This paper may be of interest to China watcher. The author is Hongkong based pro-China columinist.
http://www.upiasia.com/Security/2008/10 ... mies/3728/
China’s prime potential enemies
By Andrei Chang
Column: Military MightPublished: October 24, 2008TOOLBAR
Hong Kong, China —
China’s military preparedness and strategic deployment of weaponry take into consideration a whole range of potential enemies, an analysis of internal People’s Liberation Army documents has revealed.
In order of importance – that is, the likelihood of actual military engagement – those enemies are Taiwan, the United States and Japan (as potential defenders of Taiwan), India, Vietnam, Southeast Asia, Russia and NATO.
Chinese military journals consistently criticize the United States for seeking to isolate and contain China. The PLA’s indignation and frustration over this perceived U.S. interference is a reflection of its ambition to become a global hegemon, or at least a regional one.
As evidence of U.S. hostility, the military journals cite Washington’s sales of arms to Taiwan, its military alliance with Japan, its support of NATO’s eastward expansion, the stationing of a permanent force in Afghanistan, the expansion of its nuclear arsenal and its influence in restricting European arms sales to China. The journals claim that these U.S. actions all pose a direct or indirect threat to China’s national security.
As for Japan, despite warmer political relations between the two countries in recent months, there are two prickly issues that will not be easily resolved. One is the territorial fight over the Diaoyutai Islands – which Japan calls the Senkakus – and the other is the dispute over the exact location of the border in the East China Sea, in the midst of rich oil and gas reserves that both sides claim.
For now the two sides are working together to develop these resources, but the lack of a legally defined border makes the situation unpredictable. Also, China remains highly wary of any Japanese steps to strengthen its military.
On the Indian front, mistrust between the two countries has become more heated. New Delhi is wary of China’s increased deployment of ballistic missiles aimed at India, the activities of the Chinese navy in the Indian Ocean, and China’s intentions with regard to territorial disputes.
On the other hand, China is also keeping an eye on India’s active development of its Flame III intermediate-range ballistic missile, the activities of the Indian navy in the South China Sea, and India’s constantly changing attitude with regard to border disputes.
Differences between China and Vietnam focus on disputed maritime territories. At the same time, China is watching closely Vietnam’s rapprochement to India and the United States.
As for ASEAN countries, they too have disputes with China over territories at sea. China thinks it will eventually recapture the Nansha Islands – better known as the Spratlys – located between Vietnam and the Philippines and claimed by both, as well as by China. The area is a rich fishing ground and may also contain oil and gas. There may one day be a struggle over ownership of these islands.
In the midst of these disputes, since the mid-1990s Chinese military strategists have focused on one key issue – the economic, political and national security benefits of expanding the military and centralizing all forces to “solve the Taiwan issue.” Their position was that after Taiwan was reunited with the mainland, there would be additional economic benefits and national security gains resulting from the military build-up.
One argument held that the South China Sea disputes could be easily resolved when the time was right. Toward that end, there was a need to develop major maritime combat platforms, including an aircraft carrier.
As far as Russia is concerned, China is concerned about the resurgence of extreme nationalism within Russia, which could lead to territorial demands on China.
China is also constantly worried about NATO’s eastward expansion. The existence of NATO forces in neighboring countries would undermine its border security.
Against this background of regional tensions, improved relations across the Taiwan Strait are not reason enough for the PLA to relax its level of preparedness. All of the issues outlined above have frequently been discussed in numerous military and diplomatic documents over the past 10 years.
China’s development and deployment of military equipment corresponds to all the conflict scenarios it foresees. First, priority attention has been placed on the development of combat equipment related to the air force, navy and landing operations, all of which are directed at Taiwan.
Second, in response to possible intervention by U.S. forces, China has actively developed and deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles, intermediate-range ballistic missiles, anti-satellite weapons, space warfare capabilities, and ballistic-missile and attack submarines.
Third, to cope with frontlines in Vietnam and India, China has developed mountain warfare armored vehicles and medium- and short-range ballistic missiles. An upgraded IRBM is now deployed in Yunnan province, which borders Vietnam.
Fourth, in the direction of Japan, the PLA has deployed DF-3A IRBMs in coastal Shandong province and reinforced the combat capabilities of its No.19 Division based in that region.
Fifth, with an eye to Southeast Asia and India, a large submarine base has been established on Hainan Island and electronic surveillance stations set up on the Xisha Islands in the South China Sea at China’s southern tip.
Sixth, in response to the presence of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, China has sped up the deployment of HQ-9 long-range ground-to-air missiles in major metropolitan centers and strengthened its No. 6 Fighter Division in the Lanzhou Military Region of central China. In the direction of Russia, China is now actively developing and upgrading new main battle tanks and armored vehicles.
Given the need to cover all the scenarios described above, it is likely that China’s military spending will continue to rise, with the 2009 military budget reflecting at least a 10 percent increase over this year.
Some equipment intended for combat operations against Taiwan will be replaced, and there will be some adjustments in the deployment of this equipment. The pressure to maintain a vigilant “military deterrence” against Taiwan is expected to continue.
It is worth noting, however, that with the warming of cross-strait relations and the balance of military power in the Taiwan Strait already tilted in China’s favor, the PLA will likely focus its military build-up in other directions, particularly in the upgrading of long-range military projection capability.
Close attention should be paid to China’s building of a new aircraft carrier fleet, its development and deployment of more ICBMs, SSBNs, new bombers and new-generation fighters. The Chinese military industry will also take this opportunity to put greater effort and expenditure into upgrading and expanding its research for the development of new weapons systems.
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(Andrei Chang is editor-in-chief of Kanwa Defense Review Monthly, registered in Toronto, Canada.)
. Can you compare them similarly? 
