India Nuclear News and Discussion 4 July 2011

[Amber G.]

Should be of interest to India:

ChatGPT said:

The U.S. Army has launched a new effort—through the Defense Innovation Unit—to prototype SMR's (microreactors) at nine Army installations by 2030. The initiative, called the Janus program, seeks commercially built reactors that can provide reliable 24/7 power, especially at bases with frequent outages, high electricity costs, or remote locations where fuel logistics are difficult. The Army argues that nuclear power may be the only practical way to meet growing energy demands while improving resilience against grid disruptions and attacks.

The selected sites include major installations such as Fort Bragg, Fort Hood, Redstone Arsenal, Fort Wainwright (Alaska), and Joint Base Lewis–McChord. Companies will prototype a “first-of-a-kind” and then a “second-of-a-kind” reactor at each location under flexible OTA contracting. Beyond powering bases, the Army hopes this effort will help jump-start the commercial microreactor industry, standardize designs, strengthen the nuclear supply chain, and attract new engineering talent.

Link:Army issues solicitation, announces sites for nuclear-powered bases

[Amber G.]

In the news:
Shocking! Uranium found in breastmilk of lactating mothers in Bihar, infants at potential health risk

[Sanatanan]

^
The article says:

Dr Ashok Sharma of AIIMS Delhi, who is a co-author of the study, said, "The study analysed breast milk from 40 lactating mothers and found uranium (U-238) in all samples. Although 70% of infants showed potential non-carcinogenic health risk, the overall uranium levels were below permissible limits and are expected to have minimal actual health impact on both mothers and infants. The highest average contamination occurred in Khagaria district and the highest individual value in Katihar district. While uranium exposure may pose risks such as impaired neurological development and reduced IQ, breastfeeding should not be discontinued and remains the most beneficial source of infant nutrition unless clinically indicated."

[Font highlight, mine]

So, are the headlines in Tribune news paper meant to be sensational?

I understand Uranium salts dissolve in ground water under favourable environmental chemistry as it is said to happened at Oklo, long long ago. Perhaps in Bihar these conditions exist. Hope AERB will go "deeper" into it . Consumption of such water perhaps manifests breast milk too. Body fluids of other residents in that area may also show U at ppm levels if tested.

On the other hand, is there some sizable U mineralisation in that area not so far identified by our geologists?

[Sanatanan]

^
I recollect some years ago, a similar U contamination "scare" was created in under ground waters even in Punjab.

[Amber G.]

Ottawa close to uranium deal with India worth $2.8 billion, Globe and Mail reports

Canada and India are reportedly close to sealing a US$2.8 billion, 10-year uranium supply deal, which would give India a stable long-term fuel source for its expanding civilian nuclear-power program. The uranium would come from Canadian producer Cameco, and the agreement aligns with broader efforts by both countries to revive economic ties, including restarting stalled CEPA trade talks. For India, the deal strengthens nuclear-fuel security, supports reactor expansion, and diversifies suppliers, while remaining under IAEA-linked safeguards. Neither government has officially confirmed the agreement yet, but it is seen as a major step in deepening civil-nuclear cooperation between the two nations.

[Amber G.]

Aritcle in Yahoo finance : Better Nuclear Play: NuScale Power vs. Oklo

Key Points
NuScale Power is developing small modular reactors, and it has a system approved by the NRC.

Oklo is trying to use recycled fuel for nuclear reactors, but does not have a design formally approved.

NuScale Power is a better bet than Oklo, but both stocks are incredibly risky to own right now.

My take - for India - Plausible though optimistic.

It’s realistic: in the sense that importing or licensing an already-certified SMR design (if regulatory, logistic, and financial constraints are addressed) can accelerate deployment compared to designing a new reactor from scratch.

But it’s also optimistic — because it assumes that a technology that’s not yet commercially demonstrated anywhere will seamlessly adapt to a different regulatory, infrastructural, and economic environment.

NuScale offers one of the best-case blueprints for SMRs today — and if India to consider this route, it should do so with caution, rigorous engineering–economic analysis, and long-term commitment, rather than seeing it as a plug-and-play solution.

----
FYI - As of now, NuScale and Oklo, AFIK, have no visible connection to India’s SMR plans. The SMR push in India is driven mainly by indigenous designs or by foreign firms already experienced with Indian regulation (Russia, France). The only U.S.-SMR vendor with a known India link is Holtec — so far.

IMO - If India wants to maximize nuclear-waste efficiency, thorium-cycle potential, and build on domestic PHWR + heavy-water infrastructure, it may remain committed to that path — meaning U.S. light-water SMRs like NuScale may not be a natural fit unless broader strategic priorities shift.

[Amber G.]

^
The article says:

Dr Ashok Sharma of AIIMS Delhi, who is a co-author of the study, said, "The study analysed breast milk from 40 lactating mothers and found uranium (U-238) in all samples. Although 70% of infants showed potential non-carcinogenic health risk, the overall uranium levels were below permissible limits and are expected to have minimal actual health impact on both mothers and infants. The highest average contamination occurred in Khagaria district and the highest individual value in Katihar district. While uranium exposure may pose risks such as impaired neurological development and reduced IQ, breastfeeding should not be discontinued and remains the most beneficial source of infant nutrition unless clinically indicated."

[Font highlight, mine]

So, are the headlines in Tribune news paper meant to be sensational?

<snip>

I completely agree with your analysis. The key point — which most headlines conveniently ignore — is that the AIIMS co-author himself stated that all measured uranium levels were below permissible limits and that the actual health impact is expected to be minimal.

The “70% potential risk” figure comes from a very conservative modeling method (Hazard Quotient), not from measured toxicity.(the risk model (HQ/TDI calculation) is extremely conservative. These models often overestimate risk when the dose is near threshold.They’re designed to capture the “maximum possible risk,” not the “likely” risk.)

Geochemically, it is perfectly plausible that certain alluvial aquifers in Bihar mobilize trace uranium, just as has been documented in Punjab’s Malwa belt and in several regions worldwide with similar hydrochemistry. Groundwater → maternal ingestion → breast milk is exactly the pathway you’d expect in such settings. None of this points to industrial contamination or a hidden uranium ore deposit — just natural geogenic mobilization that warrants monitoring.

The Bihar data are indeed a bit higher than typical global breast-milk values, but still well below US EPA/WHO drinking-water limits, which makes the sensational framing (“shocking!”) misleading. Overall, it’s an important environmental finding — not a public-health crisis, and certainly not a reason to discourage breastfeeding.

So:
Is the Bihar finding serious?
- Yes — it signals a groundwater-chemistry issue that should be monitored.
Is it dangerous?
-No — concentrations are well below harmful levels and below US/WHO drinking-water limits.
- Is media coverage sensational?
-Yes — headlines implying a toxic-health crisis are not supported by the measured values or by the authors themselves.

Permissible Uranium Levels in Drinking Water (United States (EPA)/WHO/India) - 30 µg/L (micrograms per liter) ( Bihar breast milk level ~ 2–3 µg/L (Maximum: around 7–9 µg/L) MUCH lower to be health hazard)

[A_Gupta]

Does it indicate viable uranium deposits?

[Amber G.]

Does it indicate viable uranium deposits?

FWIW - my educated guess almost certainly is - No — these findings do not indicate the presence of a viable uranium deposit.

Elevated uranium in groundwater or breast milk usually reflects natural geochemical mobilization, not an ore body large enough for mining. ( Trace uranium in exit in ..
Gangetic alluvial sediments, ( and/or Fluvisols derived from Himalayan granitoids and/or U-bearing phosphates and ash layers and/orb High-carbonate groundwater

Anyway the concentrations are far below what’s needed for an economic ore deposit, and
the source is just trace uranium in granitic or metamorphic source rocks upstream.

This same pattern occurred in Punjab, where groundwater showed elevated uranium but detailed surveys by AMD and AERB confirmed no mineable ore bodies — just geogenic processes (oxidation, carbonate complexing, and leaching from sediments).

If Bihar had a major hidden deposit, you would expect anomalies in soil and rocks, not only groundwater consistent spatial clustering and much higher concentrations (tens–hundreds of µg/L or mg/L)

None of that has been reported.

So the data indicate natural groundwater chemistry, not a mining-grade uranium resource. The issue is environmental hydrochemistry, not mineral exploration potential.

[Amber G.]

Historic reform: PM Modi says India will open nuclear sector to private players. Why it matters

Prime Minister Narendra Modi on November 27 announced one of India’s most sweeping energy-sector reforms in decades, declaring that the country’s tightly controlled nuclear power sector will soon open to private investment. Calling it a “historic shift,” the PM said the move will accelerate innovation, boost energy security, and position India as a global leader in advanced nuclear technologies.

[uddu]

PM Narendra Modi Announces Nuclear Policy Reset | #thehardfacts with Rahul Shivshankar | News18
In a groundbreaking policy shift, India has announced that its nuclear power sector — long dominated by the state — will now be open to private participation. This historic move, declared by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, aims to accelerate innovation, boost clean‑energy capacity, and position India as a global leader in next‑generation nuclear technology.

[KL Dubey]

Historic reform: PM Modi says India will open nuclear sector to private players. Why it matters

Prime Minister Narendra Modi on November 27 announced one of India’s most sweeping energy-sector reforms in decades, declaring that the country’s tightly controlled nuclear power sector will soon open to private investment. Calling it a “historic shift,” the PM said the move will accelerate innovation, boost energy security, and position India as a global leader in advanced nuclear technologies.

Specifically, he is referring to the Atomic Energy Bill to be introduced in winter Sansad session. FM Sitaraman had mentioned nuclear sector legal reforms in budget speech earlier this year.

[Amber G.]

Today in History - December 2- Nuclear Fisson

[Amber G.]

Russia to offer tech on small nuclear reactors
one link : https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/115113/

It will ihave specific proposal on Russian-designed SMRs. (as part of the 23rd annual summit)).
(Kremlin spokesman confirmed that Putin's upcoming visit to India in December 2025 (as part of the 23rd annual summit) will include a specific proposal on Russian-designed SMRs.

Rosatom, is ready to share its SMR technologies with India. Rosatom's head, Alexey Likhachev, is part of the delegation and will lead discussions on this. Russia already has operational experience with SMRs, including its floating nuclear power plant, the Akademik Lomonosov.

Also Rosatom is currently developing technical specifications for a new nuclear power plant site in India that will feature the advanced VVER-1200 reactor units.

Also Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP) is being reviewed, with Units 5 and 6 actively under construction and pre-commissioning work underway for Unit 3..

The focus on SMRs reflects India's dual strategy to achieve its ambitious nuclear capacity target by deploying both large-capacity reactors and smaller, more flexible SMRs for remote areas and industrial clusters.

Many things to watch for....

Aso ToI story :
India to soon commission 3rd nuclear submarine with ballistic missiles

[Amber G.]

In another news:

Holtec gets $400M federal grant for small nuclear reactors at Palisades

- The two SMR-300 units are expected to add roughly 600 megawatts (MW) of new generating capacity—on top of the 800 MW provided by the existing (restarted) plant.

-If successful, Palisades could provide a substantial amount of clean, baseload (reliable, 24/7) power to Michigan, supporting energy demand growth.

-The use of SMRs could accelerate deployment of nuclear energy in the U.S. m

- For some of us this illustrates real momentum behind new-generation reactor designs and regulatory/funding support.

-SMR-300 units still must receive full regulatory and construction approval from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) before they can be built.


- The economics and long-term viability of SMRs remain debated in the industry (costs, waste management, licensing, public acceptance — common issues with any nuclear project).

The fact that Holtec just secured major U.S. federal funding for SMR development (for sites like Palisades Nuclear Power Plant in Michigan) strengthens the company’s global SMR development program — which includes planned deployment of its flagship SMR-300 reactors in India. Earlier in 2025, Holtec received regulatory clearance from the U.S. Department of Energy (DoE) to transfer SMR-technology to India, enabling collaboration with Indian firms Larsen & Toubro Ltd., Tata Consulting Engineers Ltd. and Holtec’s own regional subsidiary Holtec Asia

[A_Gupta]

This is a GoI press release.
PARLIAMENT QUESTION: CONSTRUCTION OF SMALL MODULAR ATOMIC REACTORS
https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage ... g=3&lang=1

In Union Budget 2025–26, the Government has allocated ₹20,000 crore for the design, development, and deployment of Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), aiming to operationalise indigenously developed SMRs by 2033.

Under Nuclear Energy Mission funds, have been allocated for R&D of 200 MWe Bharat Small Modular Reactor (BSMR-200) which is in advanced stage of obtaining administrative and financial sanction.

BSMR is based on the proven pressurized water reactor technology. It will use Slightly Enriched Uranium (SEU) as a fuel. It has been provided with passive safety features as well as several engineered safety systems to ensure nuclear safety during off normal conditions.



Under the Nuclear Energy Mission, BARC has initiated design and development works on SMRs namely;

200 MWe Bharat Small Modular Reactor (BSMR-200). Lead unit proposed at Tarapur Atomic Power station site, Maharashtra.
55 MWe Small Modular Reactor (SMR-55). Lead unit proposed to be constructed at Tarapur.
Up to 5 MWth high temperature gas cooled reactor meant for hydrogen generation. This reactor is proposed to be constructed at BARC Vizag, Andhra Pradesh.




SMR is a promising technology in industrial decarbonization especially where there is a requirement of reliable and continuous supply of power. Small modular reactors are being developed with specific objectives of;

Repurposing of retiring fossil fuel-based power plants,
Captive plants for energy intensive industries and
Off-grid applications for remote locations.


Small Modular Reactors can be located in brown field sites for repurposing of retiring fossil fuel base plants in off grid areas and as captive power plants in energy intensive industries where large plants cannot be located. They also enable reduce the construction time due to modular construction.

Government has announced to partner with private players for deployment of 220 MW Bharat Small Reactors (BSR). Accordingly, Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL) has issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) within the existing legal framework, inviting Indian industries to participate in setting up of BSR for captive power generation, to provide a sustainable, low-carbon energy solution for industries, enabling them to decarbonize their operations.

Government of India has set the target of achieving 100 GWe installed nuclear energy capacity by 2047 to contribute significantly in achieving the target of Net Zero by 2070.

Safety including environmental safety is accorded highest priority in setting up of nuclear power projects. The construction of nuclear power plants is commenced only after obtaining environmental clearance from Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEF&CC) following the due process.

Waste management facilities are an integral part of the design and established along with the plants at the site.

Public awareness activities based on a multipronged approach to spread awareness about nuclear power projects and address any apprehensions in a credible manner are ongoing. DAE regularly organise public awareness programme for educational institutions and villages around the plant sites to spread awareness about nuclear energy and to eradicate myths.

[Amber G.]

@Guptaji^^^^ Thanks for posting.

IMO, This is the direction India needed to move in, and it aligns well with the trends we’ve discussed earlier here in BRF.

This is a genuinely positive and strategic shift:

- Real money + real timelines
(The ₹20,000-crore allocation signals that SMRs are no longer just conceptual. Setting a target of operational indigenous SMRs by 2033 )

A coherent portfolio, not a single experiment India isn’t betting on one design:

BSMR-200 (PWR-based), SMR-55 (smaller footprint), 5 MWth HTGR ( clean hydrogen)

This diversified pipeline spreads technological risk and serves different power/industrial use cases.

The fossil-plant repurposing angle is huge

(Retiring coal plants already have grid connections, and transmission infrastructure. Dropping an SMR in the same place reduces cost and avoids land-acquisition battles)

-. Private participation is a clear break from the past

(U.S.is trying with GE etc,)


The push toward 100 GWe of nuclear by 2047

India is finally treating SMRs as a strategic tool for decarbonization... If the BSMR-200 at Tarapur breaks ground on time, India could become one of the first to deploy SMRs at scale.

[Amber G.]

^^^ Looks like bill is passing soon!
India’s planned overhaul of NUCLEAR laws could UNLOCK up to $214 BILLION in new reactor, SMR and fuel-cycle projects.

India's government is amending the 1962 Atomic Energy Act to open the nuclear sector to private and foreign investment. This could enable $214 billion in projects for new reactors, small modular reactors (SMRs), and fuel facilities. The aim is to boost capacity from 8.8 GW to 100 GW by 2047, supporting clean energy goals. Bill may pass soon.

[A_Gupta]

GoI Press Release - answer to a question in Parliament
PARLIAMENT QUESTION: FAST BREEDER REACTOR PROJECT
https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage ... g=3&lang=1

Various topics are covered, not sure any of the information is new to this thread, so not quoting.

Two more:
PARLIAMENT QUESTION: ELECTRICITY GENERATION CAPACITY THROUGH NUCLEAR ENERGY
https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage ... g=3&lang=1

PARLIAMENT QUESTION: FINANCIAL AND OPERATIONAL STRUCTURES FOR SMR DEPLOYMENT
https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage ... g=3&lang=1

Department of Atomic Energy Year End Review 2025
https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage ... g=3&lang=1

[Amber G.]

GoI Press Release - answer to a question in Parliament
PARLIAMENT QUESTION: FAST BREEDER REACTOR PROJECT
https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage ... g=3&lang=1

Various topics are covered, not sure any of the information is new to this thread, so not quoting.

<snip>

Thanks. Yes, these PIB releases add a few new, concrete developments that meaningfully extend what we discussed earlier about India’s SMR roadmap and PFBR progress...

Here are the important points from above links: (See above links for details)


- PFBR: Fuel loading is officially underway (a major milestone)

Earlier, we talked about PFBR in general terms ..some new information:

>>AERB has formally granted permission for Initial Fuel Loading, First Criticality, and Low-Power Physics Experiments (Oct 2025).

>>37 subassemblies are being loaded, including the first 28 fuel assemblies.

>>PFBR has moved from “construction & testing” to active core loading.


PFBR is the centrepiece of India’s closed-fuel-cycle strategy (U-Pu-Th). Fuel loading means India is finally on the path to demonstrating breeder technology after nearly two decades of slip.

- Confirmation that India’s SMR program is going “PWR-first”

Earlier conversations covered SMRs in broad strokes — mixed signals on technology choices. -New information:

>>Government has now officially declared LWR/PWR as the preferred SMR technology.

>>wo specific SMRs are in design + administrative approval stages:

>>BSMR-200 (200 MWe) — lead unit at Tarapur

>>SMR-55 (55 MWe) — also at Tarapur

This clarity matters: no more speculation about molten salt or sodium small reactors — at least in the near term.

- First explicit mention of India’s HTGR for hydrogen production

We have talked about the concept, but now it’s confirmed as an active DAE project:
(See some of mine and KL D's posts)

>>A small 5 MWth High-Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor is under development at BARC for clean hydrogen generation. To be built at BARC Vizag.

PIB has now put HTGR in the mainstream policy list.
HTGRs are one of the few nuclear designs ideal for industrial hydrogen (900–950°C).

- India–industry partnership for nuclear is now live, not theoretical

>>NPCIL has issued an actual RFP to Indian industry for setting up 220 MW Bharat Small Reactors (BSR) for captive industrial power.

>> This is being done without amending the Atomic Energy Act, within existing frameworks.

AFAIK first time i that industry is being invited to directly participate in a nuclear deployment venture.

Waste-management protocols for SMRs clearly stated

Earlier, I posted about SMR safety, but here are few specifics:.


>>The same immobilization, engineered disposal, and regulatory clearance steps used for large reactors will apply to SMRs.

>>PIB explicitly clarifies no environmental discharges above permitted limits, countering public concerns.

This public emphasis shows the government is preparing for SMR rollout in populated/industrial zones.

- . Major jump in nuclear generation in 2024–25 (record year)

- Year-End Review 2025:

-NPCIL generated 56,681 MUs — highest ever.

-Avoided 49 million tonnes of CO₂.


- Multiple non-power nuclear expansions
(Not discussed in details in this dhaga here):

-New cancer hospital in Bihar

-Rare Earth CRM release

-Boron-11 enrichment facility

-Progress on isotope and accelerator-based facilities

Broader expansion of India’s nuclear ecosystem, not only reactors.


Amber G.

(India’s nuclear program has moved from planning to tangible execution: PFBR fuel loading has begun, SMR technology choice is finalized, HTGR hydrogen work is officially underway, industrial partnerships are opening, and nuclear generation has hit record highs.)

[Haridas]

The push toward 100 GWe of nuclear by 2047

Finally some progress.

It is my understanding that SMR has Arihant pedigree

When IUCN deal was being discussed Dr Anil Kakodkar and MM Singh were trumpeting the cornerstone of the deal on
1. 20 GWe nuclear power addition by 2020 to alleviate Indian electric power shortage. Turned out to be vapourware.
2. Indian Uranium reserves of 64,000 tonnes was a capacity handicap that requires a deal to overcome. Govt exploration had newly discovered economic reserves of180,000 tonnes. That was politically hidden.


The 100 GWe by 2047 is good target n seems feasible.

Met key people few yrs ago who indicated the issue with PFBR and finally being ready for fuel loading.

[bala]

SHANTI Bill: Cabinet gives nod to private participation in nuclear power sector under Atomic Energy Bill

The Union Cabinet, chaired by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, on Friday approved the landmark atomic energy legislation, the Atomic Energy Bill, 2025 or SHANTI (Sustainable Harnessing of Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India), driving a significant message on India's energy pathways. The Atomic Energy Bill is expected to provide a single, comprehensive legal framework for India's atomic energy sector, including provisions that allow private players to participate in several areas that have so far been the sole preserve of the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE). The areas likely to open up range from exploration and mining of atomic minerals to the critical area of fuel fabrication - all currently held by the government.

https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/in ... 930339.cms

[Vayutuvan]

Nice acronym. Shanti.

[Amber G.]

The SHANTI Bill, IMO, is more than private players in — .. fixing liability, shifting risk off NPCIL, and quietly setting the legal runway for SMRs and industrial nuclear to scale.

It’s a course correction more than a revolution.

Some thoughts:
It quietly breaks a 70-year structural bottleneck:
-NPCIL is no longer the sole carrying nuclear risk. Until now, every delay, cost overrun, or financing constraint bottlenecked the entire sector.
-It is SMR-centric even if the article doesn’t say so explicitly .This bill makes far more sense economically for SMRs, captive power etc.
- The article mentions liability almost in passing, but this is the core enabler.
We will see....

[Amber G.]

Sharing: Worth reading:

India Power Demand Lags; Nuclear Gets Boost

[Amber G.]

Nuclear Energy Bill 2025: Lok Sabha clears 'SHANTI' bill as opposition walks out; paves way for entry of private players

NEW DELHI: The Lok Sabha on Wednesday gave its nod to the the nuclear energy bill called the "Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India Bill (SHANTI), 2025". The bill was passed as opposition staged a walkout, during the ongoing Winter Session.

The amended bill was tabled in the lower house, with introduction by MoS for department of atomic energy Jitendra Singh in the House on Monday, signifying a policy shift in the atomic sector operations. The bill allows entry of private players into the industry, something that was reserved for government enterprises till now. Singh said that it provides for “a pragmatic civil liability regime for nuclear damage and to confer statutory status to Atomic Energy Regulatory Board."

The proposed legislation further aims to facilitate significant growth in nuclear energy and its applications across multiple sectors. This aligns with country's target to establish 100GW of nuclear power capacity by 2047. The law introduces fresh regulatory provisions encompassing updated safety protocols, a specialised nuclear tribunal for resolving disputes, and modifications to the nuclear liability framework to limit risks and encourage investments.


The proposed legislation permits private enterprises and their collaborative ventures to seek authorisation for establishing and running nuclear facilities, as well as transporting nuclear fuel. However, crucial operations including uranium enrichment, spent fuel handling and heavy water manufacturing shall continue to be exclusively managed by the Central government. The Centre will maintain oversight of radioactive materials and radiation-producing apparatus to ensure proper safety standards.

[Amber G.]

Trump signs law, wants India’s nuclear liability aligned with global norms
U.S. President tells Secretary of State to establish mechanism to ‘assess the implementation’ of 2008 nuclear deal; Congress says PM Modi ‘bulldozed’ SHANTI Bill to make peace with ‘once good friend’

[srin]

Noob question: What is the difficulty in scaling up the output of a reactor ? For instance, we've spent decades scaling up the PWHR from 220MW to *only* 700 MW, whereas the Areva EPR is 1.6GW, Westinghouse AP-1000 is 1GW output, VVER in Koodankulam is 1GW (but there is a 1.2GW reactor also).

[Amber G.]

Noob question: What is the difficulty in scaling up the output of a reactor ? For instance, we've spent decades scaling up the PWHR from 220MW to *only* 700 MW, whereas the Areva EPR is 1.6GW, Westinghouse AP-1000 is 1GW output, VVER in Koodankulam is 1GW (but there is a 1.2GW reactor also).

Nice question.
Physics basics:

Scaling up a reactor is not like scaling up a turbine or a boiler. Power ∝ volume, but the things that keep the reactor safe scale with surface area, material limits, and neutron physics, which do not scale kindly.

Key difficulties:\
- Heat removal (the real bottleneck)
Fission power scales with fuel volume (∝ R³) while cooling capacity scales with surface area and flow paths (∝ R²). As size increases, power density, hot spots, and thermal margins shrink.
(At large size, small flow instabilities can cause local overheating - not good)

Neutron physics stops being forgiving
( edited later: Or in physicist language: The core becomes neutronicallly decoupled. Spatial flux instabilities (like Xenon tilting) require much more granular control systems than a smaller, more 'tightly coupled' core."

Larger cores have longer neutron mean free paths and more complex flux shapes.Controlling reactivity uniformly becomes harder; edge vs center behavior diverges. (*many* other factors too)

(add later: The problem isn't that large reactors are inefficient; it's that they are "Decoupled." In a huge core, the left side doesn't "know" what the right side is doing. You end up needing a much more complex "In-core Instrumentation" system to make sure the middle isn't melting while the edges are cool.) (see note in the end)

Passive safety doesn’t scale (this is crucial)

- Natural circulation, decay heat removal, and passive cooling work best at moderate power levels.
(Physicist insight/basics on Decay Heat: Remember when you turn the reactor "off," it still produces ~7% power immediately from radioactive decay. In a 1.6GW reactor, that "residual" heat is 112MW—literally enough to power a small city. Dissipating that passively is almost impossible at that scale.)

Many other important engineering problems:
- Control and shutdown reliability (Note above)
(Control rods must insert fast and reliably across a much larger core.
(Gravity-driven or passive shutdown becomes less effective)
Structural & materials limits
-Pressure vessels grow thicker → fabrication, transport, and fracture-toughness limits.
-Thermal stresses during transients scale badly with size.

Beyond ~700–1000 MW, you need more active systems, which raises regulatory and safety hurdles.

Design difference (why PWHR vs EPR/AP1000)
-Indian PWHRs prioritize simplicity, on-power refueling, and passive safety, favoring many medium units.
-EPR/AP1000 push size using heavy engineering, massive redundancy, and cost.
Bigger ≠ better; it’s a trade between unit size vs system robustness.

Reactor power doesn’t scale linearly because cooling, neutron control, safety margins, and materials scale worse than fission power. Around ~700–1000 MW is a practical sweet spot unless you accept much higher complexity, cost, and risk.

****
Why SMR are much in the news.. because for SMRs (Small Modular Reactors) - physics likes them:

(Heat removal works in your favor, Lower absolute power → decay heat is small. Surface-to-volume ratio is large → natural circulation actually works. Passive cooling can handle worst-case accidents without heroics. ...Neutron physics is simpler etc..
-Smaller cores → flatter flux, fewer spatial instabilities.
Where SMRs hit the wall - not physics, but economics:
These don’t scale down linearly, so cost/MW goes up.

-Physics strongly favors SMRs for safety and controllability. Economics punishes them unless mass-manufactured at scale.

****
India’s choices — 700 MW PHWRs and ~500 MW Fast Reactors — are not accidental. They reflect physics constraints, fuel cycle strategy, economic reality, and infrastructure maturity. Not just size for size's sake.

- Amber G.

****
Edited later: (Some more details and additional notes added - assuming if the question was asked in a nuclear physics basic course): I hope this summary is useful for interested people.

Notes: The "Decoupling" Problem:

In smaller reactors (220–540 MW), the core is "tightly coupled." Because the physical dimensions are relatively small compared to the distance a neutron travels (the migration length), a change in one part of the core is felt almost instantly throughout. As you scale up to 1.6 GW, the core becomes neutronicallly decoupled. The left side of the reactor literally doesn't "know" what the right side is doing in real-time.

This leads to spatial flux instabilities, such as Xenon tilting. A small local temperature change can trigger a "wave" of power that oscillates from one side of the core to the other over several hours. To manage this, a large reactor requires an incredibly complex and expensive array of In-Core Instrumentation—hundreds of sensors inside the heart of the machine—just to ensure the center isn't running 20% hotter than the edges. In a PHWR, keeping that flux "flat" across a massive Calandria is a far greater control challenge than in the smaller, more predictable 220 MW units.

-The "Heavy Forging":
Beyond the physics, you hit a hard wall in metallurgy and manufacturing. To ensure structural integrity under extreme pressure and radiation, the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) of a large 1.6 GW plant must be made from massive, monolithic forged steel rings.

There are only a handful of facilities globally (like India's L&T)—with the 15,000-ton hydraulic presses necessary to squeeze a 600-ton red-hot steel ingot into a single, seamless ring. If you scale a reactor too large, you exceed the capacity of the world's largest cranes and the "fracture toughness" limits of the steel itself. In contrast, the Indian PHWR design uses hundreds of smaller pressure tubes. This is a brilliant "workaround" for India’s industrial base: instead of needing one impossible-to-forge giant vessel, you can mass-produce hundreds of smaller, high-precision tubes. Scaling up the PHWR to 700 MW is an optimization of what can be reliably manufactured and transported across Indian infrastructure.

***
Indian 700 MW PHWR is a 'Goldilocks' design: large enough for economy of scale, but small enough to bypass the nightmare of specialized heavy-forging bottlenecks, neutronic decoupling, and the loss of passive safety margins. It’s a strategic choice to favor a robust, mass-producible fleet over the high-risk, 'brute-force' engineering required to build 1.6 GW giants.

[Haridas]

^^^
Thankoo saar.

[drnayar]

Noobie qn to amberji, I would have thought 1000 mw is the median capacity for scales ?.. but I see you said Indian context ?

A quick AI query brings up the answer " For large-scale national grids, 1,000–1,200 MWe remains the current standard for low-cost electricity production. However, for private investors or regions with smaller grids, 300 MWe (the SMR standard) is increasingly seen as the most bankable size for the 2030s.
"

[Amber G.]

Noobie qn to amberji, I would have thought 1000 mw is the median capacity for scales ?.. but I see you said Indian context ?

Thanks. IMO this is natural looking but insightful question, and it actually goes to the core physics reason why India’s reactor choices look “odd” if one only compares nameplate MWe...

Again may be a long reply but I think people will be interested - I’ll keep this physics-first, consistent with India’s strategic fuel-cycle direction (not vendor marketing or politics).

-India’s nuclear program is fuel-limited, not technology-limited. (We may have uranium scarcity, but good engineers/scientists)
- Our U - low-grade, limited reserves,
- Thorium: abundant, but not fissile
- Reprocessing capability: strong
- Enrichment infrastructure: intentionally modest

This immediately biases India toward:
-High neutron economy
-Minimal enrichment dependence
-Closed fuel cycle

This single constraint explains both PHWR dominance and the discomfort with very large LWRs.
--
More: (From a strategic standpoint:):- PHWRs are not just power reactors — they are plutonium generators optimized for fast-reactor feedstock.

so PHWRs with natural uranium: fits India unusually well
-Neutron economy physics ((D₂O moderated, D₂O cooled) have exceptional neutron economy:
-Natural uranium (0.711% U-235)
-High moderation efficiency
-Low parasitic absorption

This allows: Online refueling, Very high burnup for natural U, Excellent plutonium quality (high Pu-239 fraction)

This is not an incidental feature; it is foundational to the 3-stage program.
--
but there is scaling penalty specific to PHWR physics
Neutron coupling length matters,
At a large core sizes: Flux tilts become harder to control, Spatial xenon oscillations worsen etc...
Heavy-water moderation gives you flexibility, but also makes global core stability harder ..

So beyond ~700 MWe:
-You gain little neutron-economic benefit, you lose passive controllability

This makes 700 MWe a genuine physics-based optimum, not an arbitrary cap.

--
Enriched-U reactors (VVER, EPR, AP-1000): why we treat them differently -
-LWRs are fuel-cycle compromises, not core strategy.


LWRs require - 3–5% enriched uranium, Large reload batches, Long outage refueling..

For India, this means:

- Dependence on foreign enrichment, Front-end vulnerability, Strategic asymmetry
(Even with fuel assurance agreements, enrichment remains a choke point)

(- Plutonium quality issue - LWR plutonium: Higher Pu-240, Pu-241 fractions, Less ideal for fast reactors
Less suitable for thorium breeding chains)
- LWR plutonium is energetically usable but strategically inferior.

So India: Operates VVERs efficiently but does not replicate them as the dominant fleet.

---
Very large LWRs (EPR-class), IMO are especially mismatched -

- The EPR’s 1.6 GW size exacerbates India’s weakest points:
- A single EPR: Consumes ~3× the enriched uranium of a 700 MWe PHWR
- Produces plutonium of lower strategic quality
From a uranium-scarce country’s perspective, this is inefficient resource usage.
So the mismatch is not ideological — it’s system-level physics + industrial reality.
---
For Inida also Fast reactors change the calculus — and justify PHWR choices retroactively

Once fast reactors enter (PFBR → commercial FBRs):
PHWR plutonium becomes high-value seed
Uranium utilization jumps by an order of magnitude
Thorium blankets become viable

At that point:
PHWRs stop being “inefficient natural-U burners”
They become front-end neutron amplifiers

In contrast:
LWR plutonium enters the fast cycle at a disadvantage
Their role remains supplemental, not structural

Last but very important: Thorium coupling: where PHWRs quietly win again

PHWRs:
Have softer neutron spectra than LWRs
Allow flexible fuel bundle geometry
Are ideal for Th-Pu mixed fuel experiments

India’s AHWR design directly inherits:
PHWR moderation philosophy
Online refueling logic
Thorium utilization pathways

Large LWRs, by contrast do not fit that role..

So in short:
India’s reactor sizing and fuel choices are driven by neutron economy under uranium scarcity, not by chasing MWe.

PHWRs + natural U maximize:
-Neutron utilization
-Plutonium quality
- Fuel-cycle sovereignty

700 MWe is a neutronic, safety, and industrial optimum.
Amber G - India designs reactors around neutrons.

[Cyrano]

Thank you for very educative posts Amber G. I'll need to read a couple of times to understand everything with my pea brain

[bala]

Rosatom supplies nuclear fuel to India for Kudankulam NPP’s Unit 3

Rosatom's Nuclear Fuel Division has supplied nuclear fuel for the initial loading of the VVER-1000 reactor core at Unit 3 of the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) in India.The fuel, including the initial reactor loading and some reserve assemblies, was manufactured by the Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrates Plant (a facility of Rosatom's Nuclear Fuel Division).

The shipment is provided under the contract covering full lifetime fuel supply for Units 3 and 4 from their onwards. The delivery was carried out under the contract for fuel supply of power units of the second stage of the Kudankulam NPP No. 3 and No. 4 for their entire service life starting from the initial loading.

During the operation of the two power units of the first phase of the Kudankulam NPP, Russian and Indian engineers have done considerable amount of work to increase their efficiency through the introduction of advanced nuclear fuel and extended fuel cycles. Starting from 2022, the Kudankulam NPP is supplied with nuclear fuel of the TVS-2M model. It provides more reliable and cost-effective reactor operation due to its rigid design, a new generation anti-debris filter and a increased mass of uranium. Its introduction has also enabled elongation of the fuel cycle of the reactors from 12 to 18 months, so the power units are being stopped less frequently for fuel re-load and generate more electricity.The facilities of the second stage of the Kudankulam NPP will become the first in history VVER-1000 power units to be launched already in an 18-month fuel cycle.

This is the result of successful cooperation in recent years between Rosatom's Nuclear Fuel Division and Indian partners, as the efficient solutions that had been previously implemented at similar power plants in Russia and China were introduced at the two operational Kudankulam power units. Throughout the entire operational life of nuclear power plants, Rosatom not only supplies nuclear fuel, but also provides engineering services, increasing the efficiency of power units introducing new fuel and fuel cycle solutions.

https://manufacturing.economictimes.ind ... /126272321

[Amber G.]

^^^Here are some details regarding the new fuel shipment for Kudankulam Unit 3:

Global Engineering Milestone: Unit 3 will be the first VVER-1000 reactor in history to skip the traditional 12-month "break-in" period and launch directly into an advanced 18-month fuel cycle.

Structural Innovations: The new TVS-2M fuel uses a welded "rigid" skeleton rather than a flexible one. This prevents "fuel bowing" (bending under heat) and vibration damage.

Built-in Protection: Each assembly features an ADF-2 "Anti-Debris Filter." This acts as a specialized shield to catch tiny metallic particles in the cooling water before they can puncture or damage the fuel rods.

Higher Energy Density: By optimizing the internal design, Rosatom managed to pack 7.6% more uranium mass into the same physical space.

The initial core for just this one unit is so massive it requires seven separate heavy-lift cargo flights to transport the fuel from Siberia to India.

[Amber G.]

1st January: Every year, on this day, India-Pakistan exchange list of nuclear installations (1988/1991) & prisoners (2008 agreement). 35th consecutive exchange of Nuclear Installations will take place today.

[Kakkaji]

Paging Amber_G and other Gurus:

Now the investment advisor type of people are getting interested in nuclear power based on Thorium.

The following is a detailed discussion on Thorium fuel and molten salt reactors with Kirk Sorenson, who seems to be a proponent of this technology.

Is Thorium The Future Of Nuclear Energy? | Kirk Sorensen

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MZgL67lN2NM

IMHO, Sorenson explains the the history and the current situation very well.

Couple of interesting points I picked up:

1. Uranium prices have tripled over last couple of years.
2. HALEU is in short supply. (So, the ANEEL fuel may not be a good solution for India)
3. He recommends using Pu waste to start fission in Th molten salt reactors. Isn't that similar to what India has planned for 3rd stage, except that India plans to build AHWR instead of MSR?

Amber_G Saheb, please commnet.

TIA

[Amber G.]

Paging Amber_G and other Gurus:

Now the investment advisor type of people are getting interested in nuclear power based on Thorium.

The following is a detailed discussion on Thorium fuel and molten salt reactors with Kirk Sorenson, who seems to be a proponent of this technology.

Is Thorium The Future Of Nuclear Energy? | Kirk Sorensen

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MZgL67lN2NM

IMHO, Sorenson explains the the history and the current situation very well.

Couple of interesting points I picked up:

1. Uranium prices have tripled over last couple of years.
2. HALEU is in short supply. (So, the ANEEL fuel may not be a good solution for India)
3. He recommends using Pu waste to start fission in Th molten salt reactors. Isn't that similar to what India has planned for 3rd stage, except that India plans to build AHWR instead of MSR?

Amber_G Saheb, please commnet.

TIA

Insightful questions Thanks.

There have been quite a bit of of discussion (including some of my posts) here about MSR vs AHWR .. China vs India thorium strategy, and India keeps backing PHWRs. Without re-hashing basics - let me answer your questions.

Again ... The answer might be long - but hope people find it interesting ..

My Take:

Sorensen’s talk is historically accurate and technically literate, but it reflects a US/China-style leapfrogging mindset rather than India’s fuel-cycle–driven, infrastructure-constrained strategy. India’s thorium program is not about finding a “better reactor,” but about closing a fuel cycle under uranium scarcity, sanctions risk, and industrial realism. That difference explains everything that follows: PHWR persistence, AHWR preference, and our (India's) skepticism toward MSRs (at least in near future).

- Uranium prices — why this matters less for India than the West

As you say, uranium prices have risen sharply. But for India - India never assumed cheap uranium as a long-term premise. . Uranium spot prices roughly tripled over the last few years due to supply constraints, geopolitical tensions, and increased demand from nuclear power projects. Uranium markets are thin and prices can be volatile, especially as utilities and producers balance long-term contracts with spot buys. However: Our existing reactors buy fuel on long-term contracts, so spot price spikes don’t immediately translate into huge cost increases for operating fleets.

(Fuel cost is only a portion of total electricity cost for nuclear plants — capital and operations dominate.)

PHWRs were chosen precisely because they:

- Use natural uranium, Extract maximum plutonium per ton Are forgiving of fuel quality

Fuel cost has never been the dominant variable in Indian nuclear economics; capital cost, localization, and reliability are.

Contrast this with:
- The US: light-water reactors optimized for cheap uranium.
- China: willing to absorb fuel price volatility to accelerate capacity.

So uranium price spikes validate India’s historical instinct, but do not push India toward MSRs. They reinforce PHWR → FBR → AHWR logic.

HALEU shortage — why this is a strategic red flag for India

Your instinct here is exactly right.

HALEU is: Supply-constrained, Geopolitically sensitive, Enrichment-infrastructure intensive

India does not want: A fuel cycle dependent on high-assay enrichment
New choke points similar past experiences and Trmp’s etc new stunts.
So IMO ANEEL-type fuels are intellectually interesting but strategically awkward.

India prefers: Natural U (PHWR). Pu recycling (FBR),.Eventually U-233 bred in situ

In short - HALEU dependence violates the core Indian design principle: fuel sovereignty.

This , makes MSR-Thorium (in the Western sense) unattractive for near- or mid-term deployment.

-------
(To be accurate -
ANEEL is not hard-locked to HALEU. The concept was deliberately framed to allow multiple fissile “seeds” mixed with thorium, for exactly the reason you’re hinting at: supply and sovereignty.
In principle, ANEEL-type fuels can be driven by:

HALEU (U-235 enriched >5%)
Reactor-grade plutonium (Pu-239-rich mix)
Recycled U-233 (once available in quantity)

there is backup, and that backup is very much aligned with India’s closed fuel-cycle thinking)

(HALEU looks good on paper but uneasy in policy terms...other ANEEL options also has some complexities - and advantages..ANEEL is a flexibility hedge, not a program driver.)
---
Pu-started thorium MSRs vs India’s AHWR: same physics, different philosophy
[/b
-You’re absolutely right on the physics:
-Using plutonium to “ignite” thorium is exactly what India planned—decades ago.

But here’s the crucial distinction.

The similarity (physics level)

Both approaches rely on:
-External fissile driver (Pu-239 / U-235 / U-233)
-Thorium → U-233 breeding
-Transition to a U-233-dominant regime

So Sorensen is not proposing anything conceptually new from an Indian fuel-cycle standpoint.


The divergence (engineering + statecraft)

Code: Select all

Dimension	  Thorium MSR (China / Sorensen)	   India AHWR path
Fuel form	                  Liquid (molten salt)	                            Solid
Materials risk	          Extreme (corrosion, chemistry)	   Incremental
Reprocessing	          Online, complex	                           Batch, familiar
Regulatory leap	           Massive	                                           Moderate
Industrial base	          New	                                          Existing PHWR ecosystem
Failure tolerance	  Low	                                            High
Deployment mindset	  Fast, experimental	                           Conservative, staged

India’s choice is not technological conservatism—it’s system optimization.
China can afford MSRs — and India (sensibly) does not

China’s thorium-MSR push makes sense for China, not because MSRs are “better,” but because:

China: - Has massive materials science bandwidth
Can run decade-long pilot programs without political disruption
Is comfortable with technology attrition

India:
Needs reactors that run for 40–60 years
Cannot afford fleet-wide dead ends
Optimizes for manufacturability, licensing continuity, and operator training

India is not “behind” China here; it is playing a different objective function.
IMHO - PHWRs keep winning inside India

This is the part Western MSR advocates routinely miss.

PHWRs are:
Neutron-economical
Thorium-compatible
Plutonium-productive
Fuel-cycle flexible
Domestically manufacturable
Scalable without enrichment expansion

Most importantly: PHWRs are the only reactors that simultaneously serve Stage-1 power, Stage-2 fuel production, and Stage-3 transition.

MSRs do one thing very well.
PHWRs do five things adequately—and that’s why they persist.

Bottom-line answer to the original three questions

1. Uranium prices rising?
Yes — and India planned for that from day one.

2. HALEU shortage problematic?
Absolutely — which is why India avoids designs that depend on it.

3. Pu-started thorium MSRs similar to India’s plan?
Similar physics, fundamentally different engineering philosophy.

India’s thorium strategy is not about chasing elegance; it’s about closing a fuel cycle under constraints.
MSRs are an elegant solution to a problem India doesn’t have; AHWRs are a messy solution to problems India cannot escape.

Amber G.

[Kakkaji]

Amber G. Saheb:

Thank you very much for the detailed answer to my questions. It clarifies the situation for me. PHWR-->FBR-->AHWR is the correct path for India.

Whatever I have learnt about nuclear technology has been by reading your posts on this thread.

BTW, another development that might be of interest to readers of this thread:

NTPC eyes minority stake in US-based nuclear energy firm Clean Core Thorium Energy

https://www.financialexpress.com/busine ... elatest_hp

According to a PTI report, NTPC is exploring multiple international collaborations in the areas of technology and fuel, including a minority equity investment in CCTE, to advance its nuclear ambitions. According to the report, NTPC has entered into non-disclosure agreements with global energy players Rosatom and EDF to explore collaboration on deploying large pressurised water reactor projects in India.

The US-based Clean Core Thorium Energy has developed a patented thorium and enriched uranium nuclear fuel called ANEEL. It claims that the fuel is compatible with existing pressurised heavy water reactors (PHWR)/Canada Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) reactors.

IMHO, if this stake buy goes through, CCTE will not only get a cash injection from NTPC, but also the project implementation expertise of NTPC.

From what you have described above, I think NTPC will ask CCTE to substitute the HALEU in ANEEL fuel with Pu that is available in India.

Also, the wheels have started stirring after the recent passing of the SHANTI bill:

Adani Explores Nuclear Power Foray With 1.6 GW Small Reactor Project

https://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News ... oject.html

Adani Group, the conglomerate of Indian billionaire Gautam Adani, is in talks with the state government of India’s northern Uttar Pradesh state on a public-private partnership to build small modular reactors (SMRs) as India opens its nuclear energy sector to private investment.

Adani Group is in discussions with Uttar Pradesh officials to build eight SMRs with capacity of 200 megawatts (MW) each at yet-to-be-identified sites in the state, anonymous sources with knowledge of the matter told Bloomberg on Friday.

A potential deal would give Adani’s conglomerate a total of 1.6 GW of total nuclear capacity with SMRs and could place the private firm at the forefront of India’s nuclear development.

[Kakkaji]

‘ANEEL fuel fundamentally reshapes India’s thorium pathway’

https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/sp ... 471152.ece

CCTE CEO Mehul Shah's interview:

How appropriate is ANEEL for small modular reactors and India’s existing PHWRs?

ANEEL fuel is well suited for both SMRs and PHWRs, supported by CCTE’s position as custodian of the world’s largest thorium irradiation dataset. The current ANEEL design is optimised for PHWR and CANDU (CANada Deuterium Uranium) reactors, where heavy water moderation provides excellent neutron economy for thorium utilisation. This includes India’s 220 MWe Bharat Small Reactor (BSR), as well as 700 MWe PHWRs, enabling deployment across both small and large proven reactor platforms. Beyond PHWRs, CCTE is advancing next-generation ANEEL fuel concepts for light-water PWRs (pressurised water reactors), SMRs, and other reactor platforms, allowing thorium’s benefits to scale across the full spectrum of nuclear systems.

What are CCTE’s plans for India?

The plans for India focus on enabling scale, energy security, and fuel sovereignty through ANEEL fuel. Under the Viksit Bharat vision, India has announced a target of 100 GW nuclear capacity by 2047, recognising nuclear as essential for clean, reliable baseload power. Given India’s deep experience and domestic manufacturing strength in PHWR technology, we believe a majority of this capacity is likely to be PHWR-based.

However, scaling up PHWRs using conventional natural uranium creates a long-term dependency. Each gigawatt requires approximately 175 tonnes of imported uranium per year, translating to about 8,750 tonnes annually at 50 GW, and over 525,000 tonnes across the fleet’s operating lifetime, representing a significant strategic and economic vulnerability.

ANEEL fundamentally reshapes India’s thorium pathway. By deploying thorium in existing PHWRs, the first of India’s three-stage nuclear vision, it delivers immediate gains in fuel security, safety, and economics while reducing spent fuel by over 85 per cent. At the same time, the uranium-233 generated within ANEEL spent fuel creates a tangible bridge to the long-envisioned third stage, transforming today’s PHWR fleet into both a power producer and a strategic enabler of India’s thorium future, without waiting decades for new reactor systems.

Our plan is to work with Indian utilities, regulators, and industry partners to progress from demonstration to commercial deployment of ANEEL across the PHWR fleet.

We also see this as a joint venture opportunity to build domestic fuel fabrication and supply-chain infrastructure and, over time, export thorium-enabled PHWR solutions globally. This approach aligns with the India–US civil nuclear framework and positions India as a global leader in advanced nuclear fuel and long-term energy security.