China Military Watch

D Roy · Post by **D Roy** » 14 Oct 2009 20:03

well since we are on the subject of ASBMs

here are a few interesting reads.

Apologies if posted before, of course.

http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/review/Pr ... aspx?q=394

http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/review/Pr ... aspx?q=400

http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/cb_009_15.pdf

chanakyaa · Post by **chanakyaa** » 14 Oct 2009 20:24

http://burmadigest.info/2009/10/08/chin ... relations/

China also uses Burma in its strategic positioning with India, with which it has both military and economic competition. There are additionally three specific disputes: over the Aksai Chin area of Kashmir, which China took in the Sino-Indian war in 1962; Arunachal Pradesh (which China refers to as Southern Tibet); and the fact that the Dalai Lama uses India as his base.

China has built an Indian Ocean deep-water port at Kyaukpyu on Burma’s southwest coast, and it has an electronic intelligence operation directed at the Indian military on Great Coco Island.

Yogi_G · Post by **Yogi_G** » 14 Oct 2009 22:15

Rahul M wrote:
Aditya_V wrote: Sorry can't agree, what if the Pakis get this and if the DF-21 has really long range, doesnt it make Gorskhov and and indegenous aircraft project a total waste??
the so-called anti-ship ballistic missile is more fiction than fact at the moment.
the technology described is improbable, if not impossible given the PRC's current ability. of course the DoD is playing along for funding purposes but no BMs have yet demonstrated an ability to hit targets that are dynamic in realtime.

RahulM, in the missile discussion thread you had mentioned the probable use of the Prithvi in air field denial role which got me thinking, if a SRBM (with single digit CEP) could be used to take out airfields (runway in particular), wouldn't a large ship like a Carrier be equally plum a target within the abilities of the ballistic missile's accuracy limits (albeit improved further)? Your thoughts?

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 14 Oct 2009 22:56

a runway or an airbase is a stationary target, a ship is not. what's more, to hit a ship you first have to know where it is at the moment and where it will be after a certain amount of time.

the technology to do that is not trivial. you might be surprised to know how poorly the soviets fared when it came to detecting the big aircraft carriers in the open ocean. that, with all their maritime surveillance equipment and sats.

Craig Alpert · Post by **Craig Alpert** » 15 Oct 2009 00:28

CHINA UPS THE ANTE
From the post that's HARAM on BRF, and to my (and possibly many other's surprise) there's actually a QUOTE in this article where credit is given to someone else.

India’s first dedicated operational military reconnaissance satellite was CARTOSAT-2A (see http://directory.eoportal.org/get_annou ... d=10000443), which was launched on board the PSLV-C9 on April 28, 2008.

Thought there was some credibility to this so posted this. However if MODS deem this inappropriate then by all means make the necessary "mop up" of the thread.

Juggi G · Post by **Juggi G** » 15 Oct 2009 11:01

How to Counter China on Arunachal Pradesh

B Raman

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 15 Oct 2009 13:31

the DF-21 AshM == "Alfa class submarine more tfta than 688, we need seawolf" theme.

they need good funding both for SM-3 and SM-6

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 15 Oct 2009 14:29

can anyone comment on these orbat.com excerpts ?

#

As an example of India saying it is standing up to PRC is the Government has ordered 300 light tanks for use in Ladakh and some areas of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. Should we be impressed? Until India did the demilitarization thing, at times it maintained two heavy armored battlegroups in Ladakh. Going to light tanks is no substitute for this. And replacing obsolete fighters with Su-30s in one squadron in the Northeast is definitely not standing up to anyone. Right through the 1980s the Indian Air Force was far superior to the PLAAF in Tibet (after PLAAF reinforcement). The discussion used to be would India need 72-hours to attain air superiority or 96-hours. Then the Indians just threw away their advantage by failing to modernize the IAF. Its taken them 20 years to get back on track, and there is a huge backlog. Meanwhile, PLAAF has shot ahead and has many more bases/fields it can use.
#

Our position is quite clear. At the minimum, India needs to put two more divisions into Ladakh; return the division assigned to Himachal Pradesh and withdrawn in 1970 or 1971; unburden the division for UP from all other tasks and restore the independent brigade group withdrawn - we think it was in 1971; return XXXI Corps to the single task of Sikkim/West Bhutan; give a new division to Arunachal for the central sector; give a new reserve division to Eastern Command, and create a two-division corps, later three divisions, for the Nepal border.

#

A little glimpse into history: General K. Sundarji 25 years ago said that Pakistan was no longer a threat, China was going to keep becoming stronger and a greater threat. He worked out India would need, by the 1990s, 19 mountain divisions against China. He was correct - however inadequate he was as a practical general, he was a master theoretician.
#

Today we have nine mountain divisions plus 3rd Infantry Division in Ladakh, and the Army is raising two mountain divisions. But one of them, and one of the existing mountain divisions, are slated for the Pakistan front. And as China grows stronger and more belligerent, it will be a big mistake to assume that India will face only one adversary at one time.

D Roy · Post by **D Roy** » 15 Oct 2009 15:52

I don't agree with the 'PLAAF has shot ahead part'. Even with lengthened runways, imported/copied flankers and hardened airbases they still cannot maintain the kind of sortie rate required on the plateau that would really bother the IAF.
I am not even going into the fact that those cheap flankers have had serviceability/safety issues. Not all of them are really new either and the ones imported in the early nineties can be deemed obsolete. Not all of these aircraft have sensors that can do too much in BVR combat, and only a percentage are multirole.

And that unlike the IAF which has done Safed Sagar recently the PLAAF is yet to have seen anything that resembles actual combat for over three decades.

I will still say that the IAF will screw the PLAAF over Tibet.Its Kunming and the Myanmarese air corridor that needs to be taken care of.

Kanson · Post by **Kanson** » 15 Oct 2009 16:24

We should always thank Chinese CP, w/o their "intrusion" we would have remained just as a marignal power.

Again we must thank them if not for their bum explosion, we would not have gone in the route of N weaponization in 70s.

Again we must very much thank them, as their proliferation to Pak quickened our missile program and further resulted in culimnation of Pok-II.

Probably, i guess, time as come again to thank them for spiking us up. We need that push otherwise we will be a sleeping elephant. God knows, whats going to happen and how the elephant going to behave. I only pray that the CP intellectuals wont stop with pinpricks and push the elephant really hard. So hard that the elephant wont stop thrashing the CP goons to eternity.

I guess time has come. Its not just Sunderji who predicts this predicament now the situation has turned so ripe for the show.

animesharma · Post by **animesharma** » 15 Oct 2009 23:09

India's Agni-5 can target our Harbin city: Chinese daily

Is it China's response to Indian media's campaign?

I doubt china daily is just trying to educate its people, especially with agni 5 which is yet to be tested.

From Chinese Source:

India's new missile is able to attack China's Harbin
India's Advanced Systems Laboratory (ASL) has made its forthcoming Agni-5 missile highly road-mobile, or easily transportable by road, which would bring Harbin, China's northernmost city within striking range if the Agni-5 is moved to northeast India.

The Agni-5 is similar to the Dongfeng-31A presented in China's National Day Military Parade in Beijing . India is going to test-fire the missile in early 2011.

The ASL, which develops India's long-range, nuclear-tipped missiles, enables the Agni-5 to reach targets far beyond its stated 5,000-km range by quickly moving closer to the target. Therefore, from various places across India, the Agni-5 can reach every continent except North and South America.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 16 Oct 2009 16:42

Chinese Aircraft Carrier
http://farm3.static.flickr.com/2375/178 ... 84b9_o.jpg

Details

http://www.marc.cn/2007/10/fake-chinese ... rrier.html

animesharma · Post by **animesharma** » 16 Oct 2009 18:30

China reaches out to BJP, says wants cordial ties with India

saptarishi · Post by **saptarishi** » 16 Oct 2009 21:40

animesharma wrote:China reaches out to BJP, says wants cordial ties with India

chinese are clever they know for sure that congress already knows bhai-bhai funda after 1962.
so these dragons and pandas are trying out BJP. IN FEW yEARS IT WILL BE RED-SAFFRON bhai bhai

kasthuri · Post by **kasthuri** » 16 Oct 2009 22:29

I was informed by a Russian friend of mine that the zoomed small islands are disputed territories between Russia and Japan. Compare the size of Russia to the disputed area. To my agony, my friend adds, "that's how one should defend their land!!"

Paul · Post by **Paul** » 16 Oct 2009 23:42

D Roy wrote:I don't agree with the 'PLAAF has shot ahead part'. Even with lengthened runways, imported/copied flankers and hardened airbases they still cannot maintain the kind of sortie rate required on the plateau that would really bother the IAF.
I am not even going into the fact that those cheap flankers have had serviceability/safety issues. Not all of them are really new either and the ones imported in the early nineties can be deemed obsolete. Not all of these aircraft have sensors that can do too much in BVR combat, and only a percentage are multirole.

And that unlike the IAF which has done Safed Sagar recently the PLAAF is yet to have seen anything that resembles actual combat for over three decades.

I will still say that the IAF will screw the PLAAF over Tibet.Its Kunming and the Myanmarese air corridor that needs to be taken care of.

Sometime in early 80s, there was a cartoon showing two Soviet tank officers standing in front of the Eiffel tower admiring the view. The assumption is that the Soviet armor has smashed it's way across Germany all the way to Paris.
In the next view, one of them says to the other…”remind me again comrade, who was the winner in the air war again.”

It is the same story here again, it will be the boots on the ground who will hold the territory and be able to advance in Tibet. The air war will be a interesting sideshow, will not swing the balance of power either way, except in a tactical situation….all the more reason to get as many Mountain divisions and Brahmos missiles ready and deployed ASAP.

D Roy · Post by **D Roy** » 17 Oct 2009 00:21

Air superiority will allow us to cut off ingressing chinese troops by landing paratroopers behind them.

It also means that the Chinese will not be able to reinforce beyond a certain point because we'll blow up their behinds ( literally).

Katare · Post by **Katare** » 17 Oct 2009 00:46

Border row with China knotty: India

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 17 Oct 2009 00:48

Air superiority will allow us to cut off ingressing chinese troops by landing paratroopers behind them.

you have no idea ! beyond hit and run para commando attacks (at MOST), any large scale airborne attack against PRC will be near impossible.

the PLA's simple AA force is MASSIVE, all important nodes will be well covered with numerous AA guns and infantry. this is over what LR SAM cover will be there. it will be suicide.

worst part is, they won't even use the main PLA force for this stuff, they will use the huge PLA reservists and units of PAP and people's militia.

D Roy · Post by **D Roy** » 17 Oct 2009 01:18

you have no idea ! beyond hit and run para commando attacks (at MOST), any large scale airborne attack against PRC will be near impossible.

the PLA's simple AA force is MASSIVE, all important nodes will be well covered with numerous AA guns and infantry. this is over what LR SAM cover will be there. it will be suicide.

worst part is, they won't even use the main PLA force for this stuff, they will use the huge PLA reservists and units of PAP and people's militia.

if they concentrate all of this along NEFA, then an airborne assault won't even be necessary.

. Anyway,

The PAP is indeed integrated into the PLA battle order but focusing the PAP to the level you seem to suggest along the front will leave gaps for exploitation all over Tibet by the SFF. And I think your magnitudes on the deployment/employability of the people's militia along NEFA are off the mark.
these positions will certainly provide plenty of targets for the IAF once air superiority is achieved.Yes I know they are well covered in the mountains and have several underground bunkers etc etc, but the IAF can do the job. Moreover the new C-130s being imported will allow ingress in a high threat environment (especially the LR-SAMs).

I don't think all your nodes will advance and give the same kind of coverage as easily once the PLA is already in Indian territory.

So yes, an airborne assault will be very problematic without all this being taken out. but they will be in the course of the conflict.

chanakyaa · Post by **chanakyaa** » 17 Oct 2009 01:53

China's Arrival: A Strategic Framework for a Global Relationship

http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/pub ... Report.pdf

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 17 Oct 2009 03:11

D Roy wrote:
you have no idea ! beyond hit and run para commando attacks (at MOST), any large scale airborne attack against PRC will be near impossible.

the PLA's simple AA force is MASSIVE, all important nodes will be well covered with numerous AA guns and infantry. this is over what LR SAM cover will be there. it will be suicide.

worst part is, they won't even use the main PLA force for this stuff, they will use the huge PLA reservists and units of PAP and people's militia.
if they concentrate all of this along NEFA, then an airborne assault won't even be necessary. . Anyway,

first things first, what is NEFA ? in 2009 there is no NEFA.

The PAP is indeed integrated into the PLA battle order but focusing the PAP to the level you seem to suggest along the front will leave gaps for exploitation all over Tibet by the SFF. And I think your magnitudes on the deployment/employability of the people's militia along NEFA are off the mark.

how so ? please note that the PAP is distinct from local police and is a paramilitary force under the central military commission. many different types of units with their own particular missions make up PAP. the current bloated size of the PAP owes in no small parts to a jiang jemin era re-organisation of the PLA ground forces that saw a transfer of a large no of PLA units to the PAP. PAP's duties include border protection, internal security and protection of industrial assets. of these, a little more than half are involved in internal security duties. border protection is the other major mission.
for the scenario you mentioned PAP border units won't be pulled away from anything to guard the borders. that falls under their mission anyway. in wartime, like all other paramilitary forces they will operate under PLA command. and since the PAP anyway operates under the CMC, integration will probably be easier.

secondly, I might be mistaken but I think you were talking of behind enemy lines operations, viz.

Air superiority will allow us to cut off ingressing chinese troops by landing paratroopers behind them.

protecting these areas will be the responsibility of the PAP internal security units, PLA reserve and the militia, leaving the PLA main force to concentrate on offensive operations.

as I said, these three forces combined can muster enough men to have enough boots on the ground at all important nodes and enough AA guns and men to fire them to turn any paradrop into a disaster.

only way to achieve vertical envelopment (which is a fancy name for what you are proposing

) in this scenario would be to make an airdrop away from the obvious staging areas and use a suitable mobile force to get to the target, with adequate air and artillery support.
an airborne infantry/light mechanised force, like the one India has, won't do. which is where things like light tanks and air mobile ICVs come in. but that's another story.

however, all this is purely hypothetical if you can't achieve air superiority. and that, is not trivial IMHO. (please see next part)

these positions will certainly provide plenty of targets for the IAF once air superiority is achieved.Yes I know they are well covered in the mountains and have several underground bunkers etc etc, but the IAF can do the job. Moreover the new C-130s being imported will allow ingress in a high threat environment (especially the LR-SAMs).

I don't think all your nodes will advance and give the same kind of coverage as easily once the PLA is already in Indian territory.

So yes, an airborne assault will be very problematic without all this being taken out. but they will be in the course of the conflict.

first of all, our(both IAF and PLAAF) air forces don't have enough critical force in order to be decisive in an sino-Indian conflict, even if either achieves air superiority. the balance will be still tilted by the ground forces and there we have a mammoth weakness -- we haven't given the god of war his due importance.

secondly, given PRC's recent investment into the double digit SAMs, achieving air superiority over tibet would be very difficult indeed. in fact, given their range, these have the potential to seriously disrupt air operations inside our own borders !

the C-130 has no capability to penetrate modern, dense AD environment on its own, it will need considerable escort and persistent SEAD/DEAD operations before and during the ingress.
the question that will be asked is, is it worth it ?
moreover, the number of C-130J's being procured clearly suggest these are for small scale SF operations, which is what I wrote in the first post. those are not for any major paradrop exercise.

Patrick Cusack · Post by **Patrick Cusack** » 17 Oct 2009 03:46

There are conflicting reports that number of c130 could be as high as 12+.

D Roy · Post by **D Roy** » 17 Oct 2009 03:48

first things first, what is NEFA ? in 2009 there is no NEFA.

He He.

how so ? please note that the PAP is distinct from local police and is a paramilitary force under the central military commission. many different types of units with their own particular missions make up PAP. the current bloated size of the PAP owes in no small parts to a jiang jemin era re-organisation of the PLA ground forces that saw a transfer of a large no of PLA units to the PAP. PAP's duties include border protection, internal security and protection of industrial assets. of these, a little more than half are involved in internal security duties. border protection is the other major mission.
for the scenario you mentioned PAP border units won't be pulled away from anything to guard the borders. that falls under their mission anyway. in wartime, like all other paramilitary forces they will operate under PLA command. and since the PAP anyway operates under the CMC, integration will probably be easier.

secondly, I might be mistaken but I think you were talking of behind enemy lines operations, viz.

They don't have enough despite the official demarcation and designation of roles. I stand by that. They have issues with numbers, The 2008 tibet uprising exposed many things. Moreover the training is not the same throughout the entire PAP. Stride 2009 also has pointers. They are actually looking at using more PLA troops directly in internal situations in the future.

only way to achieve vertical envelopment (which is a fancy name for what you are proposing ) in this scenario would be to make an airdrop away from the obvious staging areas and use a suitable mobile force to get to the target, with adequate air and artillery support.
an airborne infantry/light mechanised force, like the one India has, won't do. which is where things like light tanks and air mobile ICVs come in. but that's another story.

however, all this is purely hypothetical if you can't achieve air superiority. and that, is not trivial IMHO. (please see next part)

The another story is another story. airmobile ICVs like BMD-4s will do diddly squat. Despite brochure claims they don't stop even 12.7mm that effectively.The current order of battle will do quite nicely since despite being more "light skinned". Mobility is proven and the troops are well trained for this scenario.

first of all, our(both IAF and PLAAF) air forces don't have enough critical force in order to be decisive in an sino-Indian conflict, even if either achieves air superiority. the balance will be still tilted by the ground forces and there we have a mammoth weakness -- we haven't given the god of war his due importance.

secondly, given PRC's recent investment into the double digit SAMs, achieving air superiority over tibet would be very difficult indeed. in fact, given their range, these have the potential to seriously disrupt air operations inside our own borders !

Not true.

1. This artillery fixation is nothing new. it invariably leads to the conclusion that the IAF can't swing the battle decisively. The IAF has sensor fuzed weapons ( CBU-105) and will nicely do in Chinese armoured mountain warfare crap etc etc.

2. The triple digit sam fixation is nothing new either. They are often touted as "offensive" air defense systems but in reality they have been studied extensively by the israelis ( in the czech republic and in exercises with greece for instance) and us. And I don't think the Triumf is totally operational and deployed yet along NEFA.

the C-130 has no capability to penetrate modern, dense AD environment on its own, it will need considerable escort and persistent SEAD/DEAD operations before and during the ingress.
the question that will be asked is, is it worth it ?
moreover, the number of C-130J's being procured clearly suggest these are for small scale SF operations, which is what I wrote in the first post. those are not for any major paradrop exercise.

Not quite . it has some capability to get through modern air defences on its own , especially in the mountains and the type of sensors/jammers on board the C-130Js being supplied to India resembles that of the MC-130. So yes you are correct that they are more attuned to SF insertions. While as of now six are being procured with an option for six more. I have heard the figure of 24 as well.

Interestingly Ashley Tellis recently said

"India does not need C-130s for Pakistan".

Radhey · Post by **Radhey** » 17 Oct 2009 17:33

D Roy wrote:I don't agree with the 'PLAAF has shot ahead part'. Even with lengthened runways, imported/copied flankers and hardened airbases they still cannot maintain the kind of sortie rate required on the plateau that would really bother the IAF.
I am not even going into the fact that those cheap flankers have had serviceability/safety issues. Not all of them are really new either and the ones imported in the early nineties can be deemed obsolete. Not all of these aircraft have sensors that can do too much in BVR combat, and only a percentage are multirole.

And that unlike the IAF which has done Safed Sagar recently the PLAAF is yet to have seen anything that resembles actual combat for over three decades.

I will still say that the IAF will screw the PLAAF over Tibet.Its Kunming and the Myanmarese air corridor that needs to be taken care of.

Could you provide basis for your comments please..

D Roy · Post by **D Roy** » 17 Oct 2009 19:04

Nearly 17 Su-27 aircraft have been lost either due to crashes or by natural calamities like typhoons.

This is from the following link dated 2002. Over a dozen more have crashed since then apart from crashes of Su-30 MKKs.

http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/761528/posts

Russia has stopped all collaboration on the Su-27sk after the J-11B ( pirate version) negotiations failed. Now if somebody thinks that China can easily mass produce an effective \ flanker without major issues I have a bridge to sell to them over the Yangste Kiang. A recent HAL interview shows just how much stuff comes from Russia for our own flankers which are supposedly being "built" here. They will have issues despite KnAAPO being the production/collaboration agency for them.

China still has major issues with the WS-10 engine which is in the 12-13ton category and will be absolutely required if they want to have a meaningful flanker. They have now turned towards Ukraine for this.Chinese flankers have mostly slotted array radars with China still working on PESA's and AESA's.

There has been analysis about the sortie rate even here. I'll see if I can get you that link.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 18 Oct 2009 03:46

Singha wrote:can anyone comment on these orbat.com excerpts ?

Our position is quite clear. At the minimum, India needs to put two more divisions into Ladakh; return the division assigned to Himachal Pradesh and withdrawn in 1970 or 1971; unburden the division for UP from all other tasks and restore the independent brigade group withdrawn - we think it was in 1971; return XXXI Corps to the single task of Sikkim/West Bhutan; give a new division to Arunachal for the central sector; give a new reserve division to Eastern Command, and create a two-division corps, later three divisions, for the Nepal border.

Let me try and answer as best as I can. What he is referring to is this:

a. The Himachal Pradesh(HP)-Tibet section of India-China Border/LAC is called Sugar Sector in IA. It used to be manned by 51st Parachute Brigade which was subsequently shifted out. IIRC, manned by ITBP now. The division raised specially for this sector is something I'm not aware of. Unless, 39th Mountain Division was raised for this task and subsequently got assigned as 16 Corps reserve. Before 9 Corps was raised, 39 Mountain Division HQ was based in Yol in HP, which is 7 hours drive from Kullu-Manali (3 hours drive from Pathankot). BTW, Yol is 6kms from Dharamshala, the seat of Tibetan Gov. in Exile and residence of HH Dalai Lama. The Division maintains all its Brigades in HP. 39th Mountain Division is the Northern Command Reserve and if the baloon goes up with Chinese, you can very well expect this Division to be thr first one to be shifted to the Ladakh/HP LAC Sector

b. The Division in UP is the 6th Mountain Division which is the AHQ reserve and triple tasked for UP-Tibet border/LAC, Pathankot-Sambha/Chickens Neck and Ladakh Sector (China/PA). The Division is based in Bareilly (UP). It fought 1965 and 1971 wars as part of I Corps in these areas. During the 1987 plan to capture Northern Areas (Operation Trident-during the Brasstacks episode) the whoel Division was airlifted to Leh.

c. IA has Independent Mountain Bde in Joshimath. Ravi Rikhye (Editor-Orbat.Com) mentions that there existed another one which was withdrawn. I'm not aware of it. But why would IA need to maintain 2 (I) Mountain Bdes is something I do not understand. Why not raise a Mountain Div HQ?

d.As per the recent reports, the requirement for the NE theater is something we're in the process of meeting.The present disposition of troops is as under:

i. IV Corps: 21 Mountain Division (Rangiya/Chansari), 5th Mountain Division(Bomdila) and 2nd Mountain Division (Dinjan-prior to Tinsukhia)
ii. III Corps: 57th Mountain Division (Liemakong)

If you look up the map of Assam and AP, the following situation becomes clear. The Tawang tract is taken care of by 5th Mountain Division. The 21st Mountain Division, IMO, is strategically located to move up the Tawang tract for offensive/defensive operations or should the need arise, move into Bhutan. The whole of Central and NE Arunachal is under the lone 2nd Mountain Division in Dinjan.

It is interesting to note that 8th and 57th Mountain Divisions were Eastern Command Reserves which doubled up as HQs to manage and execute the CI Ops. 8th has been lost to Northern Command. So, Eastern Command has only one reserve Division in NE-57th Mountain Division in Leimakong. So, what we need is a Division to beef up the Arunachal Sector plus another to add to the reserve kitty. From the reports in the media, 2 Divisions are under raising/planned for NE Sector. One of the new formations is slated to take care of a part of AP while other will go into the reserve kity.This will bring the no of Divisions in NE proper to 3(IV Corps)+1(III Corps)+2 (new-probably with III Corps)=6. Same as desired by the author. III corps is most likely going to morph into a Mountain Strike Corps.

e. As for the more Divisions for Ladakh, I has an e-mail exchange with the author on the probable locations/AOR for new Divisions. These are:Dhemchok-Chusul (Southern Ladakh) and Chang-Chenmo Valley (Central Ladakh). Of these, the former is likely to see employment of Mechanized forces. If you see the geography of Leh and surrounding areas, you will realize that Leh is flanked by spines of mountain ranges to its north and east (when you veiw the map). Any movement into Leh has to move through high passes:Khardung-La and Wari-La to reach the Nubra and Upper Shyok Valley and Chang-La to cross the Ladakh range. The only axis which will permit any mass scale and rapid movement of forces for PLA runs along the Indus River valley and provides direct access to Leh without having to cross any mountain pass. NH1D runs along this route.Chusul and Dhemchok are the access point to this axis. As of now, Chusul and Dhemchok are held by Infantry Bde each from the 3rd Infantry Divisions. This is one of the sectors he wants to be held by a Division to prevent any mass and rapid thrust by PLA. In 1962, IA inducted light tanks into Spanggur gap (SE of Chusul) fearing PLA armor. BTW, just check the location of Nyoma AGL wrt Chusul and Dhemchok

Chang-Chenmo Valley lies NE to Pangong So lake. The mountain range is towards west (east of Shyok river before it bends towards NW and meets Nubra river) and the valley proper is towards east. The run of LAC is such that the mountain range/ridge lies in Indian control along with a portion of the Valley proper. This mountain range, running North-South seperates valley of Chang-Chenmo river from rest of Leh. Ideal route to this place is from the Aksai-Chin side. The shortest route from Leh is Leh-ChagLa-Darbuk-Lunkun-Phobrang-Marsimik La. Marsimik La is highest motorable pass in the area, higher even than Khardung-La. But it does not have proper motorable road like Khardung-La. This sector is held by ITBP with Phobrang being a ITBP post before Marsimik-La. The lay of land, once you reach the valley is flat and provides access to Tibetan Plateau through various broad and flat valleys. It is more accessible from the Tibetan side. But the ridge and high mountain pass ensures that no rapid large scale east-west movement is possible.

And IA maintains Armor and Mechanized Troops in 3rd Infantry Divisions.

PA: The author wrongly mentions 33 Corps as 31 Corps.

Kanson · Post by **Kanson** » 19 Oct 2009 20:44

^^^ Thats nice to read, rohit sir, Is there any min and max divisions mark for the concerned region? There was some reference to Sundarji.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 20 Oct 2009 00:17

^^^Don't 'Sir' me dude....Rohit is quite all right...

The number in the Orbat.Com article mentioned is 19 Mountain Divisions, as desired by General Sundarji. You see, thing with coming up with such numbers is that one needs to clearly bring out the threat perceptions and own goals and objectives. Once you do that, you factor in things like adversary's capabilities, your own strength and weaknesses, geography, geopolitical environment and other factors. It is not that easy to come up/justify numbers. Yes, in a typical arm-chair internet general fashion, one can throw around numbers but then they are guess estimates of arm-chair generals like me . But nevertheless, here goes:

We have 10 Mountain Divisions, 7 of which are in NE. The spread of Mountain Divisions under various Corps is as under:

XXXIII Corps - 17th, 20th and 27th Mountain Divisions.
AOR (Area of Responsibility) - Sikkim/Bhutan

IV Corps - 5th, 21st and 2nd Mountain Divisions.
AOR - Arunachal and part of Indo-Burma border.

III Corps - 57th Mountain Division.
AOR-Eastern Command Reserve. Will most likely beef up the Central/NE AP border

XVI Corps - 39th Mountain Division.
AOR-This Division is Northern Command Reserve. To be used as per requirement

XIV Corps - 8th Mountain Division.
AOR-Kargil-Drass

6th Mountain Division - AHQ Reserve
AOR-To be used as per requirement

So, requirement for new formations on the LAC may be something like this:

NE - 2 Mountain Divisions with one each for Central AP and Eastern Command Reserve kitty. In process/planned.

Central Sector (UP-Tibet Border/LAC) - presently guarded by 9(I) Mountain Brigade. 6th Mountain Division is likely to be used in this sector in case of shooting match with PLA. The Division is conveniently based in Bareilly with brigades spread around town close to Bareilly. If, 6th is made permanent for this sector only, IA will need to raise additional Infantry/Mountain Division to make up the void in AHQ Reserve kitty.

Sugar Sector (HP-Tibet LAC) - Requirement for one Mountain Division. May be the Division can keep one Bde up/forward and 2 in reserve. The Bde will complement the ITBP presence in the area. This is a high mountain country and I don't see any large scale east-west movement of troops possible

Dhemchok-Chusul (Southern Ladakh) - As I said in earlier post, Dhemchok in South and Chusul in North of this sector are the access points if PLA wants to move on Leh (along the Indus-NH-1D). Remember, we stood our ground in Chusul in 1962 exactly because we wanted to deny PLA access to Leh. The extent of sector is ~180kms (Courtsey Google Earth). Controlling Dhemchok gives PLA the ability to choke Manali-Leh Highway (NH-1D) and axis to attack Chusul from its right flank. Chusul itself is threatened by forces opposite to it. The Chinese National Road 219 (NR 219) runs close to LAC in Dhemchok. This the Xinjiang-Tibet road (Kailash Mansarovar is 200kms from Dhemchok along this road

). Presently held by Brigade each from 3rd Infantry Divisions based in Leh. And this is an eminently Tankable country. It is no co-incidence that 3rd Div has mechanized elements (BMP-II and T-72). Each of these locations can do with a Division each with an Armored Battle Group; something like the Mechanized Bde in RAPIDS. This will free 3rd Div to take care of Central (Chang-Chenmo) and Northern Ladakh Sector.

I've already described the Central Sector in previous post and the access problem. Northen Sector is one where the Karakoram Pass is located. Opposite the Aksai-Chin proper. Flat as a pan-cake. But access to the place is across high mountain passes. IIRC, these sectors are patrolled ITBP. Please remember that given the geography of Central and Northern Sectors (primarily in terms of accessibility), you cannot switch forces between the two sectors. You'll have to fortify the sectors. And that means more manpower. 3rd Division has 2 Bdes (Dhemchok-Chusul). 3rd Bde of the Div. was moved out long ago and needs to added back as Division reserve.

IMO, if the objective is to get back the Aksai-Chin, the revamped situation may look something like this:
--3rd Division - Northern Sector with one Bde up and 2 in reserve. The area opposite this sector is flat and tailor made for use of Mechanized forces. While the PLA can drive up the Aksai-Chin/Soda Plains, we need to cross the high mountain range. I do not know how, but if we can get armor/ICV in this area, we can break out into the Aksai-Chin with the objective of cutting the Chinese NR 219.
--New Division - Central Sector with one Bde up and 2 in reserve.

So, as per this arm-chair generalissimo, the new requirement adds up as follows:
a. NE - 2 Divisions
b. UP-Tibet LAC - 1 (either new or to fill the void for 6th as AHQ reserve)
c. Ladakh - 3 plus additional Bde for 3rd Div. If all this happens in eastern Ladakh, we will need new Corps HQ to manage the entire front

Plus, I'd like one more Mountain Strike Corp for Eastern Sector. Ladakh and UP-Tibet Segment can be re-enforced by the troops from plains.

Total:
Divisoins-9
Corps HQ-2

There you go the recipe to take on the PLA.

Kanson · Post by **Kanson** » 20 Oct 2009 03:12

Aha, interent fora is a funny place where absence of non-verbal communication is to be compensated with other measures. Whatever it is, i'm not sure about extra 9 div. So whichever way you say it, thanks once again for putting out that recipe.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 20 Oct 2009 22:43

Kanson wrote:Aha, interent fora is a funny place where absence of non-verbal communication is to be compensated with other measures. Whatever it is, i'm not sure about extra 9 div. So whichever way you say it, thanks once again for putting out that recipe.

Sorry, did not get the drift wrt the bolded part

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 20 Oct 2009 23:06

you addl divs add up to 6 not 9.

at present we may be able to scrape together 3 more by cutting the western front to the bone, but these would not be 'proper' mountain divs by any yardstick

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 20 Oct 2009 23:37

Singha wrote:you addl divs add up to 6 not 9.

at present we may be able to scrape together 3 more by cutting the western front to the bone, but these would not be 'proper' mountain divs by any yardstick

The number six(6) is for pure play holding divisions that I've explained. The extra 3 are/will be part of the Mountain Strike Corps mentioned.

A Mountain Division does carry some specialized equioment but the main difference between a Mountain and Infantry Division is in term of scale of equipment. There is no drastic change which cannot be managed. Remeber, 3rd Division in Ladakh is Infantry and not Mountain Division. So, you might not require Mountain modification at all.

And as for the re-inforcement, just remember Indo-China shooting match is most likely to be during the monsoon months in plains when the HAA is free of snow. During this period, no mass scale movement, especially of Armor, is possible in Punjab. If push comes to shove, I do not see any issue with IA moving an entire Strike Corps, most likely I Corps, to the Ladakh Sector.

IA can make the following troops available IMO:

Ladakh Sector:
I Corps: 33rd Armored Division+22nd Infantry Division
39th Mountain Division - Ex-XVI Corps
4th Infantry Division - Ex-II Corps
18th RAPID - Ex-X Corps

UP-Tibet Sector
6th Mountain Division - AHQ reserve

NE
23rd Infantry Division - Ex-I Corps
54th Infantry Division-Ex-XXI Corps.

The balance troops under formations in Western Command and Strike Corps are quite enough to deal with PA mischief. And this, IMO, is the bare minimum we can/will do.

Avik · Post by **Avik** » 21 Oct 2009 00:51

Rohit,
Thanks for a solid analysis. Just a couple of points there:

1) Do you think its feasible to shift troops from I and II Corps into Ladakh if the balloon were to go up. These troops,coming from the plains would require at least a month to acclimatise ..maybe more. Also, the logistics backend in terms of the NHs into Ladakh may not be sufficient to sustain a sudden infusion of multiple divisions, if the divisions were to be inducted after the balloon has gone up. Also, I would think its correct to assume that the NH would be cut off in case of a conflict with China. Hence, the requirement for localised forces in China prior to action stations.

2) While I am in agreement with your scenario on NE, Ladakh and HP/UP,I would request you to also factor in a possible thrust through Nepal by the PLA. This could be either through Central Nepal or Eastern Nepal. The thrust through E-Nepal by the PLA could be an oblique way of getting very close to the Siliguri Corridor. I would assume a two division deployment by IA to take care of this eventuality, which, in case, does not happen could be utilised as a reserve strike corps.

Regards,
Avik

VinodTK · Post by **VinodTK** » 21 Oct 2009 04:35

Cross Posting from BSF,CRPF and other Paramilitary Forces Discussion thread

ITBP forces to get satellite phones on India-China border

Gagan · Post by **Gagan** » 21 Oct 2009 08:18

Meanwhile in the Arabian sea, darn Pirates do some Pirating...
China vows 'all-out efforts' to rescue hijacked ship

BEIJING (AFP) - – China vowed Tuesday to make "all-out efforts" to rescue a Chinese cargo ship hijacked by armed Somali pirates in the Indian Ocean northeast of the Seychelles.

"We will continue to follow developments closely and make all-out efforts to rescue the hijacked ship and personnel," foreign ministry spokesman Ma Zhaoxu told reporters, while giving no details of China's plans.

China sent three navy ships to the Somali coast

...

...the ship was seized 550 nautical miles northeast of the Seychelles and 700 nautical miles off the pirate-plagued east coast of Somalia.

The ship, called "De Xin Hai," was hijacked on Monday, said Ma,

...

However a statement on the website of China's transport ministry said the vessel was carrying coal and was sailing from South Africa to India with a 25-member crew.

EU naval spokesman John Harbour told AFP they were all Chinese nationals.

A spokesman for the ship's owner Qingdao Ocean Shipping Company, which is based in the eastern China city of Qingdao, also confirmed to AFP that the 25 seamen were all employees of the company.

...

The hijacking of the Chinese ship brings to six the total number of vessels currently in the hands of Somali pirates.

The question that comes to mind is that is this real or a hoax to build up echendee.

Yagnasri · Post by **Yagnasri** » 21 Oct 2009 19:51

I am surpriced at the distence in which is thing has taken place. Is this some sort of drama so that China can have some reason to increase its presence in Indian Ocean ?

animesharma · Post by **animesharma** » 21 Oct 2009 21:12

China vows 'all-out efforts' to rescue hijacked ship

IN should offer help

Vivek K · Post by **Vivek K** » 21 Oct 2009 21:40

IAF MKIs could help locate the ship!

Gagan · Post by **Gagan** » 21 Oct 2009 21:51

The problem is not locating the hijacked ships. The problem is that the crew and the ship with its precious cargo are held hostage and at the mercy of the pirates.

These pirates take these ships to near their village, take the crew to a secure location, and threaten the ship company with harming the crew and damage to the ship or its cargo.

The pirates themselves are common villagers who have taken to piracy, drug and gun running as a means to sustain themselves - they have been at it for some time now and so profitable is their business, that they now have representatives in the UK where ransom money is paid!

I trust the chinese must have located the ship by now. How do they tackle this will be interesting. For all their bluster, they are masters at strategic brilliance just like our paki neighbours, and are liable to fall flat on their flat faces often. We'll have to see how this turns out.

But the chances are 50-50 that this is a PR exercise to show the PLAN in good light in front of an African audience.