Oh the maal should be real for sure. India was never respected even after the economy booming in the 90s we got special treatment only after Budha smiled.John Snow wrote:Folks >> right after the 1998 tests, the Russian news paper Izvestia (IIRC) featured an article by Russian Nuke expert saying that the Indians have mastered the technique of variable yield weapon , 'DIAL a KABOOM'.
so I strongly feel that Wallis wallahs have now realised with tell a tale tellis guys that India has the maal to do business, unkil must have shared that info with lizard and also lizard thru its comrades must have known the maal is real
India Nuclear News & Discussion - 10 Aug 2007
usa might be assessing or concerned about paki bums then india should also be concerned.... seems congee's are sleeping
usa may or may not know where paki bums are and may or may not be able to do anything about it, but at least they are thinking about it then india should also have a plan (or a plan to have a plan).... for example: india should tell china that it will hold china responsible if paki bums disappear and are used to blackmail india (chinese encouragement, fine tuning, data, and moral support has allowed paki's to have nuclear bombs)
if mushy falls and nukes disappear (only to re-appear in pakistan-afghanistan border) its dangerous for usa, it is also dangerous for india..., lets hope its also dangerous for china
i think indian commando's should be working with unkil military before such a thing happens (perhaps as a military excersize) - if they already are.... all the better
Its a dull & boring day today. For me after we have hard understanding of the relavance of chotues and the way it was the apex of the pyramid. So now we have what we want. What next ? The pipeline seems empty. The weapons and gizmo toys we have it all, the simple pleasures of life. Alas we have to grow up on policy & long term issues, away from toys (read weapons).
Now does that mean we are finished with the weapons oriented charter of BR? For staretegic and long term non-weapon thinking unfortunately we will now start hitting the walls of BRF defined taboos (the un mentionable subject matter). Oh, what will they say of us ....
No let us continue our useless discussion on weapons, the engine, the nuts a bolt, airplanes and bum and ship. Oh well this is wrong forum.
Dull becomes duller ... .. . so turn to whining and pitty cat fight. Carry on ...
Now does that mean we are finished with the weapons oriented charter of BR? For staretegic and long term non-weapon thinking unfortunately we will now start hitting the walls of BRF defined taboos (the un mentionable subject matter). Oh, what will they say of us ....
No let us continue our useless discussion on weapons, the engine, the nuts a bolt, airplanes and bum and ship. Oh well this is wrong forum.
Dull becomes duller ... .. . so turn to whining and pitty cat fight. Carry on ...
-
negi
- BRF Oldie
- Posts: 13112
- Joined: 27 Jul 2006 17:51
- Location: Ban se dar nahin lagta , chootiyon se lagta hai .
Boy I am scaredArun_S wrote:Its a dull & boring day today. For me after we have hard understanding of the relavance of chotues and the way it was the apex of the pyramid. So now we have what we want. What next ? The pipeline seems empty. The weapons and gizmo toys we have it all, the simple pleasures of life. Alas we have to grow up on policy & long term issues, away from toys (read weapons).
... sirjee what makes you say so ? are you hinting at a suttle change in BR's ideology and its future Why useless sir ? yes for the jingos and others who are into such stuff and make a living out of it it might find such discussions futile at times but the weapons thread is very much required for numerous newbies who think wiki and FAS are the bible they need to be educated and I should say BR is doing a fine job .No let us continue our useless discussion on weapons, the engine, the nuts a bolt, airplanes and bum and ship. Oh well this is wrong forum.
Lastly there are things which weapons and strategy thread cant cover for every thing else there is NUKKADWA.
Last edited by negi on 11 Aug 2007 05:36, edited 1 time in total.
It's a practical solution that meets all our requirements - AK in The Hindu
[quote] What compelled the Department of Atomic Energy to go in for this ‘123’ agreement with the United States when it is on course with its indigenous three-stage nuclear power programme? Where is the need to import light water reactors (LWRs)?
The fundamental priority remains the development of the three-stage nuclear power programme. Even in the programme of 20,000 MWe of nuclear power by 2020, which provides for PHWRs [pressurised heavy water reactors], a number of FBRs [fast breeder reactors] and an AHWR [advanced heavy water reactors] run on thorium, there was a provision for eight imported LWRs of 1,000 MWe each. The objective is that while we open up the huge energy potential in our thorium resources through the development of our three-stage programme, we also look for additionalities in the near-term through imports.
Similarly, if the civil nuclear cooperation comes about and we are able to import natural uranium, we can also set up more indigenous PHWRs. So this international civil nuclear cooperation is to get additional nuclear power generation capacity in the near term, without in any way affecting our three-stage programme or the strategic programme or our domestic R&D activities.
We should also look at it from the point of view of possibility of exports. For example, our PHWRs are the smallest, commercially competitive systems worldwide. It may be of interest to several developing countries … Once the international civil nuclear cooperation opens up, it should be possible for us to sell our reactors and technology to other countries … who may have an interest in them just as it should be possible for us to buy reactors from other countries... The embargoes are there at present. If the restrictive regime which is operating around us goes away, it is certainly good for a greater share of nuclear power in the total power generation capacity.
What are the areas in the 123 agreement that have satisfied you? What are the areas with which you are disappointed?
I have always viewed the possibility of opening the civil nuclear cooperation as an additionality. These additions will not in any way impinge on our domestic development of the three-stage nuclear power programme, our strategic programme, and our R&D. Secondly, if we set up nuclear power stations which are acquired from outside, then there should be an assurance that there will be no interruption in their operation. With whatever spent fuel that will arise in these power stations, it should be possible to reprocess and recycle [plutonium] so that we can get the benefit of 50 to 60 times more energy. Also, there should be no difficulties in terms of spent fuel management in accordance with our domestic policy of reprocessing and recycling in a closed fuel cycle mode. This agreement provides for all this. These are our requirements and they are met … This agreement is a practical solution, which meets all our requirements. It is a practical way forward. So it is satisfactory.
There are three central issues: India’s right to reprocess the spent fuel into plutonium from the reactors to be imported; uninterrupted fuel supply for these imported reactors; and India’s voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing, which it does not want to convert into a bilateral legality with the U.S. Are you satisfied in all these areas?
I think so. There is an upfront reprocessing consent right. There is an assurance of uninterrupted operation of reactors. In terms of tests, the unilateral voluntary moratorium we have remains as such. There is no conversion of that into a bilateral legality. So I think it is satisfactory.
The U.S. has only given its consent to make a request to it to allow us to reprocess the spent fuel from the imported reactors. The consent may come after a year and a half. How can you say upfront consent has been given?
This needs to be clarified. First, that there is a consent for reprocessing is very explicitly stated in the same Article [6(iii)] in the beginning: “the Parties grant each other consent to reprocess or otherwise alter in form or content nuclear material transferred pursuant to this Agreement.â€
[quote] What compelled the Department of Atomic Energy to go in for this ‘123’ agreement with the United States when it is on course with its indigenous three-stage nuclear power programme? Where is the need to import light water reactors (LWRs)?
The fundamental priority remains the development of the three-stage nuclear power programme. Even in the programme of 20,000 MWe of nuclear power by 2020, which provides for PHWRs [pressurised heavy water reactors], a number of FBRs [fast breeder reactors] and an AHWR [advanced heavy water reactors] run on thorium, there was a provision for eight imported LWRs of 1,000 MWe each. The objective is that while we open up the huge energy potential in our thorium resources through the development of our three-stage programme, we also look for additionalities in the near-term through imports.
Similarly, if the civil nuclear cooperation comes about and we are able to import natural uranium, we can also set up more indigenous PHWRs. So this international civil nuclear cooperation is to get additional nuclear power generation capacity in the near term, without in any way affecting our three-stage programme or the strategic programme or our domestic R&D activities.
We should also look at it from the point of view of possibility of exports. For example, our PHWRs are the smallest, commercially competitive systems worldwide. It may be of interest to several developing countries … Once the international civil nuclear cooperation opens up, it should be possible for us to sell our reactors and technology to other countries … who may have an interest in them just as it should be possible for us to buy reactors from other countries... The embargoes are there at present. If the restrictive regime which is operating around us goes away, it is certainly good for a greater share of nuclear power in the total power generation capacity.
What are the areas in the 123 agreement that have satisfied you? What are the areas with which you are disappointed?
I have always viewed the possibility of opening the civil nuclear cooperation as an additionality. These additions will not in any way impinge on our domestic development of the three-stage nuclear power programme, our strategic programme, and our R&D. Secondly, if we set up nuclear power stations which are acquired from outside, then there should be an assurance that there will be no interruption in their operation. With whatever spent fuel that will arise in these power stations, it should be possible to reprocess and recycle [plutonium] so that we can get the benefit of 50 to 60 times more energy. Also, there should be no difficulties in terms of spent fuel management in accordance with our domestic policy of reprocessing and recycling in a closed fuel cycle mode. This agreement provides for all this. These are our requirements and they are met … This agreement is a practical solution, which meets all our requirements. It is a practical way forward. So it is satisfactory.
There are three central issues: India’s right to reprocess the spent fuel into plutonium from the reactors to be imported; uninterrupted fuel supply for these imported reactors; and India’s voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing, which it does not want to convert into a bilateral legality with the U.S. Are you satisfied in all these areas?
I think so. There is an upfront reprocessing consent right. There is an assurance of uninterrupted operation of reactors. In terms of tests, the unilateral voluntary moratorium we have remains as such. There is no conversion of that into a bilateral legality. So I think it is satisfactory.
The U.S. has only given its consent to make a request to it to allow us to reprocess the spent fuel from the imported reactors. The consent may come after a year and a half. How can you say upfront consent has been given?
This needs to be clarified. First, that there is a consent for reprocessing is very explicitly stated in the same Article [6(iii)] in the beginning: “the Parties grant each other consent to reprocess or otherwise alter in form or content nuclear material transferred pursuant to this Agreement.â€
-
enqyoobOLD
- BRFite
- Posts: 690
- Joined: 09 Sep 2004 05:16
- Location: KhemKaran, Shomali Plain
With regard to reprocessing, enrichment, and heavy water technologies, the U.S. has not transferred these technologies to any country so far. So this agreement provides for a possibility of such transfers but that will require an amendment to this agreement. That possibility has been kept open.
As moi thought.. Those who have heard of ITAR know that the above is a positve statement, not a negative one.
SSridhar
Thx a ton. This interview and Dr Chidambaram's pointed nods about our current weapons capability has put many doubts to rest.
Folks, does seem like the US didn't quite hoodwink India as much as we felt Delhi has 'sold-out'. We did well. Our time is fast approaching and the yanks moved when they still could maneuver with some flexibility.
Our Atomic establishment is truly a gem. After the green revolution for food independence, what we've now achieved in terms of energy independence is easily teh greatest achievement of independent India. Hats off hajaar to the scicoms in the DAE!
Thx a ton. This interview and Dr Chidambaram's pointed nods about our current weapons capability has put many doubts to rest.
Folks, does seem like the US didn't quite hoodwink India as much as we felt Delhi has 'sold-out'. We did well. Our time is fast approaching and the yanks moved when they still could maneuver with some flexibility.
Our Atomic establishment is truly a gem. After the green revolution for food independence, what we've now achieved in terms of energy independence is easily teh greatest achievement of independent India. Hats off hajaar to the scicoms in the DAE!
For N^3:
I will take you at your word, but I swear, I saw your original post without those two sentences starting with “I should haveâ€Shaurya, I did not CHANGE my post. When I saw that you were confused about what is in the 123 agreement, I tried to explain that the Civilian Nuclear Energy agreement BETWEEN INDIA AND THE US has nothing about Iran etc. etc.
-
enqyoobOLD
- BRFite
- Posts: 690
- Joined: 09 Sep 2004 05:16
- Location: KhemKaran, Shomali Plain
Arunji:
I would think that BR's interest was (and continues to be) to help inform opinion on how to move India's interests forward. In 1998 that meant articulating why the tests were needed, and why they were not "H&D" at all, but absolutely well-planned, rational and well-executed, meaning that the deterrent was very real.
Although the deterrent did not deter the idiot Mush from trying his Kargil stunt (I think TSP did it because they realized that time had run out for map-redrawing ambitions, and they were getting desperate that the Fauj was heading for irrelevance) the deterrent did allow GOI to laugh off the Paki bluff and prepare to finish off TSP by conventional means.
What the deterrent DID deter, is any move from the Rizald. They knew quite well that the time for muscle-flexing was not then. So the deterrent succeeded.
Following that, BRF's interest was in countering the NPAs, and that isn't over yet. Here the issue is not flaunting the deterrent, but arguing why the deterrent is permanent, test or no test. There is first-principles simulation capability, and weapons will continue to be refined as needed - and only as needed.
When the Deal was under the gun, it was vital to argue why it is in the best interests of the world as much as India's. It still is.
Refining nuclear weapons is no doubt a fun trade, but I think it is best not discussed on a forum such as BRF in today's environment.
You can see that BRF has achieved fame, in places far away from the Unmenshunnabal Phorum. Even the unknowns/outsiders who write articles get quoted in the strangest places - along with, and maybe on equal or better than equal footing, with articles from professional NPAs, etc.
What is discussed here is used by others as "indicators" of this or that perceived pov. I hate censorship as much anyone else, but there is an argument for stopping those who would insist on yelling "Fire!" in a theater. The "test now!" cacophony is exactly that, or worse, in today's environment. There are a lot of angry NPAs around, whose careers are threatened by the truth coming out. Why give them needless ammo?
U and I have seen enough of the FOIL etc. to know the realities of propaganda, so I am sure u know what I am saying.
I think there are plenty of exciting areas for BRF to explore. Although the governments are busy signing deals for shiny aircraft and mijjiles, the Ummah is IMO winning all over the world, and maybe the commies are also organized worldwide. There is no lack of horrible threats, to India or the US. Trouble is that we don't even know how to frame these threats or talk about them, let alone figure out strategies. This may not seem as coherent and focused as talking about shiny misjjiles, but the role for intelligent use of technology and strategy, is far greater and more urgent.
I would think that BR's interest was (and continues to be) to help inform opinion on how to move India's interests forward. In 1998 that meant articulating why the tests were needed, and why they were not "H&D" at all, but absolutely well-planned, rational and well-executed, meaning that the deterrent was very real.
Although the deterrent did not deter the idiot Mush from trying his Kargil stunt (I think TSP did it because they realized that time had run out for map-redrawing ambitions, and they were getting desperate that the Fauj was heading for irrelevance) the deterrent did allow GOI to laugh off the Paki bluff and prepare to finish off TSP by conventional means.
What the deterrent DID deter, is any move from the Rizald. They knew quite well that the time for muscle-flexing was not then. So the deterrent succeeded.
Following that, BRF's interest was in countering the NPAs, and that isn't over yet. Here the issue is not flaunting the deterrent, but arguing why the deterrent is permanent, test or no test. There is first-principles simulation capability, and weapons will continue to be refined as needed - and only as needed.
When the Deal was under the gun, it was vital to argue why it is in the best interests of the world as much as India's. It still is.
Refining nuclear weapons is no doubt a fun trade, but I think it is best not discussed on a forum such as BRF in today's environment.
You can see that BRF has achieved fame, in places far away from the Unmenshunnabal Phorum. Even the unknowns/outsiders who write articles get quoted in the strangest places - along with, and maybe on equal or better than equal footing, with articles from professional NPAs, etc.
What is discussed here is used by others as "indicators" of this or that perceived pov. I hate censorship as much anyone else, but there is an argument for stopping those who would insist on yelling "Fire!" in a theater. The "test now!" cacophony is exactly that, or worse, in today's environment. There are a lot of angry NPAs around, whose careers are threatened by the truth coming out. Why give them needless ammo?
U and I have seen enough of the FOIL etc. to know the realities of propaganda, so I am sure u know what I am saying.
I think there are plenty of exciting areas for BRF to explore. Although the governments are busy signing deals for shiny aircraft and mijjiles, the Ummah is IMO winning all over the world, and maybe the commies are also organized worldwide. There is no lack of horrible threats, to India or the US. Trouble is that we don't even know how to frame these threats or talk about them, let alone figure out strategies. This may not seem as coherent and focused as talking about shiny misjjiles, but the role for intelligent use of technology and strategy, is far greater and more urgent.
Its about time BR take the lead and leap of faith into good uncharted future territories/issues . The question every one should ask is if Forum has peaked and require new direction, itw own unique bearing .Arun_S wrote:Its a dull & boring day today. For me after we have hard understanding of the relavance of chotues and the way it was the apex of the pyramid. So now we have what we want. What next ? The pipeline seems empty. The weapons and gizmo toys we have it all, the simple pleasures of life. Alas we have to grow up on policy & long term issues, away from toys (read weapons).
Now does that mean we are finished with the weapons oriented charter of BR? For staretegic and long term non-weapon thinking unfortunately we will now start hitting the walls of BRF defined taboos (the un mentionable subject matter). Oh, what will they say of us ....
No let us continue our useless discussion on weapons, the engine, the nuts a bolt, airplanes and bum and ship. Oh well this is wrong forum.
Dull becomes duller ... .. . so turn to whining and pitty cat fight. Carry on ...
From this source:enqyoob wrote:With regard to reprocessing, enrichment, and heavy water technologies, the U.S. has not transferred these technologies to any country so far. So this agreement provides for a possibility of such transfers but that will require an amendment to this agreement. That possibility has been kept open.
As moi thought.. Those who have heard of ITAR know that the above is a positve statement, not a negative one.
Is US reprocessing worth...
Don't know veracity of source and have not digested document. It says however, at a place:
The only transfer of reprocessing technology after 1974 was to Japan, after Japan’s prime minister insisted that reprocessing was a “life or death issue.â€
-
enqyoobOLD
- BRFite
- Posts: 690
- Joined: 09 Sep 2004 05:16
- Location: KhemKaran, Shomali Plain
For what it is worth, AK's statement sets a standard: "I already said this is a satisfactory arrangement'. That for the second time. (Provides just enough leaf for MMS to hide behind.)What surprises me is the almost Ostrich like MMS attitude towards Hyde. Presidents will come and go and change policies at a drop of a hat, yet, Hyde shall persist. Even after knowing fully well, the US legislative process, why does he choose to ignore Hyde? It is a question.
If there was corresponding, Indian law like Hyde to govern 123, there would have been some balance but unfortunately the UPA government has not allowed even a minimum sense of the house to prevail. What we need here in the national interest of India is to have a full debate on the 123, followed by a vote – without party whips.
The picture AK has painted clearly still has a tinge of us vs. them.
This is not a deal that India went into and the Scicom wanted. For whatever reason (that is where MMS specifically SHOULD HAVE come out and stated what was on his mind) the political wing wanted it.
It is one that Scicom can live with. I really do not believe that the US is done with. One will have to wait and see what happens with the IAEA first. It is not an easy step, IAEA has battled with AK in the past. Until a week or so ago I always thought AK is in a good position to deal with them. But now with his "satisfactory" leaning, I am not as sure.
For sure India has been fragmented - there will be two camps - a civilian and a strategic. You can see this fracture in the Scicom too - already.
One of the goals J18 never achieved.rocky wrote:Next step is to impose the 123 agreement on all the NWS states. Make them split all their programs between military and civilian.Arun_S wrote:What next ?
Also, I would like the 'civilian' side in India to rally around DAE. Even if Ratan Tata ties up with the French, I would like DAE to drive.
If one is permitted to speculate, these commercial ventures will go through npci or such. DAE will be another tech source and compete with the $40bln of foreign influx. DAE could also become a regulating body along the lines of the NRC but not clear how those dynamics will work out.NRao wrote:One of the goals J18 never achieved.rocky wrote:Next step is to impose the 123 agreement on all the NWS states. Make them split all their programs between military and civilian.
Also, I would like the 'civilian' side in India to rally around DAE. Even if Ratan Tata ties up with the French, I would like DAE to drive.
As far as Dr. Kakodkar's statements are concerned, speculations would be just that. In terms of the record, however, it is clear that DAE's intervention (or involvement) did prevent a blitz from happening. It is obviously moot to guess whether the washout would've been prevented without that effort, but the fact that they had to step in speaks for itself. At this stage, I am inclined to take the Dr.'s word without reading any further into it. History will judge him correctly.
Further, in contrast to some who argue about our testing ability or lack thereof --an argument that doesn't evince much interest in me-- I would really like to learn how this deal will facilitiate an acceleration our national 3-stage plan and the realization of the thorium cycle. For, in the end, what we have ever got from anybody is what we have earned ourselves. That is not about to change, I wouldn't think.
The only way 123 helps us in accelerating our indian program for nuclear power is by getting us fuel on which we can tack our PHWRs, or potentially use foreign reactors (as has been discussed). We may then combine this with our reprocessing technology and higher-stage reactors. The price to pay is to go under IAEA, but that does not appear to be a concern. If we can achieve just that, it will help us leapfrog, I think.
To the degree that this does not happen; undue conditions popping up in reprocessing agreement down the road, kinks in putting that strategic fuel reserve, arm-twisting us into political alignments in return for doling out new "rights," we will slip further away from the already distal placement of this deal from J18.
As someone here said, it is the very open-ended nature of this deal, the many things that yet need to come into play that will determine its utility. We must, in my personal view, never let our guard down and constantly jostle with others, in particular the US. So, the right strategy is to maximize room to maneuver in our best interests. I am not sure this deal helps us with that and I am not sure yet what exemplars to draw optimism from, except our very own enqyoob.
‘Anguished’ PM to Left: If you want to withdraw, so be it
[quote]
New Delhi, Aug. 10: Tired of the Left parties’ constant bark, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh dared them to bite after their latest diatribe against the Indo-US nuclear deal on Tuesday.
In an exclusive interview to The Telegraph, the Prime Minister said: “I told them that it is not possible to renegotiate the deal. It is an honourable deal, the cabinet has approved it, we cannot go back on it. I told them to do whatever they want to do, if they want to withdraw support, so be it….â€
[quote]
New Delhi, Aug. 10: Tired of the Left parties’ constant bark, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh dared them to bite after their latest diatribe against the Indo-US nuclear deal on Tuesday.
In an exclusive interview to The Telegraph, the Prime Minister said: “I told them that it is not possible to renegotiate the deal. It is an honourable deal, the cabinet has approved it, we cannot go back on it. I told them to do whatever they want to do, if they want to withdraw support, so be it….â€
-
Dileep
- BRF Oldie
- Posts: 5884
- Joined: 04 Apr 2005 08:17
- Location: Dera Mahab Ali धरा महाबलिस्याः درا مهاب الي
JS, these are all fundoos that everyone should already know. I was referring to things beyond the fundamentals. What you missed is the reference to the high voltage DC transmission. Some people propose it as a lower loss solution. I tried to debunk that myth, because it is "low loss" only for the transmission company. It is NOT for the overall energy budget.John Snow wrote:Dileep
Power
watts = volts x amps
In A/C the V is high there fore the I is low for given power(in watts)
assuming power factor (cosAlpha to be one which in a/C in reality is around 0.9 for DC it is 1)
As you increase DC voltage (in order to keep I small for given W) ther are problems of arcing etc. I think only UUSR/Russia has/Had long grids of DC transmission (this was the war between Tsela founder of Westighouse AC proponent and Edison who was a proponent of DC)
Hence the group AC/DC in US
My argument stems from one of my pet peeves about all the hoopla about "Transmission Losses" in the electrical energy business. Transmission loss is NOT "the loss to the transmission company", but the "amount of energy wasted as heat"
For example, a sizeable portion of the "missing energy", that is reported as "transmission loss" is in fact "stolen". What is "stolen" should not be considered as "saveable" when you calculate energy budget.
And I always see people pulling out numbers like "there is 40% loss that could be reduced to 10%" Which is not true. Of course you can improve on the transmission efficiency, but NOT TO THESE LEVELS.
[quote="samuel"]From this source:
Is US reprocessing worth...
Don't know veracity of source and have not digested document. It says however, at a place:
[quote]
The only transfer of reprocessing technology after 1974 was to Japan, after Japan’s prime minister insisted that reprocessing was a “life or death issue.â€
Is US reprocessing worth...
Don't know veracity of source and have not digested document. It says however, at a place:
[quote]
The only transfer of reprocessing technology after 1974 was to Japan, after Japan’s prime minister insisted that reprocessing was a “life or death issue.â€
And, the Left runs with its tail between the hind legs
The CPI(M) today indicated that it would not stretch its opposition to the Indo-US nuclear deal beyond a point, saying "everything should not be linked to pulling down the government".
Asked whether his party would consider withdrawing support to the UPA government on the nuclear deal issue, CPI(M) Polit Bureau member Sitaram Yechury said, "why should everything be linked to pulling down the government. It will not serve any purpose."
He told reporters here that the CPI(M) was only concerned about the national interests and its main demand was that the deal should not be operationalised.
nkumar - have you looked at why countries built very large bombs in the early to mid 1960s and then increasingly focused on the 200kT range as missile accuracy increased?So a combination of your weak understanding and what you believe are intelligent and well informed sources have led you to believe that bigger is better.
I cannot quote numbers but no way will it be in that range. There are very few things where our cost of construction will be anywhere comparable to the west. In one of the articles that was published around the time TAPS-4 went critical, NPC has quoted cost of the project. Compare that with cost of reactor in the west. That should give you an idea.sraj wrote: Dr A.N. Prasad had talked about the costs of building a new reprocessing facility as required by this 123 agreement. Would our capital costs for a new facility also be in the $20 billion range? What does that do to the economics of power generation from this imported fuel?
It will never be applied for NWS. Let's not even have that as our goal. Our energies are far better spent elsewhere.NRao wrote:One of the goals J18 never achieved.rocky wrote:Next step is to impose the 123 agreement on all the NWS states. Make them split all their programs between military and civilian.
Also, I would like the 'civilian' side in India to rally around DAE. Even if Ratan Tata ties up with the French, I would like DAE to drive.
DAE will stay involved at least for the next decade. I have already expressed a wish that whatever reactors get built absorb current local stuff to the max. We should not let local players idle. There will be a big cost to pay later and all the efforts so far will go waste. So yes, I too would like the same.
-
enqyoobOLD
- BRFite
- Posts: 690
- Joined: 09 Sep 2004 05:16
- Location: KhemKaran, Shomali Plain
If u look at that table posted a few pages back, on operating reactors around the world, u c y it is a VERY smart idea for India to have the Morarjitorium. We need to do all that is diplomatically possible to ensure that the other POTENTIAL P-x powers do not join the Club - AND avoid p-o-ing them needlessly.Tremendous "breakout" capability if they decide to go nuclear...
MANY countries have far greater accumulations of spent fuel (unless it is all shipped to Yucca flats, is it?) that they can shake out of the barrels and turn into bums if they so choose, and since they all have strong hi-tech industrial base for building machine tools etc., they can very quickly get ahead of India in bum-count. This is why Prof. Karnad's "Be the "Biggest" on Ur Block" criterion for super-power-ness is dangerously flawed, and makes for very bad foreign policy for India. Now that v r into the P-6, and TSP and NoKO are very much embattled and on their way out, it is essential to close the doors, as China did in 1968, and go on QUIETLY.
There is an analogy for this, to the effect that when one is warm and happy in a pile of Pu - one should not start singing loudly.
Re: reactor costs: The number to beat, as Calvin corrected me, is around $1.5 per watt, installed. So 2GW plant means $3B, very simple calculation. Otherwise u r not very efficient. $20B should buy about 13GW.
I think BK is talking about the image thing. The perception of a fully tested armament will go a long way that even deploying those weapons.enqyoob wrote: This is why Prof. Karnad's "Be the "Biggest" on Ur Block" criterion for super-power-ness is dangerously flawed, and makes for very bad foreign policy for India.
From the about ariticlemenon wrote:So the left's bluff has been called. by none other than unmanly!!
Is it a case of rat turning when cornored or something else?
Whatever it is Left's bargaing powers have been seriously compromised.
Any opinions?
By railing against the nuclear deal, the Left was “underestimating the intrinsic strength of India, of India’s capacity to defend its national interestsâ€
In the continent far far awayfrom tubelight city ther is Blue ray hope of independent minded African nation that is going to be break out of next infinite source of energy..... as President Nakumarrah envisaged in 1957
http://www.rertr.anl.gov/RERTR28/PDF/S8 ... ampong.pdf
[/quote]The Ghana Research Reactor-1 (GHARR-1) is a commercial version of the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR) and has operated at different power levels since its commissioning in March 1995 [1]. The GHARR-1 facility is initially designed as a low power, pool-in-tank-type research reactor with a compact core consisting of a single fuel assembly comprising 344 U-Al (admixed in aluminum matrix) pins enriched to 90.2% [2-5]. The fuel assembly consists of ten concentric
zones or rings of 354 fuel and structural lattices distributed about a central control rod guide tube. The core is under-moderated with an H/U atom ratio of 197.
Thermal power is rated at 30kW with a corresponding peak thermal neutron flux of 1.0E+12n/cm2.s. Cold clean excess reactivity for fresh core is limited to about 4mk (1/2 βeff). Cooling is achieved by natural convection using light water. The integral reactivity worth of the control rod is about -7mk, providing a core shutdown margin 2 of -3mk of reactivity. The small HEU core has a low critical mass (<1kg). However,
it has a relatively large negative temperature coefficient of reactivity to boost its inherent safety properties [3]. The small size of the core facilitates neutron leakage and escape in both axial and radial directions. To minimize such loses and thereby conserve neutron economy, the core is heavily reflected respectively on the side and underneath the fuel cage by a thick annulus and slab of beryllium alloy material.
A schematic drawing of the cross sectional view through the reactor is shown in
Fig.1.
Fig.1: Cross section through the GHARR-1 reactor
Theoretically, the HEU-fueled GHARR-1 reactor has a designed core lifetime of ten years if it is operated at full power or its maximum flux for 2.5 hours day, five days a week. Under this condition, the HEU fuel, with a burnup of 1% [2-4], would depleted resulting in a drop in core excess reactivity to limits in the range of 2.5mk3 2.8mk. Loss of core excess reactivity due to axial neutron leakage is compensated
for by the addition of regulated beryllium shims to the top tray. In particular, when the total reactivity worth contributed by the top shims (10.95cm total thickness) is consumed, and the excess reactivity can no longer be sustained, the core would have reached its end of life (EOL). Future cycle operations will require a replacement of the spent or depleted fuel with a fresh fuel assembly. Refueling can be done with either LEU or HEU fuels.
There are external indicators which influence considerations for use of LEU fuels as likely candidate replacement core for the GHARR-1 facility and other MNSR facilities. It has been observed in recent times, an international trend in replacing HEU-fueled nuclear reactor cores and other associated facilities with LEU assemblies. International politics, nuclear safeguard protocols and non-proliferation treaties are other important issues which influence LEU considerations in nuclear
refueling. The absence of fuel fabrication facilities in some countries also heavily impacts on the choice or consideration of LEU fuel as candidates for fuel replacements.
For these and other important reasons including future cycle activities, it became
necessary to establish core conversion studies on the GHARR-1 facility in 1996.
The HEU-LEU core conversion analysis is presently been pursued jointly by the
Department of Nuclear Engineering and Materials Science in the National Nuclear
Research Institute of Ghana Atomic Energy Commission, and the RERTR Program
of the Division of Nuclear Engineering, Argonne National Laboratory. Previously,
deterministic methods have been used to perform neutronic core calculations and
analysis on GHARR-1. However, due to its small core, complicated geometry and
other associated structures, it has become increasingly necessary to employ more
versatile methods such as Monte Carlo transport methods to accurately model the
reactor in three-dimensions (3-D), simulate particle transport behavior and estimate
reactor physics design and safety parameters. The MCNP4c and MCNP5 transport
codes were used to improve on the previously developed model [1] and simulate
criticality, kinetic and other reactor physics design parameters of the HEU reference
core as well as for UO2, U3Si2 and U-9Mo candidate cores. The codes were also
used to neutronically evaluate possible core configurations, arrangements and
enrichments of the LEU fuels in order to produce results as close to the reference
HEU as possible.
In this paper, the brief description of the GHARR-1 Monte Carlo model and the
results of the simulation and neutronic transport analysis for the HEU-LEU
conversion studies using the MCNP transport codes are presented.
http://www.rertr.anl.gov/RERTR28/PDF/S8 ... ampong.pdf
[/quote]The Ghana Research Reactor-1 (GHARR-1) is a commercial version of the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR) and has operated at different power levels since its commissioning in March 1995 [1]. The GHARR-1 facility is initially designed as a low power, pool-in-tank-type research reactor with a compact core consisting of a single fuel assembly comprising 344 U-Al (admixed in aluminum matrix) pins enriched to 90.2% [2-5]. The fuel assembly consists of ten concentric
zones or rings of 354 fuel and structural lattices distributed about a central control rod guide tube. The core is under-moderated with an H/U atom ratio of 197.
Thermal power is rated at 30kW with a corresponding peak thermal neutron flux of 1.0E+12n/cm2.s. Cold clean excess reactivity for fresh core is limited to about 4mk (1/2 βeff). Cooling is achieved by natural convection using light water. The integral reactivity worth of the control rod is about -7mk, providing a core shutdown margin 2 of -3mk of reactivity. The small HEU core has a low critical mass (<1kg). However,
it has a relatively large negative temperature coefficient of reactivity to boost its inherent safety properties [3]. The small size of the core facilitates neutron leakage and escape in both axial and radial directions. To minimize such loses and thereby conserve neutron economy, the core is heavily reflected respectively on the side and underneath the fuel cage by a thick annulus and slab of beryllium alloy material.
A schematic drawing of the cross sectional view through the reactor is shown in
Fig.1.
Fig.1: Cross section through the GHARR-1 reactor
Theoretically, the HEU-fueled GHARR-1 reactor has a designed core lifetime of ten years if it is operated at full power or its maximum flux for 2.5 hours day, five days a week. Under this condition, the HEU fuel, with a burnup of 1% [2-4], would depleted resulting in a drop in core excess reactivity to limits in the range of 2.5mk3 2.8mk. Loss of core excess reactivity due to axial neutron leakage is compensated
for by the addition of regulated beryllium shims to the top tray. In particular, when the total reactivity worth contributed by the top shims (10.95cm total thickness) is consumed, and the excess reactivity can no longer be sustained, the core would have reached its end of life (EOL). Future cycle operations will require a replacement of the spent or depleted fuel with a fresh fuel assembly. Refueling can be done with either LEU or HEU fuels.
There are external indicators which influence considerations for use of LEU fuels as likely candidate replacement core for the GHARR-1 facility and other MNSR facilities. It has been observed in recent times, an international trend in replacing HEU-fueled nuclear reactor cores and other associated facilities with LEU assemblies. International politics, nuclear safeguard protocols and non-proliferation treaties are other important issues which influence LEU considerations in nuclear
refueling. The absence of fuel fabrication facilities in some countries also heavily impacts on the choice or consideration of LEU fuel as candidates for fuel replacements.
For these and other important reasons including future cycle activities, it became
necessary to establish core conversion studies on the GHARR-1 facility in 1996.
The HEU-LEU core conversion analysis is presently been pursued jointly by the
Department of Nuclear Engineering and Materials Science in the National Nuclear
Research Institute of Ghana Atomic Energy Commission, and the RERTR Program
of the Division of Nuclear Engineering, Argonne National Laboratory. Previously,
deterministic methods have been used to perform neutronic core calculations and
analysis on GHARR-1. However, due to its small core, complicated geometry and
other associated structures, it has become increasingly necessary to employ more
versatile methods such as Monte Carlo transport methods to accurately model the
reactor in three-dimensions (3-D), simulate particle transport behavior and estimate
reactor physics design and safety parameters. The MCNP4c and MCNP5 transport
codes were used to improve on the previously developed model [1] and simulate
criticality, kinetic and other reactor physics design parameters of the HEU reference
core as well as for UO2, U3Si2 and U-9Mo candidate cores. The codes were also
used to neutronically evaluate possible core configurations, arrangements and
enrichments of the LEU fuels in order to produce results as close to the reference
HEU as possible.
In this paper, the brief description of the GHARR-1 Monte Carlo model and the
results of the simulation and neutronic transport analysis for the HEU-LEU
conversion studies using the MCNP transport codes are presented.
Actually, this is not the case at all. If it was, Israel would have no deterrence. For deterrence to work, it is necessary for the enemy to know that (a) you have *a* weapon that will get through whatever defenses they have; ;and (b) that you have the will to use it.The perception of a fully tested armament will go a long way that even deploying those weapons.
There is no doubt that India has (a). For those that insist on MT capability, please try and read and understand the 1/3 power scaling of the effect of nuclear weapons. What this means is that a 1MT bomb has an effective blast radius only 10X that of a 1kT weapon. By comparison, at 20kT weapon (1/50th the size of a 1MT weapon) has a blast radius of 1/3.
It is much more cost effective to field more 100-200kT weapons than to fewer MT level weapons. In the past, MT level weapons were designed because of poor CEP associated with delivery devices. This is not an issue any more.
The only issue up for discussion should be the number and type of weapons. Quite frankly, this is probably a discussion that doesn't need to occur in the open. And if it does occur in the open, the wide range 100-800 weapons that is typically quoted, fall well within the range of the existng military reactors to support - and if they don't, we should just build some more military reactors.
[quote="ShauryaT"][quote="williams"]
[quote]By railing against the nuclear deal, the Left was “underestimating the intrinsic strength of India, of India’s capacity to defend its national interestsâ€
[quote]By railing against the nuclear deal, the Left was “underestimating the intrinsic strength of India, of India’s capacity to defend its national interestsâ€
Last edited by svinayak on 11 Aug 2007 19:51, edited 1 time in total.
'bum count' is driven by a particular strategy - counterforce, rather then countervalue. Counterforce requires tens of thousands for nuclear war fighting rather than the hundreds that deterrence requires.enqyoob wrote:MANY countries have far greater accumulations of spent fuel (unless it is all shipped to Yucca flats, is it?) that they can shake out of the barrels and turn into bums if they so choose, and since they all have strong hi-tech industrial base for building machine tools etc., they can very quickly get ahead of India in bum-count.
The countries that desire a "breakout" card will reprocess (either at home as Japan has begun to do or at the French facility) rather than burial at the Yucca "plutonium mine".
Japan has a potential bum count in the tens of thousands. Their arsenal can dwarf China, UK and France if they choose. They are in the league of US and Russia.
Of course, all these countries that lecture India have the luxury of being at peace. Their territory is not occupied and coveted by TWO rapacious and truly malicious nuclear armed states.
So they can wait.
India probably needs a few years breathing room to accumulate enough fissile material before a moratorium. Not being under the nuclear umbrella of a superpower means building your own arsenal.
But with the deal, and the imported reactors, the "safeguarded" stockpile in India will also grow tremendously. If the international situation deteriorates to the extent that Nippon bids the IAEA sayonara, then India will surely follow.
Israel does not have to worry about country like China. Totalitarian and revisionist states need higher level of information since they are ready to sacrifice their own people in case of war.Calvin wrote:Actually, this is not the case at all. If it was, Israel would have no deterrence. For deterrence to work, it is necessary for the enemy to know that (a) you have *a* weapon that will get through whatever defenses they have; ;and (b) that you have the will to use it.The perception of a fully tested armament will go a long way that even deploying those weapons.
They also need constant reminder about your arsenal so that they are always aware.
The largest weapon the USSR fielded was the 20 MT warhead on the SS-18 mod 1.Calvin wrote:It is much more cost effective to field more 100-200kT weapons than to fewer MT level weapons. In the past, MT level weapons were designed because of poor CEP associated with delivery devices. This is not an issue any more.
That missile was single warhead. It was targeted on hardened command centers like NORAD's Cheyenne mountain complex where a combination of poor CEP and deeply buried structures required high megatonnage.
For other targets, the MIRVed SS-18 mod 3 with ten 500 kT warheads sufficed.
Modern Russian warheads are 550 kT maximum. The single warhead Topol-M is very accurate. A MIRVed version is likely to carry even smaller yield warheads.