Indian Nuclear News & Discussion - 25 Jul 2007
That would be reprocessing wouldn't it? We have got an in principle right to reprocess, but doesn't that right mean nothing without the separate agreement that will be signed at a later date?I want to publicize the fact that India did accept some restraints on its program as quid pro quo and it was not an open ended runaway program.
What if that agreement never got signed for one reason or another? Can we still go ahead and reprocess? I'm not sure kicking the can of reprocessing to the future is a good idea (this is subject to political vagaries etc.)
The second constraint could be on fizzmat (on the strategic side) and limits on the amount. We will know on 10/8 (or maybe not).
BTW, what happens to spent fuel already in Tarapur? What becomes of it?
ShyamSP wrote:As mentioned in the same article, Presidential prerogative and foreign-affairs power can be used to trump that Hyde Act. I think Dick Cheney's touch at the end essentially is that. All those sticky points (fuel supply, reprocessing, nuclear test) are put under executive purview in the interest of US strategic interests (leverage against China, Asian ally, energy needs of US-bound businesses in India, Naval partnership, etc.)ramana wrote:I am not a lawyer but have a few questions. Walker writes that the US Admin found ways to bypass the watertight Hyde Act. What does he mean?
Legislative branch has no power over those presidential powers except in the domestic sphere. Even in those cases of domestic spying, congress turned blind-eye when the President invoked presidential powers.
I agree with you but with one big caveat. The congress does have a say in the matter. They have the prerogative of voting down this deal in the Up or down vote. And once they vote yes with a simple majority (no more amendments allowed). the 123 becomes the reference point. Not sure if Hyde amendment would have any standing.
Manny
So now the 123 is the ref point and not the Hyde act. Looks like Hyde Act was a way of catharisis for the US strategic community - all the accumulated bile since 1974 was allowed to come out as part of the Act.
I dont consider MMS a babu. A babu is one who has passed the Civil Services(IAS/IFS/IPS) exam and has worked his way up the ladder. MMS was an appointee to high office. Not the same cadre. He is more like an academic who has worked in policy planning groups in the government.
I dont consider MMS a babu. A babu is one who has passed the Civil Services(IAS/IFS/IPS) exam and has worked his way up the ladder. MMS was an appointee to high office. Not the same cadre. He is more like an academic who has worked in policy planning groups in the government.
There was a fantastic article by Chitra Raghavan ( ex NPR correspondent not of Bofors Hindu)
She wrote an article US business New magazine , how a group of smart lawyers have enacted presidential directives that can not be challanged or quagmired in Congressional polictics, IN GOTUS where there is will there is way..... otherwise how mushy being terrorist get so much aid and arms?
anyways on Chappelle show (CC comedy central)
How does Bush know that Saddam had WMD , because Bush has the reciepts!
She wrote an article US business New magazine , how a group of smart lawyers have enacted presidential directives that can not be challanged or quagmired in Congressional polictics, IN GOTUS where there is will there is way..... otherwise how mushy being terrorist get so much aid and arms?
anyways on Chappelle show (CC comedy central)
How does Bush know that Saddam had WMD , because Bush has the reciepts!
My understanding is.. The Hyde act is/was part of the process. It gives the perimeter for the executive to work within. An indication to the executive what congress would eventually could agree to (in the up/down vote). The executive has the power to negotiate treaty and yet would have to go back to the house for ratification. So if the executive deviates too much, the congress has the prerogative to not ratify it. Once they ratify it, it would mean the congress approves of the 123 agreement. The Hyde Amendment was a WIP thingi. So now, some in the congress could use the Hyde act to make a case that the executive deviated too much to not ratify it (yes/no). So the Hyde act has power until the Up/Down vote is done.ramana wrote:So now the 123 is the ref point and not the Hyde act. Looks like Hyde Act was a way of catharisis for the US strategic community - all the accumulated bile since 1974 was allowed to come out as part of the Act.
I dont consider MMS a babu. A babu is one who has passed the Civil Services(IAS/IFS/IPS) exam and has worked his way up the ladder. MMS was an appointee to high office. Not the same cadre. He is more like an academic who has worked in policy planning groups in the government.
I am not a constitutional lawyer so... But thats my understanding of the process.
Manny
Last edited by Manny on 26 Jul 2007 18:47, edited 1 time in total.
For whom?So now the 123 is the ref point and not the Hyde act
For US COngress: the Hyde Act, for the Prez: 123?
Since BOTH India and now Burns have used the word "complies" (Oh, that word). For the US it is a down-shift. Bet the anti-deal gang will jump on this.
It brings us right back to our very old argument: it will always depend on who is in THE Office. And, how strong of a PM would India have. Long live Bush (as Prez).
Rye,
Nice find.
Looks like, the more the econ grows, the more US-India-China will be joint at the hips.
Both govt. (US & IN) would like to encode "options" into 123. So long as it is in the interest of the US, the 123 is upheld. The minute IN violates it, or US interests shift, the US has the "option" to fall back on Hyde Act.So now the 123 is the ref point and not the Hyde act.
In this sense - Hyde is Mr. Jekyll and 123 is real Mr. Hyde
IN on the other hand is betting that if they have to violate the 123, or if US interests shift, IN would have to calculate the cost of that "option" and take such action if appropriate.
As long as neither country is willing to exercise the "option" to exit, given they have common interests, it could mean several decades of benefits!
Seems like "win-win" to me - both countries got options.
Last edited by Pulikeshi on 26 Jul 2007 19:22, edited 1 time in total.
NRao for the next hundered years it is in US interests to see that India is on her side. So I dnt worry about Presidential whims. Those in US against the deal dont understand the issues,concerns and the challenges to US primacy. They are on auto-censure mode of India.
This deal marks a paradigm shift in Western thinking. Even PRC will come around as it slowly realizes the impact of this event. Its not just the deal but a whole paradigm shift. India is no longer the example whipping boy of the non-proliferation movement.
This deal marks a paradigm shift in Western thinking. Even PRC will come around as it slowly realizes the impact of this event. Its not just the deal but a whole paradigm shift. India is no longer the example whipping boy of the non-proliferation movement.
How come folks haven't posted this? Some more tidbits of 123!!! I had predicted the red herrings couple of threads back.. Feels good to know that our babus managed the negotiations so well.
Just have to see the devil in the details as to what exactly are we giving up..
'India has got same rights as nuclear-weapon States
"In view of the constraints that America had, this is the best that we can get!" said a senior source in the government about the just concluded 123 agreement between India and the United States that facilitates the Indo-US civil nuclear co-operation deal.
"India has got the same rights as nuclear-weapon States," assured the source, who is well-versed with the negotiations over the 123 agreement, when asked specifically and repeatedly if India has got the same rights as the five nuclear-weapon States in the area of nuclear energy.
"There were no difficulties as such in negotiating the 123 agreement but the difficult challenge always remained as to how to translate the agreed issues into legal language while remaining steadfastly on the middle path," said the same source when asked what was the single most difficult challenge in closing the agreement.
He said, "India has got the best terms and conditions to reprocess spent fuel when compared to three other nuclear-weapon States (China, France [Images] and the UK)."
He conceded that Russia [Images] has got a fairly good deal regarding reprocessing in its recently concluded 123 agreement with America.
The 123 agreement is a bilateral agreement facilitating Indo-US civil nuclear co-operation, and is a follow-up to America's Hyde Act that has set the minimum conditions to deal with India in the field of nuclear cooperation.
The source told rediff.com in an exclusive conversation: "No other nuclear-weapon State except Russia has got such favourable terms and conditions for reprocessing of nuclear fuel as India has got out of its negotiations with America."
The permission to reprocess US-origin fuel in a dedicated, highly safeguarded facility will be on a case-to-case basis, the source said, adding that the Japan [Images]ese system of reprocessing waste fuel units has been taken as a model -- to start with -- while negotiating India 's right to reprocess spent fuel. Though, critics may argue that Japan is a non-nuclear weapons State.
One of the contentious issues was about India's right to conduct future nuclear tests because the Hyde Act has also specifies some "non-negotiable restrictions" on the deal so that, eventually, India doesn't strengthen its weapons-making capability.
It seems that both sides have agreed to keep out of the 123 agreement any mention of future tests; the inference being that the issue will be guided by Hyde Act, and hence may not go in India's favour. However, the more important question was, is and will be whether the 123 agreement accords India full civil nuclear cooperation as promised in the July 18, 2005, agreement.
The source retorted, "What is your definition of 'full civil nuclear cop-operation'? I believe the US is recognising India's strategic programme. India can have its reactors, can have enriched fuel and have the right to reprocess used fuel. India can carry on with its strategic programme, uninterrupted. This is 'full civil co-operation'!"
He also asked, "Name one country with this kind of assurance for fuel supplies."
"Now India can buy nuclear fuel from other countries. You can sell your heavy water also. There are no restrictions on it."
When asked about India having a right and access to international co-operation in heavy water, enrichment and reprocessing technologies, for the sake of argument he said, "We already have these technologies. We claim to have expertise in heavy water technologies. Why do we want to import?"
Pointed out that if India is not allowed to have full cooperation in enrichment, heavy water and reprocessing technology then the critics won't consider the 123 agreement awarding 'full civil nuclear cooperation to India, a senior officer assured, "We were like untouchables in the nuclear field. Even our friend Russia was not ready to negotiate. This agreement ends these sanctions. The country which was not talking about the N-word after 1998 (referring to America's sanctions against India for turning nuclear) is now signing the nuclear agreement."
"Ask scientist Kasturirangan (Dr K Kasturirangan, former chairman of ISRO) how it will help our space industry and our defence research once the civil nuclear cooperation sector is put in order."
Since the last few months American and Indian negotiators were maneuvering their national interests within the framework provided by Hyde Act. Also, on both sides there was real and intense opposition to the deal, and at home Prime Minister Manmohan Singh [Images] was forced to raise the benchmark before he could sign the deal. In a surprise political move he made many commitments on the floor of Parliament on August 17, 2006, and also reiterated that India's weapons programme will not be affected by the deal.
Indian critics believed the civil nuclear cooperation will restrain India's weapons programme, while in Washington opposition to the deal came from the nuclear non-proliferation lobby which wanted no maneuvering space left for India whereby imported fuel can be used in its weapons programme. Rather, this lobby wanted their negotiators to close the deal in such a manner that India's weapon-making capacity gets blunted. Some pundits in India opposed the deal because it was perceived as part of the US grand plan to contain China.
Given this tug of war, who has won or lost will be known in the future when the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards are finalised for India for reprocessing waste fuels, its imported civilian nuclear plants and fuel cycles.
Experts will be able to get some idea of things to come when on August 10 Dr Singh reveals the text of the 123 agreement in Parliament; further judgment will be made when US Congress ratifies the 123 agreement. Also, for India, crucial action will come at the deliberations of the Nuclear Suppliers Group over concessions to India as envisaged by the US. It is here that countries like China will make their stance known.
However, Australia, Canada [Images], Britain, Germany [Images] and France are backing the deal for commercial reasons and have already issued positive statements.
India will now have to enter into separate 123 agreements with nuclear fuel suppliers like Canada, Australia and other countries once the Indo-US nuclear deal falls into place.
In a restrained tone of triumph the source said, "I hope, now, the critics of the deal who had a defeatist mentality and were paranoid about the nuclear deal will rest. People with inferiority complex regarding India's capacity were against the deal."
He said critics of the deal were "thinking in a straight line about history and bilateral diplomacy."
In New Delhi the Prime Minister's Office has stepped up the political activity to "sell" the deal within India. Today former prime minister A B Vajpayee and his party colleagues including former National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra and the severest critic of them all, former minister Arun Shourie, all met with Dr Singh.
The prime minister, who has high stakes in seeing the deal through, again insisted that the nuclear deal is in India's interests.
Just have to see the devil in the details as to what exactly are we giving up..
'India has got same rights as nuclear-weapon States
"In view of the constraints that America had, this is the best that we can get!" said a senior source in the government about the just concluded 123 agreement between India and the United States that facilitates the Indo-US civil nuclear co-operation deal.
"India has got the same rights as nuclear-weapon States," assured the source, who is well-versed with the negotiations over the 123 agreement, when asked specifically and repeatedly if India has got the same rights as the five nuclear-weapon States in the area of nuclear energy.
"There were no difficulties as such in negotiating the 123 agreement but the difficult challenge always remained as to how to translate the agreed issues into legal language while remaining steadfastly on the middle path," said the same source when asked what was the single most difficult challenge in closing the agreement.
He said, "India has got the best terms and conditions to reprocess spent fuel when compared to three other nuclear-weapon States (China, France [Images] and the UK)."
He conceded that Russia [Images] has got a fairly good deal regarding reprocessing in its recently concluded 123 agreement with America.
The 123 agreement is a bilateral agreement facilitating Indo-US civil nuclear co-operation, and is a follow-up to America's Hyde Act that has set the minimum conditions to deal with India in the field of nuclear cooperation.
The source told rediff.com in an exclusive conversation: "No other nuclear-weapon State except Russia has got such favourable terms and conditions for reprocessing of nuclear fuel as India has got out of its negotiations with America."
The permission to reprocess US-origin fuel in a dedicated, highly safeguarded facility will be on a case-to-case basis, the source said, adding that the Japan [Images]ese system of reprocessing waste fuel units has been taken as a model -- to start with -- while negotiating India 's right to reprocess spent fuel. Though, critics may argue that Japan is a non-nuclear weapons State.
One of the contentious issues was about India's right to conduct future nuclear tests because the Hyde Act has also specifies some "non-negotiable restrictions" on the deal so that, eventually, India doesn't strengthen its weapons-making capability.
It seems that both sides have agreed to keep out of the 123 agreement any mention of future tests; the inference being that the issue will be guided by Hyde Act, and hence may not go in India's favour. However, the more important question was, is and will be whether the 123 agreement accords India full civil nuclear cooperation as promised in the July 18, 2005, agreement.
The source retorted, "What is your definition of 'full civil nuclear cop-operation'? I believe the US is recognising India's strategic programme. India can have its reactors, can have enriched fuel and have the right to reprocess used fuel. India can carry on with its strategic programme, uninterrupted. This is 'full civil co-operation'!"
He also asked, "Name one country with this kind of assurance for fuel supplies."
"Now India can buy nuclear fuel from other countries. You can sell your heavy water also. There are no restrictions on it."
When asked about India having a right and access to international co-operation in heavy water, enrichment and reprocessing technologies, for the sake of argument he said, "We already have these technologies. We claim to have expertise in heavy water technologies. Why do we want to import?"
Pointed out that if India is not allowed to have full cooperation in enrichment, heavy water and reprocessing technology then the critics won't consider the 123 agreement awarding 'full civil nuclear cooperation to India, a senior officer assured, "We were like untouchables in the nuclear field. Even our friend Russia was not ready to negotiate. This agreement ends these sanctions. The country which was not talking about the N-word after 1998 (referring to America's sanctions against India for turning nuclear) is now signing the nuclear agreement."
"Ask scientist Kasturirangan (Dr K Kasturirangan, former chairman of ISRO) how it will help our space industry and our defence research once the civil nuclear cooperation sector is put in order."
Since the last few months American and Indian negotiators were maneuvering their national interests within the framework provided by Hyde Act. Also, on both sides there was real and intense opposition to the deal, and at home Prime Minister Manmohan Singh [Images] was forced to raise the benchmark before he could sign the deal. In a surprise political move he made many commitments on the floor of Parliament on August 17, 2006, and also reiterated that India's weapons programme will not be affected by the deal.
Indian critics believed the civil nuclear cooperation will restrain India's weapons programme, while in Washington opposition to the deal came from the nuclear non-proliferation lobby which wanted no maneuvering space left for India whereby imported fuel can be used in its weapons programme. Rather, this lobby wanted their negotiators to close the deal in such a manner that India's weapon-making capacity gets blunted. Some pundits in India opposed the deal because it was perceived as part of the US grand plan to contain China.
Given this tug of war, who has won or lost will be known in the future when the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards are finalised for India for reprocessing waste fuels, its imported civilian nuclear plants and fuel cycles.
Experts will be able to get some idea of things to come when on August 10 Dr Singh reveals the text of the 123 agreement in Parliament; further judgment will be made when US Congress ratifies the 123 agreement. Also, for India, crucial action will come at the deliberations of the Nuclear Suppliers Group over concessions to India as envisaged by the US. It is here that countries like China will make their stance known.
However, Australia, Canada [Images], Britain, Germany [Images] and France are backing the deal for commercial reasons and have already issued positive statements.
India will now have to enter into separate 123 agreements with nuclear fuel suppliers like Canada, Australia and other countries once the Indo-US nuclear deal falls into place.
In a restrained tone of triumph the source said, "I hope, now, the critics of the deal who had a defeatist mentality and were paranoid about the nuclear deal will rest. People with inferiority complex regarding India's capacity were against the deal."
He said critics of the deal were "thinking in a straight line about history and bilateral diplomacy."
In New Delhi the Prime Minister's Office has stepped up the political activity to "sell" the deal within India. Today former prime minister A B Vajpayee and his party colleagues including former National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra and the severest critic of them all, former minister Arun Shourie, all met with Dr Singh.
The prime minister, who has high stakes in seeing the deal through, again insisted that the nuclear deal is in India's interests.
Ramanaji,
Agreed (in general - I feel that this 123 deal is a subset of that and has its own dynamics that need to be addressed - separately). However, IMHO, Indian leaders need to show more confidence - it seems to be growing, but should be a lot more. After all, unlike many other 'powers' I doubt that India will misuse hers.
SPJ,
J18 was just that - it clearly stated that the status was of an equal - like the US. The issue was how to lubricate the parts to pass thru' a stubborn US Congress - which we will face in passing this 123. As has been stated Chicom will be next stop.
Time for Chicom to dismantle Gwadar, India can guarantee oil transit and provide alternative routes.
Agreed (in general - I feel that this 123 deal is a subset of that and has its own dynamics that need to be addressed - separately). However, IMHO, Indian leaders need to show more confidence - it seems to be growing, but should be a lot more. After all, unlike many other 'powers' I doubt that India will misuse hers.
SPJ,
J18 was just that - it clearly stated that the status was of an equal - like the US. The issue was how to lubricate the parts to pass thru' a stubborn US Congress - which we will face in passing this 123. As has been stated Chicom will be next stop.
Time for Chicom to dismantle Gwadar, India can guarantee oil transit and provide alternative routes.
I think India will sign a series of bilateral 123 agreements with any country which is part of the NSG and which wants to supply fuel and/or reactors to India. Some if not all of those agreements may not have a requirement for a separate case by case reprocessing consent. All other things being equal (and they certainly are not equalmerlin wrote: That would be reprocessing wouldn't it? We have got an in principle right to reprocess, but doesn't that right mean nothing without the separate agreement that will be signed at a later date?
), India will buy fuel/reactors from those countries of the NSG which give it the minimum run around. If things go well with the NSG, it will become a competitive situation and US business will put a lot or pressure on Congress to make sure that the US is not at a competitive disadvantage on the issue of reprocessing consent.According to the existing separation plan, anything that is not under IAEA safeguards automatically becomes military and has a totally different fuel cycle loop - that includes the FBRs. And that also includes any and all kinds of reprocessing done on the military side all the way up to weapons grade. So the question of constraints does not arise.The second constraint could be on fizzmat (on the strategic side) and limits on the amount. We will know on 10/8 (or maybe not).
Separately, the link put up by Arun_S, An overview of Fuel Cycles for the AHWR, on the last thread is excellent reading. The entire 3rd stage of India's homegrown thorium cycle is ambitious but has many many technical challenges in terms of its implementation. The LWR and the PHWR reactors are a proven design with empirical track records. It will involve a lot of hard work to ensure that the Thorium cycle reaches those established benchmarks. What this 123 agreement has done is that via the reprocessing consents available to India, it has enabled India to keep the door open for the eventual commercialization of that technology. It will also allow India to leapfrog the 2nd stage and to start building AHWRs almost immediately as both the Pu and the U required in the fuel alongwith the Thorium can be immediately imported on operationalizing of this agreement. The reprocessing of those spent fuels will be done on the commercial side under IAEA supervision. To the extent that India was planning to use Pu from its FBRs for the third stage will no longer be necessary or for that matter prudent as any fuel flowing from the FBRs to the IAEA monitored AHWRs will be like going into a Black Hole. Once in, it can never leave.
I think the source seems too immersed in himself. Could be Sanjay Baru.
If the deal was all it was supposed to be then why was the Indian scientific community maligned by PMO minions? And the source should not have mentioned Kasturirangan as it confirms the tie-ins to pro deal articles being written..
If the deal was all it was supposed to be then why was the Indian scientific community maligned by PMO minions? And the source should not have mentioned Kasturirangan as it confirms the tie-ins to pro deal articles being written..
I have not followed the technical discussions, so pardon my ignorance.According to the existing separation plan, anything that is not under IAEA safeguards automatically becomes military and has a totally different fuel cycle loop - that includes the FBRs. And that also includes any and all kinds of reprocessing done on the military side all the way up to weapons grade. So the question of constraints does not arise.
From what I have read so far, AK wanted control on what is under safeguard and what is not and the authority to switch between them - his argument is strategic interest.
Now, given that we have not seen the 123 text, but from what we are hearing/new-reports, that does not seem to have been granted - no switicng of safeguared to non, etc.
So, how does the reproc fit into this picture? FBRs are on teh non-safeguarded side, so how can reproc help them?
PM tells Vajpayee n-deal will not affect strategic programmes
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh today assured his predecessor Atal Bwhari Vajpayee that the proposed Indo-US nuclear cooperation agreement would have no impact on New Delhi's strategic programmes.
The assurance was given to a delegation of top BJP leaders led by Vajpayee during a two-hour meeting but former Union Minister Yashwant Sinha said the saffron party's apprehensions have not been allayed completely.
"Our apprehensions have not been allayed completely," Sinha, a former External Affairs Minister, told reporters after the meeting at the Prime Minister's residence here but did not elaborate.
"We have no reason to distrust him, but we would like to first go through the text of the draft agreement," he said.
Besides Vajpayee and Sinha, the delegation included former union ministers Jaswant Singh and Arun Shourie and BJP chief Rajnath Singh.
External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee, National Security Advisor M K Narayanan, Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon and Atomic Energy Commission chief Anil Kakodar were also present.
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh today assured his predecessor Atal Bwhari Vajpayee that the proposed Indo-US nuclear cooperation agreement would have no impact on New Delhi's strategic programmes.
The assurance was given to a delegation of top BJP leaders led by Vajpayee during a two-hour meeting but former Union Minister Yashwant Sinha said the saffron party's apprehensions have not been allayed completely.
"Our apprehensions have not been allayed completely," Sinha, a former External Affairs Minister, told reporters after the meeting at the Prime Minister's residence here but did not elaborate.
"We have no reason to distrust him, but we would like to first go through the text of the draft agreement," he said.
Besides Vajpayee and Sinha, the delegation included former union ministers Jaswant Singh and Arun Shourie and BJP chief Rajnath Singh.
External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee, National Security Advisor M K Narayanan, Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon and Atomic Energy Commission chief Anil Kakodar were also present.
its just not strategic separation plan but the most important plan that is to use home available Th power in the future.. if the indo-us deal does not help us get to there, just not letting us to reprocess spent fuel to fuel into advanced reactors that barc is /has designed... then there exists a natural deal breaker from our side.
if the us congress otoh, does not pass the reprocessing issue.. then it also makes it an automatic deal breaker.
--
babus are clever in not saying this emphatically that in the future we would have full rights to reprocess.
if the us congress otoh, does not pass the reprocessing issue.. then it also makes it an automatic deal breaker.
--
babus are clever in not saying this emphatically that in the future we would have full rights to reprocess.
Ideally from the Indian nuke establishment standpoint, the whole deal should have been done under campaign safeguards. The US and IAEA would never agree to that - a nightmare from an accounting and security standpoint to monitor leakages. Campaign safeguards would be tantamount to switching between what is safeguarded and what it not. The issue is really cost IMO, not strategic interest. However, once you get past the initial capital investment of separate cycles and facilities i.e. military and IAEA, then it is IMO, a much cleaner system.NRao wrote:From what I have read so far, AK wanted control on what is under safeguard and what is not and the authority to switch between them - his argument is strategic interest.
Now, given that we have not seen the 123 text, but from what we are hearing/new-reports, that does not seem to have been granted - no switicng of safeguared to non, etc.
So, how does the reproc fit into this picture? FBRs are on teh non-safeguarded side, so how can reproc help them?
Re-processing (the only kind of reprocessing relevant to this agreement is the civil reprocessing or the safeguarded reprocessing) is important to preserve India's right to develop, perfect and implement the thorium cycle. Since India is the only country which is developing the thorium cycle, re-processing of the spent fuels would in any event have to be done in India for two reasons i.e. minimizing fuel consumption and because no other country has any experience in the thorium fuel cycle including the special challenges associated with reprocessing spent fuel from the AHWRs.
With the move away from campaign safeguards the FBRs have nothing whatsoever do with reprocessing (the civilian side). In the early stages of this debate there was evidence that the Indian nuke establishment was not prepared with fuel mixtures for the FBRs as well as the AHWRs. They needed time to be confident and hence there was a move towards firstly keeping the FBRs out of the agreement as well as the campaign safeguard negotiating stance. Obviously, they have done work in the 2 years since J18 regarding those fuel mixtures and are prepared to accept the complete separation of the two fuel cycles now.
NRao,
The civil-military separation was always going to be a static one. The only point of contention was ensuring the perpetuity of the fuel supply for the civilian side. This much has been clear since the J18/M2 days.
And I still do not understand this fixation on the Hyde act. The 123 agreement is the bilateral document that we sign with the Americans and our dealings with them on this matter will solely be framed by it. If for any reason the Americans renege on their end of 123 then we renege on ours. It is as simple as that. Why is this so hard to understand? Where does the Hyde act come it? It is not our problem.
One more thing. As I have repeatedly said in the past the reprocessing issue is important to us for waste management and not for any "civilian" FBRs and AHWRs. I stand by my prediction that the DAE is not going to put any FBRs and AHWRs on the civilian side any time soon.
The civil-military separation was always going to be a static one. The only point of contention was ensuring the perpetuity of the fuel supply for the civilian side. This much has been clear since the J18/M2 days.
And I still do not understand this fixation on the Hyde act. The 123 agreement is the bilateral document that we sign with the Americans and our dealings with them on this matter will solely be framed by it. If for any reason the Americans renege on their end of 123 then we renege on ours. It is as simple as that. Why is this so hard to understand? Where does the Hyde act come it? It is not our problem.
One more thing. As I have repeatedly said in the past the reprocessing issue is important to us for waste management and not for any "civilian" FBRs and AHWRs. I stand by my prediction that the DAE is not going to put any FBRs and AHWRs on the civilian side any time soon.
Does not make sense to me (anadi), IF the issue was lack of Uranium, does not the current (speculated) separation plan still have to deal with a shortage of Uranium? How could two years research on fuel-mix make that much of a diff? (IIRC, AK is on record stating that India needs some 8 reactors to tide them thru'.)Obviously, they have done work in the 2 years since J18 regarding those fuel mixtures and are prepared to accept the complete separation of the two fuel cycles now
Ldev,
In that famous IE interview of his, AK stated that the fuel cycles of the strategic program and the FBR program were "linked" and that is why there was no question of putting the FBR program on the civilian side.
The DAE has been running a FBR for about two decades now. Work on basic things like possible fuel mixtures for the three stage program has already been done.
In that famous IE interview of his, AK stated that the fuel cycles of the strategic program and the FBR program were "linked" and that is why there was no question of putting the FBR program on the civilian side.
The DAE has been running a FBR for about two decades now. Work on basic things like possible fuel mixtures for the three stage program has already been done.
I would speculate that it was not an issue of lack of uranium but of being confident that the eventual fuel oxides that the AHWRs ran on would be able to do so within the separation plans then being discussed. If the AHWRs are on the civilian side ( and here I disagree with Sparsh), then it was important from BARCs/DAEs viewpoint that the fabrication of those fuel rods which previously would have been done with partial inputs from the 2nd stage FBR output would be switched to all-imported fuel components. But because of the unique nature of the thorium cycle to India, the fabrication of those fuel bundles as well as their reprocessing would have to be done in India. There would also be the process of understanding and protecting the IP issues involved re the 3rd stage - something that they probably have been able to get a much better handle on during the last 2 years.NRao wrote: Does not make sense to me (anadi), IF the issue was lack of Uranium, does not the current (speculated) separation plan still have to deal with a shortage of Uranium? How could two years research on fuel-mix make that much of a diff? (IIRC, AK is on record stating that India needs some 8 reactors to tide them thru'.)
Post this agreement, the 3rd stage gets "de-linked" from the rest of the program. The 2nd stage becomes purely military i.e. FBRs. The 3rd stage holds the promise of eventually India becoming a GNEP supplier country in at least as far the thorium cycle is concerned. Hence IMO AHWRs (now under the post agreement scenario) will become civilian. BARC has already been making presentations of its design at IAEA conferences globally.Sparsh wrote:Ldev,
In that famous IE interview of his, AK stated that the fuel cycles of the strategic program and the FBR program were "linked" and that is why there was no question of putting the FBR program on the civilian side.
The DAE has been running a FBR for about two decades now. Work on basic things like possible fuel mixtures for the three stage program has already been done.
Sparsh,
Thanks for that clarification. (Just for my sanity, there are other sites outside of reactors that are covered under safeguard.) (BTW, check out the interview with Kakodkar in Science, Feb, 2006 - not on the net.)
On the Hyde Act vs. 123, we have been thru' this discussion. You are right, but only on the surface.
The current and future US president/s has to live up to it. Dr. Rice, Burns and Dr. Telis have stated that too.
Besides that the 123 has to be approved by the US Congress. So, the 'bilateral'ism is limited to the Hyde Act (in this case). And that is the dance they are performing right now.
Now, as you argue, the Hyde Act is internal to the US and IF a future US President decides to 'break' the 123 (for whatever reason) India is no longer obliged to follow it too (Taraour anyone?). The argument that follows is that the energy(???) invested in 123, etc is not worth it to take that risk. The reason being that the Hyde Act is not favorable to India, the 123 is so nebulous that the risk is rather high. I suspect that if DAE had its way they would have rejected this deal out right. It is the political wing within India and that too a nascent US leaning one, that has engineered this IMHO.
So, that is the reason for the fixation. Hope it helps and we cna put that to bed - for good.
Thanks for that clarification. (Just for my sanity, there are other sites outside of reactors that are covered under safeguard.) (BTW, check out the interview with Kakodkar in Science, Feb, 2006 - not on the net.)
On the Hyde Act vs. 123, we have been thru' this discussion. You are right, but only on the surface.
The current and future US president/s has to live up to it. Dr. Rice, Burns and Dr. Telis have stated that too.
Besides that the 123 has to be approved by the US Congress. So, the 'bilateral'ism is limited to the Hyde Act (in this case). And that is the dance they are performing right now.
Now, as you argue, the Hyde Act is internal to the US and IF a future US President decides to 'break' the 123 (for whatever reason) India is no longer obliged to follow it too (Taraour anyone?). The argument that follows is that the energy(???) invested in 123, etc is not worth it to take that risk. The reason being that the Hyde Act is not favorable to India, the 123 is so nebulous that the risk is rather high. I suspect that if DAE had its way they would have rejected this deal out right. It is the political wing within India and that too a nascent US leaning one, that has engineered this IMHO.
So, that is the reason for the fixation. Hope it helps and we cna put that to bed - for good.
Vsudhir,
The FMCT (no such thing as the FMCO) is going to turn out into another mighty fine piss process. Mark my words.
There is no way that a FMCT acceptable to everyone can be arrived at. Because if that were to happen then the P-5 club and its attendant perks are effectively dissolved. That is why you see the Americans suggesting this preposterous idea of verification by "national technical means". This will never be acceptable to everyone else and what will be acceptable to everyone else will never be acceptable to the Americans (and the rest of the P-5).
You should not be too bothered about us promising to work towards a FMCT*. What is the problem with making a promise that in all likelihood we know we will never be called upon to keep?
* - Just for kicks, take a look at the sort of a FMCT that the GoI has publicly stated it will work towards and then think of the acceptability of such a FMCT for the P-5.
The FMCT (no such thing as the FMCO) is going to turn out into another mighty fine piss process. Mark my words.
There is no way that a FMCT acceptable to everyone can be arrived at. Because if that were to happen then the P-5 club and its attendant perks are effectively dissolved. That is why you see the Americans suggesting this preposterous idea of verification by "national technical means". This will never be acceptable to everyone else and what will be acceptable to everyone else will never be acceptable to the Americans (and the rest of the P-5).
You should not be too bothered about us promising to work towards a FMCT*. What is the problem with making a promise that in all likelihood we know we will never be called upon to keep?
* - Just for kicks, take a look at the sort of a FMCT that the GoI has publicly stated it will work towards and then think of the acceptability of such a FMCT for the P-5.
uncalled for.. who is this source btw? its an allegation coming right from PMO. wtf? now it makes me think, bjp's bandwagoning and this one matches 1-1.In a restrained tone of triumph the source said, "I hope, now, the critics of the deal who had a defeatist mentality and were paranoid about the nuclear deal will rest. People with inferiority complex regarding India's capacity were against the deal."
He said critics of the deal were "thinking in a straight line about history and bilateral diplomacy."
http://bharat-rakshak.com/NEWS/newsrf.php?newsid=9031
what a cheap-o'! everyone knows only a few know about this secret deal.. how in the sane world the other can think without any assumptions?
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SaiK wrote:In a restrained tone of triumph the source said, "I hope, now, the critics of the deal who had a defeatist mentality and were paranoid about the nuclear deal will rest. People with inferiority complex regarding India's capacity were against the deal."
He said critics of the deal were "thinking in a straight line about history and bilateral diplomacy."
http://bharat-rakshak.com/NEWS/newsrf.php?newsid=9031
The linked Rediff article claims, India got the same rights as nuclear weapon states - I am simply aghast that after all this, starting with the different interpretations of J18, M2 (perpetual safeguards), and now 123, which seems to limit reprocessing to 20% enrichment levels - same as allowed for NNWS, fuel guarantees that do not survive an Indian nuclear test, codified expectations set on Indian quantitative and qualitative weapons development, and to top it all Hyde, which does not even pretend that India should ever be a de facto NWS and finally the IAEA agreement - which will be applied on the same lines as a NNWS - do not know on what grounds are they saying India as a defacto NWS.It seems as per all the codifications, so far, India is to be treated as an exception enjoying none of the rights and privileges of an NWS save for the ability to keep its arsenal built and a clear expectation that India will limit such an arsenal in quantity, quality and deployment postures.
What has been done so far is the codification of "reduced" privileges of an NWS. What is clear, so far, is that the US is not ready accept India as a nuclear power. What is clear, so far, is that MMS has used the economic lens to trump the strategic and geopolitical lens with the hope that this deal will allow, India to maximize its energy resources and allow India to be a more integrated partner of high technology.
The question has always been if this hope is worth the paper it is written on for the compromises being made. The question is, does the Indian Nation agree and has consensus on this grand compromise? Or is Pakistan going to get another bonanza of weapons from the US and the Indian state would meekly accept such a transaction - the same way, as happened the week of M2, 2006? Time will tell - but for God's sake do not call this deal as one, which has not compromised the Indian position.
Precisely.ldev wrote:Separately, the link put up by Arun_S, An overview of Fuel Cycles for the AHWR, on the last thread is excellent reading. The entire 3rd stage of India's homegrown thorium cycle is ambitious but has many many technical challenges in terms of its implementation. The LWR and the PHWR reactors are a proven design with empirical track records. It will involve a lot of hard work to ensure that the Thorium cycle reaches those established benchmarks. What this 123 agreement has done is that via the reprocessing consents available to India, it has enabled India to keep the door open for the eventual commercialization of that technology. It will also allow India to leapfrog the 2nd stage and to start building AHWRs almost immediately as both the Pu and the U required in the fuel alongwith the Thorium can be immediately imported on operationalizing of this agreement. The reprocessing of those spent fuels will be done on the commercial side under IAEA supervision. To the extent that India was planning to use Pu from its FBRs for the third stage will no longer be necessary or for that matter prudent as any fuel flowing from the FBRs to the IAEA monitored AHWRs will be like going into a Black Hole. Once in, it can never leave.
First AHWR will be 300 MWe, however once proven and scaled up to say 1200 MWe the core criticality is much easier (lower neutron loss to structure and escape) and the percentage of driver fuel required (to account for net neutron deficiency) will be reduced considerably.
(AHWR this is the only Thorium fuel route that can eventually realize 1.0 recycling to reach Self Sustaining Fuel Cycle)
Is this interpretation correct? Jmho, the final deal that we got preserves Indian laxman-rekha. Based on what we are seeing in open source, 20% enrichment is what is allowed for civ side, consistent with civ & mil separation. 123 does not mention N-test, is it not consistent with our demand? and IAEA safeguards, we don't know if it would be NNWS; I would expect it to be somewhere between NWS & NNWS, that is overtly non-intrusive and allows us to protect our IP. If all Hydes & Jack(ass)als want to dance around the HA, it is Unkil's headache.The linked Rediff article claims, India got the same rights as nuclear weapon states - I am simply aghast that after all this, starting with the different interpretations of J18, M2 (perpetual safeguards), and now 123, which seems to limit reprocessing to 20% enrichment levels - same as allowed for NNWS, fuel guarantees that do not survive an Indian nuclear test, codified expectations set on Indian quantitative and qualitative weapons development, and to top it all Hyde, which does not even pretend that India should ever be a de facto NWS and finally the IAEA agreement - which will be applied on the same lines as a NNWS - do not know on what grounds are they saying India as a defacto NWS.
Also, why do we want/ need Unkil's certification for being a NWS? Does it change any of the ground realities or geo-political aspects adversely?
The irony is that once the agreement is operationalized the target 1.0 recycling to reach the self-sustaining fuel cycle asap will not be as important because of the availability of imported driver fuel. Its like when you have no money you have to watch every penny carefully, but when you have a lot of money, banks bend over backward to give you more credit.Arun_S wrote: First AHWR will be 300 MWe, however once proven and scaled up to say 1200 MWe the core criticality is much easier (lower neutron loss to structure and escape) and the percentage of driver fuel required (to account for net neutron deficiency) will be reduced considerably.
(AHWR this is the only Thorium fuel route that can eventually realize 1.0 recycling to reach Self Sustaining Fuel Cycle)
[quote]Mr Markey (along with 23 Congressmen) warned: “If the 123 agreement has been intentionally negotiated to side-step or bypass the law and the will of Congress, final approval for this deal will be jeopardised.â€
Last edited by SaiK on 27 Jul 2007 03:15, edited 2 times in total.
Who is this we? GoI of the government of the United Progressive Alliance, an alliance in power due to communists. Is a formal cap and/or rollback is the only "rekha"?ShibaPJ wrote: the final deal that we got preserves Indian laxman-rekha.
Does the 20% apply to NWS?n what we are seeing in open source, 20% enrichment is what is allowed for civ side, consistent with civ & mil separation.
123 is also under US laws, the no test referece exists by reference and does not need to be sepcified. Any basic understanding of written contracts will clarify the issue.123 does not mention N-test, is it not consistent with our demand?
After having agreed to perpetual safeguards, there is no doubt and Hyde calls for it. Congress will not be voting on the bill till they see, essentially a final unsigned IAEA agreement.and IAEA safeguards, we don't know if it would be NNWS;
No, it does not change it overnight but the trajectory has been changed. What POK II started towards a trajectory, which envisaged nothing less than NWS, 123 changes it to an NPT+ category.Also, why do we want/ need Unkil's certification for being a NWS? Does it change any of the ground realities or geo-political aspects adversely?
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Separately, the link put up by Arun_S, An overview of Fuel Cycles for the AHWR, on the last thread is excellent reading. The entire 3rd stage of India's homegrown thorium cycle is ambitious but has many many technical challenges in terms of its implementation. The LWR and the PHWR reactors are a proven design with empirical track records. It will involve a lot of hard work to ensure that the Thorium cycle reaches those established benchmarks. What this 123 agreement has done is that via the reprocessing consents available to India, it has enabled India to keep the door open for the eventual commercialization of that technology. It will also allow India to leapfrog the 2nd stage and to start building AHWRs almost immediately as both the Pu and the U required in the fuel alongwith the Thorium can be immediately imported on operationalizing of this agreement. The reprocessing of those spent fuels will be done on the commercial side under IAEA supervision. To the extent that India was planning to use Pu from its FBRs for the third stage will no longer be necessary or for that matter prudent as any fuel flowing from the FBRs to the IAEA monitored AHWRs will be like going into a Black Hole. Once in, it can never leave.
Precisely.
First AHWR will be 300 MWe, however once proven and scaled up to say 1200 MWe the core criticality is much easier (lower neutron loss to structure and escape) and the percentage of driver fuel required (to account for net neutron deficiency) will be reduced considerably.
(AHWR this is the only Thorium fuel route that can eventually realize 1.0 recycling to reach Self Sustaining Fuel Cycle)
How long will it take to build the 300mw AHWR? What is a realistic timeframe for mass production of 1000mw + reactors.?
I am assuming that with access to imported PU, Thorium can be used for powering the AHWR, Am I correct?
http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2408/ ... 709900.htm
http://india.gov.in/sectors/science/nuc ... ge_III.php
--What about ADS?
It is required for two reasons. One is that the ADS produces neutrons by the spallation process, which means boiling. Neutrons in a reactor are produced by fission. When high-energy protons [from an accelerator] are bombarded on heavy nuclei like lead, the nuclear particles in the target nucleus are excited to a level that some of the neutrons are liberated from the nucleus. This is known as spallation. Spallation neutrons can augment the neutron supply, which can be used again for converting thorium to uranium-233. The second reason for the development of the ADS is that they are eminently suitable for transmuting the highly radioactive waste from conventional nuclear reactors to shortlived radio-nuclides, which do not require a long-term storage under surveillance.
ADS development will take time because this involves a series of steps and each of them is technologically challenging.
http://india.gov.in/sectors/science/nuc ... ge_III.php
Read "here for a layman version of the Thorium cycle from the World Nuclear Association Website.
Interesting Website acknowleging India contribution to the Thorum Cycle while openly declaring its stated aim of capping India's technical progress here.
Quotes
Interesting Website acknowleging India contribution to the Thorum Cycle while openly declaring its stated aim of capping India's technical progress here.
Quotes
The interesting part is hereWith about six times more thorium than uranium, India has made utilisation of thorium for large-scale energy production a major goal in its nuclear power program, utilising a three-stage concept:
* Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs, elsewhere known as CANDUs) fuelled by natural uranium, plus light water reactors, produce plutonium.
* Fast Breeder Reactors (FBRs) use this plutonium-based fuel to breed U-233 from thorium. The blanket around the core will have uranium as well as thorium, so that further plutonium (ideally high-fissile Pu) is produced as well as the U-233. Then
* Advanced Heavy Water Reactors burn the U-233 and this plutonium with thorium, getting about 75% of their power from the thorium.
The spent fuel will then be reprocessed to recover fissile materials for recycling.
This Indian program has moved from aiming to be sustained simply with thorium to one "driven" with the addition of further fissile uranium and plutonium, to give greater efficiency
-Jayram
Developing a thorium-based fuel cycle
Much development work is still required before the thorium fuel cycle can be commercialised, and the effort required seems unlikely while (or where) abundant uranium is available. In this respect international moves to bring India into the ambit of international trade will be critical. If India has ready access to traded uranium and conventional reactor designs, it may not persist with the thorium cycle.
Nevertheless, the thorium fuel cycle, with its potential for breeding fuel without the need for fast-neutron reactors, holds considerable potential long-term. It is a significant factor in the long-term sustainability of nuclear energy.
Yes, eventually the power generation business has to be run with careful bean counting and cost control.ldev wrote:The irony is that once the agreement is operationalized the target 1.0 recycling to reach the self-sustaining fuel cycle asap will not be as important because of the availability of imported driver fuel. Its like when you have no money you have to watch every penny carefully, but when you have a lot of money, banks bend over backward to give you more credit.Arun_S wrote: First AHWR will be 300 MWe, however once proven and scaled up to say 1200 MWe the core criticality is much easier (lower neutron loss to structure and escape) and the percentage of driver fuel required (to account for net neutron deficiency) will be reduced considerably.
(AHWR this is the only Thorium fuel route that can eventually realize 1.0 recycling to reach Self Sustaining Fuel Cycle)
Fuel cost apart, the operating cost is much lower because the fuel rod refuelling is less frequent (due to insitue breeding), freshwater coolant and inherent safety, less radioactive waste, etc .. etc.
IIRC perhaps for that reason BARC plans to operate the AHWR without the fuel reprocessing to recover U233 for quite sometime. Cost of U233 from reprocessing versus commercial fissile need to make business sense. That includes cost of building reactor and initial loading of the fuel.
But tech development has to continue at pace, to keep the powder dry for reprocessing based U233 fuel options. With Uranium prices skyrocketing, many decision thresholds will be breached, turning on head conventional argument/wisdom preached by experts in last 30 years.
Bigger AHWR plants with larger reactor core will of course allow fuel rods to burn longer.