Indian Army: News & Discussion

wig · Post by **wig** » 07 Sep 2009 18:33

john snow, thanks for posting the tribune article on Major Rathore. i don,t know how i missed it. May the Lord God grant eternal peace to the departed soul ad strength to those who remain to bear with the numbing loss.

Rishi · Post by **Rishi** » 07 Sep 2009 19:15

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/se ... militarism

Japan's gigantic second world war gamble

Some points I found interesting (from the Fall of Singapore)

Abandoned by their European officers, the Indians were presented with a huge moral dilemma. It seemed as if the British had "handed them over like cattle", and many were now recruited into a new Indian national army to fight alongside Japan for India's liberation. British prestige in Asia was shattered by the abandonment of its people. The ugly evacuation of Europeans was, as one British nurse in Penang put it, "a thing that I am sure will never be forgotten or forgiven".

Was not aware of this.

Rishi · Post by **Rishi** » 07 Sep 2009 19:45

Saddled with Insas, Army wants new AK-47s

NAGPUR: The indigenous 5.56x45mm Insas (Indian National Small Arms System) rifle has been the standard assault weapon for the Indian Army since
the late 1990s. However, the jawans using it in counter-insurgency operations find it ineffective.

As part of the new Army doctrine, the gun is meant to incapacitate the enemy, rather than kill. Insas has a smaller calibre, which means it has less power. This is because — and it’s the official view — injuring an enemy can lead to enemy soldiers getting engaged in tending the wounded, thus yielding a tactical battlefield advantage.

The technocrats who interacted with soldiers in the forward areas were told that this theory does not work with terrorists who, apart from attacking in small numbers, are never bothered about evacuating their injured. Hence, the soldiers say, they want to shoot to kill, rather than maim.

The soldiers also spoke about practical difficulties in using Insas. It’s accurate but not as rugged as the AK-47 used by terrorists, they say. Also, its sling often snaps while firing, making it fall during manoeuvres. The sling also obstructs the rifle’s sight. But most of all, the size of the sling never took into account the bullet proof jacket worn by jawans. As a result, it falls short and is uncomfortable to hold. This hampers quick reaction. Insas also does not have a rapid fire feature; it shoots only three rounds in a single burst.

‘‘The barrel overheats with continuous firing. The magazine cracks even on falling, which is common during action. Oil spillage while firing is also major trouble,’’ said a source quoting soldiers. ‘‘Zeroing (adjusting the sight for aim) has to be done each time the rifle is opened to clean or for any other reason. Lack of proper zeroing hampers the working of night vision device,’’ said the same source.

The total additional weight — around 40 kg with bulletproof jacket and signalling equipment — that a soldier carries is also a matter of concern, as is the colour of the rifle: they want it in brown which offers better camouflaging. On the positive side, Insas’s transparent magazine helps soldiers keep a count of bullets.

Former director general of infantry, Lt General Shanker Prasad, said Insas is antiquated and the Infantry needs a modern rifle. The Army has repeatedly asked for new assault weapons, but nothing has moved. It’s learnt that forces are now expecting new indigenously developed AK-47 rifle said to be an improvement on the original.

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 07 Sep 2009 22:55

.......said a source quoting soldiers.......

IOW 10 year old reports off the internet.

ashish raval · Post by **ashish raval** » 08 Sep 2009 15:37

IA needs massive Artillary upgrade very very soon. The situation on Chinese border is extremely concerning. Inorder to buy time, India needs to stir up Tibet question internationally. Breaking China is the only option for India to be safe in next century or else it will definately break up India for sure. It has both things 1) Will and 2) Capacity to do so.

India should take a cue from South Koreans who maintains 2nd largest reserve army in the world.

kittoo · Post by **kittoo** » 08 Sep 2009 16:39

ashish raval wrote:IA needs massive Artillary upgrade very very soon. The situation on Chinese border is extremely concerning. Inorder to buy time, India needs to stir up Tibet question internationally. Breaking China is the only option for India to be safe in next century or else it will definately break up India for sure. It has both things 1) Will and 2) Capacity to do so.

India should take a cue from South Koreans who maintains 2nd largest reserve army in the world.

While i dont know if I completely agree with other aspects of your post (even though breaking up of China will be 'delicious'), I completely agree with the reserve army comment. With the sea of youth that we have, even a little training could take us a long way. It will create a massive backup of homefront. Its need of hour, no two ways about it.

ASPuar · Post by **ASPuar** » 08 Sep 2009 16:52

Theres nothing wrong with this report about the INSAS. In fact, its a good thing that input is being collected, as the next version will be even better then!

ashish raval · Post by **ashish raval** » 08 Sep 2009 17:55

kittoo wrote:
While i dont know if I completely agree with other aspects of your post (even though breaking up of China will be 'delicious'), I completely agree with the reserve army comment. With the sea of youth that we have, even a little training could take us a long way. It will create a massive backup of homefront. Its need of hour, no two ways about it.

The problem that we face is that we are totally clueless about the capability of China. I think we need to be better prepared for the worst possible scenario than sitting idle and discussing China. We need to invest immediately in force multipliers without which PLA will be a difficult task to contain and we may loose more territories..

Lalmohan · Post by **Lalmohan** » 09 Sep 2009 02:53

Rishi wrote:http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/se ... militarism

Abandoned by their European officers, the Indians were presented with a huge moral dilemma. It seemed as if the British had "handed them over like cattle", and many were now recruited into a new Indian national army to fight alongside Japan for India's liberation. British prestige in Asia was shattered by the abandonment of its people. The ugly evacuation of Europeans was, as one British nurse in Penang put it, "a thing that I am sure will never be forgotten or forgiven".
Was not aware of this.

rishi, as in all military disasters, the picture was mixed. many officers deserted their men. many men deserted their officers. english abandoned australians, and vice versa. the japanese targetted indian troops specifically with propaganda to desert their colonial masters. in one incident, men of the baluch regiment were urged to surrender or face death. their english officer gave himself up to save them and was beheaded in front of them. some indians surrendered, some deserted, some stayed with their white officers. this is part of the reason that the japanese never trusted the INA.

one raf spy betrayed the aircraft locations by radio to the japanese which aided the rapid attack down the peninsula. as the japanese neared the city, he was executed by british military police on the steps of the harbour - now a major tourist spot.

the australian general gordon bennett staged a very selfish and personal escape and abandoned his men. it was a very shameful episode - his staff commandeered boats and had other escapees thrown off to secure his own escape. when he got back to australia he tried to play up his adventures and bravery, but he was soon found out and disgraced. for a long time, the exclamation "gordon bennett!!" was commonly used by british and australians to denote something outrageous and unbelievable.

there was widespread breakdown of law and order - looting and raping of singaporeans by allied troops as the japanese neared. the australians gained a particular reputation for it, but all the combatants were involved. military police shot many for disciplinary reasons.

the british also dumped large quantities of mustard gas shells into the harbour off sentosa island, which is now an amusement park... the stuff is still down there!

despite that there were many tales of courage. including from the female nurses, who risked everything to tend to the wounded, even under fire and on burning ships making a run for Indonesia.

war is a mess, but the psycological shock of this defeat was really very intense for all the european colonial powers

Rishi · Post by **Rishi** » 09 Sep 2009 10:19

Thanks Lalmohan. Very enlightening.

Rishi · Post by **Rishi** » 09 Sep 2009 13:07

http://www.dailyexcelsior.com/web1/09se ... date.htm#1

A group of heavily armed militants attempted to breach the LoC from Sunawali Gali in Mankote area of Mendhar Tehsil around midnight when they were challenged by the Army troops, manning the Rocket post.

''During a fierce gunbattle with the infiltrators, two militants were shot dead by the troops while we also lost our officer leading the defence,'' a senior Army officer said.

The deceased Army officer was identified as Major Akash of 5 Maratha Light Infantry, resident of Shiv Nagar, Jammu.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 09 Sep 2009 14:24

The problem that we face is that we are totally clueless about the capability of China. I think we need to be better prepared for the worst possible scenario than sitting idle and discussing China. We need to invest immediately in force multipliers without which PLA will be a difficult task to contain and we may loose more territories.

ashish raval: Can you please enlighten as to who is clueless about the capability of the China and PLA? The postors on this forum or the decision makers in IA? and what makes you think that those who have been entrusted about the defence of India (read IA) have already not done everything in their means? Also, what force multipliers are we taking about? What aspect of PLA will they help counter? And how did you arrive at the conclusion about loosing territories?

How many GAs can PLA throw at India? what is TOE and Orbat of PLA in general and Tibet in particular? Lets not make innane post with out any research which do not contribute anything to the body of knowledge.
That seems to be trend on this thread. China this, China that. But what exactly..no ones knows/understands or posts.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 11 Sep 2009 09:08

From Orbat.com:

India RAPID divisions: correction We jumped the gun a bit when we said India is working on its seventh RAPID division (1 armored brigade, 2-3 infantry brigades). It is working on its sixth the seventh is planned. All RAPID divisions were/are conversions from standard infantry divisions. The requirement to provide an armored punch to the infantry divisions was originated 25 years ago, and the program has proceeded with glacial slowness. Because of the new strategy where India has dispensed with offensive corps and defensive corps, all corps being offensive, there is a new urgency to the program. The one thing you can be sure of is that the Indians will again be asleep at the switch. Like the British, until they are thrashed they like to ad hoc along, then they wake up and do what needs to be done. Since Pakistan cannot thrash India, you can be assured the mechanization program will be nowhere done before we all die of old age.

The idea of spreading armor all over the place - in armored divisions, independent armored brigades, RAPID divisions, and independent tank regiments attached to infantry divisions - defeats the whole idea of concentrating armor for rapid, decisive offensives. Each of the three strike corps has a single armored division, so it is isn't going to be striking anywhere much.

RayC · Post by **RayC** » 11 Sep 2009 09:26

rohitvats wrote:
The idea of spreading armor all over the place - in armored divisions, independent armored brigades, RAPID divisions, and independent tank regiments attached to infantry divisions - defeats the whole idea of concentrating armor for rapid, decisive offensives. Each of the three strike corps has a single armored division, so it is isn't going to be striking anywhere much.

Interesting thoughts.

Before the RAPIDS came into being, we had one armr unit in Inf Div, Indep Armd Bdes and Armd Div.

RAPIDS came into being, not to add punch, but because of a change in the mode of conduct of operations.

If Each of the Strike Corps has one Armd Div, how many would make it effective? What is the task of the Strike Corps must be cranked in to understand the organisation.

'Concentration of armour' must be understood in it correct perspective. It does not mean packing it as if armour were a tin of sardines!

sumeet_s · Post by **sumeet_s** » 12 Sep 2009 10:57

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/news ... 001820.cms
Pakistan denies firing rockets in Indian territory.

Pakistan's border security forces on Saturday rejected a contention by their Indian counterparts that several rockets were fired into
Indian territory from across the border in the Wagah sector.

Looks like even Pak has started acting like China now...1st do everything and then swiftly deny it...

AdityaM · Post by **AdityaM** » 13 Sep 2009 18:44

First there are reports of chinese incursions. (How could they have leaked if not from the army itself? )
then the army & ministry go to great lengths in saying that all is peaceful
then we keep hearing that its a perception issue... that even the indian army crosses into chinese territory. (so its all par for the course)

And then there is this article:
Army wants patrol curbs along China border lifted
Random quotes:

The restrictions, imposed by the China Study Group many years ago, prevents Indian military troops from going up as close as possible to India’s claim line in certain areas where Chinese incursions have increased of late.
These, sources said, roughly relate to 10-odd areas in the Western Sector of the LAC in Ladakh, almost the entire Central Sector which includes Sikkim and about four areas in the Eastern Sector where perceptions vary and are hence, “sensitive”.
In fact, sources said, in some areas of Sikkim, the ITBP personnel are asked to go without weapons to prevent provocation.

If the army is not even allowed to go near the border at Ladakh, Sikkim and Eastern Sector, then how is it that the govt is now claiming that Indian troops also cross over the line while patrolling.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 13 Sep 2009 18:44

@Rahul M:

The fighting elements in the Mountain and Infantry Division remain the same at 3 Infantry/Moutain Brigades, each with 3 Infantry Battalions. While each has one Artillery Bde,the Moutain Division is expected to have howitzers(higher trajectory) as against the Field Guns; the state of IA's modernization plans means that they have the Field Guns. Only thing missing is Armored Regiment and some troops which are not considered feasible in moutainous conditions. So, there is no scope for a Moutain Division to have extra troops.

Global Security isn't exactly the right source for study of Orbat and TOE of Indian Army. On the other hans, one should go through each and every article on IA (and PA) in Orbat.Com. They are the closest to reality on orbat, TOE and analysis of IA related issues. If you can, get hold of Ravi Rikhye' s two books: 1987-The War that never was and 1984-Fourth Round (fictional account of final Indo-Pak war). Both these books very succintly highlight the strategic and tactical complusions for both the armies and impact on troop deployments.

The organization structure of Infantry Division is as such:

Div HQ
Armored Regiment - 45 tanks (but I'm not sure if this number is constant and may be more)***
R&O Flight
Infantry Brigades*3 - Each Bde. has 3 Infantry battalions. This makes 9 battalion in total.
Artillery Bde -
SATA Battery
1 Medium Regiment (130mm and above) - 18 guns in 3 batteries
3 Filed Regiments (105mm IFG) - Each Regiment has 18 guns in 3 batteries. Total-54 guns
1 Light Regiment (120mm Mortars) - 2 batteries with 6 guns each. But as per discussion with Sanjay M sometime
back,many Light Regiments have converted to Field/Medium Regiment. So, we need 3rd party opinion on this.
Engineer Regiment*1
Signal Regiment*1
Field Ambulances*2 (Army Medical Corps)
Division Ordnance Unit*1
Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (EME)*1

***There were pictures posted once by Shiv of tanks (2 different types-iirc, one type was sure Vijayanta) sporting the formation sign of 12 (11?) Infantry Division. These were part of Division Armored Regiment. Also, going by presence of 2 different types, the numbers is likely to be higher. The Vijayantas were delgated for this role. But with them getting long in tooth and T-72's replacing the other T-XX models and subsequently T-72s themselves getting subtituted with T-90s, the T-XX series may have taken over the mantle.

jaladipc · Post by **jaladipc** » 13 Sep 2009 19:36

AdityaM wrote:
If the army is not even allowed to go near the border at Ladakh, Sikkim and Eastern Sector, then how is it that the govt is now claiming that Indian troops also cross over the line while patrolling.

Gov is simply bluffing and deceiving its own people due to its incompetence.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 13 Sep 2009 19:58

AdityaM wrote:First there are reports of chinese incursions. (How could they have leaked if not from the army itself? )
then the army & ministry go to great lengths in saying that all is peaceful
then we keep hearing that its a perception issue... that even the indian army crosses into chinese territory. (so its all par for the course)

And then there is this article:
Army wants patrol curbs along China border lifted
Random quotes:
The restrictions, imposed by the China Study Group many years ago, prevents Indian military troops from going up as close as possible to India’s claim line in certain areas where Chinese incursions have increased of late.
These, sources said, roughly relate to 10-odd areas in the Western Sector of the LAC in Ladakh, almost the entire Central Sector which includes Sikkim and about four areas in the Eastern Sector where perceptions vary and are hence, “sensitive”.
In fact, sources said, in some areas of Sikkim, the ITBP personnel are asked to go without weapons to prevent provocation.

If the army is not even allowed to go near the border at Ladakh, Sikkim and Eastern Sector, then how is it that the govt is now claiming that Indian troops also cross over the line while patrolling.

AdityaM, that comment about IA not allowed to patrol upto Indian claim line is quite misleading. Consider the following:

a. The de-facto border between Indian and China in the contested zones is the LAC.
b. The incusions from the PLA are happening beyond the LAC towards the Indian side. This is because they lay claim to the entire area west of LAC. In some serious cases, they have violated the IB between the two countries. Mount Gya in Ladakh being one example.
c. Indian claim line is minimum 10kms to east of LAC in southern most part of the LAC in Ladakh (Spanggur Gap; area opposite Chusul) (I used the wikimapia to arrive at the distance). So, I'm not sure how IA can mount open patrols 10kms inside the LAC without any serious fightout.

So, while we need to be as agressive as possible and show the prophetic finger to the comlades, we need to get down the jingowagon and not make above baseless statement.

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 13 Sep 2009 20:02

rohit, do you have a link for that ?
the orbat.com page does not mention armoured regiment in inf div, at least the one I read today.
http://www.orbat.com/site/toe/toe/india/armytoe.html

may be your list is newer ?

what I found out today is that the armoured regiment in inf div is a relatively new development, it wasn't there previously.

I don't remember seeing the vijayanta pics but I certainly remember reading circa 2005 that older tanks (vijayanta was specifically mentioned) were being added to inf div to increase their firepower.
globalsecurity sources most of their info from ORBAT and IA official sites in the first place so most of the info is usually correct.
while ORBAT.com is good I find it difficult to locate the information there, the site arrangement could be improved !

any idea of the status of the combat aviation bde plans ? shiv aroor reports around 105 WSI Dhruv on order for IA, I wonder how these will be held ?

IMHO, mtn div should get integral helicopter assets of the WSI dhruv/LCH class in lieu of the armoured regiments., which can operate in the HA unlike other helicopters.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 13 Sep 2009 20:09

jaladipc wrote:
AdityaM wrote:
If the army is not even allowed to go near the border at Ladakh, Sikkim and Eastern Sector, then how is it that the govt is now claiming that Indian troops also cross over the line while patrolling.
Gov is simply bluffing and deceiving its own people due to its incompetence.

hey watch it. Its one thing to play games and another to accuse. Dont continue.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 13 Sep 2009 20:32

Sirji,

That comment about Orbat.Com was generic in nature. It is one site that can help gain an understanding of the Orbat and TOE of the IA which can be used as base on build on.

IIRC, the Armored Regiments with Infantry Divisions has been there since late 90s.

There was a recent update I had posted about IA raising new Divisions from Orbat.Com. It clealry mentioned that while IA can raise a new Division in 2years period, it envisages a longer period for the new Strike Mountain Divisions as it envisages equipping these formations with integral Helicopter assets for ease of logistics and vertical envelopement. Procurement of these assets plus the induction of new artillery assets will add to the increased timeframe. You may very well see new formations but without the desired (albiet sufficient) level and quality of equipments. However, we are far from Western style fully fledged Air Assault Bde formations. We simply do not have resources for that. To raise such a formation is bloody expensive. And honestly, I'd put the money on other things first.

I also remember reading about a plan where by Strike Corps were to have one Heavy Attack Helicopter Bde while other Corps were to have Bde with LCH. As for WSI Dhruv, I'm quite sure we will see them with the existing/new formations in NE.

As for the number of Armored Regiments and their distribution, the spread likely to be like this:

Armored Divisions*3 @ 3 Armored Bdes/Div with 6 armored Regiments in all. Total Armored Regiment-18
7 Independent Armored Bdes@ 3 Armored Regiments each. 14(I) Armored Bde has 4 Armored Regiments. Total -22
6 RAPIDS***@ 2 Armored Regiments each. Total - 12
Grand Total - 52 Armored Regiments
Leaves another 11 for Infantry Divisions.

P.S: I confused Global Security with Strategy Page. Global Security is definitely a better source but more of raw data then any analysis.
See the bottom most part of the page; it mentions the presence of Armored Regiments with Infantry Divisions.
***The number of RAPIDS have increased to 6 from 4. Some 10 new Armored and Mechanized Regiments are under raising (source:Orbat.com).

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 13 Sep 2009 21:19

rohitvats wrote:Sirji,

That comment about Orbat.Com was generic in nature. It is one site that can help gain an understanding of the Orbat and TOE of the IA which can be used as base on build on.

IIRC, the Armored Regiments with Infantry Divisions has been there since late 90s. {per an officer who served in late 90's that is not so. adding armoured regiments to inf div is part of the 'cold start' doctrine i.e circa 2002. as of now only the pivot corps inf div have been selected for adding armoured regiments.
Am I correct in assuming that this is so since the inf div in strike corps are anyway expected to go mechanised in the future ?}

<snip> To raise such a formation is bloody expensive. And honestly, I'd put the money on other things first.
{agreed. tube and MB arty for example not to mention equipping the infantry.}

I also remember reading about a plan where by Strike Corps were to have one Heavy Attack Helicopter Bde while other Corps were to have Bde with LCH. {operated by IAF but controlled by IA, as is the case with the Mi-35s ?} As for WSI Dhruv, I'm quite sure we will see them with the existing/new formations in NE.

As for the number of Armored Regiments and their distribution, the spread likely to be like this:

Armored Divisions*3 @ 3 Armored Bdes/Div with 6 armored Regiments in all. Total Armored Regiment-18
7 Independent Armored Bdes@ 3 Armored Regiments each. 14(I) Armored Bde has 4 Armored Regiments. Total -22
6 RAPIDS***@ 2 Armored Regiments each. Total - 12
Grand Total - 52 Armored Regiments
Leaves another 11 for Infantry Divisions.
{there are 17 inf div IIRC. so 6 will be without an integral armoured regiment. suspect these are the ones in the strike corps which will become mechanised over time}
P.S: I confused Global Security with Strategy Page. Global Security is definitely a better source but more of raw data then any analysis. {actually prefer that rather than analysis by some ill-informed videsi. }
See the bottom most part of the page; it mentions the presence of Armored Regiments with Infantry Divisions.
***The number of RAPIDS have increased to 6 from 4. Some 10 new Armored and Mechanized Regiments are under raising (source:Orbat.com).
{thanks a lot for the info ! which corps are the new RAPIDs going into ?
any pointers how to navigate to these pages from the ORBAT main page will be much appreciated !}

why sir btw ?

p.s I'll repost these in the Indian Army thread. perhaps we should continue there.

RayC · Post by **RayC** » 13 Sep 2009 21:44

There were armoured units in Inf Divs throughout?

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 13 Sep 2009 21:47

RayC wrote:There were armoured units in Inf Divs throughout?

Sir, I was about to X-post your comment in the IA discussion thread on the integral armored regiments with Infantry Divisions even prior to RAPIDS. I'm given to understand that this phenomenon came into being in late 90s. Is that understanding correct? Or its predates late 90s?

Thanx in advance

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 13 Sep 2009 21:49

rohit, I think we should continue in IA thread itself.
I'll cross-post the above there.
thanks.

RayC · Post by **RayC** » 13 Sep 2009 21:53

rohitvats wrote:
RayC wrote:There were armoured units in Inf Divs throughout?
Sir, I was about to X-post your comment in the IA discussion thread on the integral armored regiments with Infantry Divisions even prior to RAPIDS. I'm given to understand that this phenomenon came into being in late 90s. Is that understanding correct? Or its predates late 90s?

Thanx in advance

To be frank, my memory fails.

There was an Armoured unit in the Inf Div.

Then it was concentrated and it must be understood that armour was not available as if in a supermarket and the concept was honed to accept this.

Thereafter, armour was made available to suit the concept acceptable for India and so things changed.

Now, it is more available and the concept changed to ensure that there is more punch available for the Pivots!

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 13 Sep 2009 23:29

per an officer who served in late 90's that is not so. adding armoured regiments to inf div is part of the 'cold start' doctrine i.e circa 2002. as of now only the pivot corps inf div have been selected for adding armoured regiments.
Am I correct in assuming that this is so since the inf div in strike corps are anyway expected to go mechanised in the future ?

The integral armor question has already been answered by RayC Sir and Jagan garu. Just a guess..the officer you spoke to may actually be taking about the conversion of Infantry Divisions with Pivot/Holding Corps to RAPID. They will give more firepower to the Pivot Corps and may become precursors to the IBGs (if wishes were horses....)

As for the mechanization of Infantry assets with Strike Corps, it is long overdue. The whole Corps cannot move as one. The mobility reduces in Armored>>RAPID>>>Infantry Divisions. The RAPIDS are themselves only partially mechanized. The PA has atleast used the M113 APC to mechanize the Infantry Divisions in their ARN/ARS. Helps the Infantry to keep pace with the armor. Though not an optimal solution, suits the PA budgets

But I do not see any plan to achieve the mechanization in any great hurry. It is complex and expensive proposition. Consider the following: II Corps has 1 Armored+1 RAPID+1 Infantry Division. To fully mechanize the RAPID and Infantry Division (assuming the RAPID becomes a fully Mechanized Division) will require further 6 Armored Regiments and 10 Mechanized Regiments. I've discounted the 2 Armored and 2 Mechanized Regiments with RAPID. Add at least 4*155mm SP Howitzers per Division and you need 12 SP Regiments (216 guns). Now apply that to the 3 Strike Corps and you know the numbers we're talking about.

The irony of situation is that as per Army Plan 2000, the IA was to be completely Mechanized. Only 7 Infantry Divisions were to be converted to RAPIDS configuration as their AOR was considered to be non conducive to mechanized warfare.

there are 17 inf div IIRC. so 6 will be without an integral armoured regiment. suspect these are the ones in the strike corps which will become mechanised over time.

I do not think it is that straight forward. Not all Infantry Divisions can have integral armor assets due their AOR. 3 Infantry Div(Leh) and 19 Infantry Div(Baramullah) being some example.

thanks a lot for the info ! which corps are the new RAPIDs going into ?

While it is not difficult to find that out, unless it comes into public domain, would not want to comment on it.

any pointers how to navigate to these pages from the ORBAT main page will be much appreciated

Check the history section and period of 1946-99. Als, there is Centre for Indian Military History (CIMH) link on top of the page.

soutikghosh · Post by **soutikghosh** » 14 Sep 2009 15:47

Gurkha group to raise "guerrilla force" to defend against any Chinese invasion

http://img21.imageshack.us/img21/7180/b2209map1.jpg
It seems that the increasingly frequent incursions by Chinese troops in Tibet across the disputed Line of Actual Control has rattled the various peoples living on the Indian side of the Indo-Tibetan border.

For background, the Gorkha Janmukti Morcha is India's largest Gorkha (Gurkha) political party. It is very active in the states of West Bengal, Sikkim, and to a lesser extent, Arunachal Pradesh and Assam. The border at Sikkim is disputed and China has the gall to claim Arunachal Pradesh in its entirety. The Gorkha and Nepali speaking people in these areas are the primary recruitment centers for India's Gorkha Rifles Regiments.
Among its ranks, the GJM has a huge following by active and retired Gurkha soldiers from the Indian Army's Gorkha and Assam Regiments, soldiers from the British Gorkha Regiment who have settled in the area and Gorkhas in the police and paramilitary forces of West Bengal, Sikkim, and in the Northeast states. Their rank and file as well as political leadership represent a pretty solid breadth of military experience. They are currently (rather successfully) campaigning for a separate Gorkhaland state that will encompass Nepali-speaking areas of Sikkim, West Bengal and Assam.
What's interesting for any fan of Subcontinental militaria is that this civilian Gorkha group is inspired by other highly-trainied local border resistance formations raised after the 1962 Sino-Indian war: the Ladakh and Nubra Scouts comprised of ethnic Ladakhis and Tibetans in Jammu and Kashmir, the Dogra and Kumaon Scouts comprised of Dogras and Kumaonis in Punjab, Himachal Pradesh and Uttaranchal, and India's large Special Frontier Force - one of India's most highly trained and it's most secretive Special Operations Force comprised of ethnic Tibetans recruited from border areas, Tibetan exiles and Tibetan refugees who fled the Chinese occupation of Tibet (reportedly fluency in both Tibetan and Mandarin is a requirement.) The Ladakh Scouts has since been significantly expanded and upgraded into a full regiment and although it's one of the Indian Army's youngest, it is now among it's most decorated. The Dogra Scouts and Kumaon Scouts have since been folded into the Dogra and Kumaon Regiments and into Indo-Tibetan border police formations. The SFF has actually been expanded to include other hill peoples.

These military border regiments and paramilitary border scout formations are highly trained, very well equipped, and have an increased number of Ghatak (special forces) platoons compared to other units. They are tasked with intelligence, pathfinder scouting, special operations behind enemy lines, and organizing resistance in the population behind any potential Chinese gains. In a conflict, border scout elements and Indo-Tibetan border police will be embedded with forward stationed regular Indian army troops to provide critical local scout support through the nearly unmapped mountainous passes that define the border.
All the above units are from the the Western Sector of the Sino-Indian border, but also worth noting is that a 5,000-strong formation of Arunachal Scouts will soon be raised in Arunachal Pradesh, comprising Tibetans and Arunachalis of various tribal groups. This will effectively repeat on the Eastern sector of Sikkim and Arunachal the success of Scouts formations on the Western border.

The of the raising of border troops is especially significant in the Indo-Tibetan border, where their use as a force-multiplier cannot be understated. The Ladakhis, Tibetans, Dogras, Kumaons, Sikkimese, Nepali and Arunachali peoples make among the world's best mountain warriors and the battle-tested ferocity of Ladakh Scouts, Gorkha, Dogra and Kumaoni troops in Himalayan conflicts like Siachen Glacier and Kargil in particular is legendary. Hill peoples naturally are culturally and physically adapted as well as acclimated to scaling the Himalayan heights, they are extremely loyal troops that harbor a deep resentment of the Chinese, and as the article said, in event of a border conflict they are tasked with literally fighting to save their peoples, homes and families.

This news also follows frantic plans by Sikkim, West Bengal and Arunachal Pradesh to strengthen Home Guard defenses, including sending local police and paramilitary forces to the Indian Army's prestigious Counter-Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School: one of the worlds best COIN schools where American, British and various other countries have sent special forces troops to train. The motto of the school is "to fight the guerrilla as a guerrilla", and seeing as there are no insurgencies in Sikkim and Arunachal, the implication is that the state security forces are training in unconventional (read: guerrilla resistance) warfare against any Chinese occupation in a big way.

Needless to say, an extremely loyal and militarized local population who are not only knowledgeable of and suited to the local terrain, but whose soldiers also have a established modern reputation for being extremely ferocious mountain fighters who will have to fight for their homes, hearth and families in any Sino-Indian border conflict is an acute post-1962-war Indian advantage India has that the PLA simply does not and will never have in Tibet and amongst the Tibetans.

Behind the front lines of Sikkim, Bhutan (whose border defenses are fully integrated with India's and whose external security the Indian military is responsible for) and Arunachal, the entire northeast has a large number of local state, tribal and ethnic paramilitary forces that are masters of COIN and (counter-) guerrilla warfare, who literally wrote the book on India's extremely successful counter-insurgent strategy and who can also be counted on to offer ferocious, local and a highly experienced, battle-tested resistance to any Chinese advance. Again, these are units and experience that simply did not exist in 1962.

The expansion of these police and paramilitary groups plus the activation of airfields and forward dispersed stationing of Indian Airforce advanced aircraft, the raising of offensive mountain divisions, and now the expansion of front-line scout formations shows that India is upping their border defenses in a big way... basically doing everything right they did wrong in the 1962 war. With the increasing frequency of reports of Chinese incursions into India leading to a media frenzy, the intractability of border talks, and rapidly deteriorating goodwill between the two nations, is something in the offing we don't know about?

Amitabh · Post by **Amitabh** » 14 Sep 2009 20:01

RayC wrote:I do not grudge anyone being enamoured by foreign concepts or equipment as I do not grudge anyone preferring a western blond for his better half. It is each man's choice and good luck to him because luck is an important factor in love and war!

While I am accused of being a McCauley clone, yet on what I understand, I am swadeshi and have no shame to admit it.

I am not impressed with the idea of cloning the IA on foreign concepts, systems and terminology and gobbledygooks. Our threat perception, psyche, equipment etc are not the same.

Take Afghanistan and Kashmir. Who has been able to control the situation? And we don't use air, artillery or tanks!!

I agree with what Rumsfeld said - "you go to war with the Army you have, not the Army you want" because none can give me the army that I want!

We must cut our coat as per our cloth!

And lastly, the proof of the pudding is in the eating - has the Armed Forces let the country down with all its warts and shortcomings that the good intentioned citizens and NRIs feel that we are not up to the mark?

Without taking away from the fact that you obviously have much more experience of the army and its working than most people on this forum, I have to say that I disagree with a couple of points that you have brought up.

(1) Whatever the success or failure of the Schlieffen Plan (which was not executed as originally planned in any case), the fact is that the Prussians in the 19th century and the Germans in the 20th century dominated opponents much bigger and more powerful, and were really crushed on the battlefield by the industrial might of their opponents. The system clearly worked for them in the military sense. It might be entirely true as you say that we cannot extrapolate this leasily into the subcontinental context, but you cannot dismiss the achievements of the Prussian/German system. In fact our own greatest triumph - 1971 - is at best equivalent to just one campaign in WW1 or WW2. We have not been tested in conventional war like the Germans have (and hopefully will never be!).

(2) I humbly suggest that Afghanistan is an altogether different challenge from Kashmir. Although we have developed an excellent system to deal with the Kashmir insurgency and our manpower-oriented, as opposed to firepower-intensive, approach has great merit, the Afghan is a different kind of fighter from the Kashmiri. So it is not quite so simple. I dare say that the Indian Army would find suppressing the Taliban more challenging, partly because our troops' motivation levels would be different (foreign land vs. defending the homeland) as someone has already suggested.

So even as we are justifiably proud of the system that we have, let us take care to not dismiss organisations that have developed way to deal with even bigger challenges than those that have been - fortunately - thrown our way.

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 14 Sep 2009 20:24

amitabh ji, not commenting on any of the other points but

the Afghan is a different kind of fighter from the Kashmiri. So it is not quite so simple. I dare say that the Indian Army would find suppressing the Taliban more challenging, partly because our troops' motivation levels would be different (foreign land vs. defending the homeland) as someone has already suggested.

for quite sometime now a large proportion of terrorists in J&K have been foreign ones, including those from afghanistan. the % of foreign fighters has gone up through the years.

everywhere, including in afghanistan, it is the religiously motivated foreign fighters that were supposed to be the most feared ones, even more than than the local variety.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 14 Sep 2009 20:39

I humbly suggest that Afghanistan is an altogether different challenge from Kashmir. Although we have developed an excellent system to deal with the Kashmir insurgency and our manpower-oriented, as opposed to firepower-intensive, approach has great merit, the Afghan is a different kind of fighter from the Kashmiri. So it is not quite so simple. I dare say that the Indian Army would find suppressing the Taliban more challenging, partly because our troops' motivation levels would be different (foreign land vs. defending the homeland) as someone has already suggested

@Amitabh That is quite a speculative statement you have made without any backing. First, various Tanzeems in J&K for a very long time have constituted of Pakistani Punjabi and Afghan fighters. And while there are stories of Afghani figters being more audacious than their Kashmiri brothers, they haven't made any difference to situation on ground. And as for the homeland vs. foreign land debate....well, is there any documented instance of lack of motivation as a factor of "lesser performace" by IPKF?

BTW, I myself greatly appreciate the German General Staff. The efficacy and impact of the system can be gauged from the fact that the Treay of Versailles specifically forbade the creation or recreation of the General Staff.

RayC · Post by **RayC** » 14 Sep 2009 21:20

Amitabh wrote:

(1) Whatever the success or failure of the Schlieffen Plan (which was not executed as originally planned in any case), the fact is that the Prussians in the 19th century and the Germans in the 20th century dominated opponents much bigger and more powerful, and were really crushed on the battlefield by the industrial might of their opponents. The system clearly worked for them in the military sense. It might be entirely true as you say that we cannot extrapolate this leasily into the subcontinental context, but you cannot dismiss the achievements of the Prussian/German system. In fact our own greatest triumph - 1971 - is at best equivalent to just one campaign in WW1 or WW2. We have not been tested in conventional war like the Germans have (and hopefully will never be!).

It is true that the Indian Armed Forces cleared East Pakistan in a short time in 1971, but was it blitzkrieg in the classical sense?

Further, if we honestly analyse history, the excellent information given by the Mukti Bahini played a major role in the success. The clearer and detailed the information one gets of enemy’s dispositions, the better is the planning for the battle and hence smoother and quicker is the execution.

As far as the Schlieffen Plan is concerned, it is not my opinion, but those of military historians, and amongst them, many with military experience.

(2) I humbly suggest that Afghanistan is an altogether different challenge from Kashmir. Although we have developed an excellent system to deal with the Kashmir insurgency and our manpower-oriented, as opposed to firepower-intensive, approach has great merit, the Afghan is a different kind of fighter from the Kashmiri. So it is not quite so simple. I dare say that the Indian Army would find suppressing the Taliban more challenging, partly because our troops' motivation levels would be different (foreign land vs. defending the homeland) as someone has already suggested.

Every people fighting for their land will be ferocious and the Afghans or anyone else will be no less.

Let us take Somalia. The Indian Brigade successfully subdued Mohamed Farrah Aidid, the most formidable and dread Somali horror and his army! Our actions combined the often-conflicting roles of coercive disarmament and humanitarian relief. With stand-alone capacity, the Indian brigade had operational responsibilities for one third of Somalia viz, 1,73,000 sq km area of responsibility, the largest ever held by any contingent. And interestingly, unlike, Afghanistan, there was no govt worth the name! Compare that with the US in Somalia – Blackhawk down is an ideal example.

The Indian Army's approach is subduing with humanitarian action along with military action. Hate to use the term since it has been used by Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, the PDP chap – we do it with a healing touch and it works.

Let us not feel that Kashmir or the NE is child’s play just because near normalcy has been achieved. The NE and Kashmir are not child’s play at all. It is more difficult. If the IA had adopted the mode used by the US or SL, we would have crushed the insurgency long ago, though I am sure, it would be seething underground like a coal fire below the earth to erupt again!

Insurgencies cannot be snuffed out by force. It has to be snuffed out by force tempered with humanity! And what is worse, while the Sri Lankan govt has never accepted the Tamil as their own and so they could butcher them or the US is fighting foreigners as they did in Vietnam and now in Iraq and Afghanistan, we are trying to control our own people, who are being misguided to believe Islam is a separate political entity, divorced of the reality of nation states. This makes the issue more complex for handling than what the US is doing in Afghanistan. Every action of the US has huge collateral damage in innocent lives and property. Compare that with happenings in Kashmir!

So, let us not feel that we are having an easier problem in Kashmir. Another issue that makes it look as if nothing is happening is that our media does not go to town over what the Security Forces are achieving and are very shy of using the hyperbole. If the Indian media handled the issues like the US media, then the Indian public would realise the magnitude of the problem.

The IA controls insurgencies with one hand tied behind our back. Others control not only with both hands, but with both feet too!!

To control Afghanistan, the ISAF and the US have to ensure that there is no infiltration from Pakistan. To do this, they will have to have posts organised along the Durand Line. Then they must have secondary lines to stop those who have trickled in through the first line and lastly, they must have reserves to take on the ones who have trickled through all these lines and organised themselves to create havoc in the towns and rural areas. This requires immense amount of troops. They don’t have the luxury nor have the inclination to do so!

So even as we are justifiably proud of the system that we have, let us take care to not dismiss organisations that have developed way to deal with even bigger challenges than those that have been - fortunately - thrown our way.

Vietnam was a challenge. The ill equipped and poorly fed VC got the better of them. Iraq continues to have bomb and IED blasts killing scores. Afghanistan is floundering. Is Kashmir a smaller challenge? It appears so many since they do not realise the magnitude of the issue. Apart from the terrorists being sent inside Kashmir by Pakistan, legal political parties like the PDP are fomenting trouble by inciting the public and one can do nothing about that! The Hurriyat is of course there to add to the fun and games.

Let us not feel that we are tackling a small issue in Kashmir. It is not Kashmir alone which has been brought into near normalcy (degree varies), it is also the NE. Compare Kashmir and the NE to the days of yore.

The nub of the matter is that you can kill people, but you cannot kill a thought! You can mould that thought and Kill it with Kindness!

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 14 Sep 2009 21:31

The nub of the matter is that you can kill people, but you cannot kill a thought! You can mould that thought and Kill it with Kindness!

RayC Sir, that one line sums the crux of the whole insurgency problem. If the solution had been the 1st part of the statement, Bangladesh would have remained East Pakistan, Baluchistan would have been rose garden and Chechnya would have been a picnic spot.

Hitesh · Post by **Hitesh** » 15 Sep 2009 03:31

RayC,

Not to take anything from Indian Army's achievements in the Somalia theater, but most of the damage to Aidid's forces was done during the Blackhawk Down incident. During that incident, most of Aidid's forces came out in force to play and were decimated. After that incident, Aidid lost most of his firepower and his standing was drastically weakened among the Somalia warlords.

The VC never got the better of the American forces. After the Tet offensive, they were decimated and was never back to its former self and was a shell. In fact, it was the NVA that took over the VC's role and duties.

Surya · Post by **Surya** » 15 Sep 2009 06:01

Rahul, rohit

amitabh is mentioning our troops in Afghanisthan.

Its a diff situation with our troops in J&K. fighting the mehman in our land is diff.

There its there own land. When you are in a foreign land its harder to be motivated especially a dust bowl like Afghanisthan

So from that perspective its untested - as a country

As a country and the Army - we have not had an extended campaign in a foreign land.

So its uncharted territory

Gagan · Post by **Gagan** » 15 Sep 2009 08:09

RayC wrote:Insurgencies cannot be snuffed out by force. It has to be snuffed out by force tempered with humanity!

Exactly,
I was talking to a few villagers in rural punjab after the khalistan movement was on its last ebb. The feedback I got from them was, the grudging appreciation of the army they had was palpable.

The overall suggestion was that the army generally left the people alone, but if a terrorist was located, they went after him with full force, and usually bombed the crap out of the house where he was hiding.
There is appreciation of superior firepower, and everyone loves a winner. more so one who is seen to be doing justice and following the law.

AnimeshP · Post by **AnimeshP** » 15 Sep 2009 08:11

Surya wrote:Rahul, rohit

amitabh is mentioning our troops in Afghanisthan.

Its a diff situation with our troops in J&K. fighting the mehman in our land is diff.

There its there own land. When you are in a foreign land its harder to be motivated especially a dust bowl like Afghanisthan

So from that perspective its untested - as a country

As a country and the Army - we have not had an extended campaign in a foreign land.

So its uncharted territory

IPKF ??

Surya · Post by **Surya** » 15 Sep 2009 09:03

IPKF was not extended -operation we wound up and came home in a couple of years.

It was a neighbour - - not thousands or miles away in an extended logistic line.

to be comparable it will have a to be a few divisions worth of troops for 8 odd years a few thousand miles away

and examples before Independence do not count

RayC · Post by **RayC** » 15 Sep 2009 09:42

Hitesh wrote:RayC,

Not to take anything from Indian Army's achievements in the Somalia theater, but most of the damage to Aidid's forces was done during the Blackhawk Down incident. During that incident, most of Aidid's forces came out in force to play and were decimated. After that incident, Aidid lost most of his firepower and his standing was drastically weakened among the Somalia warlords.

The VC never got the better of the American forces. After the Tet offensive, they were decimated and was never back to its former self and was a shell. In fact, it was the NVA that took over the VC's role and duties.

On Somalia, you may look at this link:
http://inquirer.philly.com/packages/som ... rang16.asp

It is an interesting account. An excerpt from this article inadvertently indicates the US way of operating:

The American soldiers were so confident of a quick victory that they neglected to take night-vision devices and water, both sorely needed later. Carefully defined rules of engagement, calling for soldiers to fire only on Somalis who aimed weapons at them, were quickly discarded in the heat of the fight. Most soldiers interviewed said that through most of the fight they fired on crowds and eventually at anyone and anything they saw.

On Vietnam, I recommend you get in touch with Peter O'Toole of WAB, he is doing research on the Vietnam Campaign. He will have much to inform!

The issue is not about the US Army and its capabilities. The issue is the mode of approach to LIC that have social parameters. The US approach is to hammer the hell out irrespective of the collateral damage, while our way is to have a balance between force and that too minimum force and humanitarian activities. Winning the heart and soul in its real sense.