Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-3

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 03 Oct 2009 14:17

dinesha wrote:The real Pokhran story
http://www.expressbuzz.com/edition/stor ... wcg==&SEO=
At the White House site (S2 where the dud thermonuclear device was placed), if we are to go by what the scientists led Chengappa to believe, it was placed at a depth of 200 metres (page 427)
<snip>
At the bottom of the second shaft, a kilometre away, was the thermonuclear weapon. It had a fission-based trigger. The second stage was the fusion weapon. The shaft ran more than a 120 metres into the ground. At the bottom it veered slightly to the left, making an ‘L’. After the turn it ran for a further five metres, called an adit. The small tunnel was about six feet high, high enough for a person to stand. The width was about three metres. To get the men and materials into the shaft there was a winch that was suspended from an A Frame run by a diesel motor. The entire shaft was cased and shielded by a thin steel casing of .3 mm. This was to prevent or reduce seepage from subterranean streams that could mess up the wiring, among other things.

If I have interpreted this article right the S1 Thermonuclear device was in an L shaped shaft that was 200 meters deep and then ran off to one side for 120 meters. (The other interpretation is that the shaft was 120 meters deep). I am assuming the former - i.e 200 meters deep and going off to one side for a further 120 meters at a depth of 200 meters.

If that is the case- and surface disturbance and crater if any should form with its center at a spot 120 meters away from the shaft and winch. The wrong place to look for a crater would be at the site of the vertical shaft and winch. Any crater must form directly above the explosion cavity and if that cavity is 120 meters away from the bottom of the vertical shaft then the intact winch means nothing. It means only what Sublette said 10 years ago - the test could have been a fizzle but a sizzle can't be ruled out.

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 03 Oct 2009 15:03

Arun_S wrote:Chidambaram and the Bravo team stared in silent disbelief at the failure of the experiment[/size]

The silent disbelief could also be due to "Oh My God , It Worked !!"
That prompted ABV to claim in an IT interview , hamare paass bada wala hai

dinesha · Post by **dinesha** » 03 Oct 2009 16:20

shiv wrote:The real Pokhran story
http://www.expressbuzz.com/edition/stor ... wcg==&SEO=
At the White House site (S2 where the dud thermonuclear device was placed), if we are to go by what the scientists led Chengappa to believe, it was placed at a depth of 200 metres (page 427)
<snip>
At the bottom of the second shaft, a kilometre away, was the thermonuclear weapon. It had a fission-based trigger. The second stage was the fusion weapon. The shaft ran more than a 120 metres into the ground. At the bottom it veered slightly to the left, making an ‘L’. After the turn it ran for a further five metres, called an adit. The small tunnel was about six feet high, high enough for a person to stand. The width was about three metres. To get the men and materials into the shaft there was a winch that was suspended from an A Frame run by a diesel motor. The entire shaft was cased and shielded by a thin steel casing of .3 mm. This was to prevent or reduce seepage from subterranean streams that could mess up the wiring, among other things.

If I have interpreted this article right the S1 Thermonuclear device was in an L shaped shaft that was 200 meters deep and then ran off to one side for 120 meters. (The other interpretation is that the shaft was 120 meters deep). I am assuming the former - i.e 200 meters deep and going off to one side for a further 120 meters at a depth of 200 meters.
.

.. it ic quite clearly mentioned that the shaft ran for five meters after the turn...so the end of the tunnel is 6 ft high x 5 mts long and 3 mts brd.. . but it is confusing .. can this 120 be typo?? .. 5 mts seems to small an offset..

The DAE had instrumentation in the shaft for Cortex which was a prototype. (It later transpired that the prototype Cortex failed to work).

this article further clearly claims that Cortex Measurement was carried out by BARC..and it also falied

..
looks like everthing except TN device malfunctioned..

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 03 Oct 2009 16:46

dinesha wrote: .. it ic quite clearly mentioned that the shaft ran for five meters after the turn...so the end of the tunnel is 6 ft high x 5 mts long and 3 mts brd.. . but it is confusing .. can this 120 be typo?? .. 5 mts seems to small an offset..

Or maybe he is saying the shaft was more than 120 meters deep. That is well known.

I wonder if the winch and cable were DRDO or BARC.

harbans · Post by **harbans** » 03 Oct 2009 17:32

On DOB i wonder if we can conclude anything from the post shot radioactivity paper wrt the 14mev activation products in figure 5. The depth units are 50m for sure and activation of Mn54 and Sc 56 have been drilled till 240 m from the plots, peaking around 200m..decreasing till a 120 m and again increasing near the surface again. From 200 to 150 m below activation products decrease rapidly. Can that in some way indicate cavity area? I am not very sure how to interpret that graph accurately though.

shyamd · Post by **shyamd** » 03 Oct 2009 17:32

shiv wrote:The USA is our biggest enemy with nukes. It has been the prime mover for stopping India from acquiring tech while it allowed Pakistan to get nukes from China and proliferate to others. And Pakistan is now being paid by the US to develop it delivery systems.

But we do not want to acknowledge the US as a huge problem. The US is our friend. It is a democracy. It is a source of education and employment for our family. Does China meet any of these criteria? No.

Thank you. But we do need to have a deterent against them of some sort. Having a deterrent just against China is not enough imo. US will try anything to armtwist in the event of any problems as we all know. If I am not mistaken, They also happen to have threatened to nuke us in 71. As Kalam said its a weapon of peace, and yes US is a democracy etc but they also happen to be funding and helping our enemies, lets not forget. So until then, IMHO we need to have a deterrent against the US. I am not suggesting that we become anti US all of a sudden, I am saying that a deterrent is necessary based on their past and current activities. The point is that they can choose to nuke us if they wish and we don't have a credible deterrent. Why should we be in such a position?

What do you think?

harbans · Post by **harbans** » 03 Oct 2009 17:40

Also in Mr Ramachandrans article he gives out a graph (1) on Mn and Ce isotopes for the TN device drilled till..320 meters for sampling, showing high activity from 210 m to around 320 m deep. Can we conclude anything from here? They've given also a comparitive for the fission device on the same graph.

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 03 Oct 2009 18:11

The "Gandhi bomb",truly "non-violent" as it has been described in these exposes,now firmly places the onus upon the GOI to reassure the country that it will stop at nothing,absolutely nothing in providing our armed forces with a credible strategic deterrent based upon TN warheads.Thus far,few believe the pronouncements of its babus and technocrats masquerading as nuclear scientists who have been trotted out,apart from elements of the P-2 team whose reputation is on the line,I cannot see this debate being ended unless India conducts new TN devices the sooner better than later

Gagan · Post by **Gagan** » 03 Oct 2009 18:27

Come what may, Manmohan Singh, He will not test.

Sanku ji,
KS was in charge of site security. That means that he was in some ways responsible for camouflaging the test area, covering the winch with nets. If US satellites failed to detect POK-2 again some of the credit must go to KS(I don't think that they did, or that their agents on the ground did not detect India's top nuclear scientists disappear all at once). Since he was also doing the instrumentation, he would surely have gone down the shaft to check the cables and instrument placement etc.

Sridhar · Post by **Sridhar** » 03 Oct 2009 19:07

When is the tenure of AK ending and who is likely to be the next Secretary, DAE and Chairman, AEC?

Bade · Post by **Bade** » 03 Oct 2009 19:17

If the expected crater size for the TN test was anywhere between 40m to 70m, and the shaft entrance was 120 m away from where the device was implanted then the winch and surroundings being relatively intact does not imply a dud or no blast or even low blast. It is a good one and half times or more away than the rim of the expected crater or surface disturbance features.

Bade · Post by **Bade** » 03 Oct 2009 19:24

In the old round of discussions ( refer to the seismology for dummies series from the archive when a postor kuttan was very active

) there were allegations of lack of simultaneity in the tests. With delays of 0.1 secs etc being mentioned, keep in mind a few nano second resolution measurements were possible in the 90's. Does this mean that one of the tests damaged the instrumentation setup at other sites a 1km away ?

ps: note that the post shot radio-chemical in-situ sample collection and analysis does not suffer from this weakness.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 03 Oct 2009 20:27

Sanku wrote:
shiv wrote: I wonder if the winch and cable were DRDO or BARC.
Indeed and whether KS knew that there was a winch installed.

Was he in the loop? He talks of the winch? But did he really see it?

Did he touch it feel it? How does he know how strong the winch was?

May be BARC made it of titanium and didn't tell DRDO.

(firing from your shoulders only Shivji, and not at you, hopefully that is understood)

No. The length of cable and therefore length of shaft. Surely it must have been BARC

I wonder what went wrong with the cable length measuring instrumentation so that a straight reply about depth of shaft is so hard to come by.

The expressbuzz article accurately pinpoints facts

Instrumentation in 1998 was of a much higher order than 1974. This is undisputed.

Chengappa said more than 200
Someone said 230
Expressbuzz says more than 120

So a failure of instrumentation to measure the length of cable to reach the bottom of the shaft is yet another BARC failure. After all the DRDO instrumentation was perfect and tested hundreds of times, and if the winch and cable were DRDO the length of cable required to touch the bottom of the shaft would have been known after having been measured accurately using sophisticated laser measuring tapes.

Unless winch and A-Frame were DRDO (Delta) and cable BARC (Bombay)..

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 03 Oct 2009 20:45

Gagan wrote: KS was in charge of site security. That means that he was in some ways responsible for camouflaging the test area, covering the winch with nets. If US satellites failed to detect POK-2 again some of the credit must go to KS(I don't think that they did, or that their agents on the ground did not detect India's top nuclear scientists disappear all at once). Since he was also doing the instrumentation, he would surely have gone down the shaft to check the cables and instrument placement etc.

Do you think he would have been an insider on cable length to reach the bottom of the shaft? That minor detail could have been hidden from him.

Bade · Post by **Bade** » 03 Oct 2009 21:08

No self respecting Indic scientist would get down and that dirty. I have not seen such things in massa or even desh with visiting scientists from India, exceptions are there. I was told of an ex-IISc or RRI director who was often found working under his car. But this is rare. It is unlikely KS belongs to such a mold.

edited post on timing...need to think more...

Bade · Post by **Bade** » 03 Oct 2009 21:16

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electromagnetic_bomb

In July 1962, a 1.44 megaton United States nuclear test in space, 400 kilometers (248 statute miles) above the mid-Pacific Ocean, called the Starfish Prime test, demonstrated to nuclear scientists that the magnitude and effects of a high altitude nuclear explosion were much larger than had been previously calculated. Starfish Prime also made those effects known to the public by causing electrical damage in Hawaii, about 1445 kilometers (897 statute miles) away from the detonation point, knocking out about 300 streetlights, setting off numerous burglar alarms and damaging a telephone company microwave link.[6]

More juicy details on collateral electrical damage in there for curious readers. POK-II being underground, things will be different but still there are more unknowns in electrical measurements/analysis than in radio-chemical analysis.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 03 Oct 2009 21:49

shyamd wrote: What do you think?

Three quotes from Gurmeet Kanwal:

China has approximately 20 ICBMs to over 1500 of the US. However, it is nobody's case that the US is not deterred by the Chinese arsenal. Had China's ICBMs not deterred the US, it would not have been so vigorously engaged in developing a national missile defence (NMD). It clearly emerges that the nuclear force levels necessary for a retaliatory strike are independent of the quantum of the adversary's nuclear force and depend only on the numbers that are needed to inflict unacceptable damage. The side that can cause greater damage does not necessarily achieve greater deterrence. Quite obviously, the required number of nuclear warheads and their delivery systems must survive a first strike and there should be adequate redundancy. Hence, for a retaliatory strategy, attempts at maintaining a numerical parity with the adversary are neither necessary nor desirable

During the Kennedy era, the Soviet arsenal was estimated to be only one-seventeenth of the US stockpile. 7 Yet, it is well known that during the Cuban missile crisis the US was deterred because the Chiefs of Staff could not assure the government that a few Soviet warheads would not hit American cities even if the US launched a massive disarming first strike. The enduring lesson of the Cuban missile crisis is that even gross asymmetry in the number of nuclear warheads in one's adversary's arsenal provides no guarantee that the adversary would not be deterred if he was convinced that even a few warheads would get through and cause unacceptable damage.

K. Subrahmanyam has written that "... if a country can project an image of having around 500 nuclear warheads, which India can build in twelve to fifteen years time if it were to set out on the programme and disperse them on its vast area, the country will have a credible deterrent." Even after the Pokhran-II tests, while explaining that minimum deterrence is not a numbers game, he wrote: "Whether it is 150, 250 or 300, the Indian deterrent will still be a minimum one compared to others except Pakistan.

Wrong thread - needs to be in the deterrence thread

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 03 Oct 2009 22:07

@ 120 meters, 45 Kt, could have produced a 70 or so meter crater. No doubt.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 03 Oct 2009 22:55

He has made S1 the smaller fission and S2 the TN.

Shiv,

I think I will subscribe to your theory, based on:

The shaft ran more than a 120 metres into the ground. At the bottom it veered slightly to the left, making an ‘L’.

In a hole dug vertically "left" has no meaning when one looks down into the hole/shaft. "left" will only have some meaning if the shaft was to run horizontally.

Furthermore:

At the White House site (S2 where the dud thermonuclear device was placed), if we are to go by what the scientists led Chengappa to believe, it was placed at a depth of 200 metres (page 427) in contrast to S1 which was about 50 metres less deep (at “over 150 metres”, page 422).

So, the "dud" was certainly at 200 meters (at least), which this scribe is not sure of. Followed by:

At the bottom of the second shaft, a kilometre away, was the thermonuclear weapon. It had a fission-based trigger. The second stage was the fusion weapon. The shaft ran more than a 120 metres into the ground. At the bottom it veered slightly to the left, making an ‘L’. After the turn it ran for a further five metres, called an adit.

"At the bottom of the second shaft" - So far, per his own writing (God bless) has to be 200 meters.

One word on this 120 horizontal drilling issues (IF it really is that): 120 meters into granite is not joke. The reason better have been a real good one.

However, IF the shaft was 230 meters deep and they decided to go only 120 meters deep, then they - for sure - would have needed a "adit" to host the test device. And, IF that is true, then Santhanam's claim of a crater could be in sight. BUT, there will be no granite at that depth. This is closer to the depth at which they tested the POK-1 device (107 meters) and should have had a crater that was about twice as large of that of POK-1.

I will take RR over this guy any day.

But, why do scribes make more problems than solve them is beyond me. Is it that difficult to run the article through a few guys (besides the Editor) - neighbors, non-news people?

A diagram should solve most, if not all, problems.

The 120 meters is enticing, but IIRC, the A-frame was dislodged, so did they plug the shaft properly?

More questions than answers.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 03 Oct 2009 23:18

Sridhar wrote:When is the tenure of AK ending and who is likely to be the next Secretary, DAE and Chairman, AEC?

2007 :: Kakodkar, Nair get two-year extension

In 2007:

This is his third extension.

Sridhar · Post by **Sridhar** » 04 Oct 2009 00:48

Nrao: Thanks.

It may be a typo - 120m instead of 210m.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 04 Oct 2009 01:28

Typos to confuse others are most welcome. But to confuse self?

There are things that cannot be divulged. But, what can be should be written to get rid of confusion.

This whole episode is getting to be tiring.

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 04 Oct 2009 02:02

NRao wrote:
IF you actually believe that such thinking, today, exists in China - as a major stream - than I give up.

I am willing to accept that there are pockets that think fairly closely to something like this. BUT, notice that Mao himself was more interested in spreading communism, etc. I doubt if he would recognize the current China or even approve of it in an economic sense.

Nothing is guaranteed in a totalitarian country. They will have some version of mass annihilation of their own people or from other countries.

Do you honestly believe that a US or a RU would keep quite and allow China to take over the Indian peninsula?

In geopolitics every country especially the big boys are for their own interest. They may even make what is left of India as their own colony.

I would never consider a Mao story to be a rational one WRT deterrence.

With nuclear weapons nothing can be counted as irrational.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 04 Oct 2009 02:59

Acharya,

Response in deterrence thread.

ss_roy · Post by **ss_roy** » 04 Oct 2009 05:44

I think burying people who get reappointed for the nth time would do more for the success of indian nuclear weapons than a test.

The deeper the better!

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 04 Oct 2009 06:22

NRao wrote:
However, IF the shaft was 230 meters deep and they decided to go only 120 meters deep, then they - for sure - would have needed a "adit" to host the test device. And, IF that is true, then Santhanam's claim of a crater could be in sight. BUT, there will be no granite at that depth. This is closer to the depth at which they tested the POK-1 device (107 meters) and should have had a crater that was about twice as large of that of POK-1.

Testing 45 kt at 120 meters is asking for venting - but that is my guess. I will revisit the scaled depth calculation but look at this hypothetically assuming that to be correct - and this point was made earlier in these very pages by Narayanan illustrated in this exchange between him and me

1) If 45 kt was being tested at 120 meters radioactive contamination of the atmosphere and soil surface would have occurred 5 km from civilian habitation. This is the very thread where it is being argued that the Chinese are callous about human life. Testing 45 kt in what is possibly shale at 120 meters (taking POK 1974 example @ 107 meters) only means that Indians are equally callous - supporting my argument in that regard. The venting of radioactivity would have been planned and deliberate if the required yield of 45 kt was reached. Luckily the bomb fizzled and did not vent.

So an unproven double accusation has to be made - which is easy to make provided you accuse the entire team of being incompetent bums - including Santhanam who has now been accused of being a complete insider with deep knowledge of what was going on.

The 120 meter 45 kt story has to go something like this:

"These ignorant men whom we call scientists were trying to test a 45 kt bomb at the shallow depth of 120 meters - a depth only marginally greater than the 1974 blast of 8-12 kt which was barely contained by burial at 107 meters in the same region. Luckily for the people of Pokhran 5 km away Indian scientific incompetence extended beyond the inability to calculate scaled depth to an actual inability to design a bomb and that incompetence saved the day proving that two negatives make a positive. The so called bomb was a dud producing only 20-25 kt as revealed by Dr. K Santhanam who was part of the same team consisting of ignorant people planning to cause a disaster."

The only "hole" in this story that might "shaft" the hypothesis is whether 120 meters of shale/sandstone or even granite will contain a 25 kt blast.

Let me make two more serious observations:

General reading on the issue tells me that when new nuke designs are tested for the first time the "yield" is calculated by physics only. Nobody can predict exactly what will happen except to say that this design can produce so many kt max and produce zero kt minimum. There have been (non Indian) tests reported that have yielded a higher yield than planned. The safest thing to do is to bury the device as far down as necessary to contain the maximum yield. If it fizzles it is safe, but if it sizzles unexpectedly - it should not threaten the environment.

The second point I wanted to make is that the two sides of the debate, fizzle and sizzle (not on BRF) can both be accused of taking advantage of general ignorance.

The sizzle team is being accused of fudging and utilizing ignorance to pass off fission success as thermonuclear success. But the fizzle team has been no better in its tendency to obfuscate, fail to release details, or release only conflicting detail and utilize the general ambience of ignorance of the issue to make accusations. Coming more than a decade after the test - it is no wonder that the story has not yet got much traction because of two reasons, one of which is heartening to me:

1) The science enabled community of India represented in part by BRF are not necessarily taken in my smoke and mirrors

2) The aam junta do not understand, and are accustomed to seeing groups of people curse each other in public and couldn't care less.

For me, the take home lesson here is that if the fizzle team are the patriots they claim to be (which I personally am certain they are) they have done an absolutely incompetent job of trying to dislodge the original sizzle team from their pedestal. So far.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 04 Oct 2009 06:53

This is the url of the paper with Chinese author I was referring to in an earlier page that has some interesting thoughts about the definition of fizzle ya sizzle

http://www.wsichina.org/\cs7_6.pdf

The smallest possible yield resulting from pre-detonation is referred to as a “fizzle yield.” Nuclear expert J. Carson Mark provided a criterion for identifying pre-detonation as the chain reaction of approximately e45 fissions initiated before
maximum criticality is achieved.13 He estimates that in assembly systems similar to Trinity’s, the fizzle yield is approximately 2.7 percent of the design yield. Robert Oppenheimer gave a similar estimate for a fizzle: around 700 tons from a 20 kt nominal yield, or 3.5 percent of the design yield.

Whether the North Korean test was a failure depends on the design yield of the device tested. If North Korea’s design yield was 20 kt, as was the case for other states’ first tests, then a yield of 0.5 kt could be a fizzle yield (because the ratio of the test yield to the design yield is 2.5 percent: 0.5 kt/20 kt), which is less than the defined threshold for a fizzle yield (approximately 3 percent). However, if North Korea planned a yield of 4 kt, even a test yield of 0.5 kt (12.5 percent of design yield)would not be a fizzle yield. Indeed, Chinese officials have told American nuclear experts and diplomatic officials that Pyongyang informed Beijing in advance that they had planned to conduct an explosive test of approximately kt.15

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 04 Oct 2009 07:03

Shiv,

Sort of expecting and actually for my own sanity, I partially chased a similar event in the US: nuclear test Schooner, conducted in Nevada.

Area 19, where the test was conducted did have a fallout. But from the first URL, this:

Schooner, detonated in late 1968, was designed to specifically study the effects and phenomenology of cratering with a nuclear explosive in hard rock. The depth of burial was 110 meters (350 feet) and the yield was 41 kilotons; the result was a crater 260 meters (850 feet) in diameter and 63 meters (210 feet) deep.Fallout from the Schooner test (part of the Plowshare cratering tests) was deposited off-site on the surface toward the northwest and is detectable in Area 19.

NASA's Apollo astronauts use Test Site craters to prepare for Moon surface.

Because the "Schooner" and "Sedan" craters at the Nevada Test Site had features similar to the topography of Moon craters, astronauts used them to train for their missions.

Astronauts for Apollo 14 exercised at Schooner crater, and visited Sedan crater in November 1970. Apollo 16 astronauts visited the Schooner crater in November 1970, and exercised there in October 1971.

Apollo 17 astronauts conducted exercises at Schooner and on Buckboard Mesa in August 1972.

WRT Santhanam, this crater is three times as large. Even if we were to account for all other factors, this depth (of 120 meters) is not really possible for a 70 meters or so crater dia.

WRT fallout, it does not seem to be that much - I am perhaps too naive and do not understand the implicationS of those fallout numbers, but the fact that the astronauts used it within two years or so indicates that. The fallout went a max of 2 Km and that too only in one direction.

Underground testing is a rather strange experience:

The time lapsed between first and third frame is 23 minutes. In that time the observation tower managed to move away!!!

Having said all that I still feel that the Indian TN was at a depth of 230 meters or so, and, I do believe that they went some distance horizontally - perhaps 120 meters, more likely just 5 meters.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 04 Oct 2009 07:13

It is interesting that Santhanam feels that India needs at least two more tests. Wonder why.

Also, this - 2 more tests - really cannot be based on his knowledge of nuclear device design. I have to suspect it needs a rather large input from someone like PKI (is there anyone else out there to match PKI?).

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 04 Oct 2009 07:18

NRao it appears that the early fallout is the problem

Some info here:
http://www.rerf.or.jp/general/qa_e/qa12.html

Neutron activation. Neutrons comprised 10% or less of the A-bomb radiation, whereas gamma rays comprised the majority of A-bomb radiation. Neutrons cause ordinary, non-radioactive materials to become radioactive, but gamma rays do not. The bombs were detonated far above ground, so neutron induction of radioactivity on the ground did not produce the degree of contamination people associate with nuclear test sites (Nevada test site in Southwest U.S., Maralinga test site in South Australia, Bikini and Mururoa Atolls, etc.).

Past investigations suggested that the maximum cumulative dose at the hypocenter from immediately after the bombing until today is 0.8 Gy in Hiroshima and 0.3-0.4 Gy in Nagasaki. When the distance is 0.5 km or 1.0 km from the hypocenter, the estimates are about 1/10 and 1/100 of the value at the hypocenter, respectively. The induced radioactivity decayed very quickly with time. In fact, nearly 80% of the above-mentioned doses were released within a day, about 10% between days 2 and 5, and the remaining 10% from day 6 afterward. Considering the extensive fires near the hypocenters that prevented people from entering until the following day, it seems unlikely that any person received over 20% of the above-mentioned dose, i.e., 0.16 Gy in Hiroshima and 0.06-0.08 Gy in Nagasaki.

As for Hiroshima and Nagasaki proper, the longest-lasting induced radionuclide that occurred in amounts sufficient to cause concern was cesium-134 (with a half-life of about 2 years). Most of the induced radioactivities from various radionuclides decayed very quickly so that it now takes considerable time and effort to measure it using highly sensitive equipment. Despite such miniscule levels, measurements of residual radioactivity using recently developed ultra-sensitive techniques have been utilized to estimate neutron doses released from the bombs and have formed part of the basis of the latest atomic-bomb dosimetry (DS02).

Regarding the photo - must have been a fizzle. The rig is intact. It has not even toppled.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 04 Oct 2009 07:19

NRao,

PKI = Alpha and Omega.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 04 Oct 2009 07:26

true.

What I am implying is that Santhanam did his stuff while he was with DRDO.And, then I SUSPECT he did some other stuff after retiring. I very much doubt if he could have got any assists from BARC personnel of worth (may be he can...). So, for him to make ANY comments on the number of tries India MAY need he will need a heavy duty bunny = PKI.

Just a guess.

Also for PKI to state with some surety he will need a decent picture of what happened. RC will never provide such pictures.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 04 Oct 2009 07:30

Regarding the photo - must have been a fizzle. The rig is intact. It has not even toppled.

Must be a real slow day/morning for you.

Well, .................... the cavity moved.

dinesha · Post by **dinesha** » 04 Oct 2009 10:46

Kalam’s dual standards
http://www.expressbuzz.com/edition/stor ... 0Laborator

Pure Rona-Dhona article..
This one talks away credibility of previous article.. looks like he has little access to secrets..
He expects Crater of S1 to be three times that of S2 irrespective of DOB..
.. and this one is more bitc*ing about RC then kalam..

Cain Marko · Post by **Cain Marko** » 04 Oct 2009 10:48

NRao wrote:The time lapsed between first and third frame is 23 minutes. In that time the observation tower managed to move away!!!

CM

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 04 Oct 2009 11:34

What is interesting is APJ still supports RC and claims its a success , when his own DRDO team has submitted a report to GOI which as Santhanam mentioned is a classified one and has apprehension about the test.

To be fair to Dr Kalam he has its own fair share of success and failures as a scientist and head of DRDO , he did equally good job as previous top indian scientist like Dr Sarabhai , Dr Brahmprakash and Dr Bhaba did.

But he some how attained a demi god status , perhaps he used and manipulated media to his advantage , much like media made him a hero and now his word is counted as the final word , much like a man who knows all , could do no wrong and would never lie.

The media due to his charisma and politician ( due to his minority status ) made good use of Kalam for their needs , and Kalam too equally enjoyed the limelight and made good of it.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 04 Oct 2009 15:21

I think "V Sudarshan is Executive Editor of The New Indian Express and is based in Chennai." is writing a sequel for DD or something. Part of his game plan seems to be to create or generate more confusion so that people read his stuff. Then at the very, very end he will solve the problem - as it happens in a good movie.

IF he is serious his writings need a peer review - BR, before he publishes his writing/s. Being an Executive editor at Express Buzz affords him a larger platform and he should be a lot more responsible that he seems to be IMHO.

He seems to be making the same mistake that he thinks RC and Kalam have made.

shyamd · Post by **shyamd** » 04 Oct 2009 18:00

Shiv, Thanks. Interesting indeed. Will comment more when time permits.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 04 Oct 2009 18:36

NRao wrote:It is interesting that Santhanam feels that India needs at least two more tests. Wonder why.

Also, this - 2 more tests - really cannot be based on his knowledge of nuclear device design. I have to suspect it needs a rather large input from someone like PKI (is there anyone else out there to match PKI?).

Well who knows. Two more tests perhaps to make sure that the damn thing works for the first time.

But now look at this

http://aps.org/units/fps/newsletters/20 ... icles.html
How Much Warhead Reliability Is Enough for a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty?

The main threat to warhead reliability is caused by non-nuclear components, which is usually observable without testing on these issues: insufficient tritium, faulty tritium bottles, corrosion of fissile material, degradation of high explosive, low–temperature performance, vulnerability to fratricide neutrons, radar, batteries, fuse switch, neutron generator, faulty cables, trajectory sensors, control systems, rocket motor, gas transfer valve, firing set, and pilot parachute. The warheads in the enduring stockpile have been tested 150–200 times.

and

The United States has not tested each warhead type enough times to determine reliability with high confidence statistics, and certainly not for the effects of aging. Assume ten reliability tests were performed and all were successful. The reliability is not 100 percent with 100 percent confidence, but rather there is a 30 percent chance that reliability is less than 90 percent and a 10 percent chance that reliability is less than 80 percent.[10] Thus, the United States has never known warhead reliability with precision when the warhead entered the stockpile, nor has the United States searched sufficiently for aging effects with confidence tests.

NNSA Definition of Reliability. “The reliability of obtaining the predicted yield of a nuclear weapon has never been assessed because there have never been enough performance [nuclear] tests to establish a statistical reliability. Thus, when a defect type impacting the nuclear explosive package is discovered, the yield performance is evaluated, but no reliability degradation estimate can be made. Therefore, no data is available regarding analysis relating to reliability degradation to predicted yields.….In general terms, reliability is defined as the ability of an item to perform a required function.

and this

The effect on secondary yield of radiant energy transfer from the primary stage is very nonlinear. A drop in primary yield by a factor of two, for example, could greatly reduce the secondary yield because critical pressures and temperatures may not be obtained. However weapon yield is not a “step function” that varies between two values, zero and certified yield. NNSA is concerned about catastrophic failure of an entire type. This is partially driven by the fact that yield on target is usually much larger than what is needed for particular missions, so the only issue is “does it work.”

The entire article is revealing. Now if the primary becomes unreliable by aging it has an effect on the secondary that is unpredictable and unprovable under forced or voluntary testing moratorium. Note also that the US makes its warheads of yield far more than required and it follows that some degradation is not of too much concern.

For a country with an unproven set of warheads - where the TN is dependent on the fission, the situation of long term storage becomes even more tricky.

Under the circumstances it could be argued that the most effective deterrent could be one that is guaranteed to explode - i.e a simple fission design - which is also one whose components can be repeatedly tested without actually conducting a nuke test.

I am deliberately making this argument that I know is irritating/distressing to many viewpoints. I am trying to see what kind of technical arguments are available on the issue without the need for proving any viewpoints by character assassination.

samuel · Post by **samuel** » 04 Oct 2009 20:25

From same article:

Code: Select all

Table 1. US Nuclear Warheads in the Enduring Stockpile (2006). Warhead types that are to be partially dismantled are marked with an *. This table does not include the B62 (580 warheads) and W84 (383 warheads), which are scheduled for full dismantlement. [R.S. Norris and H.M. Kristensen[8]]
Type   	  Yield 	Platform 	Active 	Inactive 	Total
B61/3* 	10-350 kt 	airplane 	200 	186 	386
B61/4* 	10-350 kt 	airplane 	200 	204 	404
B61/7 	10-350 kt 	airplane 	215 	224 	439
B61/11 	10-350 kt 	airplane 	20 	21 	41
B83 	     1.2 Mt. 	airplane 	320 	306 	626
W76* 	     100 kt 	SLBM 	  1712 	1318 	3030
W78* 	     335 kt 	ICBM 	  785 	20 	805
W80/1* 	  150 kt 	ALCM    	1450  	361 	1811
W87 	     300 kt 	ICBM  	0 	553 	553
W88 	     475 kt 	SLBM   	404 	0 	404
TOTAL 	  	               	5306 	3193 	8499

W87/88 are teller-ulam type TN but advanced.