India Nuclear News And Discussion

[Gerard]

Is this for real?? If so, we're saved!

This is extraction from very low grade ore, not seawater.

Similar experiments have been done in India
NML uses bug technology to produce uranium

[Ameet]

Mongolian President arrives in Delhi. Civil nuke agreement and uranium supply on the cards.

http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/ind ... 46852.html

[Suraj]

Mongolian President arrives in Delhi. Civil nuke agreement and uranium supply on the cards.
http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/ind ... 46852.html

The deal has been signed:
India, Mongolia Sign Civil Nuclear Agreement for Uranium Supply

India signed a civil nuclear energy agreement with Mongolia that will help the South Asian country source uranium for its power plants.

The deal was finalized after talks with Mongolian President Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said in a statement today.

Asia’s third-biggest energy consumer has been looking for sellers of uranium as it tries to secure fuel for a planned 14- fold increase in nuclear generation capacity by 2030. A three- decade ban on supplies to the country was lifted in September last year, following which the government has agreed civil nuclear pacts with U.S., Russia, France, Kazakhstan and Namibia.

India is seeking long-term supply contracts from Kazakhstan, Canada and Brazil as it orders reactors worth at least $14 billion from overseas, Nuclear Power Corp. of India Chairman Shreyans Kumar Jain said June 5. The state-run company may spend more than $1.2 billion to buy equity in uranium mines abroad to meet shortages at home.

[NRao]

Siddharth Vardarajan writes:

Sing NPT, accept full safeguards US want UN to tell India

Sign NPT, accept full safeguards, U.S. wants U.N. to tell India

Siddharth Varadarajan

Obama nonproliferation resolution in Security Council has no place for India exception

New Delhi: In a measure of how the official line in Washington on India’s nuclear status has changed from the Bush to the Obama administrations, the U.S. is circulating a draft U.N. Security Council resolution calling, inter alia, for all Indian nuclear facilities to be placed under international safeguards and not just those that have been declared “civilian” under the July 2005 Indo-U.S. civil nuclear agreement.

The ostensible rationale for the resolution President Barack Obama would like adopted at the special UNSC session he will chair on September 24 is to demonstrate the seriousness of his stated commitment to the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.

But there is a sting in the tail for India: For the first time since the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) entered into force, the UNSC is going to demand that all states outside the treaty sign it immediately or begin adhering to its provisions.

The only other time the UNSC has adopted such a prescriptive demand for a country or group of countries that never accepted the treaty was in 1998, when it passed resolution 1172 urging India and Pakistan to sign the NPT as well as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in the wake of the nuclear tests both countries conducted in May that year.

Since then, 1172 has been treated by the international community, and the U.S. in particular, as a dead letter as far as India is concerned.

.....

Of special concern to India, therefore, is the third operational paragraph of Mr. Obama’s proposed resolution, which says the U.N.: “Calls upon all States that are not Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to join the Treaty so as to achieve its universality at an early date, and in any case to adhere to its terms;”.

For a country like India, that is not a party to the NPT and did not explode a nuclear device prior to 1968, the phrase “to join the treaty… and in any case to adhere to its terms” essentially means it should open up all nuclear facilities for inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency so that the latter can ensure that Indian reactors and fissile material stocks are not being used for weapons purposes.

Preambular paragraph 15 also reaffirms “all other relevant non-proliferation resolutions adopted by the Security Council,” an implicit reference to Resolution 1172.

Taken together, these references to India may lack enforceability but they do signal a quiet return to the “roll back” rhetoric and discourse of the Clinton era, before President George W. Bush pushed for India to be made an exception to the requirements of the NPT-related non-proliferation architecture.

Over the past few months, U.S. administration officials have revived the push for NPT universality at various international forums and sought to get the G8 to back a ban on enrichment and reprocessing technology sales to countries like India that have not signed the treaty.

Though these moves have been accompanied by statements of support for the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal and the beginning of talks on reprocessing, the repeated foregrounding of the NPT suggests growing American impatience with the Bush administration premise that India’s nuclear credentials warrant it being placed in a category different from Pakistan, Israel and North Korea.

Other provisions


The draft resolution also contains a range of other provisions on the CTBT, the permanence of safeguards and so on, as well explicitly requiring that all situations of “noncompliance with non-proliferation obligations” be brought to the UNSC which would then determine whether this non-compliance was a threat to international peace and security.

The only reference the resolution makes to the actual abolition of nuclear weapons is its call for all NPT and non-NPT members to undertake to pursue good faith negotiations on “a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” By clubbing together non-NPT states with all NPT states (i.e. both the nuclear and non-nuclear), this formulation avoids extending de facto recognition to the nuclear weapon status of India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea.

This call would not have been there is there wasn't ambiguity about Indian tests. The fizzle or reduced sizzle places India at mercy of such moves.

[NRao]

United States Draft UNSC Resolution on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Disarmament

The Security Council,

PP1. Resolving to seek a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons, in accordance with the goals of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all,

PP2. Reaffirming the Statement of its President adopted at the Council’s meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government on 31 January 1992 (S/23500), including the need for all Member States to fulfill their obligations in relation to arms control and disarmament and to prevent proliferation in all its aspects of all weapons of mass destruction,

PP3. Recalling also that the above Statement (S/23500) underlined the need for all Member States to resolve peacefully in accordance with the Charter any problems in that context threatening or disrupting the maintenance of regional and global stability,

PP4. Bearing in mind the responsibilities of other organs of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, arms control and nonproliferation, and supporting them to continue to play their due roles,

PP5. Underlining that the NPT remains the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and calling upon all States Parties to the NPT to cooperate so that the 2010 NPT Review Conference can successfully strengthen the Treaty and set realistic and achievable goals in all the Treaty’s three pillars: non-proliferation, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and disarmament,

PP6. Reaffirming its firm commitment to the NPT and its conviction that the international nuclear non-proliferation regime should be maintained and strengthened to ensure its effective implementation,

PP7. Calling for further progress on all aspects of disarmament to enhance global security,

PP8. Welcoming the decisions of those non-nuclear-weapon States that have dismantled their nuclear weapons programs or renounced the possession of nuclear weapons,

PP9. Welcoming the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament efforts undertaken and accomplished by nuclear-weapon States, and underlining the need to pursue further efforts in the sphere of nuclear disarmament, in accordance with Article VI of the NPT,

PP10. Welcoming in this connection the decision of the Russian Federation and the United States of America to conduct negotiations to conclude a new comprehensive legally binding agreement to replace the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, which expires in December 2009,

PP11. Welcoming and supporting the steps taken to conclude nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and reaffirming the conviction that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, and in accordance with the 1999 UN Disarmament Commission guidelines, enhances global and regional peace and security, strengthens the nuclear nonproliferation regime, and contributes toward realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament,

PP12. Recalling the statements by each of the five nuclear-weapon States, noted by resolution 984 (1995), in which they give security assurances against the use of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon State Parties to the NPT, and reaffirming that such security assurances strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime,

PP13. Reaffirming its resolutions 825 (1993), 1695 (2006), 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009),

PP14. Reaffirming its resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008),

PP15. Reaffirming all other relevant non-proliferation resolutions adopted by the Security Council,

PP16. Gravely concerned about the threat of nuclear terrorism, including the provision of nuclear material or technical assistance for the purposes of terrorism,

PP17. Mindful in this context of the risk that irresponsible or unlawful provision of nuclear material or technical assistance could enable terrorism,

PP18. Expressing its support for the 2010 Global Summit on Nuclear Security,

PP19. Affirming its support for the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism,

PP20. Recognizing the progress made by the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and the G-8 Global Partnership,

PP21. Reaffirming UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004) and the necessity for all States to implement fully the measures contained therein, and calling upon all UN Member States and international and regional organizations to cooperate actively with the Committee established pursuant to that resolution, including in the course of the comprehensive review as called for in resolution 1810 (2008),

1. Emphasizes that a situation of noncompliance with nonproliferation obligations shall be brought to the attention of the Security Council, which will determine if that situation constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and emphasizes the Security Council’s primary responsibility in addressing such threats;

2. Calls upon States Parties to the NPT to comply fully with all their obligations under
the Treaty, and in this regard notes that enjoyment of the benefits of the NPT by a State Party can be assured only by its compliance with the obligations thereunder;

3. Calls upon all States that are not Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to join the Treaty so as to achieve its universality at an early date, and in any case to adhere to its terms;

4 Calls upon the Parties to the NPT, pursuant to Article VI of the Treaty, to undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear arms reduction and disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, and calls on all other States to join in this endeavor;

5. Calls upon all States to refrain from conducting a nuclear test explosion and to join the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), thereby bringing the treaty into force;

6. Calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate a Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices as soon as possible, and welcomesthe Conference on Disarmament’s adoption by consensus of its Program of Work in 2009;7. Deplores in particular the current major challenges to the nonproliferation regime that the Security Council has determined to be threats to international peace and security, and demands that the parties concerned comply fully with their obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions,

8. Encourages efforts to advance development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy in a framework that reduces proliferation risk and adheres to the highest international standards for safeguards, security, and safety;

9. Underlines that the NPT recognizes in Article IV the right of the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I , II and III of the Treaty,

10. Calls upon States to adopt stricter national controls for the export of sensitive goods and technologies of the nuclear fuel cycle;

11. Encourages the work of the IAEA on multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including assurances of nuclear fuel supply and related measures, as effective means of addressing the expanding need for nuclear fuel and nuclear fuel services and minimizing the risk of proliferation, and urges the IAEA Board of Governors to agree upon measures to this end as soon as possible;

12. Affirms that effective IAEA safeguards are essential to prevent nuclear proliferation and to facilitate cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and in that regard:

a. Calls upon all non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT that have yet to bring into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement or a modified small quantities protocol to do so immediately,

b. Calls upon all States to adopt and implement an Additional Protocol, which together with comprehensive safeguards agreements constitute essential elements of the IAEA safeguards system,

c. Stresses the importance for all Member States to ensure that the IAEA continue to have all the necessary resources and authority to verify the declared use of nuclear materials and facilities and the absence of undeclared activities, and for the IAEA to report to the Council accordingly as appropriate;

13. Encourages States to provide the IAEA with the cooperation necessary for it to verify whether a state is in compliance with its safeguards obligations, and affirms the Security Council’s resolve to support the IAEA’s efforts to that end, consistent with its authorities under the Charter;

14. Undertakes to address without delay any State’s notice of withdrawal from the NPT, including the events described in the statement provided by the State pursuant to Article X of the Treaty, while recognizing ongoing discussions in the course of the NPT review on identifying modalities under which NPT States Parties could collectively respond to notification of withdrawal, and affirmsthat a State remains responsible under international law for violations of the NPT committed prior to its withdrawal;

15. Encourages States to require as a condition of nuclear exports that the recipient State agree that, in the event that it should terminate, withdraw from, or be found by the IAEA Board of Governors to be in noncompliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement or withdraw from the NPT, the supplier state would have a right to require the return of nuclear material and equipment provided prior to such termination, noncompliance or withdrawal, as well as any special nuclear material produced through the use of such material or equipment;

16. Encourages States to consider whether a recipient State has in place an Additional Protocol in making nuclear export decisions;

17. Urges States to require as a condition of nuclear exports that the recipient State agree that, in the event that it should terminate its IAEA safeguards agreement, safeguards shall continue with respect to any nuclear material and equipment provided prior to such withdrawal, as well as any special nuclear material produced through the use of such material or equipment;

18. Calls for universal adherence to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and its 2005 Amendment;

19. Welcomes the March 2009 recommendations of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) to make more effective use of existing funding mechanisms, including the consideration of the establishment of a voluntary fund, and affirms its commitment to promote full implementation of UNSCR 1540 by Member States by ensuring effective and sustainable support for the activities of the 1540 Committee;

20. Reaffirms the need for full implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2004) by Member States and, with an aim of preventing access to, or assistance and financing for, weapons of mass destruction, related materials and their means of delivery by non-State actors, as defined in the resolution, and calls upon Member States to cooperate actively with the Committee established pursuant to that resolution and the IAEA, including rendering assistance, at their request, for their implementation of UNSCR 1540 provisions, and in this context welcomes the forthcoming comprehensive review of the status of implementation of UNSCR 1540 with a view to increasing its effectiveness, and calls upon all States to participate actively in this review;

21. Calls upon Member States to share best practices with a view to improved safety standards and nuclear security practices and raise standards of nuclear security to reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism, with the aim of securing all vulnerable nuclear material from such risks within four years;

22. Calls upon all States to manage responsibly and minimize to the greatest extent that is technically and economically feasible the use of highly enriched uranium for civilian purposes, including by working to convert research reactors and radioisotope production processes to the use of low enriched uranium fuels and targets;

23. Calls upon all States to improve their national technical capabilities to detect, deter, and disrupt illicit trafficking in nuclear materials throughout their territories, and to work to enhance international partnerships and capacity building in this regard;

24. Urges all States to take all appropriate national measures in accordance with their national authorities and legislation, and consistent with international law, to prevent proliferation financing, shipments, or illicit trafficking, to strengthen export controls, to secure sensitive materials, and to control access to intangible transfers of technology;

25. Declares its resolve to monitor closely any situations involving the proliferation of nuclear weapons, their means of delivery or related material, including to or by non-State actors as they are defined in resolution 1540 (2004), and, as appropriate, to take such measures as may be necessary to ensure the maintenance of international peace and security;

26. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

[NRao]

Obama's UN nonproliferation resolution: the text

When Barack Obama makes his debut appearance at the United Nations next week, and becomes the first president of the United States to preside over a United Nations Security Council meeting, the centerpiece of his administration’s efforts to set a new tone of international partnership at the forum will be his administration’s nuclear disarmament proposal.

The text of a draft U.S. government UN Security Council resolution on nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, distributed by the U.S. to Security Council permanent member states this weekend, has been obtained by POLITICO and is made available here.

The draft U.S. UN resolution, which was apparently not yet officially distributed beyond the Security Council permanent five member states, may be subject to adjustments between now and when Obama chairs a head of state-level meeting of the UN Security Council on nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament September 24th.

"As he laid out in his April Prague speech, President Obama has made non-proliferation and arms control a top priority and he is looking forward to promoting and further strengthening international multilateral cooperation on these vital issues at this session," NSC spokesman Michael Hammer said by email. "While we will not get into details regarding our diplomatic discussions, we are working closely with UN Security Council members to ensure that it is a productive session.”

Washington nonproliferation experts describe the draft U.S. resolution as important, including in signaling the Obama administration’s return to some international non-proliferation commitments that the Bush administration had walked back from. In particular, they note the proposal's endorsing that world nuclear powers pledge to not attack non-nuclear states with nuclear weapons, as well as a passage that would make a nation's "right" to pursue peaceful nuclear energy contingent upon being in compliance with other obligations spelled out in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

“What Obama is doing here, is, as he said in Prague, recommitting the United States to action on disarmament,” the Arms Control Association’s executive director Daryl Kimball said Monday. “He is reiterating U.S. and P-5 support for some things that the Bush administration walked back from.” Among them: the comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT), which bans the testing of nuclear weapons (and which the U.S. has signed but the Senate not ratified), and what are called “negative security assurances” – guarantees by nuclear weapons states not to attack non-nuclear weapons states with nukes, Kimball said.

Kimball said another important passage in the draft U.S. disarmament resolution is a passage that makes the “right” of states to pursue nuclear energy “contingent on fulfilling their other non-proliferation treaty obligations,” Kimball noted. In other words, countries such as Iran that have been found to be in violation of their nonproliferation treaty obligations would not have a recognized “right” to enrich uranium, as Iran has frequently declared it has.

“What this is about is trying to build international support for strengthening global non-proliferation efforts in all sorts of ways,” Kimball said, “rather than just seeking to limit the pursuit to a few bad apples,” namely Iran and North Korea.

“This resolution is a solid piece of work, the best one could expect from the UN resolution process,” said Joseph Cirincione, president of the Plougshares Fund, which advocates nonproliferation goals. “It’s significant in several aspects,” he added, naming in particular the draft’s reaffirming a pledge that nuclear states would not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states – a U.S. position up until the Bush administration, he said. “This could be very important later on,” Cirincione said, in making the case that the sole purpose of having nuclear weapons is to deter other states from using them.

"It's a good text that has a balanced approach between the three pillars of the non proliferation regime : non proliferation, disarmament and the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy," one European diplomat told POLITICO on condition of anonymity. "Some points need to be ironed out. In particular, this resolution, which should contain no wording that could be seen as weaker than what was agreed in previous resolutions. And it should certainly state the obvious : that proliferation is a threat to international security. This should be an occasion to send a message to those out there that are not complying to their international obligations."

The draft does not call out specific countries by name, but calls on all states to join the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Only four countries have not – India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel.

“I would not oversell this language,” one Washington non proliferation hand who asked to speak anonymously said, referring to that passage. “It is standard diplomatic text reaffirming the commitment of the P-5 to the NPT obligation to eventual nuclear disarmament. Important, but not groundbreaking.”

Washington hosts the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty review conference in May, a review which occurs every five years. The NPT treaty, first made open for signatures in 1968, came into force in 1970.

[Prem]

I have distinct fear that .MMS might use this security Council shenanigan as Cover to sign shitty bitty treaty.His Nov visitto USA calls for close scrutiny.

[NRao]

I feel that MMS will say "We will sign CTBT" - very loudly. Then in a very low, meek voice state the conditions under which he would sign. The latter would be lost in the noise generated by the clapping for the prior.

[NRao]

India, Mongolia ink nuke pact

Mongolia today became the fifth nation to sign a civil nuclear pact with India as New Delhi extended a 25 million US dollar soft loan to the Central Asian nation to help it mitigate the effects of the global financial meltdown.

Great significance is being attached to the MoU between the two countries on ‘development of cooperation in the field of peaceful use of radioactive minerals and nuclear energy’. Mongolia’s huge uranium reserves are expected to boost and energise India’s starving civil nuclear fuel cycle.

India has already signed nuclear deals with France, Russia, the US and Kazakhstan after it got an exemption from the nuclear suppliers’ group (NSG) in September last year to undertake nuclear commerce.

Mongolia, which claims to have 6 per cent of the world’ uranium reserves, is not a member of the NSG. However, it had supported India’s case for a clean waiver at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) meeting prior to the NSG meet.

Nuclear experts believe that the supply of uranium is more crucial for India than access to enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technology.

Mongolia’s decision could be a big surprise for Australia, which has refused to supply uranium to India as it was not a signatory to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT). India hopes Australia would also give up its reservation sooner rather than later and agree to supply uranium to India.

[shiv]

I have distinct fear that .MMS might use this security Council shenanigan as Cover to sign shitty bitty treaty.His Nov visitto USA calls for close scrutiny.

I am not sure why everyone here fears the CTBT. After all India has been trying desperately to appear like a "responsible power" to get brownie points and like a nearly toilet trained child we get 200 opportunities and 25,000 reasons to test and we test twice in 25 years. Why not agree to become fully toilet trained and give "Mooh tod jawab" to the world and show that we are a mature and responsible power. Not like Pakistan and N.Korea.

Hain?

[JwalaMukhi]

India is actually trying to desperately appear and is acting like "irresponsible power" who needs to be disciplined. Shouldn't "responsible power" require mimicking other mature "responsible powers" who indulge in preaching virtues of celibacy to others, while whoring all along. India volunteering to sign CTBT is contrary to it being an "irresponsible power"; because it needs to be disciplined by CTBT; not voluntary to sign it. Only "responsible powers" have the luxury of choosing to be magnanimous to voluntarily sign CTBT. "Irresponsible powers" do not have that choice or luxury of deciding to sign, they will be forced to.

[rkirankr]

The whole thing appears so confusing. Now this whole controversy adds lots of fuzziness to whether India has bum which only fizzled or really worked.Even cheeni and paki guys will be confused. Now if we sign CTBT a rational thinking paki will think "oh evil yindoos already have a tried and tested bum , they are signing CTBT, so they are confident of their bum while ours is from NOKO , so we will surrender, give up kashmir and fly the Tiranga in the pindi" We will ofcourse grow at 25% and kangress first family will be counted among gupta and maurya dynasty.

[NRao]

No reason to doubt yield of Pokhran-II tests: Atomic Energy Commission
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/news ... 015656.cms

MUMBAI: The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) has sought to put a lid on the controversy over the success of Pokhran-II saying it has no reason to cast doubts on the yield of the country's thermonuclear test in May 1998.

The AEC made this assessment at its formal meeting on September 5 to discuss issues in the wake of the controversy ignited by K Santhanam, a retired DRDO nuclear physicist and a member of the team involved in the tests, a Commission release said on Tuesday.

Santhanam had last month described the May 11, 1998 test as a `fizzle' (failure to achieve expected yield) and said India needed to conduct more tests. His claim was backed by some nuclear scientists including Dr P K Iyengar but was strongly countered by former President and missile scientist A P J Abdul Kalam.

The commission utilised the meeting to reiterate the credibility of the type and yield of the tests as the matter was already discussed several times since May 1998, AEC Secretary K Murlidhar said in the release. Meetings were held on May 21, November 12,1998 and subsequently on March 26 and November 18, 1999, in the presence of Raja Ramanna, a former AEC member and father of 1974 Pokhran-I nuclear test, he said. "The Commission had been briefed about the successful tests in May 1998 at its meeting held on May 21, 1998 wherein, details of the type of tests, estimated yields and other technical details were given," he said.

Some members of the atomic panel had felt that the media reports on whether Pokhran-II generated the expected yield could be more in the form of disinformation campaign, AEC sources said.

[arunsrinivasan]

India designs new atomic reactor for thorium utilisation

India announced on Wednesday that it has designed a new version of Advanced Heavy Water atomic reactor which will use lesser low enriched uranium along with thorium as fuel and having next generation safety requirements.

"A new version of AHWR named Advanced Heavy Water Reactor-Low Enriched Uranium (AHWR-LEU) that uses low enriched uranium along with thorium as fuel has been designed recently," chairman of Atomic Energy Commission Anil Kakodkar said at the International Atomic Energy Agency's(IAEA)'s General Conference.

The reactor has a significantly lower requirement of mined uranium per unit energy produced as compared to most of the current generation thermal reactors, Kakodkar said.

India, which has large thorium reserves, has chalked out a nuclear power programme based on its domestic resource position of uranium and thorium.

"This version can also meet the requirement of medium sized reactors in countries with small grids while meeting the requirements of next generation systems," Kakodkar said indicating that India was ready for export of such reactors in the near future.

"While we strongly advocate recycle option, AHWR-LEU would also compete very favourably even in once through mode of fuel cycle (where spent fuel is stored without reprocessing)," he said adding that the Department of Atomic energy has circulated a brochure of AHWR-LEU at the Conference for the benefit of potential customers.

[Arun_S]

Something in line with what I was proposing an year ago as the intermediate solution where PHWR can be run in mixed mode, and while AHWR funding approval awaits on MMS desk for the last 4 years.

However the most cost effective, compact and Thorium efficient reactor however will be the type that uses Enriched-Uranium (I.e. original AHWR of Indian design).

The reactor has a significantly lower requirement of mined uranium per unit energy produced as compared to most of the current generation thermal reactors, Kakodkar said.

Every thing is comparative. Kakodkar is careful (read clever) with words and does not state the unstated that this AHWR-LEU design is inferior to AHWR in key performance and cost matrices. This BARC design using -Low Enriched Uranium is making lemonade from the 123/IUCNA lemon that prevents import of enriched Uranium as well as prevents enrichment of imported Uranium that would allow India to fire up AHWR using imported Enriched fuel, making useless the need to import LWR.

Pls recall that original Indian AHWR proposed using Plutonium and not Uranium as feed stock to maintain criticality, while 75-90% energy comes from in-situ Thorium. The design remains unchanged if the AHWR uses Enriched Uranium or Pu.

Those who negotiated 123 agreement conveniently forgot the need for import of enriched Uranium w.r.t. AHWR and energy independence. And allowed teh restriction on import of enriched-U right in the first few pages of the 123 agreement.

[Arun_S]

I will highlight the parts that is deterimental to Indian interests:
United States Draft UNSC Resolution on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Disarmament

The Security Council,

PP1. Resolving to seek a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons, in accordance with the goals of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all,

PP2. Reaffirming the Statement of its President adopted at the Council’s meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government on 31 January 1992 (S/23500), including the need for all Member States to fulfill their obligations in relation to arms control and disarmament and to prevent proliferation {Arun_S: There are two types of Proliferation that west understands. Horizontal Proliferation (to otehr countries), & Vertical Proliferation (buildup of stockpile). Indians OTOH use the word to mean Horizontal Proliferation) US is using proliferation here to also mean no-Verticla Proliferation).

PP3. Recalling also that the above Statement (S/23500) underlined the need for all Member States to resolve peacefully in accordance with the Charter any problems in that context threatening or disrupting the maintenance of regional and global stability,

PP4. Bearing in mind the responsibilities of other organs of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, arms control and nonproliferation, and supporting them to continue to play their due roles,

PP5. Underlining that the NPT remains the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and calling upon all States Parties to the NPT to cooperate so that the 2010 NPT Review Conference can successfully strengthen the Treaty and set realistic and achievable goals in all the Treaty’s three pillars: non-proliferation, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and disarmament,

PP6. Reaffirming its firm commitment to the NPT {Arun_S: India cant re-effirm a treaty what it has conciously not signed.} and its conviction that the international nuclear non-proliferation regime should be maintained and strengthened to ensure its effective implementation,

PP7. Calling for further progress on all aspects of disarmament to enhance global security,

PP8. Welcoming the decisions of those non-nuclear-weapon States that have dismantled their nuclear weapons programs or renounced the possession of nuclear weapons,

PP9. Welcoming the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament efforts undertaken and accomplished by nuclear-weapon States, and underlining the need to pursue further efforts in the sphere of nuclear disarmament, in accordance with Article VI of the NPT,

PP10. Welcoming in this connection the decision of the Russian Federation and the United States of America to conduct negotiations to conclude a new comprehensive legally binding agreement to replace the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, which expires in December 2009,

PP11. Welcoming and supporting the steps taken to conclude nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and reaffirming the conviction that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, and in accordance with the 1999 UN Disarmament Commission guidelines, enhances global and regional peace and security, strengthens the nuclear nonproliferation regime, and contributes toward realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament,

PP12. Recalling the statements by each of the five nuclear-weapon States, noted by resolution 984 (1995), in which they give security assurances against the use of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon State Parties to the NPT, and reaffirming that such security assurances strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime,

PP13. Reaffirming its resolutions 825 (1993), 1695 (2006), 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), {Arun_S: Someone pls help review these resolutions and see its bearing on Indian interests.}

PP14. Reaffirming its resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), {Arun_S: Someone pls help review these resolutions and see its bearing on Indian interests.}

PP15. Reaffirming all other relevant non-proliferation resolutions adopted by the Security Council, {Arun_S: Someone pls help review these resolutions and see its bearing on Indian interests.}

PP16. Gravely concerned about the threat of nuclear terrorism, including the provision of nuclear material or technical assistance for the purposes of terrorism,

PP17. Mindful in this context of the risk that irresponsible or unlawful provision of nuclear material or technical assistance could enable terrorism,

PP18. Expressing its support for the 2010 Global Summit on Nuclear Security,

PP19. Affirming its support for the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism,

PP20. Recognizing the progress made by the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and the G-8 Global Partnership,

PP21. Reaffirming UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004) and the necessity for all States to implement fully the measures contained therein, and calling upon all UN Member States and international and regional organizations to cooperate actively with the Committee established pursuant to that resolution, including in the course of the comprehensive review as called for in resolution 1810 (2008),{Arun_S: Someone pls help review this resolution and see its bearing on Indian interests.}

1. Emphasizes that a situation of noncompliance with nonproliferation obligations shall be brought to the attention of the Security Council, which will determine if that situation constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and emphasizes the Security Council’s primary responsibility in addressing such threats;

2. Calls upon States Parties to the NPT to comply fully with all their obligations under the Treaty, and in this regard notes that enjoyment of the benefits of the NPT by a State Party can be assured only by its compliance with the obligations thereunder;

3. Calls upon all States that are not Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to join the Treaty so as to achieve its universality at an early date, and in any case to adhere to its terms; [/color] {Arun_S: India cant re-effirm a treaty what it has conciously not signed. It further cant agree to any resolution that binds it voluntary choice of action into adherence.}

4 Calls upon the Parties to the NPT, pursuant to Article VI of the Treaty, to undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear arms reduction and disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, and calls on all other States to join in this endeavor;

5. Calls upon all States to refrain from conducting a nuclear test explosion and to join the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), thereby bringing the treaty into force;[/color] {Arun_S: Indian monotorium on testing is voluntary and not constrained by any agreement or treaty it has signed (teh IUCNA specifies commercial and trade panelties if India does N tests). It further cant agree to any resolution that binds it voluntary choice of action into adherence.}

6. Calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate a Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices as soon as possible, and welcomes the Conference on Disarmament’s adoption by consensus of its Program of Work in 2009;7. Deplores in particular the current major challenges to the nonproliferation regime that the Security Council has determined to be threats to international peace and security, and demands that the parties concerned comply fully with their obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions, {Arun_S: India should stay away from it and delay teh investment in building a fissile material stockpile that can foresee-ably exceed Indian requirement ( at least equal to that of China + Pakistan) and thus stop further stockpiling. This has serious implication to fissile material for R&D that is out side IAEA per IAEA agreed rules covering FBR, AHWR etc. }

8. Encourages efforts to advance development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy in a framework that reduces proliferation risk and adheres to the highest international standards for safeguards, security, and safety;

9. Underlines that the NPT recognizes in Article IV the right of the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I , II and III of the Treaty,

10. Calls upon States to adopt stricter national controls for the export of sensitive goods and technologies of the nuclear fuel cycle;

11. Encourages the work of the IAEA on multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including assurances of nuclear fuel supply and related measures, as effective means of addressing the expanding need for nuclear fuel and nuclear fuel services and minimizing the risk of proliferation, and urges the IAEA Board of Governors to agree upon measures to this end as soon as possible;

12. Affirms that effective IAEA safeguards are essential to prevent nuclear proliferation and to facilitate cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and in that regard:

a. Calls upon all non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT that have yet to bring into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement or a modified small quantities protocol to do so immediately,

b. Calls upon all States to adopt and implement an Additional Protocol, which together with comprehensive safeguards agreements constitute essential elements of the IAEA safeguards system,

c. Stresses the importance for all Member States to ensure that the IAEA continue to have all the necessary resources and authority to verify the declared use of nuclear materials and facilities and the absence of undeclared activities, and for the IAEA to report to the Council accordingly as appropriate;

13. Encourages States to provide the IAEA with the cooperation necessary for it to verify whether a state is in compliance with its safeguards obligations, and affirms the Security Council’s resolve to support the IAEA’s efforts to that end, consistent with its authorities under the Charter;

14. Undertakes to address without delay any State’s notice of withdrawal from the NPT, including the events described in the statement provided by the State pursuant to Article X of the Treaty, while recognizing ongoing discussions in the course of the NPT review on identifying modalities under which NPT States Parties could collectively respond to notification of withdrawal, and affirms that a State remains responsible under international law for violations of the NPT committed prior to its withdrawal;

15. Encourages States to require as a condition of nuclear exports that the recipient State agree that, in the event that it should terminate, withdraw from, or be found by the IAEA Board of Governors to be in noncompliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement or withdraw from the NPT, the supplier state would have a right to require the return of nuclear material and equipment provided prior to such termination, noncompliance or withdrawal, as well as any special nuclear material produced through the use of such material or equipment; {Arun_S: This cuts the legs of Indian fall back position as it negotiated 123 and NSG. Needs deeper scrutiny.}

16. Encourages States to consider whether a recipient State has in place an Additional Protocol in making nuclear export decisions;

17. Urges States to require as a condition of nuclear exports that the recipient State agree that, in the event that it should terminate its IAEA safeguards agreement, safeguards shall continue with respect to any nuclear material and equipment provided prior to such withdrawal, as well as any special nuclear material produced through the use of such material or equipment;{Arun_S: This may impact Indian fall back position as it negotiated 123 and NSG. Needs deeper scrutiny.} [/i]

18. Calls for universal adherence to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and its 2005 Amendment;

19. Welcomes the March 2009 recommendations of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) to make more effective use of existing funding mechanisms, including the consideration of the establishment of a voluntary fund, and affirms its commitment to promote full implementation of UNSCR 1540 by Member States by ensuring effective and sustainable support for the activities of the 1540 Committee;

20. Reaffirms the need for full implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2004) by Member States and, with an aim of preventing access to, or assistance and financing for, weapons of mass destruction, related materials and their means of delivery by non-State actors, as defined in the resolution, and calls upon Member States to cooperate actively with the Committee established pursuant to that resolution and the IAEA, including rendering assistance, at their request, for their implementation of UNSCR 1540 provisions, and in this context welcomes the forthcoming comprehensive review of the status of implementation of UNSCR 1540 with a view to increasing its effectiveness, and calls upon all States to participate actively in this review;

21. Calls upon Member States to share best practices with a view to improved safety standards and nuclear security practices and raise standards of nuclear security to reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism, with the aim of securing all vulnerable nuclear material from such risks within four years;

22. Calls upon all States to manage responsibly and minimize to the greatest extent that is technically and economically feasible the use of highly enriched uranium for civilian purposes, including by working to convert research reactors and radioisotope production processes to the use of low enriched uranium fuels and targets;

23. Calls upon all States to improve their national technical capabilities to detect, deter, and disrupt illicit trafficking in nuclear materials throughout their territories, and to work to enhance international partnerships and capacity building in this regard;

24. Urges all States to take all appropriate national measures in accordance with their national authorities and legislation, and consistent with international law, to prevent proliferation financing, shipments, or illicit trafficking, to strengthen export controls, to secure sensitive materials, and to control access to intangible transfers of technology;

25. Declares its resolve to monitor closely any situations involving the proliferation of nuclear weapons, their means of delivery or related material, including to or by non-State actors as they are defined in resolution 1540 (2004), and, as appropriate, to take such measures as may be necessary to ensure the maintenance of international peace and security;

26. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

[NRao]

from the Pokhran thread:

Here's something from the other side of the 'nuclear testing coin', the 3 stage nuclear power program reaching a milestone

http://www.indianexpress.com/news/india ... on/517864/

which is on top of deals to obtain Uranium

Something in line with what I was proposing as the intermediate solution where PHWR can be run in mixed mode.

However the most cost effective, compact and Thorium efficient reactor however will be the type that uses Enriched-Uranium (I.e. original AHWR of Indian design).

This BARC design using -Low Enriched Uranium is making lemonade from the 123/IUCNA lemon that prevents import of enriched Uranium as well as prevents enrichment of imported Uranium.

Pls recall that original Indian AHWR proposed using Plutonium and not Uranium as feed stock to maintain criticality, while 75-90% energy comes from in-situ Thorium.

Man oh man. That seems to be the fastest compliance to NPT!!!!!

Did I miss anything? Did India sign it?

[sanjaykumar]

One little problem is that even a loser country like Pakistan once equiped with rudimentary nuclear explosives can inflict unacceptable damage on those with the mandate-from-heaven nukes. So let's cut the crap-the question is what can the powers-of-heaven do to retain their moral authority?

[Gagan]

How many nuclear power and research reactors does India has now?

[Gerard]

Why this fuss over a UNSC resolution?

There is another UNSC resolution - 1172 that mentions India by name

http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1998/sc6528.doc.htm
06/06/1998

"The Security Council...

"1. Condemns the nuclear tests conducted by India on 11 and 13 May 1998 and by Pakistan on 28 and 30 May 1998;

"2. Endorses the Joint Communique issued by the Foreign Ministers of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America at their meeting in Geneva on 4 June 1998 (S/1998/473);

"3. Demands that India and Pakistan refrain from further nuclear tests and in this context calls upon all States not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion in accordance with the provisions of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty;

"4. Urges India and Pakistan to exercise maximum restraint and to avoid threatening military movements, cross-border violations, or other provocations in order to prevent an aggravation of the situation;

"5. Urges India and Pakistan to resume the dialogue between them on all outstanding issues, particularly on all matters pertaining to peace and security, in order to remove the tensions between them, and encourages them to find mutually acceptable solutions that address the root causes of those tensions, including Kashmir;

"6. Welcomes the efforts of the Secretary-General to encourage India and Pakistan to enter into dialogue;

"7. Calls upon India and Pakistan immediately to stop their nuclear weapon development programmes, to refrain from weaponisation or from the deployment of nuclear weapons, to cease development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons and any further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, to confirm their policies not to export equipment, materials or technology that could contribute to weapons of mass destruction or missiles capable of delivering them and to undertake appropriate commitments in that regard;

"8. Encourages all States to prevent the export of equipment, materials or technology that could in any way assist programmes in India or Pakistan for nuclear weapons or for ballistic missiles capable of delivering such weapons, and welcomes national policies adopted and declared in this respect;

"9. Expresses its grave concern at the negative effect of the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan on peace and stability in South Asia and beyond;

"10. Reaffirms its full commitment to and the crucial importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty as the cornerstones of the international regime on the non‑proliferation of nuclear weapons and as essential foundations for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament;

"11. Expresses its firm conviction that the international regime on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should be maintained and consolidated and recalls that in accordance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons India or Pakistan cannot have the status of a nuclear-weapon State;

"12. Recognizes that the tests conducted by India and Pakistan constitute a serious threat to global efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament;

"13. Urges India and Pakistan, and all other States that have not yet done so, to become Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty without delay and without conditions;

"14.Urges India and Pakistan to participate, in a positive spirit and on the basis of the agreed mandate, in negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, with a view to reaching early agreement;

"15.Requests the Secretary-General to report urgently to the Council on the steps taken by India and Pakistan to implement the present resolution;

"16.Expresses its readiness to consider further how best to ensure the implementation of the present resolution;

"17.Decides to remain actively seized of the matter."

Has India signed the NPT and CTBT as demanded by the UN Security council in 1998? Has India stopped developing ballistic missiles? Has it stopped producing fissile material?

Why the fuss about another resolution in November? Will this resolution be blessed by some deity? Will Obama descend from Mount Sinai carrying tablets of stone addressed to India by the almighty? "Thou shalt not test" ?

[NRao]

G,

The current fear seems to be related to MMS signing in CTBT/NPT. Granted it is a fear.

[JwalaMukhi]

The whole thing appears so confusing. Now this whole controversy adds lots of fuzziness to whether India has bum which only fizzled or really worked.Even cheeni and paki guys will be confused. Now if we sign CTBT a rational thinking paki will think "oh evil yindoos already have a tried and tested bum , they are signing CTBT, so they are confident of their bum while ours is from NOKO , so we will surrender, give up kashmir and fly the Tiranga in the pindi" We will ofcourse grow at 25% and kangress first family will be counted among gupta and maurya dynasty.

It should be exactly be as confusing as possible. No need to end the confusion.

Please pardon my French. Not so fast; if signing a piece of paper conveys something powerful, then every eunuch guarding the odalisques in harem; will start thinking themselves as pimp daddy because one is associated with the 'Harem'. One has to be desperado to be in such a situation; as to associate with the 'Harem' at all costs, that one would be willing to be a castarato because it fools some of them to think that one has become pimp daddy.
Sorry, the track record of capability of being a 'rowdy' needs to be established painstakingly, at a time of ones choosing. Else, one does not need to voluntary to sign up for being the eunuch of the 'Harem' even though it makes no material difference as one is anyways celibate. Foreclosing the option of being the pimp daddy, by volunteering to be castarato is a strict no no. Stunts like S-e-S are best not repeated. Future generations may develop cojones and does not have to deal with the ignominy of being volunteered as a castarato.

[Neshant]

No reason to doubt yield of Pokhran-II tests: Atomic Energy Commission

Surely they know their credibility has fallen off the cliff.

[anishns]

The day MMS signs the CTBT/NPT he will be signing the death warrant for Congress. I still have hope in the Indian populace

G,

The current fear seems to be related to MMS signing in CTBT/NPT. Granted it is a fear.

[Bheem]

If India can import enriched Uranium for LWR, why cannot it import enriched Uranium for safeguarded AHWR?

[anishns]

If we think that our Nuclear bums are all "fizzleya".....why can't we just buy some TN's from Russia for lots of $$$?
Maybe then our dear media can go crazy and shout from rooftops that India is acquiring TN's from a foriegn country.....just like it announced that Pakistan is stock piling more nuclear weapons.

And more so if China can sell/giveaway nukes to Pakis and NKO without feeling much pain eventhough its a NPT signatory? Why can't we get away with it....

<and now I will duck for cover as self reliance fanboys will have a field day at my expense>

[shyamd]

Why Santhanam's Pokhran revelations are too late

[NRao]

India yet to raise proposed ENR ban with U.S.

I think he is mistaken, Indian team did meet with US team somewhere in Europe a month or so back.

Despite the United States seeking to dilute the waiver India was granted from the Nuclear Suppliers Group’s export rules last year, the Manmohan Singh government is yet to protest or even formally raise the matter with Washington at any level.

India’s baffling silence has led President Barack Obama’s advisors to conclude that their attempts to re-impose an international ban on the sale of enrichment and reprocessing technology and equipment will not adversely affect bilateral relations or the prospects of American companies winning lucrative nuclear and defence contracts, a former Bush administration official involved with the Indo-U.S. civil nuclear deal told The Hindu.

The official said that when he asked the State Department about the wisdom of getting the G-8 to endorse the U.S.-proposed ban on ENR sales to India this July, he was told to keep his concerns to himself since the Indians themselves had not bothered to protest the American move.

A senior official in the Ministry of External Affairs confirmed that India did not raise the ENR issue during Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s visit to Delhi, when she met both the Prime Minister and External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna.

“Well, I have a strategic dialogue with my counterpart, I suppose that could be one of the areas,” National Security Adviser M.K. Narayanan told The Hindu, when asked about India’s reluctance to complain about continuing American attempts to dilute the NSG’s clean waiver since November 2008. “It hasn’t come up because we have a new team there, we’ll have to sit down and talk about it. I am going [to Washington] in October, I suppose I’ll take it up.”

The Indian leadership’s unwillingness to raise the issue meant Ms. Clinton’s advisers never bothered to brief her properly on the prickly topic. Which helps explains her blunder during a Delhi press conference. As long as ENR transfers to India were safeguarded, she said, the U.S. would regard these as “appropriate.”

But the State Department later clarified that the Secretary of State had wrongly represented the American position and that it was very much the U.S. policy to seek multilateral restrictions on the transfer of ENR items to countries like India, a stand that flies in the face of the letter and spirit of the July 2005 Indo-U.S. nuclear agreement.

[Sanjay M]

Nah, I think Manny's more interested in not offending his foreign patrons, so that he can get re-elected.

[Gerard]

India's N-programme needs to be transparent: Chinese scholar

[sanjaykumar]

While India wants to develop nuclear programmes, the potential for them to include nuclear weapon improvement in both quality and quantity naturally leads to "suspicion," he says.

"At the end of the day, India cannot be the nation that triggers or worsens any possible arms race in South Asia. For that simple reason, India must make its nuclear plans transparent to the international community."

I hope China can find more logical scholars than this one.

[Gerard]

India seeks out Britain, France, Russia over NPT, CTBT

[joshvajohn]

For me India should sign NPT and other treaty with the condition that India should have nuclear shield support technology as there are a nuclear threats from China, pakistan and Myanmar. Also India should be added into a nuclear club nations or at least some amendment in the treaties accepting this fact. Then this will limit spreading of nuclear technology illegally by China and other countries to other countries. We may also have access to upto date nuclear technologies.

[SSridhar]

A country of India's size, economic power, and geostrategic importance straddling most crucial sea lanes of communication apart from its wide reach of benign soft power that influences most parts of the world cannot be expected to live at the mercy of an uncertain and a charitable umbrella provided by an undependable somebody else.

[svinayak]

A country of India's size, economic power, and geostrategic importance straddling most crucial sea lanes of communication apart from its wide reach of benign soft power that influences most parts of the world cannot be expected to live at the mercy of an uncertain and a charitable umbrella provided by an undependable somebody else.

I agree.
Myanmar does not pose any nuclear threat to India and anybody says that needs help/

India has to protect itself and for that India needs adult leaders who look after the country

[Sanjay M]

I think we need Myanmar's help in reining in Bangla.
If anything, I think we should keep Rangoon apprised of Chinese efforts to give N-tech to Dhaka.
Beijing can't pretend to be all things to all people. Everyone will not be fooled so easily.
They're going to have to decide which they want as their better friend - Rangoon or Dhaka.

[Gagan]

I don't think Bangladesh is seeking nuclear weapons.

Nuclear technology for civilian use yes, but military N weapons tech no. Who does it want to deter? It has only two neighbours.

Now, why can't DAE do that in Bangladesh and set up a 220 MW PHWR? India's diplomacy and scientific know how must ensure that all nations in SAARC except pakistan, are within India's pax. India needs to go beyond educational grants and trade concessions to setting up reactors, building ports and ships, setting up assembly plants for cars and the like for example.

[RamaY]

I don't think Bangladesh is seeking nuclear weapons.

Nuclear technology for civilian use yes, but military N weapons tech no. Who does it want to deter? It has only two neighbours.

Now, why can't DAE do that in Bangladesh and set up a 220 MW PHWR? India's diplomacy and scientific know how must ensure that all nations in SAARC except pakistan, are within India's pax. India needs to go beyond educational grants and trade concessions to setting up reactors, building ports and ships, setting up assembly plants for cars and the like for example.

I would suggest India setting up 2-3 ~500MW 2/3rd generation indigenous reactors on BD and Myanmar borders and help them manage. All the electricy generated goes to those nations but will physically be within 20-30 miles from Indian border.

[joshvajohn]

Clouded alliance - North Korea and Myanmar's covert ties
http://www.janes.com/news/security/jir/ ... _2_n.shtml

Column: Calling China's Bluff
2009-09-09 16:08:02
Last Updated: 2009-09-09 16:45:46

RSN Singh is a former military intelligence officer who later served in the Research and Analysis Wing, or R&AW. The author of two books: Asian Strategic and Military Perspective and Military Factor in Pakistan, he is also Associate Editor, Indian Defence Review.
http://sify.com/news/fullstory.php?a=jj ... 39_s_Bluff

[RoyG]

Came across a video of a nuclear inspection in India. Thought it was kinda interesting...Apologize if posted earlier.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kj0UTwLZVuA