The chief of air staff at the master status display as each of the flankers took off and turned south east towards Port Blair beating their own record of 3 minutes per aircraft by a clear 30 seconds each . The box lunch was served and consisted of fresly done Magi noodles with some large chicken pieces and a can of chilled Pepsi . But he was too preoccupied to have lunch and pushed it aside as he started instructed his command level officers onec again without break
- establish a direct link to both once they are in area – tell them to us volume not area in all engagements –we must use all the advantages of home turf and that means availability of ground air defense support and fuel advantage –no flanker should engage in hero giri –no dog fight style engagement till the strike flight reaches within bomb release range –make that clear to all pilots now
- what is the status of Lightings
- sir they have just finished fuelling
- ok that’s nice =tell them to get them off their fat ass asap –the whole battle outcome will depend on we having more assets in the region than the enemy
- any civilian flight in or out of port blair
- no sir not to our knowledge
- what about international flight which use the high altitude air corridor over car nic
- checking sir
- you should have done that 30 minutes back –do it now
- issue immediate NOTAM to all civilian flights that air space over andamans is closed to all civilian and military traffic as of now – divert all flights over sri lanka
- what we have on ground in port blair
- sir two Tu 142 and some Mi 17 s with half a dozen Dornier
- get them dispersed
- get the mobile ATC on line now –shut down all emission from main ATC
The instructions came in a continiuos stream like out of a ZSU 23 6 cannon without pause and the staff officers were all sweating as they communicated the orders to field commanders .
The Russian paradigm of BVR combat has its origins in the Cold War period, when Soviet operational analysis indicated that the low kill probability of missile seekers and airframes, especially if degraded by countermeasures, would be a major impediment to success. By the 1970s the standard Soviet technique in a BVR missile launch was to salvo two rounds, a semi-active radar homing weapon and a heatseeking weapon. To this effect some Soviet fighters even included a weapons select mode which automatically sequenced the launch of two rounds for optimal separation.
The mathematics of multiple round missile engagements are unambiguous - the size of a missile salvo launched is a stronger driver of success than the actual kill probability of the individual missiles. If the missiles are wholly identical by type, then the following curves may be optimistic, insofar as a factor degrading the kill probability of one missile is apt to have a similar effect on its siblings in a salvo. However, where the missiles differ by seeker type and guidance control laws, then the assumption of statistically independent missile shots is very much stronger. A question often asked is why are Sukhoi Flanker variants equipped to carry between eight and twelve BVR missiles? The answer is a simple one - so they can fire more than one three or four round BVR missile salvo during the opening phases of an engagement. In this fashion the aircraft being targeted has a difficult problem as it must jam, decoy and/or outmanoeuvre three or four tightly spaced inbound missiles. Even if we assume a mediocre per round kill probability of 30 percent, a four round salvo still exceeds a total kill probability of 75 percent.
competent Flanker driver gets the first shot with three or four round salvo of long burn R-27 variants, with mixed seekers, leaving one or two remaining salvoes of BVR missiles on his rails, and the same Flanker driver will have modern DRFM monopulse jammers capable of causing likely much more than a 50 percent degradation of AIM-120 kill probability. With a thrust vectoring engine capability (TVC), the Flanker driver has the option of making himself into a very difficult endgame target for the AIM-120 regardless of the capability of his jamming equipment. Since all of the AIM-120s fired are identical in kinematic performance and seeker jam resistance, any measure applied by the Flanker driver which is effective against one AIM-120 round in the salvo is apt to produce the same effect against all AIM-120 rounds - a problem the Flanker driver does not have due to diversity in seeker types and missile kinematics. In electronic warfare terms neither side has a decisive advantage, but the Flanker does have a decisive advantage in aircraft and missile kinematics and in having up to six times the payload of BVR missiles to expend. The simple conclusion to be drawn is that operators of the F/A-18E/F or F-35 JSF should make every effort to avoid Beyond Visual Range combat with late model Flankers, as the best case outcome is parity in exchange rates, and the worst case outcome a decisive exchange ratio advantage to the Flanker. Given the evident design choices the Russians have made, this is not an accident, but rather a consequence of well thought through operational analysis of capabilities and limitations of contemporary BVR weapon systems.