Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

[aditp]

How is the Arjun disruptive? What exactly does it disrupt?

Not in the classical sense, but in a relative sense ....quite disruptive. Both IA and PA use tank forces, based on russian designs (visa chinese copies / ukraine in case of PA). As such, tanks on both the sides are based on hit avoidance design philosophy, making them death traps. A shift from the Tin series to the Arjun (designed on the survivability philosophy) can literally be a mini RMA for the IA, and disruptive for the PA.

[kvraghav]

Hi Sanku,
What i asked was,do you have a copy of QR 326 formaulated for Arjun MBT or any type of Official paper on Arjun MBT.That would be easy for me to find the official paper you asked regarding FMBT 2020.But the GSQR 2020 is being formulated and some of the ideas were presented in the seminar.Also if u decide a Qr for your MBT and go and buy a tank,completely opposite to it...then whats the point in having GSQR.What now after 2015,pak decides to buy challengers or leos.We promptly say that FMBT is too light small and all and buy some western tank i suppose isint it??But they are playing it safe this time.Last time the MBT they bought and the one for which GSQR was formulated were opoosite.So this time they decided to match some of the PLANNED features to current in development russian tanks.Why have a QR as such if u know you will go for the opposites.Just wait till pak orders next MBT and find a number greater than that.Hmm but we fail there too.In that way we cant beat their MBT-2000.

[Sanku]

I dont have the GSQR right now; but as I pointed out; that material plus auxilarly material is posted on this thread itself before.

What I cant understand is how you cant understand the difference between Arjun GSQR and the the need to induct T 90. There are more than one factor in play here -- if srticly speaking an Arjun GSQR type tank was inducted because Arjun was not ready it would by a Leopard/Chally type.
Umpteen issues there
1) Cost
2) ToT -- and other pol pain in deailing with Uncle and its munnas
3) A complete break from a existing infra to support the T series. (This is true with Arjun but with Arjun the induction is slow and on our pace anyway)
4) Negative impact on Arjun -- if we have a nearly identical design to Arjun what need to produce other Arjun?

With T 90 pros
1) Obvious easy fit in infra doctrine logistics blah...
2) Russia and Cost
3) ToT (yeah the barrels didnt come YET) but at least there WAS ToT (remember the deal was signed years back when no one would give us any tot)
4) Customization
yada yada...

Frankly I have never understood why people take such obvious data points and create a huge mystery around it -- just to justify one organization, which again doesnt really need justification since they did what they could and the folks who should be justifying are the Managers --i.e. MoD.

[Sanku]

It is good for young uns (mentally) to remember there is a reason why nursery rhymes and pithy saying are given -- it is inculcate basic common sense before folks learn the hard way.

The one here is "for want of shoe...."

A tank does not arrive on a celestial chariot in the battle field. It has to be taken through trains -- hence tank carriages, it needs bridges that it can cross (total weight capacity) both of civil and mil (TLB) nature. It needs a series of work shop every where to support it. It needs training for crew and support staff.

Finally it needs all this in HUGE number, since tanks are not inducted in 100s but 1000s.

If this is not disruptive for a new tank I dont know what is ever disruptive anywhere in the world -- and I am really surprised at saying stuff like this on BRF -- heck this is management 101 for Gods sake.

[kvraghav]

I am not worried about CVRDE getting the falk but blaming only that for the failure??obiously there was a failure in the vision of the people who prepared QR for Arjun.Given the pros of T-90s that you specified,why not take it this way.If they were SERIOUS about the Arjun induction,they knew there would be an refinment of infrastructure to support a heavy tank...then why didnt they buy a heavy tank and upgrade infrastructures slowly and they would have 2 tanks of same class which could use the infra...all along as and when the t-55/t-72 were retired,slowly winding off the light tank infra.but now what this has ensured is that..we keep infra for both the types up,or we kill the arjun.

[somnath]

To be fair to the folks at DRDO/CVRDE, the Arjun was conceived at a time when there was a clear threat of the Pakis acquiring the M1. Obvioulsy, no one really got the IA to sign in blood on the GSQRs, and along the way, with the Pakis going to the T84, the IA simply walked away and asked for a T-series type tank..

the confusion on the tank platform is a derivative of the confusion over the armed forces doctrine, which in turn is a derivative of a lack of an institutionalised process of making "grand strategy". An Army which expects to fight only "short wars" (as indicated by the levels of its war wastage reserves - about 7 days per most people), and does not expect to fight deep into enemy (read Pak) territory, or fight an urban insurgency/war, the moot question is whether so much of time, money and institutional energy should go into findign the "right" tank...Do we really need an uber, best in class, tank platform? Are our strategic objectives lending themselves to rapid tank thrusts requiring very expensive tanks? Or will upgraded T72s do? Is the money best spent on other things we direly need?

the recent book by Bharat KArnad (and the latest article by Ajai Shukla in DnI) tlak about this obsession with "large systems" that are unlikely to see battle, at the expense of the other, less glamorous but badly needed stuff..

[RayC]

The realpolitik is that India will not be allowed by powers that be to wage a prolonged war. Period.

The world is petrified that there can be a nuclear conflagration! They think the third world is still little naked Joes running in the bush country! So be it.

Therefore, to plan campaigns and expeditionary forces is for those who sport stars in the eyes based on US capabilities and plans. India has no money for wasteful expenditure and instead has to be pragmatic, given her overfull basket of woes. And India is not the US as Burkina Faso is no India!

We do require the best in every weapon platform and systems, but it has to be based on what we can achieve in the punctuated trimeframe allowed for us in battle by the powers that be. It must be understood that it is not that they will attack us, but they surely can affect us politically and economically and that is what forces India to halt a winning campaign!

The concept of deep strike is alive and kicking and equipment for the same is catered for, but then the emphasis is on the Cold Start, which is achievable for the powers that be halt us in our tracks.

There maybe no grand strategy at the political level, but there is no confusion as far as Armed Forces doctrines go!

[aditp]

The realpolitik is that India will not be allowed by powers that be to wage a prolonged war. Period.

RayC, while I agree with your views, shouldnt our war waging capabilities be strong with sufficient war wastage reserves for a protracted campaign, be the need? The very hallowed powers that you have mentioned, will be the ones to stay away (from coming to our aid) , in case of a serious outbreak of hostilities, for the mortal fear of subjecting their own resources to a nuclear strike. As things stand, even BDR takes liberties with us a place and time of its own choosing. I believe, we must maintain a very strong detterent posture (bordering on an offensive one).

[Sanku]

I am not worried about CVRDE getting the falk but blaming only that for the failure??

I never blamed CVRDE for failure -- never; and IA also had its role in mismanaging the issue (also said that), however the real blame lies with
1) MoD - babus
2) Short term knee jerk reaction to defence by GoI through the years.

To the issues of disruption etc. I am only raising the real issues involved here -- not saying they cant be solved if you put your back to it.

Note I only blame MoD/GoI for incompetence here and not corruption (too long a period with too many elements to be a corruption issue -- corruption is usually in point transactions)

[RayC]

The realpolitik is that India will not be allowed by powers that be to wage a prolonged war. Period.

RayC, while I agree with your views, shouldnt our war waging capabilities be strong with sufficient war wastage reserves for a protracted campaign, be the need? The very hallowed powers that you have mentioned, will be the ones to stay away (from coming to our aid) , in case of a serious outbreak of hostilities, for the mortal fear of subjecting their own resources to a nuclear strike. As things stand, even BDR takes liberties with us a place and time of its own choosing. I believe, we must maintain a very strong detterent posture (bordering on an offensive one).

Of course we have the first line, second line and WWR as per our requirement including deep strike.

BDR takes liberties because the govt allows such liberties, so do the Chinese. Remember the Chief's statement being in variance to the govt's? And then there was hectic damage control and semantics!

Let us not think that India is Gandhian. That is all I will say.

[kvraghav]

Hi Sanku,
I remember we had a discussion/argument on this long time back when only CVRDE was blamed.I will post the links of previous posts.The point is there is emphasis on cold start now in which case infra comes very handy.But our VISION for 2020 emphasises on heavier tank.So isint it better now to start with arjun so that we would be ready by that time.IIRC USA had light tanks in world wars (Lighter than panzers) and then shifted to this heavy tank concept.It worked for them since they are a occupational type of force.Someone please correct if i am wrong here.It is obious that given the infra,a heavy tank can do what a light tank does but vice versa is not true(ex:Urban warfare).

[somnath]

As a matter of fact, from whatever one can glean from the Cold start concepts, it would seem as if a "light tank" is more up the IA's alley. Some of the "features" of cold Start

1. Rapid deployment
2. Flexible IBGs designed to move rapidly "laterally" as opposed to only straight
3. Short sharp conflict to destroy the military machine rather than occupy territory

Keeping these in mind, a tank that is easy on the logistics train, having high mobility and speed, and ability to operate at night would be required. For the IA, that would translate to "T series"...the problem is that the future tank vision again talks about a somewhat "heavy" tank, without really nothin (at least in public domain) on how that would fit into the same set of parameters as detailed above...

IMHO, without a stated (or plausible) objective of either occupying cities or annexing fresh territory, so much time and money spent on discussing tanks is a bit strange...Whenever there is a conflict, in the Indian context, tank battles are likely to be less decisive than the focus suggests.

[RayC]

HEAT and advances in technology like Chobam armour etc were a catalyst for having tanks with high mobility, protection and heavier weapon power. Thus the medium tank was found ideal for weight and the QR mix. It led to the demise of the light and the heavy tank. The new nomenclature given to such tanks was Main Battle Tank. Modern materials, design and technology and better and efficient engines ensured the weight was kept optimum and they did not become lumbering behemoths. Thus, an all purpose tank came into being, duly protected as would a heavy tank be and having a mobility commensurate to the medium tank.

Neither its weight, mobility, nor firepower, but instead the idea that only one type of heavily armoured vehicle is required to carry out the roles of breakthrough, exploitation and infantry support is what makes the issue of not having a variety of tanks and instead of having one class of tanks.

The armed helicopter ensures more flexibility and maneuverability than a light tank as also a helicopter can cover more area in the same time spectrum than what a light tank does and so the recce requirement that the light tank fulfilled is now the prerogative of the armed helicopter.

Light tanks are dead meat in today's anti tank environment.

Tank vs Tank will always be there since moves by Indians will surely be countervailed by the Pakistanis.

[Tanaji]

It is good for young uns (mentally) to remember there is a reason why nursery rhymes and pithy saying are given -- it is inculcate basic common sense before folks learn the hard way.

The one here is "for want of shoe...."

A tank does not arrive on a celestial chariot in the battle field. It has to be taken through trains -- hence tank carriages, it needs bridges that it can cross (total weight capacity) both of civil and mil (TLB) nature. It needs a series of work shop every where to support it. It needs training for crew and support staff.

Finally it needs all this in HUGE number, since tanks are not inducted in 100s but 1000s.

If this is not disruptive for a new tank I dont know what is ever disruptive anywhere in the world -- and I am really surprised at saying stuff like this on BRF -- heck this is management 101 for Gods sake.

Ah, Sankuji, back to the old stuff again eh?

Tell me Saar, who wrote the (moving target and changing) GSQRs for Arjun? Was it a bunch of pointy haired types at DRDO and CVRDE or was it the gents at the Army? If it was the latter, one would also presume that they knew what type of tank they were going to get, which is notably, a Western "heavy" and not a Russian one. I need not tell you that the heavy weight comes from the extra protection that a Western design has... so if the Army formulated the GSQR, they wanted such a tank. Is it then, too much of an imagination stretch for them to envisage all the "disruption" that it will cause in their logistics chain? Its hilarious to see people trot out out the disruption excuse when they wanted it in the first place!

Unless of course, the GSQR was a cut and paste from various glossy brochures as has been alluded by many. Someone asked about whether the IA has any firm requirements for the "future" tank. It probably doesn't and won't until the Russian Black Eagle, Sparrow, Falcon design is ready.

Between outright lying or misleading by Army officers to Parliamentary committees, allegations of natasha factor, rapidly changing GSQRs and a marked reluctance for comparative tests, please pardon us when we view the handling of the Arjun affair by the MoD, the Army and CVRDE (in that order) with skepticism.

[Sanku]

The weirdness would be GSQRs not moving over 30 years.

[RayC]

Tanaji,

It is true that the GSQR changed.

It was in consultation with the DRDO and not without.

Would you, as an Indian citizen, be happy and comfortable to be in 2009 with a 1980 tank which is obsolete and is not capable to meeting the current battlefield environment? And to make the matter worse, the adversary having tanks that are current!

You maybe, but ask those who will lose their lives in such a coffin!

[KiranM]

Tanaji,

It is true that the GSQR changed.

It was in consultation with the DRDO and not without.

Would you, as an Indian citizen, be happy and comfortable to be in 2009 with a 1980 tank which is obsolete and is not capable to meeting the current battlefield environment? And to make the matter worse, the adversary having tanks that are current!

You maybe, but ask those who will lose their lives in such a coffin!

Sir, just to understand the Services point of view, which features of Arjun are not contemporary?

[RayC]

Now that the Chief has said it is a great tank, I will leave it at that.

He sure would know more about it than me.

I am sure the glitches must have been addressed and now it is fit for induction.

[KiranM]

Ok.. Let me re-phrase. As per your point of view, which feature of Arjun is not contemporary?

[RayC]

Kiran,

If the glitches have been removed by the DRDO and the tank is acceptable by the Army, then the tank must be contemporary.

[Kunal]

You maybe, but ask those who will lose their lives in such a coffin!

It is just not fair for you to put up such a statement. To suggest that drdo or any one here is asking for coffins to be rolled out for our soldiers is horrible. It is galling to read such statements from supposed gentlemen.

[KiranM]

ok, I got the feeling you have reservations inspite of Army's stated position.

BTW Sir, I have a query at the Special Forces thread. Please oblige me.

Thanks and Regards.

[aditp]

Now that the Chief has said it is a great tank, I will leave it at that.

He sure would know more about it than me.

I am sure the glitches must have been addressed and now it is fit for induction.

RayC sir, precisely bcoz we dont want our armymen to land up in coffins, do we want the Army to consider the Arjun objectively vis-avis the T-90. As far as coffin goes, the T-series give a brilliant fireworks display upon being hit, a fate we dont want for our armymen. The Arjun's ammunition storage eliminates any such chances, thereby ensuring a coffin for the PA, not IA.

BTW, the chief continues with his flip-flop as pointed out in earlier posts.

[nrshah]

Only comparative trials between Arjun and IA preferred tanks can silence all the question about quality of tank.

With respect to delay, it is agreed that there was delay. But we also need to understand the time when project was undertaken. What was the industrial base of the country? What were technology we had at that point of time? What was state of economy? Etc...

With all delay, now we have enough infra to think of new gen tanks... The problem is we dont amortise cost and time on learning curve. F 22 Raptor took good enough time to develop lot of tech which was readily available at the time of F 35. This is how it works.

In my views, IA should promote comparative trails and should induct if performance is found satisfactory. The tech should be then used to develop a next gen tank, GSQR of which may be decided by IA along with other concerned.

[RayC]

Now that the Chief has said it is a great tank, I will leave it at that.

He sure would know more about it than me.

I am sure the glitches must have been addressed and now it is fit for induction.

RayC sir, precisely bcoz we dont want our armymen to land up in coffins, do we want the Army to consider the Arjun objectively vis-avis the T-90. As far as coffin goes, the T-series give a brilliant fireworks display upon being hit, a fate we dont want for our armymen. The Arjun's ammunition storage eliminates any such chances, thereby ensuring a coffin for the PA, not IA.

BTW, the chief continues with his flip-flop as pointed out in earlier posts.

Yes indeed there must be comparative trials and the best tank chosen. No doubt about that!

All tanks in the world have become excellent firework display. Nothing new!

Chief flip flops?

Maybe that is the hallmark of starry heights. Manmohan also flip flops. And that is why he is on top of the dung heap!

[manish]

Not to take the focus away from the discussion, but here is a chance sighting of IA armour on the move:

Udupi: Is This Army Artillery Heading Towards War Zone?

Pics: Durga Digitals
Daijiworld Media Network – Udupi (RD)

Udupi, Feb 25: The Indian armed force tankers that were located at Seabird (INS Kadamba), Asia’s largest naval base in Karwar in Uttara Karnataka were transported by railway wagons to Secundarabad, through Mangalore recently.

Why would the tanks be based at Seabird? Or are these tanks returning from the recent tri-services exercises that included amphibious ops? Or is it just a severe case of DDMitis/conjecture?

Complete article with some more pictures and details is here:
http://www.daijiworld.com/news/news_disp.asp?n_id=57195

PS: It would be better to ignore some of the comments posted at the bottom of that news item, IMHO !

[satya]

IIRC, last year there was an article by former COAS Gen.Padmanabhan titled Indian Army Vision 2020 in IDR and there he clearly stated tht T-90 ''most likely'' will be the MBT for the next decade. Point is , we are debating this issue of Arjun vs T-90 for just sake of debating , IA has already made up it mind and is moving clearly in that direction ( you don't odrder 1300 + new tanks specially when resources are scarce ) .Relevant are the current news about upgrades in protective gears for T-90s.
Indian Army: 2020

[RayC]

You maybe, but ask those who will lose their lives in such a coffin!

It is just not fair for you to put up such a statement. To suggest that drdo or any one here is asking for coffins to be rolled out for our soldiers is horrible. It is galling to read such statements from supposed gentlemen.

The problem is that you chaps don't read and jump to conclusions without cause.

Read this:

Would you, as an Indian citizen, be happy and comfortable to be in 2009 with a 1980 tank which is obsolete and is not capable to meeting the current battlefield environment? And to make the matter worse, the adversary having tanks that are current!

You maybe, but ask those who will lose their lives in such a coffin!

I stated that in 2009 if you had a 1980 tank, it would be a coffin!

Now since you possibly have no idea of a battlefield or a war environment (or else you would not have given that post), let me take you through with baby steps, lest you give me a start and let loose another slur at me like 'supposed gentleman'!

1. The 1980 tank has no hope in hell to survive in a modern Anti Tank environment.

2. When this ancient tank is hit, its ammunition, in all probability, will explode.

3. The tank will catch fire.

4. Then what would happen to the crew?

5. They will walk out of the tank like as if they were Superman, Batman and Spiderman rolled in one?

6, If such an situation is not sure death, then what is?

I, as a retired soldier, have no qualms in facing realities and stating it so. I have no false pretensions or pride for equipment that is outdated and not capable of facing contemporary battlefield conditions, since I owe it to my soldiers that I shall get them the best that India can afford.

Further, imagine fighting today's war with a blunderbuss and not the INSAS, I would not give it to my troops even if the blunderbuss was made by my first cousin!!

Added Later:

Tanaji,

I was alluding to a 1980 tank in 2009 battlefield and I am told that I a 'supposed gentleman'!
Such a tank has no hope in hell in the modern Anti Tank environment and so what would that tank be? Is such a statement as - To suggest that drdo or any one here is asking for coffins to be rolled out for our soldiers is horrible. It is galling to read such statements from supposed gentlemen - totally out of context not make one get perturbed, more so since it indicates that I am a heartless chap! Do you expect me to be Jesus?

[sunilUpa]

Manish,

That is a Konkan Railway stretch. Very interesting to read that the tanks were based at Karwar!

[Tanaji]

Tanaji,

It is true that the GSQR changed.

It was in consultation with the DRDO and not without.

Would you, as an Indian citizen, be happy and comfortable to be in 2009 with a 1980 tank which is obsolete and is not capable to meeting the current battlefield environment? And to make the matter worse, the adversary having tanks that are current!

You maybe, but ask those who will lose their lives in such a coffin!

Yes, I get that GSQRs change. My point is that for anyone to make the argument that "Arjun cant be inducted because it is disruptive, plays merry hell with our logistical change and requires lots of effort" is being hypocritical. The same GSQRs were framed by IA. Now for the same IA to turn around and say that it has resulted in the tank causes other issues, is strange to put it mildly. IA is full of capable, intelligent men who are resourceful and visionary. Surely they would have known how their GSQRs would impact the logistical chain. Why then make that argument? If you ask for something and you get it, surely you should be expected to take responsibility for the outcome.

I guess there are other aspects to this as well. IA and IAF never believed in the concept of tranches where one accepts an initial version with reduced capabilities to keep the production line going in exchange for a full featured version some time later. They want everything in the first version. This may be because IA and IAF has historically been starved of funds, and when something does get allocated, they typically want the best and do not want to work /wait with a phased approach. It was fine earlier, but with local products coming up to the mark, it may be time to rethink this approach.

Interestingly, the Army seems to have no qualms about accepting reduced capability T90s initially and then upgrade them with the Shtora suite...

PS.

RayC: A sincere request. I love your posts and it provides a refreshing perspective of things, and always read the threads where you participate. However could you please tone down the "You cant comment unless you enlist / you dont know because you arent enlisted / You won't understand unless you enlist" theme? No one is an expert on everything, yet this is a forum and thats why we are here, to participate and learn on things that we arent experts on. You have a habit of cutting off people by that argument. I notice that you used the same argument with Mohan G in the other thread, stating that he is not an expert to comment on Army selection procedures. Fair enough... but I dont think you are an expert on banking issues and the mechanics of setting up a bank, which Mohan G is, but that didnt stop you from arguing did it?

Just my frank thoughts.

[ksmahesh]

PS.

RayC: A sincere request. I love your posts and it provides a refreshing perspective of things, and always read the threads where you participate. However could you please tone down the "You cant comment unless you enlist / you dont know because you arent enlisted / You won't understand unless you enlist" theme? No one is an expert on everything, yet this is a forum and thats why we are here, to participate and learn on things that we arent experts on. You have a habit of cutting off people by that argument. I notice that you used the same argument with Mohan G in the other thread, stating that he is not an expert to comment on Army selection procedures. Fair enough... but I dont think you are an expert on banking issues and the mechanics of setting up a bank, which Mohan G is, but that didnt stop you from arguing did it?

Just my frank thoughts.

Tanaji ,

MohanG's (with all due respect) posts had a pattern. I am sure you would have noticed. Reason behind RayC's counter arguments was evident from the discussion. Are banking sector and military sectors comparable? I love Arjun and would very much like to see it in Army but that depends on people that be. If army has reasons for preferring T-90 then so be it, after all it is them who know better. Yes we can debate on their decisions but unless we know for sure the reasons for preference will the discussion be useful? and Can we demand answers from army?

IMVHO comparative trials (followed by evaluation by Army experts) would show the better tank.

I am waiting for the trials to start with the hope that Arjun performs better than T90.

[RayC]

Tanaji,

It is true that the GSQR changed.

It was in consultation with the DRDO and not without.

Would you, as an Indian citizen, be happy and comfortable to be in 2009 with a 1980 tank which is obsolete and is not capable to meeting the current battlefield environment? And to make the matter worse, the adversary having tanks that are current!

You maybe, but ask those who will lose their lives in such a coffin!

Yes, I get that GSQRs change. My point is that for anyone to make the argument that "Arjun cant be inducted because it is disruptive, plays merry hell with our logistical change and requires lots of effort" is being hypocritical. The same GSQRs were framed by IA. Now for the same IA to turn around and say that it has resulted in the tank causes other issues, is strange to put it mildly. IA is full of capable, intelligent men who are resourceful and visionary. Surely they would have known how their GSQRs would impact the logistical chain. Why then make that argument? If you ask for something and you get it, surely you should be expected to take responsibility for the outcome.

I guess there are other aspects to this as well. IA and IAF never believed in the concept of tranches where one accepts an initial version with reduced capabilities to keep the production line going in exchange for a full featured version some time later. They want everything in the first version. This may be because IA and IAF has historically been starved of funds, and when something does get allocated, they typically want the best and do not want to work /wait with a phased approach. It was fine earlier, but with local products coming up to the mark, it may be time to rethink this approach.

Interestingly, the Army seems to have no qualms about accepting reduced capability T90s initially and then upgrade them with the Shtora suite...

PS.

RayC: A sincere request. I love your posts and it provides a refreshing perspective of things, and always read the threads where you participate. However could you please tone down the "You cant comment unless you enlist / you dont know because you arent enlisted / You won't understand unless you enlist" theme? No one is an expert on everything, yet this is a forum and thats why we are here, to participate and learn on things that we arent experts on. You have a habit of cutting off people by that argument. I notice that you used the same argument with Mohan G in the other thread, stating that he is not an expert to comment on Army selection procedures. Fair enough... but I dont think you are an expert on banking issues and the mechanics of setting up a bank, which Mohan G is, but that didnt stop you from arguing did it?

Just my frank thoughts.

I appreciate your comment that I should not use the "You cant comment unless you enlist / you dont know because you arent enlisted / You won't understand unless you enlist" theme. I try not to do so. My sole purpose is to explain, within my limited knowledge, as to whys and whereofs.

All members are equal here on this forum and so when someone acts hoity toity (and it is not you) and lectures a person who has 39 years in uniform and 35 as a commissioned officer, based on merely theoretical knowledge and borrowing anecdotes from foreign armies, then there is a good chance of the hands on experienced person to get a wee bit off.

If one saw the film Longest Day and quoted it as the be all and end all of war to a person who actually participated in the Longest Day i.e. the Normandy Landings, and that was drummed in as the ‘last word’, then the person who participated in the Longest Day would be dumbfounded as to whether he was merely poodlefaking! But yes, questions should be asked and if not satisfactory to the questioner, he should ask further, but the hands on experienced person should not be given the impression that he merely poodlefaked and the theory man and his Longest Day film are the real McCoys! And the temerity to state that a visionary like Gen Joshi did not know his beans! So Gen Joshi is a fool and these bookish chap is the last word on military! I don't remember who it was, but there was a chap who did lampoon Gen Joshi!

To be frank, whether Arjun is inducted or not, it is not for me to say. It is for the Govt and the Army. Yet, should the Army accept equipment that is not sterling, one does get uncomfortable, since the lives of our soldier and the sovereignty is paramount. That is the subconscious that is drilled into us and that is why those bravehearts in Kargil and other wars went to their deaths without any fear, knowing that is their duty and that the Nation has given them the best equipment that the Nation could afford.

Don't you think that before one drumbeats for the DRDO, they spare a thought for the soldiers and officers and then give a balanced view? Have I not brought out the Gurdial Gun and the IFG as successes? What is good is good, but one just cannot turn a blind eye to equipment still not up to scratch. Spare a thought for the soldier and officers who have been so loyal to the Nation. Do they deserve equipment whatever has been produced out a notion of giving a chance to Indian DRDO? There is so much of grouse over the 6th Pay Commission, but have we acted disgracefully as the Pakistan Army who do a coup at the drop of a hat or have we mutinied like the Bangladesh Rifles? The indignities that are being heaped by the Govt and its bureaucrats are monumental and yet the military stand firm by the tenets of democracy. Must we also be saddled with equipment that does not fit the bill? Are our lives that cheap? Is that what the Nation wants to do to us?

The GSQR is not a military show alone.

The logistics are taken into consideration. The Railways have long ago stated that BG lines would be taken up to the Rajasthan border. Roads were supposed to be able to take the tank load and the bridges widened and strengthened. Now, if they are not done, whose fault is it? The Ministries live on dreams and false promises that they cannot fulfil willingly or unwillingy! As good as the silly slogan Roti Kapda aur Makan and Garibi Hatao! Fooling all and making an ass of all! Have all Indians got Roti, Kapda aur Makan or has Garibi been Hataoed? If so, what’s all this hoop la over Slumdog Millionaire and that bloke Singhvi states that it is good governance! These hoaxster crawl out of the cupboards in Delhi and they are all over.

IA also does not believe in tranches. But if the prototype takes donkey's year to surface and by that time, the adversary has the latest, what do you expect the IA to do? Accept whatever is laid on the platter and build its fleet on that and be decimated at a high cost in men and materiel on the battlefield?

As far as MohanG and Somnath goes, I learnt a lot of banking procedures and norms for them. However, they are not aware of the funds available to the Army even though they are doled out over the financial year. It is not mere Regimental Funds, which is a drop in the ocean. That was my contention. And it would be run as per Indian banking practices by qualified bankers and not by Army men. Further, it was a plan that Gen Joshi and his advisors had formulated and I am not in the know of the working details. Obviously, they knew what they were doing, just like the AWHO which is beneficial for the Army personnel and yet it is a financial organisation! If that has succeeded way before home loans became popular, why should we think that Gen Joshi's plan was harebrained (which someone used)?

How is the AWHO scheme such a thumping success? This is a financial institution.

[RayC]

Take the issue of Light tanks. IIRC Some posters felt that there has to be a mix of Heavy, Medium and Light Tanks for the IA. Someone or was there more who also said that the Light Tank should be the sole tank ideal for the Cold Start concept.

They are not aware that today there is but only the Main Battle Tank. It is actually a medium tank which has most of the characteristics of a heavy tank, but lighter because of advanced technology, and with the speed of a medium tank and can perform the all the tasks that a tank is expected to do.

Nowadays, I try to avoid addressing any poster. I give a general comment since I find it too exasperating as some obscure item will be pulled out of the hat to prove his point. I am sure Burkina Faso has light tanks.They can't afford anything else, but it will be brought as the Gospel and and an endless discussion will ensue!

Take the issue that artillery should replace tanks. After much explanations in many posts, I fished out the Manoeuvre Theory and produced it based on Brig Richard E Simpkins, who is an acknowledged mechanised warfare expert and who explains issue with physics etc. Though it took up my time, yet I thought it incumbent on my part to explain.

I could have merely ignored the contention that artillery should replace tanks since that idea is totally out of sync with contemporary military thinking since that is not how battles can be won.

I assure you I am not here watching the post counter or in competition with anyone. I know my station and therefore, I am not here to prove my credentials to anyone.

[SanjibGhosh]

http://www.sindhtoday.net/south-asia/68064.htm

DRDO to make indigenous Arjun tank hi-tech

Chennai Feb 25 (IANS) The Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) will be developing around 12 futuristic systems in five years for incorporation into India’s first indigenously built Arjun main battle tank (MBT), an official said here Wednesday.

“The futuristic technology systems include automatic target tracking, defensive aids, laser warning, tank simulator systems. We are looking at developing robotic vehicles that would work on tele-link,” R. Jayakumar, associate director of the DRDO’s Combat Vehicles Research and Development Establishment (CVRDE), told reporters.

The organisation also plans to automate the tracking of targets.

“With the firing and mobility powers of the tank being satisfactory, the focus is now on making the vehicle invisible to the enemy through development of detection avoidance and laser warning systems,” said Jayakumar.

One of the labs under the DRDO, CVRDE is also in the process of developing tank simulators similar to flight simulators.

“After undergoing simulator training, a soldier can comfortably operate the vehicle,” said Jayakumar.

When asked about the status of the Indian Army’s order for 124 Arjun tanks, CVRDE director S. Sundaresh said: “The order will be completed this year. We are confident of getting more orders, which would enable us to have more local component content in the battle machine.”

Presently, the local content is around 50 percent. The engine and power train has been imported from Germany.

“We plan to source engines from Cummins India for future orders. If more orders come by, we can reduce the imported content to 25 percent,” Sundaresh added.

The research organisation has transferred the technology to the Heavy Vehicles Factory in Avadi town.

“More than 10,000 drawings running into around 2,000 pages have been passed on to the vehicle manufacturer,” Sundaresh said.

Asked about the delays in developing the tank, officials said the army froze its specifications only in November 1985.

“The tank was unveiled in 1995. It takes at least 10 years for any country to develop a battle tank from the scratch. The army put the pre-production tanks (15 units) to rigorous tests totalling more than 70,000 km and fired over 7,000 rounds. No other tank would have undergone such tests,” said Jayakumar.

Meanwhile to commemorate the DRDO’s golden jubilee, five of its labs - CVRDE, Vehicles Research and Development Establishment, Ahmednagar; Research and Development Establishment (Engineers), Dighi; Snow and Avalanche Study Establishment, Manali; and Centre for Artificial Intelligence and Robotics, Bangalore - will hold a two day exhibition here starting Feb 28.

[manish]

Manish,

That is a Konkan Railway stretch. Very interesting to read that the tanks were based at Karwar!

Yes, I realised that - and that is what I find intriguing. That seems to be an entire tank regiment on the move, along with its support vehicles etc. If the tanks had come from anywhere further up north from Karwar, probably they would not have used the Konkan Railway as the routes to either Secunderabad (as claimed) or any other destination down south usually go through MH - AP - KA/TN - KL right? (I am of course discounting the possibility of these being headed to some destination in North Malabar or surrounding areas, so I might be completely wrong on this!)So Karwar it must be then. Interesting...

[RayC]

Manish,

That is a Konkan Railway stretch. Very interesting to read that the tanks were based at Karwar!

Yes, I realised that - and that is what I find intriguing. That seems to be an entire tank regiment on the move, along with its support vehicles etc. If the tanks had come from anywhere further up north from Karwar, probably they would not have used the Konkan Railway as the routes to either Secunderabad (as claimed) or any other destination down south usually go through MH - AP - KA/TN - KL right? (I am of course discounting the possibility of these being headed to some destination in North Malabar or surrounding areas, so I might be completely wrong on this!)So Karwar it must be then. Interesting...

An interesting point you raise.

Could it be that they were trying another route so as to 'prove' it and keep it as a contingency route. Notwithstanding, it would be a circuitous route for tanks based in the South.

The Konkan Railway is a newly laid track and one wonders if the tracks have 'bedded in'.

[KiranM]

^^^ IN in future will move its Western fleet to Karwar. Could it also be that the Services as such are testing out the logistics involved to move tanks to Karwar to load onto the Landing Ships?

[manish]

An interesting point you raise.

Could it be that they were trying another route so as to 'prove' it and keep it as a contingency route. Notwithstanding, it would be a circuitous route for tanks based in the South.

The Konkan Railway is a newly laid track and one wonders if the tracks have 'bedded in'.

RayC sir that is quite a possibility('proving'), but I doubt 'bedding in' is a problem. I am no expert, but Konkan Railways has been operational for over a decade now, and IIRC was the first to introduce commercial Ro-Ro (Roll On - Roll Off) service for trucks in India- a loaded truck should be at least 70 - 80%(?) of the weight of a T - 72/90 that weighs ~47 tons. Actually I have personally seen a long train carrying trucks at the Suratkal station last year, while travelling to Mumbai. But I do recall that there were some real issues of the 'bedding in' type in the heavy Mangalorean Monsoon season,with the tracks passing through many stretches that were laid on 'loose' soil, but that was a few years ago.

BTW, RayC sir, I have another doubt. In the pictures, it can be seen that the wagons have protruding edges so as to 'fit' the tank - so are the tanks lifted up by cranes/ARVs and placed on the exact spot on the flatbed wagon?

Edit:
Found a link to a picture of the KR RO-RO service:

[Singha]

there was a big (by our std) amphibious landing ex in gujarat recently. these vehicles
probably went on ships from karwar and were returning to base in central/southern area.
there is one div in south who trains for such a role.

http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articl ... rcise.html

Amphibious Landing Exercise off Gujarat Coast


(Source: Press Information Bureau India; issued February 9, 2009)

The Indian Army, Navy and the Air Force today jointly conducted the largest ever Amphibious Exercise codenamed "EXERCISE TROPEX-2009" at Madhavpur beach, Gujarat. The amphibious landing, the most complex of all military manoeuvres involving coordination and synergy from conceptualization to planning and final execution, was ably demonstrated on the shores of Madhavpur. The element of Coast Guard was also a part of this short, swift and intense conflict.

The pre-assault operations of planning, mobilization and embarkation having been achieved at Karwar, the Amphibious Task Force sailed from Karwar on February 05, 2009 and landed on the shores of Madhavpur today using the newly inducted Landing Platform Dock (LPD) INS Jalashwa, several Landing Ship Tank Large (LST (L)), fleet ships with their integral helicopters, shore-based aircraft and submarines from the Indian Navy and Hovercraft of the Coast Guard. This is the first time the Joint Doctrine on Amphibious Warfare of the Indian Armed Forces which was formulated last year was put into practice with its full scope. As a precursor to the present operation, a tri-service landing operation, 'TRIVENI' was conducted at Lakshadweep Islands in early January this year.

Air support is critical to any amphibious operations since mortars and artilliary are not available abinitio on landing. HQ Southern Western Air Command deployed its Jaguars which carry a large array of weapons, flying at 200 feet pulled up and carried out rocket attacks with pin-point accuracy on simulated enemy targets. MiG 29 aircraft with its state of the art radar and ultra modern missiles carried out Combat Air Patrol over Madhopur to out-manoeuvre incoming enemy aircraft.

Tanks, armoured personnel carriers and infantry troops of 91 Infantry Brigade of the Sudarshan Chakra Corps were carried in both stand-off and hard beaching modes. Use of deployment of troops exploiting third dimension, i.e. airborne and heliborne formed an integral part of the exercise. AN-32 aircraft paradropped paratroopers from the skies followed by slithering operations by MI-8 helicopters to deploy troops at the assault area.

Troops in waves emerged from the sea and carried out effective assaults on the beach of Madhavpur. The defensive layout depicting the enemy were from the Golden Katar Division of the Indian Army.

The exercise exhibited high level of coordination and synergy between the Armed Forces to carry out such swift and intense conflict during military operations. It also provided tremendous training value through the testing of human and material endurance, execution of organizational and logistics plans and finally delivering the punch in a mock battle.

The exercise was witnessed by Air Marshal KD Singh, AOC in C, South Western Air Command, Vice Admiral JS Bedi, FOC in C, Western Naval Command and Lieutenant General Pradeep Khanna, GOC in C, Southern Command and other senior military officers from the three services.

[manish]

there was a big (by our std) amphibious landing ex in gujarat recently. these vehicles
probably went on ships from karwar and were returning to base in central/southern area.
there is one div in south who trains for such a role.

This is the most likely scenario, even I felt the same first up, especially since you can see the support vehicles as well in some of the other pictures.