Sorry, can't let you paint everyone with the same brush - if you don't include yourself into it.Rangudu wrote: So many what ifs but so few answers. One thing is clear, no one has changed his/her views on this thread since July 18, 2005. Every one is projecting his/her pet theories, conspiracy or otherwise in the name of discussing the nuclear deal.
Let deal fail, but India won’t trade off national interest
Seema Guha
NEW DELHI: As US and Indian officials sit down to rework the wording of a fresh waiver draft for the September meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, highly-placed sources in the government involved in the nuclear deal have categorically ruled out accepting major changes in the new document.
Taking a tough stand, New Delhi has held out the ultimate threat of walking away from the landmark agreement rather than accept strings attached to the NSG waiver. Asked how much ground can be yielded without compromising India’s national interest, sources said there was very little ground to manouevre.
“Yes, we are willing to go along with cosmetic changes, alteration in wording but nothing more. We have made this clear to all our friends,”’ a senior official said on condition of anonymity on Sunday.
He made it clear that there will be no commitment on testing beyond what has been the official position of unilateral moratorium on future nuclear tests. Yes, if the draft wants to put on record India’s commitment to non-proliferation, we have no objections as no one can question our impeccable record on that score, he added.
The official said even a periodic review by the NSG of India’s non-proliferation stand was unacceptable. “A periodic review brings with it several problems. No country will be willing to invest billions of dollars for the next fifty years or so, with a damcolese sword hanging on its head. A project may have to be stopped half way through if even one member of the NSG suddenly decides that India has not fulfilled its non-proliferation commitment. We can’t let down the country’s future by agreeing to such terms,” an official said.
Strategic analyst K Subrahmanyam, a staunch supporter of the Indo-US nuclear deal is not perturbed over the delayed decision by the NSG. “Only those who do not know how the system works believed that the waiver would be obtained in the first meeting. The important meeting is the one ahead and I am confident India will get what it is looking for,” he said.
He believes the ball is now in the US court. It is for Washington to get the language right, one acceptable to India as well as the non proliferation group within the NSG. Subrahmanyam feels that the US, Russia, France, Japan and all countries which are interested in doing multi-billion dollars worth of business with India, will go out on a limb to convince the smaller countries.
Very ironic that in the same sentence, you do state that India's nukes shall not deter China, but fail to mention that TSP's nukes have deterred India's superior conventional response capabilities.narayanan wrote:This is the cold reality of being weaker in conventional and economic might, and all the megaton bums and IRBMs in the world won't change that.
Look at the Indian response to 61 years of Pakis killing our citizens daily - and compare that to what China would have done to a neighbor who tried that for even a day. There is absolutely no deterrence, until India shows some smarts.
Interesting Gerard. Is any NSG member of the view, that the current draft does not have conditions?Gerard wrote:Once sales are not conditional, this intent is irrelevant.Prasad said even if subtle changes acceptable to all the NSG members and to India were introduced in the waiver document through “language fixing”, the non-proliferation intent would remain. “The intent is to get India to give up the testing option,” he said.
The doors could have been opened through non-NSG members first. Who knows, what the geo-political situation would be in another 5-10 years? We should not have looked at nuclear energy as the linchpin till the third stage was ready. Also, the ability to virtually double our reserves is no joke. It provides ample options.Rangudu wrote:Exactly. If some CPIM Chinese puppet had said this at least we could chalk it up to ignorance but when people like PKI say it one has to wonder who they are trying to fool.Gerard wrote: And the NSG full scope rule would magically disappear during this bilateral negotiation?
Exactly.ShauryaT wrote:The doors could have been opened through non-NSG members first. Who knows, what the geo-political situation would be in another 5-10 years? We should not have looked at nuclear energy as the linchpin till the third stage was ready. Also, the ability to virtually double our reserves is no joke. It provides ample options.
Under the draft we have seen, are sales conditional on testing, no ENR etc?ShauryaT wrote:Interesting Gerard. Is any NSG member of the view, that the current draft does not have conditions?
Here is a suggestion:RajeshA wrote:A Live Example of Unkil trying to manipulate Indian Media and Indian Media quitely acquiescing.
A small setback at NSG: Economic Times Bureau
As if the Economic Times was really in the loop, what the core restriction will be. Sacrifice of full civilian nuclear cooperation (ENR Technology) is what the haggling would be. If US can't sell additional conditions to the Indian electorate, than how about additional restrictions.But while we can well demand a “clean exemption”, and oppose conditionalities, it does makes sense to be reasonably flexible. The Indo-US nuclear deal after all does have built-in mechanisms for such practicalities.
The 123 Agreement, for example, requires further legislative changes prior to key technology transfers and the like. If in its next meet the NSG remains chary of granting India carte blanche approval on sensitive issues like trade in enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technology and equipment, a measure of flexibility on our part, without compromising our core concerns, may not be out of place.
The agreement with the NSG can leave waiver requirements for ENR technology to a later date. The immediate task at hand is to get an NSG waiver, albeit conditional, so that the nuclear deal gets legislative okay in the US Congress without further delay. The Bush administration, after all, has only a few months in office. So speed is of essence.
Also, ENR may not have operational significance in the here and now. Of course, once the nuclear deal has legal sanctity, and India resumes nuclear trade with the international community after a gap of over 34 years, the environment would be so much more conducive for greater give and take.
Economic Times is the traitor.
2. India proposes some 'cosmetic' changes to the draft of its own, such as:2d. Refraining from transferring enrichment and reprocessing technology to states that do not already possess these.
2f. Harmonizing its export control lists with those of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and [committing to - delete] adhering[ence] to current NSG guidelines
This game has been played for too long around the Indian goal area. It needs to be taken into the opposing team's goal area.2g. Continuing its unilateral voluntary moratorium on nuclear tests, and declaring its readiness to work with others towards conclusion of a multilateral, non-discriminatory, and verifiable Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.
http://www.indianexpress.com/story/352834.htmlTaking the knights
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Posted online: Monday, August 25, 2008 at 2353 hrs Print Email
India needs to show some toughness to smaller NSG nations now
The Indian Express: New Delhi need not panic, following the inconclusive discussion at the Nuclear Suppliers Group last week on exempting India from the current international rules on atomic commerce. Having taken a little longer than three years to make up its own mind on the historic civil nuclear initiative with the United States, India could not have expected that the 45 members of the NSG would simply roll over. That the NSG, set up originally in 1975 in response to India’s first nuclear test in May 1974, is being asked to redefine the rules to favour New Delhi underlines the weight of the wrenching proposition before the international community. Prolonged and bitter internal wrangling over the nuclear initiative and has made it a lot more difficult for Indian diplomacy to wrap it all up at the international level on short order.
Given these circumstances, the outcome from the first sitting of the NSG has not been entirely unproductive. It underlined some basic trends in favour of the initiative. Excepting China, the other nuclear weapon powers — Russia, France and Great Britain — have lent solid support to the Indo-US nuclear deal. So have many other major powers like Germany and Japan. By all accounts, a majority at the NSG now supports a “clean” waiver to India. On the negative side, the resistance has crystallised around a group of small states, including Austria, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland. These “White Knights” of the Western world, well known for taking ‘pure’ positions on global issues, are demanding that the NSG toughen the terms under which India might be allowed to regain access to international nuclear trade.
As the NSG reconvenes early next month, India’s first task is a bilateral one. It must ensure that the political leaderships of the blocking nations are fully aware of the costs to their relations with India that an uncompromising stance would engender. On the multilateral side, New Delhi must reaffirm that it cannot and will not accept fresh conditionalities, other than those it is already committed to. Subject to that limit, India must be prepared to address some of the genuine political unease at the NSG. What is needed over the next few days is hardball diplomacy rooted in a combination of strategic rigidity and tactical flexibility.
editor@expressindia.com
IF he made this statement prior to the first meeting or after the second one I would have respected him. Perhaps, the fact that they scheduled two meetings was part of this (dumb) strategy, and, may get him off the hook.“If this goes through, it will only be by fixing language (of the waiver document),” said A.N. Prasad, former director of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, who has been among critics of the proposed civilian nuclear deal.
“What happened yesterday was no surprise at all,” Prasad told The Telegraph. “It would have been stupid to expect that all the NSG member countries would agree to unconditional nuclear supplies (to India),” he said.
2a. Deciding to separate its civilian nuclear facilities from its strategic and military nuclear facilities in a phased manner and file a voluntary offer [declaration - delete] regarding its civilian nuclear facilities with the International Atomic Energy Agency
2b. [Conducting negotiations with the IAEA and - delete; superflous] [o]Obtaining approval of the IAEA [its] Board of Governors [regarding - delete] for a Safeguards Agreement for application of safeguards only to the civilian nuclear facilities designated by it at its sole discretion [that is in accordance with IAEA standards, principles and practices (including Board of Governors document GOV/1621) - delete; superflous; the approved IAEA Safeguards Agreement stands on its own, it does not need to be described here]
2c. Committing to sign and adhere to an Additional Protocol with respect to India's civil nuclear facilities which takes into account the existence of India's strategic and military nuclear facilities which would therefore qualify for a "national security exclusion"
India needs to concentrate more on nuclear and solar energy, for efficient energy usage and consumption, since the coal reserve of the country will be depleted within the next 45 years.
Think about this. If the deal passes, what will be the purpose of the NSG?Suppiah wrote:If the deal dies, what are the chances of NSG collapsing? .
Strange!! Just woke up I guess.Gerard wrote:Plan panel expert warns of coal shortageIndia needs to concentrate more on nuclear and solar energy, for efficient energy usage and consumption, since the coal reserve of the country will be depleted within the next 45 years.
Very ironic that in the same sentence, you do state that India's nukes shall not deter China, but fail to mention that TSP's nukes have deterred India's superior conventional response capabilities.
) but the fact is that LOOOONG before TSP acquired nuclear capabilities, India was already deterred by TSP and its powerful friends. So I don't agree that it is TSP's nuclear capabilities that have deterred India - in fact I hold the view that TSP may have nuclear "capabilities" but no weapons and no hope of getting any weapons - and STILL, India is effectively deterred. And no amount of "testing" whether of 1 KT or 100MT weapons, will change that. But China is not India.Hong Shin, the Peopre's Ribelation Almy wants you to malch ovel that lange and set up camp on top of that lidge. Ret's teach these uppity lound-eyes a resson! Test BIG nuke, eh?
The next mtg they can vote with their minds and make amends.
Narayanan, At one point you say thatnarayanan wrote:Arun, trouble is, I can't agree that the Dlagon will be detelled by 10 bums or 10,000 bums, from small incursions into Arunachal etc. Just as India need not be deterrred by China's existing nuke capabilities from pushing them out any time. In fact this precisely why there is no sense in burning up national credit by going and doing "tests" of high-yield nukes.
Both countries know that the other is not going to go to the strategic nuclear option, but neither can bet that the other won't react with battlefield nukes, especially in remote Himalayan valleys.
So conventional power and economic self-reliance, with a few tactical nukes available if things get really serious, are all that really matter there. If China tries takeovers in Arunachal and India decides to make an issue of it and throw them out, then of course China will try to use that to attack somewhere else, but if they know that there will be an Indian breakout in another place, or that the IAF will wipe out their incursion forces, then there is deterrence.
IMO, any Indian nuke test will be met with precisely a new Chinese land incursion, that stays well below the threshold for a nuclear war. And unless India has conventional power, there's not a damn thing Dilli can do about it other than to close its eyes and pretend that nothing is happening. This is the cold reality of being weaker in conventional and economic might, and all the megaton bums and IRBMs in the world won't change that.
Look at the Indian response to 61 years of Pakis killing our citizens daily - and compare that to what China would have done to a neighbor who tried that for even a day. There is absolutely no deterrence, until India shows some smarts.
BTW all will be dead and probably on Mars!"We should focus on our solar and nuclear generated source of energy since the rate at which coal and lignite is getting consumed, the nation's coal reserve will run out within the next 45 years", said Kirit Parikh, member of Planning Commission, in an interactive session on, Energy Scenario for India in 24th century, organised by the Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ICC).
sraj wrote: Otherwise, if the NSG passes a waiver with a lot of fanfare on Sept 5 which crosses Indian redlines, but is a fait accompli, what does GoI do? It may not even realize that its redlines have been crossed until much later when it finishes analyzing and debating complex, deliberately obtuse language open to several interpretations (have we learned anything from the Hyde fiasco?).
I agree this would be the most likely, but most unfortunate scenario to unfold in the days to come.NRao wrote: I feel India will get what she wants - after theatrics that rivals the Chicoms (hats off to them) Olympic opening and now the ongoing closing.
Aha Manny Sir!Manny wrote:This is interesting.
Swiss, CIA and Khan.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/25/world/25nuke.html?hp
Manny
But in Europe, there is much consternation. Analysts studying Dr. Khan’s network worry that by destroying the files to prevent their spread, the Swiss government may have obscured the investigative trail. It is unclear who among Dr. Khan’s customers — a list that is known to include Iran, Libya and North Korea but that may extend further — got the illicit material, much of it contained in easily transmitted electronic designs.
The West’s most important questions about the Khan network have been consistently deflected by President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan, who resigned last Monday. He refused to account for the bomb designs that got away or to let American investigators question Dr. Khan, perhaps the only man to know who else received the atomic blueprints. President Bush, eager for Pakistan’s aid against terrorism, never pressed Mr. Musharraf for answers.
“Maybe that labyrinth held clues to another client or another rogue state,” said a European official angered at the destruction.
The Swiss judge in charge of the Tinner case, Andreas Müller, is not terribly happy either. He said he had no warning of the planned destruction and is now trying to determine what, if anything, remains of the case against Friedrich Tinner and his sons, Urs and Marco.
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf23.htmlArun_S wrote:In the first place there was no legal compulsion in trading with these countries even before the recent Indian additional safeguard agreement w/IAEA? These countries who themselves are signatories to IAEA charter and NPT, but thanks to Dr.Homi Bhabha stature and leadership at IAEA in 1950 and 60's, the NPT & IAEA did not prevent these countries from exporting uranium to India as long as the power reactors using it was in facility specific safeguard , just like many indigenously built PHWR and the Russian Kudankulam nuclear power plant.RajeshA wrote:Perhaps one should keep in mind, there are other Uranium producing countries outside of NSG, namely
a) Namibia (7.5%)
b) Niger (7.4%)
c) Uzbekistan (5.5%)
Now that India has a Safeguards Agreement with IAEA, it should be less of a problem, importing Uranium from these countries.
Instead of throwing away our money at the NSG countries, we can invest that money
a) in R&D for enrichment, LWR Technology, etc.
b) courting Namibia, Niger and Uzbekistan big time
as well as earning money by selling our reactors and technology to all, who are willing to buy, of course with Safeguards, and so ...
How about starting by selling to that country, with which we have civilizational ties.
WE HAVE OTHER OPTIONS.
Why do "mujra" when there was nothing preventing going to the water-hole in the first place?
To add, it does seem extremely unlikely that the NSG cartel would go to such lengths to control trade in uranium and then leave such obvious loopholes for countries like India - who has always been denied - opportunity to circumvent.arnab wrote: http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf23.html
I think it is a bit more difficult then that. Niger and Namibian mines are controlled by Australian (Rio Tinto) and Canadian (Uraniumone) companies. Only Uzbekistan (Navoi) might offer some option - though I doubt it. Incidentally the Chinese Govt through Chinalco has bought a 14.99 per cent share in Rio Tinto
1. While many (not all) existing mines in these non-NSG countries are indeed controlled by French, Australian, and Canadian companies, they also have a large amount of unexploited/undeveloped uranium reserves as well as several mines owned and operated by state-owned enterprises. An Indian company has actually obtained a concession in Niger, and Union Minister Jairam Ramesh publicly announced a few months ago that GoI has contacted the highest levels of the Namibian govt to discuss supply of uranium.amit wrote:To add, it does seem extremely unlikely that the NSG cartel would go to such lengths to control trade in uranium and then leave such obvious loopholes for countries like India - who has always been denied - opportunity to circumvent.arnab wrote: http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf23.html
I think it is a bit more difficult then that. Niger and Namibian mines are controlled by Australian (Rio Tinto) and Canadian (Uraniumone) companies. Only Uzbekistan (Navoi) might offer some option - though I doubt it. Incidentally the Chinese Govt through Chinalco has bought a 14.99 per cent share in Rio Tinto
Just wondering...
Lack of Nat U is only a contrived excuse and not the real reason behind this "deal". It is the need to import "parts and equipment" which the non-NSG countries - Namibia, Niger and most probably Uzbekistan - cannot supply. That may be one of the reasons for not moving in their direction so far.sraj wrote: 1. Full scope safeguards are not a requirement if Natural Uranium is imported from non-NSG countries such as Namibia, Niger, Uzbekistan or the 100+ other countries which are not members of this 45-nation NSG cartel.
2. Enriched Uranium is not needed to feed indigenous PHWRs, thereby obviating the need for expanding enrichment capacity.
3. Capital costs of indigenous 540 MW PHWRs (Tarapur 3 & 4) at $1200/KWe see here Kakodkar's statement on Slide 14 compares favourably with all the import options.
Would anyone like to pick holes in the "non-NSG Natural Uranium + indigenous 700 MW PHWRs" option as an alternative to this unending rigmarole of the last 3 years which is fast becoming an unedifying spectacle?
Indeed it has been discussed Sraj but without any suitable conclusion.sraj wrote:2. amit: do you recall the story posted by ramana of the parrot which refuses to fly away because it is under the illusion that it is tied to its perch? why do we persist in believing that these cartels are all powerful without even making the effort to discover our own rights under international law? this subject has been discussed several times on these threads.
was also included in the first draft so that if ENR is denied to India, GoI can also argue, that India is also not making any ENR commitments to the NSG.2d. Refraining from transferring enrichment and reprocessing technology to states that do not already possess these.
Boss you're absolutely spot on. The intention will be there to delay in such a way that the 123 can't be passed by the present Congress during the Lame Duck session.Pulikeshi wrote:I don't believe either India or the US can be complacent that the second meeting will
greet them with the pipsqueaks and others coming back with changed hearts & minds.
Those intending on scuttling the deal are going to find a way to - delay the decision post next meeting.
I sure hope the US & India have a response to such tactics.
ShauryaT: You are correct - what is the role of the NSG if India is in the tent pissing out?
Boss,RajeshA wrote: It would be sensible for GoI, that in case India is being made to sacrifice on ENR, then that is a delay rather than a denial. GoIUS can agree on some date, after which ENR will automatically be allowed to India, 2 years, 3 years, or on completion of the Separation Plan in 2014 or earliear. In the mean time US Congress too could change their Laws to permit ENR, especially in view of an upcoming expiry of ENR denial to India.
It would not be desirable, if India again needs a new consensus of the whole NSG, before ENR is allowed. That will be extremely difficult to push through.
Amit,amit wrote:Boss,RajeshA wrote: It would be sensible for GoI, that in case India is being made to sacrifice on ENR, then that is a delay rather than a denial. GoIUS can agree on some date, after which ENR will automatically be allowed to India, 2 years, 3 years, or on completion of the Separation Plan in 2014 or earliear. In the mean time US Congress too could change their Laws to permit ENR, especially in view of an upcoming expiry of ENR denial to India.
It would not be desirable, if India again needs a new consensus of the whole NSG, before ENR is allowed. That will be extremely difficult to push through.
I'm not too sure that would be good play.
Once ENR is postponed, then the US will have no incentive to get it back on the table. Remember that the main worry on ENR for the US is the fact that it might place folks like Westinghouse at a disadvantage vis a vis the French and Russians as the latter might use ENR as a sweetner for a deal.
Once the playing field is made level with a postponement on a decision on ENR, then why should the US even revist the whole issue? And what's the incentive for it to change internal laws to allow it's export?
I don't think agreeing to a postponment on a decision on ENR would be good strategy on the part of India. IMHO, of course.
GoI/US can agree on some date, after which ENR will AUTOMATICALLY be allowed to India, 2 years, 3 years, or on completion of the Separation Plan in 2014 or earliear.
Very true, Philip.Philip wrote:The inferiority complex of the non-nuclear weapon states,satellites and allies of the US/NATO has been exposed in the NSG standoff.Countries like Australia especially imagine that they're the equal of India in military terms .These nations all enjoy the safety net of the western nuclear powers ,safeguarding them from any attack,yet want India to buckle down in servitude as during the colonial days .They have been bound and handcuffed by signing the treaties like the NPT/CTBT,etc. and want India similarly to join the ranks of the nuclear imprisoned.The US cannot unilaterally exempt India as it would bring down the entire non-proliferation structure.How much influence lame-duck Pres.Bush can muster is the moot question.In any case,even if the NSG go ahead,they might bring into force new rules of the game at a later date and achieve their goal.
This is the time to stand firm.Too much has already been sacrificed by India.Further compromises are meaningless.MMS can gain some sympathy and much stature by saying NO to any further conditions.AS almost every analysts has said,it is upto the US to move matters with the NSG not India.