Historical Battles in Ancient & Medieval Bharat

[Yagnasri]

Yes some guru has to study this

The numorus weapons and the way the forces were used and discribed is vast. But most impresive is the methods which are organisational and political as per our epics.

Some things like

Jointness of using forces like the Akshowhini. Even at the time of Ramayana and Dasaradha offers to Vishvamuthya that he will come to forest with one Akshiowhini of his army. Each sub division of this unit is consisting of all 4 types of army like foot horse elephnet and chariots. We dont find such combindness in ancient times in other armys - may be in China

What do we consider th ploy of telling a person that his beloved son is dead or putting a person born as women in front to kill a warrior who will not use weaponse on women. War for use always include some things other than mear use of weapons to kill others.

Political steps to weaken the support to other side king - Like Rama making Vibhishana as king.

Unfortunately we do not study this aspect.

Sending raiding party in to deep enimy territory - Lakshmana going after Indrajit.

Take symbolisums - Did any one tried to think the godess durga with weapons in 15 hands and one hand giving Abhayam to the people. Vishnu with a Koumodaki, Sudarshan, Shankham (panchajanyam) in 3 hands and then one hand with flower and Abhayam. The people who made these representations know that to give assurence of protection with one hand you need rest of the hands full with weapons. So for we failed to understnad that by preparing best and by being powerful than our enimes we ensure peace. We are still think that some how there will be peace with good intentions.

[Pulikeshi]

^^

Boss, I was doing some research for writing up on a topic on strategy.
However, in doing that I noticed that there is not much material on
hard 'weapons' invented in historic India.

Like for example a catapult, cross-bow, ramming devices, etc.
At best I remember the lizard (Iguana?) used by Shivaji, stories of the Urmi, etc.
Did a lack of invention in military weapons cause India to be invaded repeatedly?
There is always talk of Indian bravery, and betrayal by the ghaddar
However, I for one have not seen any evidence of invention -
Am trying to get educated...

[ramana]

Pulikeshi, Long ago while the subject was verboten in BRF, we looked at Pre-Modern Warfare in ancient India and created this thread:

Pre-Modern Warfare :INdia and Elsewhere

In fact a Chinese writer was piqued about ancient Indian seige weapons and you can see the interaction.

Narayana Rao garu, I hear you loud and clear but we have the Indian epics thread in GDF. BTW will look up that article on Khadga that Hauma wrote.

[Pulikeshi]

Ramana,

Thanks will look at the info in more detail...

However, I have found very little useful non-puranic tangible information.
Do not want to talk about hypothetical aastras, vimanas, etc.

There seems a historic dearth of offensive warfare technologies.
To this day it continues with imports being the main way to compensate.

[Sanku]

There seems a historic dearth of offensive warfare technologies.

Will Ajatshtaru's spiked chariots et al do? As Ramana said note the Chinese reference.

Meanwhile Purana's seem to run fairly accurately till Nanda and Mauyra era's so leaving out those references will be self limiting.

[Rahul M]

^^

Boss, I was doing some research for writing up on a topic on strategy.
However, in doing that I noticed that there is not much material on
hard 'weapons' invented in historic India.

Like for example a catapult, cross-bow, ramming devices, etc.
At best I remember the lizard (Iguana?) used by Shivaji, stories of the Urmi, etc.
Did a lack of invention in military weapons cause India to be invaded repeatedly?
There is always talk of Indian bravery, and betrayal by the ghaddar
However, I for one have not seen any evidence of invention -
Am trying to get educated...

arthshastra has a very long list of weapons divided into the classes of melee, ranged and siege. due to the discontinuity in knowledge the exact definition of many of those are a little hazy.

[negi]

Don't know about asthras/shastras but the part about composite bow is true , back in 90's Surabhi had covered a story on composite bow made of wood and horns of himalayan goat , noteworthy part was all the materials used for making the bow came from body parts of the animal and the finished product looked a lot like the modern recurve bow .


Ramana garu thanks for the link

The Hindus also appear to have wielded the bow with a thumb ring and used a leather guard called the hastaghana to protect agains the bow string abrading the hand.

So now Eklavya's story makes perfect sense.

[jambudvipa]

Does anyone know how to create a campaign map on the computer? I mean the ones used in the Osprey books where military symbols are used to indicate the movement of the opposing armies on the battlefield.
I feel this would be a good tool to explain to our younger generation ,rather than a dry compendium of dates and who defeated whom.

[ramana]

There is book on the download sites on e-cartography ie making maps from google maps etc. Apparently its being done all the time for GIS use.

[jambudvipa]

Thanks for the info Ramanaji,can you tell me what the book is called?

Airavat ji: Your blog is excellent.Read article on battle of Khanua,very well written.just had one question,I was under the impression that Shiladitya betrayed Rana Sanga.But after reading your article,this does not seem to have been the case.How was this tale spread that Shiladitya betrayed Rana Sanga?

[Airavat]

By traditional accounts of history, military defeats cannot happen unless there is a traitor in the midst. The same theme is found in the Kanhad-Dev-Prabandh, which describes the bloody conquest of Gujarat by Alauddin Khalji in 1298, and attributes it to the treachery of the minister Madhava. Attributing military losses to "traitors" is true for not just communities in India, but traditional societies around the world.

The bhats (bards) faithfully recorded events as they happened but did not have the capacity to analyze them; so in this case as time went by and the story of Khanua was told and retold over the generations, the treachery of Silhadi became a prominent theme. The misguided Colonel Tod accepted this account and even nationalist Rajasthani historians like Har Bilas Sarda refer to Shiladitya's treachery, while admitting that it did not make much difference to the outcome of the battle.

No credible reason is described for his treachery. What exactly was he promised? Silhadi already ruled over several territories in Malwa and was related by marriage to Rana Sanga, making him extremely influential in North India, so what more could Babur have offered him? The Mughal invader held a durbar after defeating the Afghan confederacy in the east where several Indian chieftains appeared, but Silhadi is not mentioned among them, which is incredible considering his alleged role in turning the Khanua battle in Babur's favour.

The fact is that that Tomar chief of Raisen loyally aided Maharana Sanga's son and successor Ratan Singh. Traditional accounts cannot explain how an alleged traitor, responsible for the deaths of several prominent Mewar chieftains and thousands of soldiers, was not only welcomed but even trusted by this kingdom with the duty of forming coalitions with other anti-Mughal powers! Even more incredibly this anomaly is sought to be explained away in modern times as an example of the "chivalry and large-heartedness of the rulers of Mewar".

[ramana]

Airavat capture this reply and question in your blog. I cant see it lost in the hay here.

jd try this:

Mapping Hacks: Tips & Tools for Electronic Cartography


Mapping Hacks: Tips & Tools for Electronic Cartography Publisher: O'Reilly Media | ISBN: 0596007035 | edition 2005 | CHM | 568 pages

Since the dawn of creation, … should things change now? Well, they shouldn't. The reality is that map creation, or "cartography," has only improved in its ease-of-use over time. In fact, with the … Rich Gibson, and Jo Walsh do more than just illuminate the basic concepts of location and cartography, they walk you through the process one step at a time.

There are other books too.

[jambudvipa]

Airavatji,I have created battle maps based on your article on Battle of Khanua.Feel free to use it on your blog or elsewhere.I also have pdf version if anybody wants it.

Ramanaji: If Airavatji is in agreement,can we do a little ebook on major Indian battles with descriptions and maps writeen from an Indian view point?
I apoligise in advance for the large image sizes.I would be obloged if someoen can tell me how to cut them down.

[Yagnasri]

It is very good for us to have a book giving indian point of view. This is seriously lacking in any history books. For example we do not have any details of battles fought by Hemu. Even details of battle of Raicur are not tought even in AP or karnataka school books. (They teach Tallikota)

[Atri]

It is very good for us to have a book giving indian point of view. This is seriously lacking in any history books. For example we do not have any details of battles fought by Hemu. Even details of battle of Raicur are not tought even in AP or karnataka school books. (They teach Tallikota)

Raichur battle was the first battle in India to use guns.. This was decade before first battle of Panipat. Krishnadevaraya employed portuguese engineers to kill the troops on the bastions of Raichur fort..

[ramana]

It is very good for us to have a book giving Indian point of view. This is seriously lacking in any history books. For example we do not have any details of battles fought by Hemu. Even details of battle of Raichur are not taught even in AP or karnataka school books. (They teach Tallikota)

Google Books for Hemu Napoleon of India.

[Yagnasri]

True Ramanaji. But we don't read about him at all in our history right. We dont even read about the 27 years war between Maratas and Mughuls. All we read is there were Moguls and suddenly there is East Indian Company and 1857 war and rule by British. It is as if we don't want to hear about the libaration wars waged by the Indian people. How for this is healthy for a nation in which the people who are to be national heros are not even merit a passing reference and mass murderers like Akber are praised like anything. For example how may of common people know about Gokula and Jat revolt against Aurangajab. not many.

[Rahul M]

anyone has any idea how armour and helmets in ancient India looked like ? this is a serious request.

[Atri]

anyone has any idea how armour and helmets in ancient India looked like ? this is a serious request.

I have been searching for this for long time. Mahabharat describes so many strategies (Vyuha) for deployment of armies, different types of weapons, but haven't come across the drawings OR descriptions of many.

Even the inscriptions of Gupta times describe armour clad horse cavalry, heavy elephant cavalry, rathas and trebuchets. But no graphical representation anywhere.

The archers used leather armour, that is known.

[Sanku]

Umm how about the wall carvings and such like from the Gupta era, and other such later material?

[ramana]

Check Roshan Al Kazi's book on Ancient Indian costumes. Its a NBT book out of print. Rahul M has acopy I knows. He might see whats there in it.

Ms Al Kazi had taken the trouble to sketch up costumes from paintings(Ajant included) and sculptures thru the ages.

[peter]

I don't think Silhadi's treachery can be discounted. Few things to ponder:

a) Babur mentions Silhadi as Salahauddin in Baburnama though he records the correct name of other rajputs in Rana S's army. Some historians believe that Silhadi is just a corruption of Salahauddin and his Hindu name is lost in the annals.

b) In Baburnama, while describing Rana Sanga's forces, the first general that is mentioned is Silhadi! He is said to be a commander of 30,000.

c) After defeating Rana S, Babur advanced against Medni Rai at Chanderi who was also present at Khanua. Silhadi at Raisen which is not very far from Chanderi and a fellow tomar, did not come to the aid of Medini rai.

d) Silhadi converted to Islam to save himself from muslim ruler of Gujarat in early 1530's.

e) While passing through a village near Gwalior Babur comments in Baburnama that this was the village of Silhadi!

We know that Silhadi was not the most important general rather he was a chieftain in the army of Medini Rai. There is no way Babur would have been aware of Silhadi as a general unless Silhadi went and met Babur for negotiations as is asserted by James Tod. He would have been sent in the negotiating party because Rana S trusted him since Silhadi was his son in law. For Babur to comment on even Silhadi's village points to an acquaintance with Silhadi which is not adversarial. Lastly we should not forget that Babur never attacked Raisen where Silhadi resided.

As to the motives of Silhadi it seems rather obvious. Till Medini rai was alive Silhadi could not be an undisputed rajput leader of malwa. I would not be surprised if Silhadi came to an understanding with Babur that he would decamp on the day of the khanua battle from the vanguard so long babur attacks Medini rai if he wins which is what he did. Perhaps Silhadi changing his religion was part of the equation too since Babur refers to him as Salahuddin in Baburnama.

As far as Silhadi seeking help from Rana S's son it is not surprising either. Uday Singh father of Rana Pratap forgave Banbir even though Banbir almost succeded in assasinating Uday Singh.

Lastly too much has been made of the superior artillery of Babur. If one observes battle of dharmat, which was fought almost 120 years later , the vanguard of Imperial forces demolished the artillery of aurangzeb and killed the general Murshid kuli khan who was leading aurangzeb's artillery. The technology had advanced much in 120 years from the time of Khanua. If 120 years later, at Dharmat, the artillery was ineffective against the charge of a cavalry how could artillery be the deciding factor at khanua?

An important question is what happens if a key general (say Silhadi) in the vanguard does not perform his duty and then decamps. Can the war be salvaged if that happens?

Peter

PS: It is strange most Indian historians only trust the mughal records which are nothing but court histories and give no credence to the oral legends which though embellished do contain kernels of truth. I did not hear anyone in vernacular sources say "treachery" at haldighati. How come?

By traditional accounts of history, military defeats cannot happen unless there is a traitor in the midst. The same theme is found in the Kanhad-Dev-Prabandh, which describes the bloody conquest of Gujarat by Alauddin Khalji in 1298, and attributes it to the treachery of the minister Madhava. Attributing military losses to "traitors" is true for not just communities in India, but traditional societies around the world.

The bhats (bards) faithfully recorded events as they happened but did not have the capacity to analyze them; so in this case as time went by and the story of Khanua was told and retold over the generations, the treachery of Silhadi became a prominent theme. The misguided Colonel Tod accepted this account and even nationalist Rajasthani historians like Har Bilas Sarda refer to Shiladitya's treachery, while admitting that it did not make much difference to the outcome of the battle.

No credible reason is described for his treachery. What exactly was he promised? Silhadi already ruled over several territories in Malwa and was related by marriage to Rana Sanga, making him extremely influential in North India, so what more could Babur have offered him? The Mughal invader held a durbar after defeating the Afghan confederacy in the east where several Indian chieftains appeared, but Silhadi is not mentioned among them, which is incredible considering his alleged role in turning the Khanua battle in Babur's favour.

The fact is that that Tomar chief of Raisen loyally aided Maharana Sanga's son and successor Ratan Singh. Traditional accounts cannot explain how an alleged traitor, responsible for the deaths of several prominent Mewar chieftains and thousands of soldiers, was not only welcomed but even trusted by this kingdom with the duty of forming coalitions with other anti-Mughal powers! Even more incredibly this anomaly is sought to be explained away in modern times as an example of the "chivalry and large-heartedness of the rulers of Mewar".

[Rahul M]

ramana ji, her book is good but not cent percent accurate when it comes to military attire. btw, much of her book is available in HTML format in 4to40.com

here's what I know,
elephants were armoured with lamelar plates similar to cataphract cavalry. there's a single metal plate (2-3 inches long and across)that has been unearthed which is rectangular in shape with a concentric raised inner rectangular area in order to deflect weapons.
foot soldiers had light armour in form of linen tunics stuffed with wool, fur and other fibres, sometime covered with a leather layer which could stop light penetrating weapons. heavier armour came in form of either metal plates or mail/small metal plates stringed together to form lamelar armour. kautilya uses the term loha-jalik. however we do know that in subsequent eras India produced some of the best mail armour that was even reputed to stop buckshot rounds. the question is when did it start.

lastly, how did the helmet look like, I don't remember seeing even a single illustration of a war helmet. was the version we saw in ramanand sagar's mahabharat (which is similar/same as later day mukuts) a more ceremonial version of an earlier war helmet ? references to helmets are dime a dozen in the texts but not a single historian AFAIK has bothered to create even one artist's impression of it.

[Rahul M]

I have been searching for this for long time. Mahabharat describes so many strategies (Vyuha) for deployment of armies, different types of weapons, but haven't come across the drawings OR descriptions of many.

atri, kautilya describes 30 different formations IIRC. unfortunately my version, by LN rangarajan has omitted much of that part. perhaps it's there in shamashastry's version. I'll give it a look, since ebooks are available.

Even the inscriptions of Gupta times describe armour clad horse cavalry, heavy elephant cavalry, rathas and trebuchets. But no graphical representation anywhere.

could you be more exact about the source ? which inscriptions specifically ? the texts of gupta era inscriptions I've read didn't contain any.

[Airavat]

Lastly too much has been made of the superior artillery of Babur. If one observes battle of dharmat, which was fought almost 120 years later , the vanguard of Imperial forces demolished the artillery of aurangzeb and killed the general Murshid kuli khan who was leading aurangzeb's artillery. The technology had advanced much in 120 years from the time of Khanua. If 120 years later, at Dharmat, the artillery was ineffective against the charge of a cavalry how could artillery be the deciding factor at khanua?

Don't look at one battle in isolation; artillery was the deciding factor in the battles of Chaldiran, Panipat, Khanua. The fourth battle in this series would be the Battle of Gogra where Babur defeated the eastern Afghans and the Bengal Sultan.

Artillery worked in the early 16th century because it was a surprise weapon, but a century later it wasn't. Cavalry formations had worked out the amount of time it took to load, prime, fire, and reload these guns, and in the gap between each round they could make their charge. Moreover, all the developments in field-artillery came from Europe after the 16th century, while no such developments took place in India.

Eastern powers could not develop artillery as much as the Europeans, even though both acquired it at the same time, because the former were overly reliant on cavalry. In Europe cavalry formations were defeated by infantry even without field-artillery, like the English archers defeating the French cavalry at Agincourt, or the Scottish pikemen beating the English cavalry at Bannockburn, or the Swiss infantry repulsing Austrian cavalry at Morgarten and Laupen. This is why European powers began to invest time and effort in developing infantry and artillery formations, which in later centuries led to their global domination of warfare.

In India, cavalry reigned supreme till the 18th century, and in some parts even into the 19th century and the Indian warriors had a mindset that no rabble of foot-soldiers could ever hold back charging cavalry. Consequently Indian artillery began coming under the command of European officers from the 17th century, and by the 18th century European-led infantry and artillery formations were the deciding factor of warfare in India.

[peter]

Lastly too much has been made of the superior artillery of Babur. If one observes battle of dharmat, which was fought almost 120 years later , the vanguard of Imperial forces demolished the artillery of aurangzeb and killed the general Murshid kuli khan who was leading aurangzeb's artillery. The technology had advanced much in 120 years from the time of Khanua. If 120 years later, at Dharmat, the artillery was ineffective against the charge of a cavalry how could artillery be the deciding factor at khanua?

[..]
Artillery worked in the early 16th century because it was a surprise weapon, but a century later it wasn't. Cavalry formations had worked out the amount of time it took to load, prime, fire, and reload these guns, and in the gap between each round they could make their charge. Moreover, all the developments in field-artillery came from Europe after the 16th century, while no such developments took place in India.
[..]

Cavalry attacks in a mass where one row of horsemen is not very far from the next row. Even if some rows get decimated the others would get to artillery gunners before they have time to reload. This is why the cavalry won. Artillery was not a surprise.

Indian/European historians have towed Babur's line in giving all credit for his victory at khanua to the artillery which is incorrect. I gave you an example of dharmat where italian gunners were in the employ of Aurangzeb and he had guns/cannons which loaded much faster then the ones at Khanua. They were neutralised by the cavalry of Jaswant Singh. So how could much slower loading guns 120 years earlier at khanua have any impact? Remember the speed of horses did not change in these 120 years. Mughal court historians never wrote about the treachery they committed. Instead they tried to malign the opposing commander as a bad general or tried to show they had some better technique of war. Case in point Dharmat. Jadunath Sarkar has believed bad generalship of Jaswant Singh which he read in mughal sources. Yet he does not explain how Jaswant Singh's vanguard demolished the artillery, vanguard and reached the centre of rebellious prince's army?

Since you have not commented on Silhadi do you accept that he was a traitor?

Peter

[Airavat]

Cavalry attacks in a mass where one row of horsemen is not very far from the next row. Even if some rows get decimated the others would get to artillery gunners before they have time to reload. This is why the cavalry won. Artillery was not a surprise.

When it was used for the first time on the battlefield, artillery was definitely a surprise weapon. It was the common factor at Chaldiran, Panipat, Khanua, Gogra. Study these other battles.

Indian/European historians have towed Babur's line in giving all credit for his victory at khanua to the artillery which is incorrect.

Babur actually gives all the credit for his victory to:

1) Declaring jihad against Rana Sanga.
2) Giving up wine. And distributing broken wine cups, made from gold and silver, as alms.

It is actually modern historians who credit artillery, and Babur's defensive arrangement, for this victory.

Since you have not commented on Silhadi do you accept that he was a traitor?

Silhadi being Salahauddin, his supposed enmity with Medini Rai (of which there is no evidence), Babur not attacking Raisen (he was actually diverted by the advance of the eastern Afghans while he was besieging Chanderi) etc, are incredibly speculative and have not been mentioned even by nationalist historians like RC Majumdar, KM Munshi, etc.

Case in point Dharmat. Jadunath Sarkar has believed bad generalship of Jaswant Singh which he read in mughal sources. Yet he does not explain how Jaswant Singh's vanguard demolished the artillery, vanguard and reached the centre of rebellious prince's army?

Have you read Jadunath Sarkar's description of this battle, and can you provide the relevant quote, where he does not describe this??

[peter]

Cavalry attacks in a mass where one row of horsemen is not very far from the next row. Even if some rows get decimated the others would get to artillery gunners before they have time to reload. This is why the cavalry won. Artillery was not a surprise.

When it was used for the first time on the battlefield, artillery was definitely a surprise weapon. It was the common factor at Chaldiran, Panipat, Khanua, Gogra. Study these other battles.

Evidence is not strong for your claim. Bunch of examples to the contrary:
a) Dharmat (already discussed some)
b) Mahadaji Scindhia and De Boigne against Rathores at Tonga (Scindhia and De boigne lost)
c) English and Sikhs at Ferozeshahr (English won but guns / cannons were ineffective). Let me put forth two quotes on this battle:
i) General Hope Grant of the British army:

... night of 21 December was one of gloom and never perhaps in our annals of Indian warfare, has a British army on so large a scale been nearer to defeat which could have involved annihilation.

ii) Cunningham Political Agent of East India Company:

...Guns were dismounted, and their ammunition was blown into the air; squadrons were checked in mid career; battalion after battalion was hurled back with shattered ranks . . . the obstinacy of the contest threw the English into confusion; men of all regiments and arms were mixed together; generals were doubtful of the fact or of the extent of their own success, and colonels knew not what had become of the regiments they commanded or of the army which they formed a part of

Sikhs lost not because of superior artillery or guns of the british but because of
Lal Singh and Teja Singh.

Indian/European historians have towed Babur's line in giving all credit for his victory at khanua to the artillery which is incorrect.

Babur actually gives all the credit for his victory to:

1) Declaring jihad against Rana Sanga.
2) Giving up wine. And distributing broken wine cups, made from gold and silver, as alms.

It is actually modern historians who credit artillery, and Babur's defensive arrangement, for this victory.

Battle of Badr is the model which all mughal/arabic historians used in describing a battle they won. Modern historians did not want to highlight jihad so they based their analysis of Babur's victory on his guns and artillery which feature very prominently in Baburnama for his Khanua victory. This is still shoddy scholarship because the vernacular sources of Rajasthan were not taken into account by these historians.

Since you have not commented on Silhadi do you accept that he was a traitor?

Silhadi being Salahauddin, his supposed enmity with Medini Rai (of which there is no evidence), Babur not attacking Raisen (he was actually diverted by the advance of the eastern Afghans while he was besieging Chanderi) etc, are incredibly speculative and have not been mentioned even by nationalist historians like RC Majumdar, KM Munshi, etc.

Babur calls Silhadi as Salahuddin in Baburnama. Salahuddin is the only name Babur uses. Other Hindu generals are correctly identified. Do you think Babur knew the name of the village in which Rana Sanga was born?

Case in point Dharmat. Jadunath Sarkar has believed bad generalship of Jaswant Singh which he read in mughal sources. Yet he does not explain how Jaswant Singh's vanguard demolished the artillery, vanguard and reached the centre of rebellious prince's army?

Have you read Jadunath Sarkar's description of this battle, and can you provide the relevant quote, where he does not describe this??

Yes I have read Dr Sarkar's "History of Aurangzeb". Here are some quotes:
i)On the morning of the battle this is what Sarkar writes about Jaswant Singh:

Page 4 : .. a general who shrinks in terror, changes his mind, and attempts to gain time by parleying before a battle, is not likely to win in the clash of arms; he has already lost the confidence which is half the victory.

Yet Sarkar does not accuse Aurangzeb of being a general "who shrinks in terror" because the first messenger for avoiding the battle actually came from Aurangzeb. See Page 2 where Sarkar describes arrival of Brahmin Kavi Rai to Jaswant Singh's camp.

On Page 6 Sarkar describes, still before the battle, why the rajputs would loose. They are an

ill knit group of discordant elements. Unlike Jai Singh, Jaswant Singh was not the commander to humour or manage them.

Further on Page 8 still before the battle:

Finally, Jaswant as a general
was no match for Aurangzib, who had "aged in war". Contemporary historians blame him for his incapacity, in-experience and faulty plans.

Sarkar agrees with "contemporary historians" on Jaswant's ability.

On the same page 8 Sarkar further goes on that Jaswant:

chose his ground badly and so cramped his men that the horsemen could not manoeuvre freely nor gather momentum for a charge... Lastly, he made the fatal mistake of despising artillery....

Sarkar quotes contemporary mughal sources for above statements but forgets that Qasim Khan was the "Mir Aatish" (commander of the artillery) and had artillery under his command in this battle.

Sarkar's POV that Jaswant Singh was a bad general is clear.

Then on Page 14 Sarkar describes how jaswant singh's vanguard of 2500 (this number is from Jodhpur Hukumat ri bahi edited by Raghubir Singh and Sharma and contains a very detailed description of men in jaswant singh's army. Sarkar does not mention the number of rajputs in jaswant's vanguard) rajputs attacked first approximately 3000 in aurangzeb's artillery then the 8000 of his vanguard and finally reached aurangzeb's centre where he had about 10000 men:

Attack on artillery:

.... the Rajput leaders of the Van, — Mukund Singh Hada, Ratan Singh Rathor, Dayal Singh Jhala, Arjun Singh Gaur, Sujan Singh Sisodia and others, with their choicest clansmen, galloped forward. Shouting their war-cry of Ram! Ram! ''they fell on the enemy like tigers, casting away all plan." The flood of Rajput charge first burst on Aurangzib's artillery. The guns and muskets fired at point-blank range, woefully thinned their ranks, but so impetuous was their onset that it bore down all opposition. Murshid Quli Khan, the Chief of Artillery, was slain after a heroic resistance and his division was shaken ; but the
guns were not damaged. The artillerymen probably fled before the storm, and returned as soon as it passed away.

Page 15 describes the attack on aurangzeb's vanguard:

Victorious over the artillery guard, the assailants fell on the front part of Aurangzib's Vanguard. Here an obstinate hand-to-hand combat raged for some time. The Rajputs at first outnumbered their opponents. Zulfiqar Khan, the commander of the front division of the Van, when pressed hard by the enemy, followed the custom of Indian heroes in the sorest straits. Getting down from his elephant, he made a firm stand on foot in the centre of the carnage, fighting with the valour of despair, without caring for his own life or stopping to count how many backed him. But this heroic sacrifice could not stem the tide of Rajput onset : two wounds stretched him low, and the Rajputs, flushed with success, swept on and pierced into the heart of the Van. This was the most critical moment of the day. If the Rajput charge were not checked, all would be over with Aurangzib ; the assailants, gathering impetus with each victory, would shatter his defence, and then all the divisions of his army would catch the contagion of panic and rush headlong out of the field.

Then Sarkar repeats reasons for Jaswant Singh's bad generalship:
Page 16:

Only a few men from Jaswant's Centre and Advanced Reserve had moved up to support their victorious brethren. But the Maharajah had chosen his position so badly that many of the Imperialists standing on the uneven ground
could not join in the fight, and many others could not charge by reason of their being cramped within a narrow space.

Question is if Jaswant Singh was so inept and his army filled with "discordant elements" how could a cavalry of 2500 smash through 3000 of aurangzeb's artillery and 8000 of his vangaurd? Has Dr Sarkar bothered asking a simple question as to how difficult was it for Jaswant Singh's centre to move past his own vanguard of 6000 under Qasim Khan who were blocking the way forward?

Peter

[ParGha]

Peter,
Have you considered the possibility that the cavalry got lucky and simply smashed through the gun-lines? It has happened before elsewhere: An infantry square was once considered unbreakable by cavalry alone in the 19th C, but there have been instances where they got lucky - the KGL in the Peninsular Campaign, the Sudanese in the Mahdi War.

[ParGha]

With regard to Ferozepur, a LOT of political machinations were taking place even before the battle which had sealed the outcome. At the military level, while the artillery was better served on the Indian side, the EIC and BA infantry were better trained and led and their cavalry played safe and steady. Same story as Assaye.

[peter]

Peter,
Have you considered the possibility that the cavalry got lucky and simply smashed through the gun-lines? It has happened before elsewhere: An infantry square was once considered unbreakable by cavalry alone in the 19th C, but there have been instances where they got lucky - the KGL in the Peninsular Campaign, the Sudanese in the Mahdi War.

I pointed out many battles in which arti was neutralised. Hard to believe cavalry got lucky in each of the battle. Usually there is more then luck which causes someone to do well in a war. Take the example of dharmat. The number of people that would have been hit by the artillery/guns would have fallen down or gotten killed. Now if the mass of the cavalry was less then some threshold then artillery would have seemed superior or if the number of rounds that could be fired and re-fired was past a certain threshold then no cavalry would have stood a chance.

So I do not think luck plays any role.

[peter]

With regard to Ferozepur, a LOT of political machinations were taking place even before the battle which had sealed the outcome. At the military level, while the artillery was better served on the Indian side, the EIC and BA infantry were better trained and led and their cavalry played safe and steady. Same story as Assaye.

Explain more please as I could not parse what you mean.

[Avinash R]

On armor and helmets http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 61#p484561

[Airavat]

Evidence is not strong for your claim. Bunch of examples to the contrary:

All your examples are from much later in history, when both of us are in agreement that Indian cavalry had learned to overwhelm artillery, which is why cavalry reigned supreme in India till the 18th century.

The central point is whether artillery was a surprise weapon when first used on the battlefield, and whether it had an impact on the battles of Chaldiran, Panipat, Khanua, and Gogra?

Modern historians did not want to highlight jihad so they based their analysis of Babur's victory on his guns and artillery which feature very prominently in Baburnama for his Khanua victory. This is still shoddy scholarship because the vernacular sources of Rajasthan were not taken into account by these historians.

It's quite a sweeping charge to make on all historians; we know the mess created by colonial and leftist historians in Indian History writing, but why include nationalist historians like Majumdar, Munshi, or Sarkar in that bunch? These nationalist historians did study all sources, including those in Rajasthani.

But what happens when vernacular Rajasthani sources seem to contradict each other? For example there is one oral tradition that of the brothers Sanga and Prithiviraj, Sanga was the eldest, while the written tradition (from Mehta Nensi's Khyat) states that Prithviraj was the eldest. The latter tradition is supported by contemporary inscriptions in Mewar, which is why modern historians follow it rather than the oral tradition.

Case in point Dharmat. Jadunath Sarkar has believed bad generalship of Jaswant Singh which he read in mughal sources. Yet he does not explain how Jaswant Singh's vanguard demolished the artillery, vanguard and reached the centre of rebellious prince's army?

Yes I have read Dr Sarkar's "History of Aurangzeb". Here are some quotes:

Attack on artillery: .... the Rajput leaders of the Van, — Mukund Singh Hada, Ratan Singh Rathor, Dayal Singh Jhala, Arjun Singh Gaur, Sujan Singh Sisodia and others, with their choicest clansmen, galloped forward. Shouting their war-cry of Ram! Ram! ''they fell on the enemy like tigers, casting away all plan." The flood of Rajput charge first burst on Aurangzib's artillery. The guns and muskets fired at point-blank range, woefully thinned their ranks, but so impetuous was their onset that it bore down all opposition. Murshid Quli Khan, the Chief of Artillery, was slain after a heroic resistance and his division was shaken ; but the guns were not damaged. The artillerymen probably fled before the storm, and returned as soon as it passed away.

So he does describe how the Rajput cavalry broke through Aurangzeb's artillery and clashed with his vanguard. That's all I wanted to know.

On the same page 8 Sarkar further goes on that Jaswant: chose his ground badly and so cramped his men that the horsemen could not manoeuvre freely nor gather momentum for a charge... Lastly, he made the fatal mistake of despising artillery....

Sarkar quotes contemporary mughal sources for above statements but forgets that Qasim Khan was the "Mir Aatish" (commander of the artillery) and had artillery under his command in this battle.

Jadunath Sarkar most certainly writes about Qasim Khan: "Half the imperial van, viz., the Mughal troops under Qasim Khan, rendered no aid to their Rajput comrades now struggling hard with Aurangzeb's van; they were suspected of collusion with the enemy or of antipathy to the Rajputs. The charge of Jaswant's vanguard was not followed up. Aurangzeb's troops, who had parted before the rushing tide, closed again behind them, and thus cut off their retreat."

Has Dr Sarkar bothered asking a simple question as to how difficult was it for Jaswant Singh's centre to move past his own vanguard of 6000 under Qasim Khan who were blocking the way forward?

This is what Sarkar writes: "Meantime his van had almost entirely melted away: part of it has perished around Mukund Singh in his heroic charge; of the rest, the Chandrawat Rajputs and Bundelas had fled, and the Musalmans under Qasim Khan, who had kept aloof from the fighting, prepared to run away as they saw Aurangzib's host advancing on them."

Jadunath Sarkar does not attribute the defeat to Jaswant's bad generalship alone but to a myriad of causes. And he does have words of praise for Jaswant Singh and the Rajputs:

1) Death has no terror for the Rajput, but then it must be death in conflict. If he is to die, it is better to perish after killing some of the enemy, than to be butchered while standing motionless in a dense column.
2) Jaswant had fought valiantly for four hours and by firmly keeping his own ground he had so long saved the imperial center, the pivot on which his whole army rested. In spite of two wounds, his voice and example had cheered the Rajputs.
3) Every clan of Rajasthan contributed its quota to the band of heroes who sacrificed their lives in their master's service (swami-dharma).

And lastly his spirited description of the Rajput cavalry charge, their skill in swordsmanship, and their bravery in continuing the fight even when surrounded on all sides and outnumbered. These are things that you will not find in the writing of the colonial and leftist historians.

[Airavat]

Jadunath Sarkar's summary of the Battle of Dharmat:

"Evidently Jaswant's plan was to skirt the enemy's artillery and come to close quarters with their troops, disregarding the gun-fire during the first few minutes of the wild gallop. But such tactics could have succeeded only if the charge had been made on a wide level plain and also if the opposing artillery had been served by Indians proverbially slow in turning and firing their pieces.

....after they had passed by the enemy's artillery and engaged Aurangzib's troops, the French and English gunners of the prince quickly turned their guns sideways and began to mow down the Rajputs in their new position. It was truly a contest between swords and gunpowder, and artillery triumphed over cavalry."

In other words, the Rajput cavalry charge triumphed over the Indian portion of the artillery, leading to the death of Murshid Quli Khan. While the sections under European gunners, who fired at a faster rate, continued peppering the Rajput cavalry.

[Rahul M]

All your examples are from much later in history, when both of us are in agreement that Indian cavalry had learned to overwhelm artillery, which is why cavalry reigned supreme in India till the 18th century.

would you mind elaborating a bit on the changes in tactics etc that led to this ?

[Yagnasri]

When Franks met the arabs and their foot solders stood their ground they have own. Well trained, lead, disiplined and well equied (like English long bows) infentory did started to stand up for well before 19th century.

[Airavat]

Eastern powers could not develop artillery as much as the Europeans, even though both acquired it at the same time, because the former were overly reliant on cavalry. In Europe cavalry formations were defeated by infantry even without field-artillery, like the English archers defeating the French cavalry at Agincourt, or the Scottish pikemen beating the English cavalry at Bannockburn, or the Swiss infantry repulsing Austrian cavalry at Morgarten and Laupen. This is why European powers began to invest time and effort in developing infantry and artillery formations, which in later centuries led to their global domination of warfare.

In India, cavalry reigned supreme till the 18th century, and in some parts even into the 19th century and the Indian warriors had a mindset that no rabble of foot-soldiers could ever hold back charging cavalry. Consequently Indian artillery began coming under the command of European officers from the 17th century, and by the 18th century European-led infantry and artillery formations were the deciding factor of warfare in India.

[ParGha]

Let me ask one question about artillery at Dharmat: was it prepared with grape_shot and improvised shrapnel, or was it prepared with counter battery round-shot?

We know from multiple records that Babur used mainly grape-shot and improvised shrapnel, because he had no opposing artillery to contend with.

[peter]

Evidence is not strong for your claim. Bunch of examples to the contrary:

All your examples are from much later in history, when both of us are in agreement that Indian cavalry had learned to overwhelm artillery, which is why cavalry reigned supreme in India till the 18th century.

The central point is whether artillery was a surprise weapon when first used on the battlefield, and whether it had an impact on the battles of Chaldiran, Panipat, Khanua, and Gogra?

If your hypothesis was true then a change in cavalry tactics should be discernible, which caused the cavalry to overwhelm the artillery, going forward from say 1530's (khanua) to 1650's (Dharmat). Do you see any such change?

Modern historians did not want to highlight jihad so they based their analysis of Babur's victory on his guns and artillery which feature very prominently in Baburnama for his Khanua victory. This is still shoddy scholarship because the vernacular sources of Rajasthan were not taken into account by these historians.

It's quite a sweeping charge to make on all historians; we know the mess created by colonial and leftist historians in Indian History writing, but why include nationalist historians like Majumdar, Munshi, or Sarkar in that bunch? These nationalist historians did study all sources, including those in Rajasthani.

Unravelling of medieveal Rajasthani sources started in earnest only post independence of India and a lot of researchers did not look at them. For example Jodhput Hukumat ri Bahi (http://books.google.com/books?id=k58JAQ ... =&as_brr=0) is not referenced by Majumdar, Munshi and Sarkar. This is the only MSS, AFAIK, which contains gory details on the composition of Imeprial army sent to Dharmat.

I can publish relevant sections here if any one is interested.

But what happens when vernacular Rajasthani sources seem to contradict each other? For example there is one oral tradition that of the brothers Sanga and Prithiviraj, Sanga was the eldest, while the written tradition (from Mehta Nensi's Khyat) states that Prithviraj was the eldest. The latter tradition is supported by contemporary inscriptions in Mewar, which is why modern historians follow it rather than the oral tradition.

Sure. But can we say that every oral source is wrong and reject it? And even for the Sanga and Prithviraj episode I find it intriguing that right of primogeniture belonged to Prithviraj and yet he wants to go to the Charani lady to ask her who would be the king!

Case in point Dharmat. Jadunath Sarkar has believed bad generalship of Jaswant Singh which he read in mughal sources. Yet he does not explain how Jaswant Singh's vanguard demolished the artillery, vanguard and reached the centre of rebellious prince's army?

Yes I have read Dr Sarkar's "History of Aurangzeb". Here are some quotes:

"Attack on artillery: .... the Rajput leaders of the Van, — Mukund Singh Hada, Ratan Singh Rathor, Dayal Singh Jhala, Arjun Singh Gaur, Sujan Singh Sisodia and others, with their choicest clansmen, galloped forward. Shouting their war-cry of Ram! Ram! ''they fell on the enemy like tigers, casting away all plan." The flood of Rajput charge first burst on Aurangzib's artillery. The guns and muskets fired at point-blank range, woefully thinned their ranks, but so impetuous was their onset that it bore down all opposition. Murshid Quli Khan, the Chief of Artillery, was slain after a heroic resistance and his division was shaken ; but the guns were not damaged. The artillerymen probably fled before the storm, and returned as soon as it passed away."

So he does describe how the Rajput cavalry broke through Aurangzeb's artillery and clashed with his vanguard. That's all I wanted to know.

That is not the point. Question is: Jadunath sarkar says that Jaswant Singh chose a ground from which a charge could not take place and yet he writes that a charge *did* take place. How is this possible? What are the reasons for it? In other words Sarkar is contradicting himself.

On the same page 8 Sarkar further goes on that Jaswant: chose his ground badly and so cramped his men that the horsemen could not manoeuvre freely nor gather momentum for a charge... Lastly, he made the fatal mistake of despising artillery....

Sarkar quotes contemporary mughal sources for above statements but forgets that Qasim Khan was the "Mir Aatish" (commander of the artillery) and had artillery under his command in this battle.

Jadunath Sarkar most certainly writes about Qasim Khan: "Half the imperial van, viz., the Mughal troops under Qasim Khan, rendered no aid to their Rajput comrades now struggling hard with Aurangzeb's van; they were suspected of collusion with the enemy or of antipathy to the Rajputs. The charge of Jaswant's vanguard was not followed up. Aurangzeb's troops, who had parted before the rushing tide, closed again behind them, and thus cut off their retreat."

Issue is not whether Qasim khan was present at this battle rather was he commanding any artillery at Dharmat. Sarkar gives an impression that Jaswant despised artillery and thus his army did not have any while other sources say that Qasim Khan, himself Mir Aatish, led other aatishbegs in this battle.

Has Dr Sarkar bothered asking a simple question as to how difficult was it for Jaswant Singh's centre to move past his own vanguard of 6000 under Qasim Khan who were blocking the way forward?

This is what Sarkar writes: "Meantime his van had almost entirely melted away: part of it has perished around Mukund Singh in his heroic charge; of the rest, the Chandrawat Rajputs and Bundelas had fled, and the Musalmans under Qasim Khan, who had kept aloof from the fighting, prepared to run away as they saw Aurangzib's host advancing on them."

Jadunath Sarkar does not attribute the defeat to Jaswant's bad generalship alone but to a myriad of causes. And he does have words of praise for Jaswant Singh and the Rajputs:

Sarkar gives following reasons for Jaswant Singh's defeat:
a) Jaswant was an inexperienced, unconfident general who shrank in terror against aurangzeb.
b) Jaswant made faulty plan for the battle and chose a bad battleground which did not allow his army to mount a cavalry charge.
c) Jaswant Singh despised artillery and had none.
d) Jaswant Singh's army was full of dischordant elements who could not fight cohesively as a unit.

Do you think Sarkar is correct in asserting these four points and were these the real reasons for Jaswant Singh's defeat?