1962 Sino-Indian War: Declassified CIA Documents

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1962 Sino-Indian War: Declassified CIA Documents

Postby Sanjay M » 28 Jun 2007 11:28

As you know, the CIA has recently declassified many documents, including some relating to the 1962 Sino-Indian border conflict:

http://signal.nationalinterest.in/archives/Admin/562

To me this seems to be a topic worthy of serious in-depth discussion.

What can we learn, and what lessons can we draw from this information?


What is the true nature of US influence/intervention inside of India?
What is the true nature of Chinese influence/intervention inside of India? How much of it comes from the China side, and how much of it is initiated from Indians themselves due to domestic politics and ideological affiliations?


Admin Note: I changed the thread title to reflect the broader scope of the topic than the declassification.



ramana

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Postby Baljeet » 28 Jun 2007 11:41

sanjay
Extremly good catch.

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Postby Virupaksha » 28 Jun 2007 12:34

Just read part dealing with 50-59, frankly BR was right on its mark, consider the summary proposed


Had it not been Nehru, but rather EL more military-minded man who occupied the post of prime minister in late October 1959, a priority program to prepare I n d i a eventually to f i g h t would have been started. In the course of two months, India had been humiliated by two military defeats *and the public and government officials had been aroused to anger against the nation's enemy as never before in its short history , But Nehru insisted that war with China was out of the question, and apparently did not think the challenge justified the economic burden of increased military spending. A man of different temperament and background, no less aware of the hard facts of Indian military inferiority , might nevertheless have felt that the country must be mobilized to prepare for long due military revenge against the Chinese at all costs. Guts and action , not words, was the military man's attitude in late October. This was not Nehru's way, however, and his authority and prestige in the country (although questioned more extensively than ever before) were still sufficiently great to reject preparedness for an eventual recourse to arms.



This beautifully sums it all up.

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Postby Virupaksha » 28 Jun 2007 13:19

"THE PROBABLE REPERCUSSIONS OF A US DECISION TO GRANT OR DENY MILITARY AID TO PA"-1/12/1954

Just read this paper, from CIAs archive, a very well made intelligence report i should say. It understood the then Indian politics very well and the insights are good. Should I say predicted the future?

So this is the level of research which CIA undertakes before providing arms to country, I am impressed.

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Postby SK Ram » 28 Jun 2007 15:31

Went through one of the three pdfs and I am not really sure if all of it is credible . Despite most of the stuff about Nehru being more or less along expected lines , the article has a tenor about it in which virtually the entire blame is shifted on the Indians for incompetent political policies . I find it hard to believe that Nehru committed all his blunders just because of pressure from " amateur " opposition members - some of them just journos they say...

Basically its a pretty damming revelation and it certainly is not fun to read it . Wonder whats changed in the corridors of power today ? Laymans impression doesn't make me feel that MMS has anymore spine than Nehru to tackle similar situations today.

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Postby Kartman » 28 Jun 2007 15:51

SK Ram wrote:Went through one of the three pdfs and I am not really sure if all of it is credible . Despite most of the stuff about Nehru being more or less along expected lines , the article has a tenor about it in which virtually the entire blame is shifted on the Indians for incompetent political policies . I find it hard to believe that Nehru committed all his blunders just because of pressure from " amateur " opposition members - some of them just journos they say...

Basically its a pretty damming revelation and it certainly is not fun to read it . Wonder whats changed in the corridors of power today ? Laymans impression doesn't make me feel that MMS has anymore spine than Nehru to tackle similar situations today.


IMHO, the question is not about whether an individual (Nehru or MMS) has "spine" or not... but to what degree the institutions are functioning. Nehru, for all his bluster about democracy/anti-colonialism/power-to-the-people, was extremely dictatorial in his functioning.

His back-to-back series of blunders came about because he and Krishna Menon subverted and bypassed established institutions and procedures... much like Hitler post ~1943.

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Postby davidn » 28 Jun 2007 19:34

Suggest someone save relevant reports to HDD. Read an article which said that the CIA's been reclassifying a lot of run of the mill previously declassified stuff under the present government.

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Postby SSridhar » 28 Jun 2007 19:41

Kartman,
Nehru, for all his bluster about democracy/anti-colonialism/power-to-the-people, was extremely dictatorial in his functioning.

Especially so in foreign affairs which ministry he kept with himself until the end. His dictatorial trends put him in direct confrontation with such leaders as Patel, Prasad, Rajaji.

This is what Durga Das writes in his book "India: From Curzon to Nehru and After" :
In September {1950}, the Communist radio asserted that Tibet was a part of China and that "the British and American imperialists and their running dog Nehru are now plotting a coup in Lhasa for the annexation of Tibet". I asked Nehru for his comments and he told me this was the Communist Chinese reaction to his permitting a Kuomintang mission to pass through India. He said he would not quarrel with China over Tibet. He would not take over Curzon's role and establish Indian influence in Lhasa. Patel and Prasad, to whom I spoke later, reacted differently. They felt Tibet was India's northernmost outpost in the Himalayas and that the Communist radio comment was a danger signal which New Delhi must heed

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Postby svinayak » 29 Jun 2007 01:03

Their basic view seem to have been: if Nehru has be- come less conciliatory and moved t othe "right,"the real political cause
is a voluntary s h i f t by Nehru himself-- by his own top advisers) which has been encouraged by the U.S. Even
i f the alternate possibility seriously suggested it- self-e.g. that Chinese political and military actions caused the change i n
Nehru's thinking about Peiping's intentions--it seem to hsve been rejected. For it is logically neater, less complex, indeed more inwardly self-assuring t o reject their actions as the cause and see Nehru as the arch enemy because of h i s- own change in attitude toward China.

As for considering India as a major m i l i t a r y threat, the Chinese leaders seem to have acted throughout the period BY though it were not, and as though they could handle It when it became one.
They may have had temporary misgivings, feeling at times that he might swing India unequivocally toward the West and into the U.S.
t f c p f t ,but Nehru's f o r n f u l reaffimma- tions of his policy of non-alignment may have dispelled these fears.

Nevertheless, his growing distrust of the Chinese leaders led then. in turn'to view him as a two-faced neutral
--one who professes neutralism generally but is anti-Chinese on key issues, the definition of a real neutral being one who
opposes no Chinese policies, like Sihanouk. Nehru, therefore, was no longer China's "friend."

Be was, of course, still better than the "rightist" leaders in India, and the Chinese hoped that by calling for negotiations on
the border dispute they could p u l lhim back from the swing to the right. By fall 1959, the Chinese leaders had decided t oswitch from a policy of no negotiations on an overall border settle- ment, coasting along on the basis of the existing status quo, t oone of preliminary iscussions w i t ha view to an eventual overall settlement The respective Chinese and Indian posi- tions regarding such a prospective settlement nd the prelimin- ary discussions which took place i n1960 w i l lbe discussed in Section I1 of t h i s paper.




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Postby SaiK » 29 Jun 2007 01:28

Here you all go... ENJOY! Lots to read up.. and more.. click them on.

http://www.foia.cia.gov/cpe.asp

The 147 documents in this collection, amounting to over 11,000 pages of analysis, were written between 1953 and 1973


7. The Sino-Indian Border Dispute Section 1: 1950-59 2-Mar-63
http://www.foia.cia.gov/CPE/POLO/polo-07.pdf

8. The Sino-Indian Border Dispute Section 2: 1959-61 19-Aug-63
http://www.foia.cia.gov/CPE/POLO/polo-08.pdf

9. The Sino-Indian Border Dispute Section 3: 1961-62
http://www.foia.cia.gov/CPE/POLO/polo-09.pdf



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Postby sunilUpa » 29 Jun 2007 01:31

Don't forget the commies...

Commy Saga

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Postby ramana » 29 Jun 2007 01:53

Is there a realistic apparisal of the US growing near to India during that period which could have triggered the PRC wariness? I mean there were many US citizens who acted as interlocutors for the Dalai Lama issue. And what was PRC view of the First Five year plan of India?

One thing I know is most of whats written about JLN is what is seen. There is no analysis as to what was he doing and why?
----------------
From Deccan Chronicle, 29 June 2007

[quote]
CIA papers reveal 1961 secret


New Delhi, June 28: Secret CIA papers made public this week in Washington under US freedom of information laws reveal how in July 1961 R.K. Nehru, then secretary-general of India’s ministry of external affairs, was “scolded like a small boyâ€

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Postby svinayak » 29 Jun 2007 02:39

ramana wrote:Is there a realistic apparisal of the US growing near to India during that period which could have triggered the PRC wariness? I mean there were many US citizens who acted as interlocutors for the Dalai Lama issue. And what was PRC view of the First Five year plan of India?

One thing I know is most of whats written about JLN is what is seen. There is no analysis as to what was he doing and why?
----------------

I think the timing of the release of the Indian related parts is psy-ops.



From various details in all these papers it looks like the authors had some inclination of the Chinese behaviour. The coincidence of their reading and the mind of Zhou is too close.

It looks like Zhou made deep study of Nehru, Indian political system and tendency of Nehru to ask for help from US during crisis. And looks like he got instruction from outside sources for these subjects ( Uncle?)

Tibet campaign is a overt operation of China with a covert helping hand of US. They had common goals of making sure that Soviets do not take over Tibet.

The confidence of China in doing what it was doing in Tibet can comeup only with a strong support of mafia group.

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Postby ShauryaT » 29 Jun 2007 02:57

Acharya wrote:
ramana wrote:Is there a realistic apparisal of the ----------------

I think the timing of the release of the Indian related parts is psy-ops.



It looks like Zhou made deep study of Nehru, Indian political system and tendency of Nehru to ask for help from US during crisis. And looks like he got instruction from outside sources for these subjects ( Uncle?)

Tibet campaign is a overt operation of China with a covert helping hand of US. They had common goals of making sure that Soviets do not take over Tibet.

The confidence of China in doing what it was doing in Tibet can comeup only with a strong support of mafia group.
Geez, almost every second post of yours sounds as if EVERYTHING is a great US conspiracy.

I mean, I really do not credit the Americans with such great scheming powers to steer events for decades.

All available EVIDENCE, points to a few short sighted individuals acting based on their interests, their convictions and their politics.

Acharya, may be I am not wise, either educate or at least move beyond these innuendos.

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Postby Igorr » 29 Jun 2007 03:02

ramana wrote:I think the timing of the release of the Indian related parts is psy-ops.
What can be their aim?

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Postby svinayak » 29 Jun 2007 03:07

ShauryaT wrote:
Acharya, may be I am not wise, either educate or at least move beyond these innuendos.


Read the connection of Divinity school, Mao and George Marshall visit to China before the communist CPC victory in China.
Also read the history of CPC and Chaing Kai Shek relationship with US.

Read Kissinger book - My WHite House years . His contact with China before 1972 is recorded clearly.

Dont blame other if you have not read all the different view point published in the last 50 years.

India China war was not an isolated war. It was connected to Soviet US - Cuban crisis and US CHina relationship.

Also one more point.
If you think that Soviet revolution in Russia by Lenin was an independent revolution then you are way behind. Read the funding of Lenin by the Jewish bankers in New York to understand the real history.
Last edited by svinayak on 29 Jun 2007 03:15, edited 1 time in total.

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Postby Sanjay M » 29 Jun 2007 03:11

[quote="ramana"]
CIA papers reveal 1961 secret


New Delhi, June 28: Secret CIA papers made public this week in Washington under US freedom of information laws reveal how in July 1961
...

The papers draw a picture of a “reluctantâ€
Last edited by Sanjay M on 29 Jun 2007 03:15, edited 1 time in total.

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Postby svinayak » 29 Jun 2007 03:13

Sanjay M wrote:

Okay, I see some contradiction in the claims being made about these documents.

So which claim are the CIA documents asserting? India the naive, or India the belligerent? Are they asserting that India was both naively romantic and also belligerently hardline all at the same time?

Are conflicting spin-doctors attempting to draw conclusions that the CIA documents don't support?


Please elaborate further. Many readers here need some schooling.

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Postby ShauryaT » 29 Jun 2007 03:25

Acharya wrote:Read the connection of Divinity school, Mao and George Marshall visit to China before the communist CPC victory in China.
Also read the history of CPC and Chaing Kai Shek relationship with US.

Read Kissinger book - My WHite House years . His contact with China before 1972 is recorded clearly.

Dont blame other if you have not read all the different view point published in the last 50 years.

India China war was not an isolated war. It was connected to Soviet US - Cuban crisis and US CHina relationship.

Also one more point.
If you think that Soviet revolution in Russia by Lenin was an independent revolution then you are way behind. Read the funding of Lenin by the Jewish bankers in London to understand the real history.
So, If I list a 100 or a 1000 more books than the list here and tell you that I have read most of the material stated, will you start believing me , if I say, I have not come to the same conclusion?

The point is not about, who has read how much but for you, to explain your accusations of the US schemes through a coherent set of posts.

Just because an apple grew next to an orange, does not mean the apple had something to do with the orange and the grape and the lemon. Co-realted events, do not necessarily mean they were influenced by each other decisively. But if you claim so, then it is upto you to put your logic down with coherent evidence and facts in meaningful posts without someone scurrying to buy more books at Amazon.com and make their stock go high.

If you are the expert, who has figured the seemingly co-related events, I am asking for the expert to lay it out to the layman in a language the layman can understand.

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Postby Sanjay M » 29 Jun 2007 03:28

I wasn't alive when the 1962 war happened. My father had just left the army and emigrated abroad when the war happened and his former military unit was decimated. My dad says people simply ran in chaos, in the face of superior Chinese firearms. The Indians had Enfields, while the Chinese had machine guns.

He was in Canada, so he went and bought heavy winter and mountain gear which he shipped off to India via the High Commission, but that was used by follow-on rescue people afterwards.
Last edited by Sanjay M on 29 Jun 2007 03:31, edited 1 time in total.

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Postby svinayak » 29 Jun 2007 03:29

ShauryaT wrote:
If you are the expert, who has figured the seemingly co-related events, I am asking for the expert to lay it out to the layman in a language the layman can understand.

I am no expert. You have the option of ignoring my post and keep going.

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Postby ShauryaT » 29 Jun 2007 03:30

Sanjay M: The naiveness of Nehru in FP needs no further elaboration. My read of the belligerent part is a Nehru, who pursued the policy of forward deployments, without making the necessary sacrifices and investments to prepare and sustain and anticipate the chinese reactions, to such an adventure.

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Postby Sanjay M » 29 Jun 2007 03:38

ShauryaT: I thought this would be the assessment. But to me it's one thing to misread the enemy's capabilities, and another thing to misread the enemy's intent. So I'm not disputing that we underestimated PLA capabilities, but the contradiction I see is that Indian leadership is being accused of having been naive about Chinese intent (ie. accepting Chinese explanations that their maps would be corrected), while on the other hand it is being accused of taking a hard line towards the Chinese.

Are you saying that we did a Musharraf? Just as Musharraf took an aggressive posture in attacking Kargil and underestimated Indian resolve to fight back, then we similarly took an aggressive posture and underestimated the Chinese will to fight?

If that's the case, then who was the Musharraf on our side? Which guys were the "hawks"?

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Postby rocky » 29 Jun 2007 03:41

Acharya, your theory of the Americans encouraging the Chinese takeover of Tibet and wanting to keep the Soviets out of there makes perfect sense as the US was the inheritor of maintaining the old British world order following the demise of the British empire - except for one issue: Indo-US co-operation directed against China spiralled to new zeniths after the 1962 war - to not only include Chinese activities in Tibet, supporting the Tibetan government in exile, the SSB, monitoring Chinese nuclear activities from the Indian Himalayas - but then all of a sudden hit a roadbloack in 1972.

The 1971 war of Bangladesh liberation was too inconsequential for the US to switch it's allegiance to the Chinese side following the Nixon visit.

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Postby Sanjay M » 29 Jun 2007 03:47

rocky, I don't see how the US would have wanted China to invade Tibet. It's more like the place was too remote/isolated for anyone to seriously thwart the Chinese, although there are plenty of tales of CIA training Tibetan guerrillas.
There's no way that rabidly Maoist China was considered an ally during the 1950s. It was only later on, after the Atlanticist Kissinger types came in, that the extra-clever strategies to divide the communist bloc came in.

Speaking of which, I wonder why India didn't at least take advantage of the communist split, mirrored in the CPI-CPI(M) split, to at least diminish the domestic communist threat. We should have recruited the CPI to wipe out the CPI(M) cadres, to at least reduce a key headache.
Sometimes it takes a thief to catch a thief.

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Postby ShauryaT » 29 Jun 2007 03:52

Sanjay M wrote:ShauryaT: I thought this would be the assessment. But to me it's one thing to misread the enemy's capabilities, and another thing to misread the enemy's intent. So I'm not disputing that we underestimated PLA capabilities,
No, no. My read is more than an under estimation of material capabilities of warfare, India seriously underestimated chinese intent and pyschological capability to wage war on India.

but the contradiction I see is that Indian leadership is being accused of having been naive about Chinese intent (ie. accepting Chinese explanations that their maps would be corrected), while on the other hand it is being accused of taking a hard line towards the Chinese.


Well, China was well on its way to do what it wanted, i.e: build the road through Aksai Chin ---- that by itself should have spoken volumes on chinese intent and what would it take to wrest control of Aksai Chin back from the Chinese. Instead, paltry forward parties was the response - and hence the belligerence tag. IOW: The idea that India was the first to escalate the issue to a dispute to be settled through the force of arms. (PS: I am not justifying the tag but that is the view)

Are you saying that we did a Musharraf? Just as Musharraf took an aggressive posture in attacking Kargil and underestimated Indian resolve to fight back, then we similarly took an aggressive posture and underestimated the Chinese will to fight?
A little different. Nehru's hope was to call the chinese bluff, only to find that they were not bluffing.

If that's the case, then who was the Musharraf on our side? Which guys were the "hawks"?
No prize for guessing who the Musharraf was. As for the Hawks - members of the Swatantrata party and some in the Congress too but it did not matter - Nehru was able to rough shod over all of them.

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Postby Sanjay M » 29 Jun 2007 04:03

ShauryaT wrote:Well, China was well on its way to do what it wanted, i.e: build the road through Aksai Chin ---- that by itself should have spoken volumes on chinese intent and what would it take to wrest control of Aksai Chin back from the Chinese. Instead, paltry forward parties was the response - and hence the belligerence tag. IOW: The idea that India was the first to escalate the issue to a dispute to be settled through the force of arms. (PS: I am not justifying the tag but that is the view)

Are you saying that we did a Musharraf? Just as Musharraf took an aggressive posture in attacking Kargil and underestimated Indian resolve to fight back, then we similarly took an aggressive posture and underestimated the Chinese will to fight?
A little different. Nehru's hope was to call the chinese bluff, only to find that they were not bluffing.


Well, that last line sounds like the Chinese were already maneuvering to settle the dispute through force of arms. Did they play a Gulf of Tonkin on us?


If that's the case, then who was the Musharraf on our side? Which guys were the "hawks"?
No prize for guessing who the Musharraf was. As for the Hawks - members of the Swatantrata party and some in the Congress too but it did not matter - Nehru was able to rough shod over all of them.


Seriously, enlighten me. Who was the Musharraf on our side?
Krishna Menon? B M Kaul?
At least in Kargil, Musharraf wasn't naive about our capabilities, although he clearly misread our resolve.

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Postby ShauryaT » 29 Jun 2007 04:10

rocky wrote:Acharya, your theory of the Americans encouraging the Chinese takeover of Tibet and wanting to keep the Soviets out of there makes perfect sense
Sure it does, While in Korea the US was getting its Musharraf kicked by the Chinese, they were busy supporting the take over of Tibet by China - in the same period, right?

It was British India, that made Tibet a buffer state in the North from the Russians and it should have been India - by that logic, the US should have supported India to maintain that buffer and not the communist Chinese ally. Instead, what did India to to the take over of Tibet in 1959?

one issue: Indo-US co-operation directed against China spiralled to new zeniths after the 1962 war - to not only include Chinese activities in Tibet, supporting the Tibetan government in exile, the SSB, monitoring Chinese nuclear activities from the Indian Himalayas - but then all of a sudden hit a roadbloack in 1972.
There is evidence to suggest that China escalated its war with India, with USSR approval. India had no choice but to ask for US help (given that we were so prepared :oops: ).

The short bon homie did not last much long till about 1966 or so (well before the Bangladesh events) and the break down in talks for a settlement of Kashmir.
The 1971 war of Bangladesh liberation was too inconsequential for the US to switch it's allegiance to the Chinese side following the Nixon visit.
Geee...There is a cable from Kissinger, essentially amounting to a no objection from the US, if China intervenes on behalf of Pakistan in the war of Bangladesh. US Interaction with China started well before Nixon's visit, which was only the final seal.

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Postby ShauryaT » 29 Jun 2007 04:21

Sanjay M wrote:Well, that last line sounds like the Chinese were already maneuvering to settle the dispute through force of arms. Did they play a Gulf of Tonkin on us?
Our intent did not matter. They had a read of our capabilities and knew that they had the upper hand.

Who was the Musharraf on our side?
The guy who signs the check - ultimately.

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Postby Sanjay M » 29 Jun 2007 04:34

ShauryaT wrote:
Sanjay M wrote:Well, that last line sounds like the Chinese were already maneuvering to settle the dispute through force of arms. Did they play a Gulf of Tonkin on us?
Our intent did not matter. They had a read of our capabilities and knew that they had the upper hand.

Who was the Musharraf on our side?
The guy who signs the check - ultimately.


No, really, the quotes I'm seeing above cite a reluctant Nehru being dragged to war by some "hawks" -- so I want to know who were the hawks dragging Nehru to war. As you've said, Swatantra didn't amount to a hill of beans, so who had the power to drag Nehru towards war? Don't tell me Nehru was scared of the army, like Nawaz was.

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Postby ShauryaT » 29 Jun 2007 04:40

Sanjay M wrote:No, really, the quotes I'm seeing above cite a reluctant Nehru being dragged to war by some "hawks" -- so I want to know who were the hawks dragging Nehru to war. As you've said, Swatantra didn't amount to a hill of beans, so who had the power to drag Nehru towards war? Don't tell me Nehru was scared of the army, like Nawaz was.
That is the voice of the Indian nation, which no longer could be suppressed, once the matter was out in the public and the knowledge that China would not budge. So include every other SOB, who demanded action, once the gross violations of claimed Indian territory were a public matter.

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Postby Sanjay M » 29 Jun 2007 05:05

ShauryaT wrote:That is the voice of the Indian nation, which no longer could be suppressed, once the matter was out in the public and the knowledge that China would not budge. So include every other SOB, who demanded action, once the gross violations of claimed Indian territory were a public matter.


But the non-sequitur then is that this voice of the Indian nation was suddenly nowhere to be heard once we received a rude shock on the battlefront.


National/public resolve carries a little more momentum than resolve at the mere political leadership level. So where did the great ocean of public outcry evaporate to, in the face of Chinese attack? It just strikes me as odd.

During Kargil, the whole nation was glued to the event until the end. Hell, even from overseas I was calling in to talkshows, interview chats, to tell public officials to be dropping the thermobarics on the commanding heights. Everybody was stirred up by this.

And yet am I supposed to believe that in 1962 the public momentum was conveniently dissipated into crestfallen acceptance, because of a brief border clash? I find it hard to believe.

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Postby ShauryaT » 29 Jun 2007 05:18

Sanjay: Once the knowledge was out of the tight confines of Nehru's PMO and a few select FM officials - reporting to Nehru, The outcry was from the power influencers, first. That is MP's, Military, Career Officers - so the Dilli Billi crowd.

The larger nation was in the dark - till very late. The India of 1961-62 is a far cry from the India of 1999. No TV - let alone a hundered channels. Limited media presence and the over whelming percentage of the media was deferential as opposed to confrontational.

Not a blade of grass grows there - was the refrain.

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Postby Sanjay M » 29 Jun 2007 06:07

Well, as I posted in another thread -- this is why India needs a Trilateral Commission, or CFR. Public policy cannot be made in isolation from the public, or other social forces.

The best way to safeguard against national interests being sold out by a corrupt or spineless few, is to have wider policy debate, discussion and awareness.

We need to develop a broader architecture for this.

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Postby parikh » 29 Jun 2007 07:24

Acharya wrote:Read the connection of Divinity school, Mao and George Marshall visit to China before the communist CPC victory in China.
Also read the history of CPC and Chaing Kai Shek relationship with US.
Read Kissinger book - My WHite House years . His contact with China before 1972 is recorded clearly.


Another source would be Jung Chang Haliday's book on Miaow, china and ussr had an initial no interference pact in 1962 [/quote]

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Postby svinayak » 29 Jun 2007 07:43

rocky wrote:Acharya, your theory of the Americans encouraging the Chinese takeover of Tibet and wanting to keep the Soviets out of there makes perfect sense as the US was the inheritor of maintaining the old British world order following the demise of the British empire -


except for one issue: Indo-US co-operation directed against China spiralled to new zeniths after the 1962 war - to not only include Chinese activities in Tibet, supporting the Tibetan government in exile, the SSB, monitoring Chinese nuclear activities from the Indian Himalayas - but then all of a sudden hit a roadbloack in 1972.


Once you think out of the Box you will catch the drift in those early years after 1945 how the power blocs jostled.

Without a shot SU expanded across central asia, east asia and Europe after 1945. This became extremely dangerous and the Anglo American elite wanted to coantin this expansion. They were willing to work with Mao to check Stalin and and SU.

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Greetings and Opinions (Indian-Sino War)

Postby member_11208 » 29 Jun 2007 09:02

Hello all and Namaste,

I am a new member joining these discussions. I have been a long time "watcher" (especially concerning Indian aeronautics), but have recently felt the need to participate in these forums. As an Indian, I am deeply concerned about the economic and millitaristic future of our country and strongly believe that only by analyzing the past, we can avoid the pitfalls of the future.

Concerning CIA declassification: I previously heard from NPR of the troves of CIA documents being de-classified and can only imagine this is a cheap ploy by Hayden to show the agency's "new-found" transparency. Nothing incriminating is in these documents... merely simple facts amid copious amounts of blacking out. It is ludicrious to think the current CIA would weaken itself in anyway through declassifying past actions. However, we do know one prevalent force in the USA's history throughout the late 20th century: the burning desire to fight communism at all costs. Thus USA aid to Chinnese millitants is hard to conceive, although weakening India (a neutral Cold-war participant... at best) is imaginable.

Who knows what were the motives of that clandestine organization? Perhaps to pit India against China and thus occupy a communist power's attention while punishing a neutral party?

Thoughts/Comments?

ramana
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Postby ramana » 29 Jun 2007 09:43

I was in 7th std in Hyderabad in '62. My father a lawyer used to get three papers(Hindu, Deccan Chronicle & Indian Express) in the morning and one in evening (Hindustan times for Delhi). I followed every bit of that aggression that I could lay my hands on. I knew the names of the soldiers who died. There was a gold donation drive. My mother gave a very large amount for the National Defence Fund. We felt we had to do something on our part as the soldiers were defending the borders. So at least in our family we never felt that we had to accept the Chinese aggression. Mostly it was a sense of betrayal by the Chinese despite the many gestures of friendship that India showed them. It was India that helped negotiate the Korean ceasefire in case people don't know and bring them form the doghouse.

Later I got to read every scrap of opinion on the 1962 war- Neville Maxwell, Mankekar, Dalvi, Palit and so on and so forth. In my town there is retired AMC brigadier who fought in Chusul and he tells me great accounts of that time. How he treated the war wounded and had to use his own arms.For me the 1962 dies not erase. I owe my Bay Area members a talk from him.

ramana
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Postby ramana » 29 Jun 2007 10:07

Igorr wrote:
ramana wrote:I think the timing of the release of the Indian related parts is psy-ops.
What can be their aim?


If you step back and read the revelations they say that JLN was a dupe and incompetent and we have the secret analysis that says that. Never mind it could be all wet. Next the revelation about the Commies being under Soviet and PRC control are made in the next file.

Now who is in charge of the UPA?- Congress and lefties. The papers were released to let loose a firestorm inside India as a way to soften the parties.

here is an analysis of the commie info from Offstumped

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Postby sum » 29 Jun 2007 11:05

$@#!* COMMIES....esp J.basu and H.K.surjeet...
to think that these people are in control of the present govt.......
maybe,this explains our present day china stance!!!!


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