This one of the first ChiefJustices to sart a dissertaion along with judgement as why he had to decide one way or the other.Calvin wrote:The inimitable Cho once said that he opposed V R Krishna Iyer, not because he was left thinking, but because thinking had left him.
Actually, this is an attempt to get FMCT pushed through the back door, by using a smokescreen of "terrorists may lay their hands on fissile material", and thereby prevent the fuel-cycle independence of anyone outside the GNEP supplier group.ramana wrote:Seems to be e geo-political ploy.
err... it was dictator EMS, the greatest commie ever. other wise I would be enjoying 144 (at least part of it) acres of my grandpa's western ghat kingdom now left with zero or minus.menon wrote:Is he not the one who as Law minister of Kerala made all his properties into trust properties and THEN brought in Kerala Land Reforms Act (which excempted trust properties)? A Great Commie indeed.
If I remember right it was his action that led to emergency also.
That signal will only come if and when Washington gets back to New Delhi and calls for another round of talks. The assessment here is that if Bush is keen, Washington will invite Foreign Secretary Shankar Menon within a fortnight at the latest to resume the dialogue.
Which ever way one looks at it, MMS must step down for being incapable of assuming PMship of India. Him being taken for a ride is not an excuse nor is distinguishable from wilfully colluding with Americans in taking everyone for a ride along with him. With little to no mandate, zero accountaility, he became PM and tried to do something no other PM ever embarked to do.But the 123 draft agreement prepared by Washington was more or less on the same lines as the Hyde Act. ``The Indian Prime Minister cannot sell this here, not after the red lines he drew in his two statements to Parliament,'' said an official. ``We pointed this out again and again to the Americans but they didn't seem to want to listen.''
As of today, the negotiations have revealed that disagreement existed on five major issues: (a) Testing; (b) Right of return; (c) Safeguards; (d) Fuel assurances; and (e) Right to reprocess spent fuel.
The latest round of three-day Indo-US nuclear deal talks between Indian and American officials ended in New Delhi on June 3 without resolving certain specific aspects relating to Indo-US "full civilian cooperation".
It may be recalled that on July 18, 2005, US President George Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh signed in Washington a landmark agreement on civil military cooperation that, if implemented as intended, would mark the end of what Jaswant Singh, the former Foreign Affairs Minister, once famously called "nuclear apartheid" against India. This agreement had spelled out the term "full civilian cooperation" provided India voluntarily provide separation plan and bring its civilian nuclear facilities under the international safeguard regime.
On March 2, 2006 when President Bush visited New Delhi, India provided such a separation plan among other things to attain "full nuclear cooperation" with the US, including an assurance of uninterrupted fuel supply to all the civilian nuclear facilities in India. However, all these assurances suffered a setback when the US Congress passed the Henry J Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 in December.
The Hyde Act did redefine the nature of the "full civilian cooperation." thereby giving the impression to India that the US was shifting the goal post of July Joint Agreement. However, the Bush Administration officials like Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns asked India "not to rock the boat" and that the provision of Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 which forms part of the Hyde Act (Section 103) would be as 123 Agreement or bilateral agreement between the US and India that need to be worked out would be the operative part of the Indo-US civil nuclear cooperation. After signing the Hyde Act, President George Bush in reference to controversial Section 103, had said "The executive branch shall construe such policy statement as advisory."
India is hoping that it could resolve some of the concerns of the Hyde Act. While negotiating the text of the 123 agreements the negotiation with American officials have been held at Washington, New Delhi, London, Cape Town since January to the current round of talks ending on June 3. As of today, the negotiations have revealed that disagreement existed on five major issues: (a) Testing; (b) Right of return; (c) Safeguards; (d) Fuel assurances; and (e) Right to: reprocessing spent fuel, reprocessing technology and heavy water technology.
Assurance of permanent fuel supplies has been a major concern. The Department of Atomic Energy officials had been noticing from the beginning that placing of all the civilian reactors under permanent safeguards was on the assurance of permanent fuel supply. The Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Anil Kakodkar points out that there was another 123 agreement which India signed with the US relating to Tarapur reactor in 1963. It had contained very specific provisions for reliable supplies to Tarapur, but nothing prevented the Americans from reneging on that 123 agreement. Therefore, the Indian technical team wants to put down clearly the American assurance on fuel supply in the 123 Agreement, including that of developing a "reserve of nuclear fuel", to ensure uninterrupted supply over a lifetime of India's reactors.
Such an assurance is not forthcoming from the American side led by Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns who had been referring to the Hyde Act Section 103(b) (10) which is structured to limit nuclear power reactor fuel reserves to amount commensurate with reasonable reactor operating requirements. Furthermore, according to the Congressional Report, the US officials have testified to Congress that America does not intend to help India build a stockpile of nuclear fuel for the purpose of riding out any sanctions that might be imposed in response to Indian action such as conducting another nuclear test.
On conducting a nuclear test, the Indian officials seem to have indicated that there was no way India could commit itself not to test. Yet there is some indication that on this issue a compromise formula is being attempted. Nevertheless this issue involves the sovereignty and security of the country. Indeed American officials have repeatedly indicated that current strategic partnership with India has been to make India power.
Our neighbourhood is surrounded by untrustworthy nations. The relation of China with Pakistan, supply of magnetic rings to Pakistan, transfer of Korean missile technology to Pakistan and the unresolved Sino-Indian border dispute are the threats to Indian security. For the US the threat is only from the terrorists but for India it is from the terrorists and the countries funding and abetting them directly or indirectly plus nuclear blackmail from China and Pakistan combined.
Compromising on this issue is akin to compromising with the security of nation in the long term.
Section 123(a)(4) of the US Atomic Energy Act gives the US government the right to require the return of any nuclear material and equipment transferred under this deal and any special materials produced through the use thereof, if India conducts nuclear test or terminated or abrogates the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreement. Presently, the Hyde Act does not exempt India from this clause. However, there are suggestions of setting up a consultative mechanism that gets into action in case of nuclear devise thereby to reduce complete breaking down of the right to return clause.
On the other key issue of reprocessing of spent fuel right, the American officials have conceded that neither the Hyde Act nor any other law prevents US from giving consent on reprocessing to India. All that the US Atomic Energy Act and Hyde Act seek that India would have to get the consent of US for reprocessing. Therefore, all that Indian officials are legitimately seeking for "permanent consent for reprocessing written in the 123 agreement. Reports indicate that while the American officials would concede on this count but would not immediately accept on the contentious issue of denial of technology transfer for uranium enrichment, spent-fuel reprocessing and heavy water production. In fact these technologies are specifically under section 103(a)5 and 104(d)(4) of the Hyde Act.
It is noteworthy that July 2005 Joint statement, in effect, accepts India as a de facto nuclear weapon power. The US atomic Energy Act nor Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty does not deny the right for these technologies even to non-nuclear weapon states Yet the Hyde Act denies these technologies to India. Moreover, Under Secretary of State Burns during the Senatorial hearing of the Hyde Act affirmed: "we do not export enrichment or reprocessing technology to any State. Therefore, full civil nuclear cooperation with India will not include enrichment or reprocessing technology."
Secretary of State Rice also informed the Senators that "the US does not foresee transferring heavy water production equipment or technology to India." Still the Indian side is seeking these technologies for India by pointing out already Euroatom and Japan has received these technologies.
The American officials reportedly have pointed out that these technologies were not immediately provided to Japan and Euroatom. Possibly this could be way out in resolving this issue of technology transfer by committing the US to transfer of these technologies on the specific time-frame.
For India an ideal nuclear deal written into 123 agreement could be right to testing, the right to reprocessing; unrestricted uranium supplies; full civil nuclear cooperation without exceptions of certain parts of the fuel cycle; lifting embargoes on civil nuclear activity; and safeguards in perpetuity to be made contingent on continuing bilateral cooperation so as to avoid any Tarapur-like situation. Viewed in terms of sovereign rights, of entitlements without anybody limiting, especially relating to nuclear deal would depend on our capability to exercise that right. We are thankful to our scientists that having exercised the right have successfully provided us nuclear installation of dignity of almost 24 reactors. Yet we need adequate fuel supply of uranium for these reactors and further growth which we lack. The US deal does not give us all we ought to get.
Meanwhile, there are bizarre championship of opponents to the deal in domestic environment of India and the US and also in countries like Pakistan and China. Any compromise which indicates a compromise of sovereignty of India would threaten the life of the UPA government in New Delhi. For President Bush the problem is less as his administration would end only constitutionally in December 2008 only. Yet India cannot let go the historic opportunity of ending "nuclear apartheid."
Prof Christopher S Raj, INFA
what else is left -looks like the deal has managed to find road block in all areas simply putAs of today, the negotiations have revealed that disagreement existed on five major issues: (a) Testing; (b) Right of return; (c) Safeguards; (d) Fuel assurances; and (e) Right to reprocess spent fuel.
The latest round of three-day Indo-US nuclear deal talks between Indian and American officials ended in New Delhi on June 3 without resolving certain specific aspects relating to Indo-US "full civilian cooperation".
Wonder which is a better word, that or sellout.saboteur of India’s nuclear and missile programme
AK has an option for that too. However, what he implies, is that, everything will be under DAE - LM, Westinghouse, ABC, XYZ,.....Kolkata : The Atomic Energy Act will be amended "as soon as possible" to enable private sector participation in the civilian nuclear programme, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission Anil Kakodkar said here on Tuesday.
"Certainly more players can come into nuclear energy that has so much potential but it has to be synchronised with the amended Act," he said.
It is the color of the lens. Nothing less, Nothing more. The general world views form a basis to pursue certain paths. MMS believes in the following:NRao wrote:Also, IF so, then why would MMS bargain for this deal knowing this?
Just curious.
Stop Israeli weapon supplies. Phalcon and Green Pine ? GE Engine supplies for Tejasthe most america can do is
Well, understand that, but at times even giving in into a "short" term strategic event can hurt the longer term one. Right?But in this country he can't really get away with a bad decision on long-term strategy, there are too many hurdles in the path.
At times vigilance can be misinterpreted as a panic attack.Thus no reason to press panic-button at any point, but never cease vigilance
Unlike the Cold War period, concepts of 'deterrence' and 'denial' are no longer mutually exclusive. They are in a state of co-habitation today. Unlike the US, India believes in the continuance of deterrence by punishment. Deterrence by denial is not feasible for India and has only a limited value. Further, there are limitations on India acquiring BMD capabilities as it involves huge expenditures. In the case of the US, the emphasis is on asymmetric threats, which is not the case with India. However, China is going in for missile defence and hence there has to be simultaneous research and development of offensive and defensive weapons by India.
The US is looking at leaner but meaner nuclear forces, alongside modernization of warheads and delivery systems. It is also looking for a responsive weapons infrastructure. India has smaller nuclear weapons compared to the West and if the taboo on nuclear use is broken, it will create new problems for Indian security. India must accord serious thought to its nuclear weapons infrastructure, especially because of its commitment to separating its military and civilian nuclear facilities in terms of the Indo-US nuclear deal. There must be clear emphasis on improvement in yield to weight ratio.
......... While this has no major implications for India, if it is a case of multilateral arms control, China will come into the picture, and India's calculation of its own deterrent size and composition will be influenced.
Nuclear weapons are here to stay. India must take cognizance of this reality and ensure adequate measures for security. Substantial measures must be taken for conventional modernization to shore up the credibility of its nuclear deterrent. Above all, India must persevere in striving for a nuclear weapons free world.
If this is the state of affairs on nuclear weapons thinking and strategies, is it feasible for India to abandon or neglect its nuclear deterrent? The underlying rationale for nuclear deterrence remains the same. India cannot afford complacency in building its nuclear deterrent capabilities. China's current estimation and future projections have to be taken into account while planning for India's nuclear deterrent. India's nuclear strategy for combating terrorism differs from the global strategy in dealing with this problem through improved intelligence, export controls and more vigilance. Dr Sethi's paper addresses the fact that India must pay attention to upgrading and modernizing its nuclear arsenal to address the uncertainties of the future while, at the same time, emphasizing that India adheres by a restrained nuclear policy. If, according to Dr Sethi, India's nuclear threshold is raised to thwart any adventure by Pakistan, this will open a Pandora's box of proliferation concerns. While a verifiable FMCT, UNSCR 1540, and no first use (NFU), seem to be favoured in India, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) remains a matter of concern as it sidesteps international law, lacks UN backing and militates against the Convention on the Law of the Seas.
http://ipcs.org/whatsNewArticle1.jsp?ac ... icle&mod=b
http://ipcs.org/whatsNewArticle11.jsp?a ... icle&mod=b Nuclear Tests: India Cannot Foreclose the Option
The deal is important for India, but its fate is now contingent on India's stance on future nuclear tests.
Future nuclear tests are crucial for ensuring the safety and reliability of existing nuclear arsenals and making design improvements for higher yield and reducing the yield-weight ratio of nuclear warheads in the future.
The credibility of this posture derives from India effectively communicating its resolve to its adversary, viz. that any nuclear attack will be reciprocated with a symmetrical response. To achieve this objective, India requires modern state-of-the-art weapons, tried and tested, which could deter any belligerent adversary from contemplating an attack on India.
After the May 1998 tests, India was under stringent sanctions under the existing US laws. If India is to conduct any nuclear tests in future, India would again be subject to sanctions by the US. The legal situation is thus clear. After the May 1998 tests, India had announced a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing to reassure the global community, as also to the ideal of global nuclear disarmament. This is a voluntary stand, which was reiterated in the July 2005 agreement. However, India's voluntary moratorium cannot foreclose the option for a future government to test if national interests so demand. India cannot convert its unilateral voluntary moratorium into a bilateral legality.
Narmad posted
India, like any choice, comes with a price
Choices usually involve a price, but people persist in believing that they can avoid paying it. That's what the Indian government thought when it joined the American alliance system in Asia in 2005, but now the price is clear: China is claiming the whole Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, some 83,000 sq. km. (32,000 sq. mi.) of mountainous territory in the eastern Himalayas containing over a million people. China has claimed Arunachal Pradesh for a century: during the Sino-Indian border war of 1962 Chinese troops briefly occupied most of the state before withdrawing and inviting India to resume negotiations. However, most Indians thought the dispute had been more or less ended during Chinese premier Wen Jiabao's visit to New Delhi in April 2005, when the two sides agreed on "political parameters" for settling both the Arunachal Pradesh border dispute and another in the western Himalayas.
Indians assumed that the new "political parameters" meant that China would eventually recognize India's control of Arunachal Pradesh. In return, India would accept China's control of the Aksai Chin, a high-altitude desert of some 38,000 sq. km. (14,000 sq. mi.) next to Kashmir. And that might actually have happened, in the end if India had not signed what amounts to a military alliance with the United States
A year ago, Indian foreign policy specialists were confident that they could handle China's reaction to their American deal. In fact, many of them seemed to believe that they had taken the Americans to the cleaners: that India would reap all the technology and trade benefits of the U.S. deal without paying any price in terms of its relationship with its giant neighbour to the north.
But there was confidence in Washington, too: a quiet confidence that once India signed the 10-year military cooperation deal with Washington, its relations with China would automatically deteriorate and it would slide willy-nilly into a full military alliance with the United States. Who has taken whom to the cleaners remains to be seen.
U.S. presidential campaign and India
Derek Chollet
The strong U.S.-India relationship has deep support from both Republicans and Democrats.
WITH THE U.S. 2008 presidential campaign in full swing, nearly 20 Republican and Democratic contenders (and possibly more to join soon) are already crisscrossing the country and outlining their policy positions and platforms. This frenzy of campaigning even seems early for most Americans, but for those abroad — in India and elsewhere — it is worth asking: how does this matter to us?
All American presidential elections are consequential, but the next one seems more so. For the first time in over 50 years, no incumbent President or Vice President is in the race, making this a truly open contest to be the first post-Bush, post-9/11 President. The next President — whether Republican or Democrat — will have an opportunity to assess the successes and failures of the Bush years, and then change course accordingly.
It is fair to expect that after 2009, the world will witness a major readjustment of American foreign policy across many issues.
Every new administration spends its first few years dealing with the difficult inheritance of its predecessor, and Mr. Bush’s successor will have his or her hands full — from winding down the disastrous Iraq war to reversing the animosity toward the U.S. around the world. Most analysts concede that when it comes to America’s place in the world, Mr. Bush’s successor will face the most difficult circumstances in U.S. history. That’s why it’s so significant that one of the good news stories a new U.S. administration will inherit is a relationship with India that is stronger than ever before.
For this reason, the U.S.’ relationship with India will not be a major issue in the 2008 campaign. So far, the subject has hardly been mentioned at all. But it’s fair to ask: what would a change in administration, especially to a Democratic one, mean for India? There are some who believe that because of Democratic concerns about nuclear proliferation (the former U.S. Ambassador, Robert Blackwill, derides them as nonproliferation "ayatollahs") and trade issues, a Democratic victory in November 2008 would somehow be bad for India or set our relationship back.
There is always a temptation for a new President to make his mark by doing the opposite of his predecessor. George W. Bush did this with his "ABC" — anything but Clinton — attitude after he took office, and the next Democrat in the White House will have plenty of incentive to return the favour. But importantly, the U.S. relationship with India was an exception to this in 2001, and there are powerful reasons to expect the same in 2009.
Importantly, the strong U.S.-India relationship has deep support from both Republicans and Democrats. While many Bush officials like to herald their work as opening a new era in U.S.-India relations, most Democrats see the past seven years as a continuation of the course set by President Bill Clinton in the late 1990s. To be sure, steps such as the nuclear deal are historic breakthroughs, and these have strong support from most Democrats — especially the dominant presidential contenders. The fact is that the strong U.S.-India relationship is one of the great bipartisan achievements since the end of the Cold War. At a moment where American politics is so soured by partisanship, that’s no small feat.
Trade issues
While trade issues remain a point of anxiety for many Democratic constituents and politicians — and the campaign might produce some heated rhetoric — there is broad recognition of how important the economic relationship with India is. The Democratic presidential contenders recognise that outsourcing is a fact of the global economy, and instead of talking about ending trade or building economic walls with India, they talk about ensuring that the government does more to help those who suffer most. In fact, one could argue that because of their credibility with labour unions and working Americans, Democrats are better positioned to put U.S,-India trade relations on a solid footing.
Democrats have also raised concerns about the deep problems of India’s neighbour, Pakistan. The Bush administration has pursued unprecedented cooperation with Islamabad — showering Musharraf with $10 billion in aid since 2002 — in exchange for cooperation in fighting terrorism. Yet most Democrats believe such cooperation has been too episodic, and that the peace deals Islamabad recently signed with pro-Taliban elders in western Pakistan have amounted to a failed policy and a Musharraf retreat. Democrats are concerned over negative trend lines in Pakistan — the lack of democracy, rising anti-Americanism, and deep social tensions. And they are alarmed that the vast majority of U.S. assistance money to Pakistan’s military is going to weapons that are more appropriate for confrontation with India than rooting out Al-Qaeda. A new administration would reassess this policy and look for ways to fix it.
But most important, Democratic presidential contenders (and those who would staff their administrations) realise that in a world where the U.S. has far fewer friends and seems more isolated than ever before, the U.S.-Indian partnership can be a foundation for greater American engagement in Asia and beyond.
They believe in working to give India the place of leadership it deserves as the world’s largest democracy — whether by including it on the U.N. Security Council, or as a founding member of a new "Alliance of Democracies."
In short, no serious Democrat is talking about undoing the great work the past two Presidents have done to strengthen U.S.-Indian relations. If anything, they are planning for a more ambitious agenda. So as one of the most interesting American presidential elections unfolds, America’s friends in India should watch with close interest — and with the confidence in our strong partnership.
(Derek Chollet is a senior fellow at The Center for a New American Security and served in the State Department during the Clinton Administration.)