Indian Missile Technology Discussion

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 03 Feb 2009 21:33

When the production run is limited the vehicles are groomed and not like factory production. Its when the cross 100 that they can be deemed factory made for then you have production flow.

I dont think India has the luxury of different packages for different delivery modes.

H.B.Krishna · Post by **H.B.Krishna** » 04 Feb 2009 01:08

If one is to believe in 1:1 cardinality between Wagon and A-2 missiles, then people in and around C V Raman Nagar / BEML Gate would know there are atleast 22 specimens per year

Ofcourse based on assumption that each new Wagon is for new missile onlee

Arun_S · Post by **Arun_S** » 04 Feb 2009 01:53

Sanjay wrote:Development vs operational tests is an artificial concept especially in the Indian context. There is no reason the two can't be combined. One of the reasons the Prithvi was tested so often was because of the intention to fully integrate it as an artillery weapon. As I re-iterate, there is no need to test beyond 3 times to declare a system operational. What needs to be done subsequently is batch testing every few years. To that end, I would view Agni-1 and Agni-2 operational, but not Agni-3. The reference: Karnad, India's Nuclear Policy: Praeger Security International 2008, @ page 83.

Regarding Prithvi tests what U say is correct but another important factor in requiring larger number of tests is that Prithvi does not fly ballistic trajectory. Being the first DRDO missile to get off the board, low cost and not optimized for ISP/mass fraction, the design path implicitly chose to use gliding capability to stretch the range. That rubbed against the relatively simple navigation system those days. These 2 factors have impact on range and accuracy and all iterative improvement required additional tests. eventually culminating in Prithvi for runway denial role (of course the cost of missile was not as bad as Agni, but the cost of logistics etc is not small either).

Sanjay · Post by **Sanjay** » 04 Feb 2009 04:45

Arun your comments are 100% correct. All sorts of warheads were tested etc. BTW Prithvi is not a "precision strike" weapon at all. It is accurate - not precise. The range/ warhead variety and dual nature of Prithvi make it a viable and useful system. The Smerch/Prithvi complement each other but each one can do things the other can't.

Lets get back to the Agni: again operationalised means army personnel are trained to use it and can deploy and use it if necessary. That has been achieved. What has not been achieved is the numerical strength desired.

Now regarding BDL - I'd asked the question back in 2003-2004 during the stint with Force and got the answer that the production was handed over to BDL. The IOC of Agni-1 was achieved in 2003 with the 8 pre-production missiles that DRDO had produced. At the time I was under the impression that Agni-2 was under BDL production. I believe - only an opinion mind you - that the numbers of Agni-2 produced are somewhat higher than 12-18 but only that number are operational with the missile group.

H.B. Krishna - you sure those are launcher/deflector cars ? If 22 produced then that is very feasible and it is then feasible that 22 Agni-2 are operational. And 22 per year - possible and delightful and would go to the fact that Agni production was stepped up some couple years back. You're not teasing us ?

One thing - know that I tend to be very conservative with warhead numbers and missile numbers and numbers could be higher but unlikely to be lower.

Regarding that comment about 9m at 330km - very possible and in line with what was being sought.

What is becoming clear is a growing frustration with the lack of clarity regarding the Indian deterrent posture. That is different from saying nothing is being done or India is "behind" etc. It would be in everyone's interest that some information on quantities and deployments of delivery systems is done.

What is very interesting about Karnad's work is the assertion - borne out by circumstantial independent evidence - that fissile material production was stepped up using the Candu reactors and that the target is 200 warheads by 2010 and that the reprocessing facilities to achieve the same is in place. Moreover, the assertion that Agni production is being targetted to surpass Pakistan's missile production is heartening as is the work to develop a range of missile warheads - ones for the Agni and Prithvi family being achieved already. What we all want to know is what has been achieved on the programs and what more is being done.

somnath · Post by **somnath** » 04 Feb 2009 06:53

How relevant is the "runway denial" role for the Prithvi? Costs apart, the Pakis would construe any incoming Prithvi as a nuke strike and launch their own - even if they could somehow figure out that the Prithvi is targeted towards the Sargodha air base and not the neighbouring residential areas!

The whole point behind a nuclear deterrence is "known deterrence" - the enemy knows what you are capable of. The kind of amorphous, diffused structure that worked pre 1998 is a serious liability now that we are a declared nuke weapons state.

That is where the question of "enough" missiles come in.

Sanjay, any sources on the Agni production moving to BDL?

On Prthvi again, a lot of "friends of uncles and their relatives" -type sources (!) indicate that the IA at least treats it as a training platform for missile crews, not as a full fledged operational or deterrence platform - that much has been indicated repeatedly in the media coverage over the last 10-15 years.

What was really surprising in BK's book though was the allusion to the IN having a surface vessel launched nuke capability. While he did not give out specifics, seems like there are ships (maybe the Sukanya class) that are equipped with nuke tipped missiles...Thats a whole new paradigm isnt it? Ships carrying nuclear warheads would become targets themselves in a first strike...

Sanjay · Post by **Sanjay** » 04 Feb 2009 07:30

Somnath, I can't put my hands on any precise ones now but it was dealt with in Force (2003-2004) sometime and subsequently it has been mentioned in subsequent missile tests as well as in an article - TOI I think - which spoke of India enhancing missile production capability and tangentially refers to the Agni. But the missile is in BDL hands. DRDO doesn't have that kind of production capacity. Furthermore, the raisings of the missile group are at Secunderbad - near the BDL complex. Finally there is a 2005 Indian Express report which mentions the same when discussing the firing of the head of BDL.

Prithvi could be very useful. It's there, it has warheads, it can be used. Again though there was a lot of thought put into the use of the Prithvi, but I don't know what was decided. You do not acquire 200 of the things to train with.

Finally, it is not amorphous deterrence to those in the know. But what frightens me is the lack of questions being asked in the media - not rants about Pakistan being ahead and all Indian missiles are failures - about the state of the deterrent, what is the likely composition etc. The last time there was anything approaching that was an India Today article back in January 2003 or so which cited Agni numbers as 20 or some such (could be true). Again, where is the media asking questions of the SFC and the MoD and the missile scientists ? The questions aren't being asked and information not being volunteered.

Some of this is a deeper Indian mindset. Think about it - we have 1 photograph of a Marut with its belly rocket-pack on display - it took until 1991 to learn via a book (Touching the Sky) that the OSA-AKM, AT-6 and Kh-25MP were in IAF service and a two line blurb in Rediff during a slideshow of the R-day parade in 2007 that TISAS had actually been fitted to the T-72s and BMPs.

What I am getting at is unless direct and persistent questions are asked, the entire Indian security establishment does not volunteer anything at all.

somnath · Post by **somnath** » 04 Feb 2009 08:13

Sanjay,

Completely agree with you on the Indian security midset. Unfortunately, it doesnt work when you are dealing with nukes though. As many people point out, the deterrence value of nukes is gone the first time you use it! So the enemy must know what your capabilities are, so that he is sufficiently "deterred"..that is why there was so much information in the official and semi official media about US and Soviet nuke capabilities - numbers, delivery platforms, even operational doctrines! The idea was that the other guy knows sufficently well that you have the capability for a debilitating second strike.

It becomes all the more important for us while confronting Pakistan, which is not a "normal" state or society. Our current amorphous posture can well give wet dreams to some crazy lunatic there to pull off a first strike in a tense stand off scenario. Once that is done, we would be at a point of no return..

The media is too uneducated to ask the right questions - "Pakistan ahead of India is missiles" makes for a "better" heaedline! The big frightening aspect that came out of reading BK was the fact that SFC is still being staffed by generalists! People go back to their parent cadres, with absolutely no possibility of fool proof "tracking" post their tenures at SFC...

Kanson · Post by **Kanson** » 04 Feb 2009 23:10

H.B.Krishna wrote:If one is to believe in 1:1 cardinality between Wagon and A-2 missiles, then people in and around C V Raman Nagar / BEML Gate would know there are atleast 22 specimens per year
Ofcourse based on assumption that each new Wagon is for new missile onlee

That is only half of the story. Agni is road and rail mobile, isnt it?

Kanson · Post by **Kanson** » 04 Feb 2009 23:18

somnath wrote:How relevant is the "runway denial" role for the Prithvi? Costs apart, the Pakis would construe any incoming Prithvi as a nuke strike and launch their own - even if they could somehow figure out that the Prithvi is targeted towards the Sargodha air base and not the neighbouring residential areas!

The whole point behind a nuclear deterrence is "known deterrence" - the enemy knows what you are capable of. The kind of amorphous, diffused structure that worked pre 1998 is a serious liability now that we are a declared nuke weapons state.

That is where the question of "enough" missiles come in.

Sanjay, any sources on the Agni production moving to BDL?

On Prthvi again, a lot of "friends of uncles and their relatives" -type sources (!) indicate that the IA at least treats it as a training platform for missile crews, not as a full fledged operational or deterrence platform - that much has been indicated repeatedly in the media coverage over the last 10-15 years.

What was really surprising in BK's book though was the allusion to the IN having a surface vessel launched nuke capability. While he did not give out specifics, seems like there are ships (maybe the Sukanya class) that are equipped with nuke tipped missiles...Thats a whole new paradigm isnt it? Ships carrying nuclear warheads would become targets themselves in a first strike...

Nothing substantial...couldnt get the glance out on seeing this.

first of all, before indentifying the direction, do the Pak have the capability to id the incoming missile as Prithvi or something else ? That should be the first question.
Second, why to do first stike on ship, if the ship could be destroyed by other simpler means like AShm & torpedoes.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 04 Feb 2009 23:42

Some of the foremost doctrine thinkers in India are naval officers- KK Nayyar and Raja Menon to mention a few who are retired. They have thought about this.

BTW, In Op Parakram one of the first things that India did was move that ship(s) to the Arabian Sea. Even before the Army was mustered.

sam_kamath · Post by **sam_kamath** » 05 Feb 2009 00:17

I am just curious.. but can any one please tell me approximately how many prithvis would have to be launched to be sure we have completely neutralized sargodha
I am assuming only conventional warheads.

H.B.Krishna · Post by **H.B.Krishna** » 05 Feb 2009 00:46

Kanson wrote:
H.B.Krishna wrote:If one is to believe in 1:1 cardinality between Wagon and A-2 missiles, then people in and around C V Raman Nagar / BEML Gate would know there are atleast 22 specimens per year
Of course based on assumption that each new Wagon is for new missile onlee
That is only half of the story. Agni is road and rail mobile, isnt it?

I am getting

I am no expert and have no insider info...I am not even sure if those wagons were for A-1 or A-2. Some guru who have been in and around BEML for last 4 or so years may be able to explain....So please consider my above post at DDM quality levels or below

And my apologies for that

sudeepj · Post by **sudeepj** » 05 Feb 2009 01:05

somnath wrote:How relevant is the "runway denial" role for the Prithvi? Costs apart, the Pakis would construe any incoming Prithvi as a nuke strike and launch their own - even if they could somehow figure out that the Prithvi is targeted towards the Sargodha air base and not the neighbouring residential areas!

I am not sure that such a 'hair trigger' nuclear alert has ever been deployed in the Sub continent. Leaving that apart, this 'hair trigger' alert is simply propaganda put out by Pakistani and Chinkil operatives. Its in their interest for the Indian people in general, and decision/opinion makers in particular to think that 'if India so much as dares to look in our direction without doing a salaam, we will nuke India'. For this scenario to come to pass, think of the steps that must happen in two cases, launch authority is with the Generals or its delegated further down the chain of command. Also note that such a posture stems from fear and a lack of capabilities, not from strength.

If launch authority is with the Generals, the Pakistani ADGES must detect a massive coordinated counter force missile strike moving their way. Only in this case can they justify (to themselves) a loose it or use it scenario.

If launch authority is delegated to (say) colonels and brigadiers in charge of individual missile units, they must receive an alert from the Pakistani ADGES that a missile strike on their unit is on the way. In this case, the colonel can justify a loose it or use it case, but he must balance it with the cost of him being wrong and setting in motion a chain of events that would surely end with the complete and utter destruction of the Pakistani nation state and the Islamism project. Hence, even in this case, unless the colonel is a takfiri type, a loose it or use it scenario does not materialize.

Hence, as long as India does not do massed missile strikes, and leaves the Pakistani ADGES intact, there is no danger from the Pakistanis of nuclear escalation. In fact, you could launch a Prithvi every 2 hours with a run way denial warhead, and you would still not cross any nuke thresholds.

The whole point behind a nuclear deterrence is "known deterrence" - the enemy knows what you are capable of. The kind of amorphous, diffused structure that worked pre 1998 is a serious liability now that we are a declared nuke weapons state.

The enemy certainly knows what we are capable of, but the Indian public and the opinion makers do not, and hence fall for Pakistani and Chinkil propaganda. In my opinion, apart from a brief period during the Kargil war, Indians have been loosing the propaganda war being waged on their own public using Indian airwaves. You can be Hanuman reincarnate, but if you dont know your own power, its of no use.

somnath · Post by **somnath** » 05 Feb 2009 07:27

Sudeepj,

Its not a question of a solitary Prithvi..A one shot will probably not "escalate", but then a one Prthvi round means pretty much nothing in a tactical scenario for us either.

the fact is that when we are talking about actually "using" Prithvis, it would be preceded by some sort of a "stand off"..So the Pak nuke infrastructure would already be "geared". and when the shooting actually starts, by the time we start firing our second or third Prithvis, they would pretty much have their weapons "mated" to the selivery platforms, and ready on truly "hair trigger" alert..In such a scenario any incoming ballistic missile detected can be construed as a preemptive nuke attack..

The question is really of cost benefit..For any of the stated purposes (runway denial etc), what are the relative benefits of Prithvi vis a vis aircraft delivered bombs, MBRL shots etc, versus the costs, both monetary and tactical..

and the question of "public" v/s adversary knowledge is moot..A lot of intel analysis done is gleaned from public soures, as "classified" sources of intel have always ranges of probabilities attached...So if somehow the public info about our posture is completely amorphous, the adversary is not going to assume a greater "punch" simply on account of classified intel..Its a bit different from conventional equipment, where there is amerit in keeping things as a "surprise" for the enemy. In nukes, the doctrine is to make everything clear - or at least, in case you have the "power", make that clear to the enemy. An amorphous posture is for a state that has diffused capabilities, and thus simply wants to create enough "confusion" in the minds of the adversary..

Ramana, IN was mobilised during Ops Parakram, but wasnt aware that a nuke armed platform was too..Any sources?

Kanson, my mistake..what I meant was that the ships carrying nukes would be the first "targets" for an enemy attack (not necesarily nuclear) in case war breaks out..I dont think any other country has a ship borne nuke platform anymore...But I may be wrong, or India would have devised something unique!

Sanku · Post by **Sanku** » 05 Feb 2009 11:22

Thats why we have NFU doctrine and then screamed publicly about it na.....

In such scenario if we assume that Pakis will assume that a Ballistic missile salvo, assumed to be Prthivi and not Smerch or other long range rocket will be nuclear and will trigger hair fall -- we can also safely assume that Paki's will assume that jag doing DSPA is actually dropping a cluster bomb where each submution is a tactical nuke continuing Pak will assume this in this assumed scenario we can also get to an assumption that a chidia flying across the border may be carrying tough to detect once launched nuclear capable Brahmos and in hair trigger situation Paki's will any way punch that button as their first and foremost act.

But I would not be surprised if this sort of thinking is actually more prevalent in Babudom -- discuss disscuss discuss think about it and give up because hey there might be a scenario where CAG can actually raise an objection and OMG actually write a strong note on the file -- forget the nukes -- think of a more scary scenario -- what if CAG actually said IA was a dumbo because cluster mutions would have costed less than a Prthivi and hence a two ship formation of Jags without any air support and with 100% payload for ground strike (to maximize ROI onlee) should have been sent

The horror the horror

sudeepj · Post by **sudeepj** » 05 Feb 2009 12:11

somnath wrote:Sudeepj,

Its not a question of a solitary Prithvi..A one shot will probably not "escalate", but then a one Prthvi round means pretty much nothing in a tactical scenario for us either.

In a runway denial mode, it does mean something. Same with targeting hardened shelters.

the fact is that when we are talking about actually "using" Prithvis, it would be preceded by some sort of a "stand off"..So the Pak nuke infrastructure would already be "geared". and when the shooting actually starts, by the time we start firing our second or third Prithvis, they would pretty much have their weapons "mated" to the selivery platforms, and ready on truly "hair trigger" alert..In such a scenario any incoming ballistic missile detected can be construed as a preemptive nuke attack..

OK. Put yourself in a Pakistani Generals shoes, you have mated nuke payloads to missiles and your ADGEs calls in with a 90 second warning about a salvo of four missiles heading towards Sargodha. What would you do?

The question is really of cost benefit..For any of the stated purposes (runway denial etc), what are the relative benefits of Prithvi vis a vis aircraft delivered bombs, MBRL shots etc, versus the costs, both monetary and tactical..

If you want aircraft to deliver your weapons, you have to do some SEAD missions first. More costly in terms of risk to pilots and machines. Apart from that, you dont want the Pakistanis blind, you want them to see that what is coming towards them is a rapier, not a sledgehammer.

and the question of "public" v/s adversary knowledge is moot..A lot of intel analysis done is gleaned from public soures, as "classified" sources of intel have always ranges of probabilities attached...So if somehow the public info about our posture is completely amorphous, the adversary is not going to assume a greater "punch" simply on account of classified intel..I

Huh.. This argument is beyond silly.. Armys don't base doctrine on opeds. Besides, our posture is not completely amorphous, if it was the case, there would not be missions from the US warning Pakistan of annihilation if it initiated full scale war with India. They know what we can do. Their propaganda about it is something different.

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 05 Feb 2009 12:19

somnath wrote:Sanjay,
The media is too uneducated to ask the right questions - "Pakistan ahead of India is missiles" makes for a "better" heaedline! The big frightening aspect that came out of reading BK was the fact that SFC is still being staffed by generalists! People go back to their parent cadres, with absolutely no possibility of fool proof "tracking" post their tenures at SFC...

What is the significance of this

somnath · Post by **somnath** » 05 Feb 2009 12:47

Acharya wrote:
somnath wrote:Sanjay,
The media is too uneducated to ask the right questions - "Pakistan ahead of India is missiles" makes for a "better" heaedline! The big frightening aspect that came out of reading BK was the fact that SFC is still being staffed by generalists! People go back to their parent cadres, with absolutely no possibility of fool proof "tracking" post their tenures at SFC...
What is the significance of this

Two things. One, because of the highly technical nature of handling nuclear weapons, as well as specific psychographic, "general awareness" and technical profiles of the people required to man them, it makes sense to create a dedicated of cadre of people for handling nukes. Second, personnel from a dedicated team can be "retained" and "tracked" throughout their lifetimes, even after retirement. This is necessary purely from a security perspective. A generalist cadre, on the other hand, means that people revert to their parent organisations and it becoems doubly tough to keep a "track" of them, either in serviec or after...

Sudeepj, please read some of the excellent accounts of how the US and SU "played" the MAD game during the Cold War. There were specific facilities, sites, bases etc that were made visible to each other - many times electronically - just to convey their respective capacities as well as intent to each other. Its not about doctrines based on opeds. All intel analysis is based on a mix of publicly available information and "classified" ones. Especially strategic analysis of the type that we are talking of for nucolear postures. One of the biggest criticism of the CIA in its failure to detect PokII was the fact that it was there in BJP's election manifesto..If our publicly available data consistently throws up diffused, amorphous and "degraded" versions of our true capability, the analysis of our adversaries would not be as "deteerred" as our true capabilities would like them to be!

about the Prithvi question, I wont venture to comment more, in absence of any more data than what has been discussed already. I guess both POVs can be equally right!

kit · Post by **kit** » 05 Feb 2009 13:11

A big FAE delivered by a prithvi would look almost like a nuclear blast .. would the half numbed pig bother to think whether it is a nuke or not before launching all his weapons ?

Sanjay · Post by **Sanjay** » 05 Feb 2009 21:57

H.B. Krishna, did or do you know that 22 launchers for some type of Agni missile have been produced or are being produced per year or have seen or heard such a report ?

Sanku · Post by **Sanku** » 05 Feb 2009 22:17

I know from personal exp that IA/IAF/IN do a great job of tracking talent -- even specialist in obscure hydralauic systems have been "called up" from retirements in real boondocks if the need arises.

I dont think we need to worry about the straw man of "tracking specialists" for SFC to need specialists!!!

Arun_S · Post by **Arun_S** » 05 Feb 2009 22:18

kit wrote:A big FAE delivered by a prithvi would look almost like a nuclear blast .. would the half numbed pig bother to think whether it is a nuke or not before launching all his weapons ?

O yes, just like a .303 rifle would look almost like a bofors gun.

Max yield of Prithvi carried FAE ~2.5 tonne, typical yld of tactical sub-Kt bum ~ 200 tonne, onleee off by 2 order of magnitude.

Sanku · Post by **Sanku** » 05 Feb 2009 23:10

Arun_S wrote:
kit wrote:A big FAE delivered by a prithvi would look almost like a nuclear blast .. would the half numbed pig bother to think whether it is a nuke or not before launching all his weapons ?
O yes, just like a .303 rifle would look almost like a bofors gun.
Max yield of Prithvi carried FAE ~2.5 tonne, typical yld of tactical sub-Kt bum ~ 200 tonne, onleee off by 2 order of magnitude.

I actually spent 20 mins thinking how to reply to that post -- there is a reason some Guru's are Guru's I guess.

H.B.Krishna · Post by **H.B.Krishna** » 06 Feb 2009 01:50

Sanjay wrote:H.B. Krishna, did or do you know that 22 launchers for some type of Agni missile have been produced or are being produced per year or have seen or heard such a report ?

I have seen wagons of (At least look like) Agni 1 / Agni 2 near BEML gate lined up for transportation. I used to keep a tab on those and counted 22. And I reiterate...I am a newbie ...To me they looked very similar to the wagon used for Agni 2 test launch (From snaps in public domain). I would be happy our Gurus can corroborate...

Gerard · Post by **Gerard** » 06 Feb 2009 02:01

The video of the Agni rail mobility tests showed a covered wagon

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 06 Feb 2009 02:06

Arun, Have you put all the info from the recent Brahmos trial together and made any conclusions?

Thanks, ramana

-------------
This is what I make out of the myriad news reports on the recent Brahmos test. On 20th Jan., 2009 DRDO tested a Brahmos missile taken from Army inventory. The missile was of Block I model upgraded to Block II via software. The software upgrade provides the seeker (SCAN) better discrimination in order to hit pinpoint targets. The software upgrade was earlier proofed in high speed aircraft trials prior to the test. In the test, the missile failed to hit its target and was initially estimated to be off by a few meters and was eventually found to be off by one km. The target itself was a wall 12m high with metal reflectors in a gorge twice that high. High speed manouvers at the terminal were observed. A review of test data showed that the seeker did not acquire the GPS signals and could have been led astray. The reports speak of quick identification of the error and are confident of a fix. A repeat test is expected on Feb 20th. A real fix would be to include an IMU/RLG in BlockIIA to avoid GPS blinks in future.
-----------
The SCAN seeker seems to be develped by LRDE and is GPS reciever with an electro-optical seeker and link to give feedback of what was hit. So it wasn't the el-op seeker that didnt work but the GPS receiver lost track and led to overshoot.

Arun_S · Post by **Arun_S** » 06 Feb 2009 11:08

ramana wrote:Arun, Have you put all the info from the recent Brahmos trial together and made any conclusions?

Thanks, ramana

-------------
This is what I make out of the myriad news reports on the recent Brahmos test. On 20th Jan., 2009 DRDO tested a Brahmos missile taken from Army inventory. The missile was of Block I model upgraded to Block II via software. The software upgrade provides the seeker (SCAN) better discrimination in order to hit pinpoint targets. The software upgrade was earlier proofed in high speed aircraft trials prior to the test. In the test, the missile failed to hit its target and was initially estimated to be off by a few meters and was eventually found to be off by one km. The target itself was a wall 12m high with metal reflectors in a gorge twice that high. High speed manouvers at the terminal were observed. A review of test data showed that the seeker did not acquire the GPS signals and could have been led astray. The reports speak of quick identification of the error and are confident of a fix. A repeat test is expected on Feb 20th. A real fix would be to include an IMU/RLG in BlockIIA to avoid GPS blinks in future.
-----------
The SCAN seeker seems to be develped by LRDE and is GPS receiver with an electro-optical seeker and link to give feedback of what was hit. So it wants the el-op seeker that didnt work but the GPS receiver lost track and led to overshoot.

You spoke what was in my mind.

The trajectory & selection of target that was 12 meter tall and recessed (hiding) in 24 m deep gorge speaks for the role of the missile; viz taking out the limited Pakistani stratajik (sic) warheads and all dummy warheads that have now been relocated out of FATA & Balauchistan to Paki-punjab and Sindh's dry 'beehad' (ravine) area. {Northern Areas due to remoteness and closeness to Swat and FATA forced relocation fo the nuke dummies much earlier}. So Indian army can now take out the residual stratejik assets in a large BrahMos swoop.

The unkill doing a selective zonal disabling of GPS feed is surely an eye opener for MoD, IA and DRDO. While IRNESS will take many years to be operations much before the forthcoming a war to disarm Bakistan, India has no choice but to use more expensive IMU/RLG based INS to take teh vehicle to a point where the terminal seekers will reliably take over without requiring any external navigation aids. This is the time to break free and announce launch of military (nav and C&C mission) satellites by ISRO.

The BrahMos Block II is clearly a weapon made to weed out paki nukes and its C&C nodes.

VikramS · Post by **VikramS** » 06 Feb 2009 11:19

^^^
The miss by 1 Km is perhaps not accurate in describing the complete picture. It is likely that the missile missed by significantly less in the vertical plane, though the actual ground impact point of the missile was a Km away; the terminal trajectory is close to horizontal and Mach 3, even a miss by a few meters may lead to a ground impact a Km away. Even without the GPS based correction, the preprogrammed flight path is unlikely to lead to a miss by a Km.

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 06 Feb 2009 11:20

A salvo of 100 Bramos BlockII from all angles should be enough to paralyze the C&C

p_saggu · Post by **p_saggu** » 06 Feb 2009 11:55

In the test, the missile failed to hit its target and was initially estimated to be off by a few meters and was eventually found to be off by one km.

Don't they test missiles like these under UAV Cover with live video feed? How do the people at the launch site monitoring the whole thing see the missile on its way?
If they're not doing it they had better.

kit · Post by **kit** » 06 Feb 2009 14:01

Arun_S wrote:
kit wrote:A big FAE delivered by a prithvi would look almost like a nuclear blast .. would the half numbed pig bother to think whether it is a nuke or not before launching all his weapons ?
O yes, just like a .303 rifle would look almost like a bofors gun.
Max yield of Prithvi carried FAE ~2.5 tonne, typical yld of tactical sub-Kt bum ~ 200 tonne, onleee off by 2 order of magnitude.

I actually spent 20 mins thinking how to reply to that post -- there is a reason some Guru's are Guru's I guess.

yup it does ! one cannot be a guru for everything anyway, for then he wouldn't be one would he

Sanjay · Post by **Sanjay** » 06 Feb 2009 16:33

H.B. Krishna, the Agni wagons have an elevating mechanism. Did you notice that ?

Sanku · Post by **Sanku** » 06 Feb 2009 16:46

I dont think a UAV feed can detect a miss of a few meters in vertical plane leading to a large horizontal miss. Which is what seems to have happened here.

I dont see the need for a UAV on test area; the other telemetry already available is more accurate if its accuracy we are looking for; otherwise plain old eyeballing is ok.

The "failure" hype is media --> what can you do for it.

ajay_ijn · Post by **ajay_ijn** » 06 Feb 2009 17:24

p_saggu wrote:
In the test, the missile failed to hit its target and was initially estimated to be off by a few meters and was eventually found to be off by one km.
How do the people at the launch site monitoring the whole thing see the missile on its way?

I thought they use Radars or some transmitters on missile to indicate its position.

pkudva · Post by **pkudva** » 06 Feb 2009 17:29

Sanku wrote:I dont think a UAV feed can detect a miss of a few meters in vertical plane leading to a large horizontal miss. Which is what seems to have happened here.

I dont see the need for a UAV on test area; the other telemetry already available is more accurate if its accuracy we are looking for; otherwise plain old eyeballing is ok.

The "failure" hype is media --> what can you do for it.

I fully agree,media creates all these news.
As for the video i am sure cameras will be mounted in the target places as well as the target itself.Secondly it will be monitored through the sattelites (I am sure they do it). Thirdly they will be monitored through the flight trajectory and compare it with the pre planned testing trajectory.

Neela · Post by **Neela** » 06 Feb 2009 19:19

Snippets on Agni, Prithvi and Pinaka .

http://www.drdo.com/pub/nl/2009/jan09.pdf

sunilUpa · Post by **sunilUpa** » 06 Feb 2009 20:08

Neela wrote:Snippets on Agni, Prithvi and Pinaka .

http://www.drdo.com/pub/nl/2009/jan09.pdf

Humm the Dec 18th Test of Naval Brahmos was successfull in all repects. Interesting to read that it has Sea-Land capability..(Unlike what DDM was projecting just a while back - Naval Brahmos is Anti-Ship only

)

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 06 Feb 2009 23:04

Sanku wrote:I dont think a UAV feed can detect a miss of a few meters in vertical plane leading to a large horizontal miss. Which is what seems to have happened here.

I dont see the need for a UAV on test area; the other telemetry already available is more accurate if its accuracy we are looking for; otherwise plain old eyeballing is ok.

The "failure" hype is media --> what can you do for it.

Sanku, If you go thru all the post flight news reports there are 'unnamed' sources in the Army who were venting their frustration. Must be catalog engineers who dont understand the product that the DRDO was providing in the Block II upgrade. Must have gone to the Arjun acceptance school.

I think the solution will be an integrated RLG+GPS reciever to fit inthe same foot print.

It might not be malafide. The car gps blinks in mountains and areas with high buildings. The 24m deep gorge might have blinked the GPS.

The key is to have prime navigation based on INS and GPS for updates to correct errors. The whole time of flight was ~ 37 secs and over <40Km. How much error can you build up in an INS!

H.B.Krishna · Post by **H.B.Krishna** » 06 Feb 2009 23:39

Gerard wrote:The video of the Agni rail mobility tests showed a covered wagon

Sanjay wrote:H.B. Krishna, the Agni wagons have an elevating mechanism. Did you notice that ?

But those didn't have a cover, and hoist mechanisms. They did sport that deep belly -___- , characteristics of Agni wagons ?? (For hoist mechanisms and Missile storage)

Sanjay · Post by **Sanjay** » 07 Feb 2009 01:39

H.B. Krishna - please describe what you're talking about: were these anything other than simple transport wagons ? Did they seem to have any facility for elevating or storing a missile ?