will take place today.

[Rakesh]

Indian Army Carried Out Entire Operational Planning’: Fresh Details Emerge on Operation Sindoor
https://bharatshakti.in/indian-army-car ... n-sindoor/
31 Dec 2025