Rahul M wrote:jet engine I think.
And when the teacher asks how does a Jet engine starts??
We'll say: Shooo....zzzzz....whaaaa..... like that.
eh Rahul da good one that "jet engine"
Rahul M wrote:jet engine I think.
Is it forbidden to talk about this subject on BRF? I tried skimming through BRF threads...found none discussing this...please post the thread which discusses this subject..its a humble request...please.Venkarl wrote:India expanding military nuclear site: US think tank
Saw this in BRF news section..I want to know if there is any discussion going on this subject.
TIA
Venkat
can I expect more from you on this Master?? ....anyways...thanks.Rahul M wrote:no venkarl, it's not forbidden.
What did you want to discuss about it? Is there anything new or significant to discuss?Venkarl wrote:Is it forbidden to talk about this subject on BRF? I tried skimming through BRF threads...found none discussing this...please post the thread which discusses this subject..its a humble request...please.Venkarl wrote:India expanding military nuclear site: US think tank
Saw this in BRF news section..I want to know if there is any discussion going on this subject.
TIA
Venkat
TIA
Venkat
1. Why the fascination with Boost-phase? Even Aegis + RIM-161 is not a boost-phase system.PratikDas wrote:The point of being off the coast is to be hundreds of kilometers closer to the possible point of launch - somewhere in the Arabian Sea or the Bay of Bengal. Since the area wouldn't be within India's territorial waters, you wouldn't be able to station something there permanently - you'd need to have the ABM on a ship. This would increase your chances of a boost phase intercept.Misraji wrote:^^^
....
Furthemore, if you want to protect the cities, why again would we be looking at ship-based ABM?? Wouldn't
fixed sites serve the purpose. And then its no longer boost phase interception is it?
The ideas that have been expressed above are nothing fancy.
These things might actually be better explained in books rather than online forums.
....
Of course you can have everything hovering in the air all the time, but I think having it floating on the sea would not only bring your radar closer to the incoming missile, it would also give you the opportunity to take it out - as the first line of defence.
1. I don't care what Aegis does. I'm interested in probabilities of intercept. Boost-phase intercepts get the missile before it can possibly deploy MIRVs.Misraji wrote: ...
1. Why the fascination with Boost-phase? Even Aegis + RIM-161 is not a boost-phase system.
2. Why would we not be able to station something permanently in some area of the sea?
3. How big are Arabian Sea or Bay of Bengal? Where would you put this ship-based BMD?
4. If its near the submarine launching the missile, it implies that you could track the submarine.
Then why not kill the submarine first rather than let it launch the missile and then try and take out
the missile?
5. Whats the difference between placing the ABM system in Mumbai versus the coast of Mumbai?
~Ashish.
1. Unfortunately we would need to care about Aegis for the purposes of this discussion, wouldn't we? It is the only ship-based ABM deployed today. So it serves as a good model what is realistically achievable.PratikDas wrote: 1. I don't care what Aegis does. I'm interested in probabilities of intercept. Boost-phase intercepts get the missile before it can possibly deploy MIRVs.
2. As far as I understand, India doesn't own the Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal, but is allowed to pass through the international waters
3. Off the coast of the valuable targets, to detect the incoming missile sooner and to react with ABM sooner
4. Boost phase intercept is not compulsory! But getting the radar out in the waters, detecting the SLBM sooner, getting a lock sooner, and then utilising the lock to react immediately from the nearest platform - i.e. the ship with the radar certainly helps!
5. Radar range is extended, ABM range is extended.
Misraji wrote: ....
1. Unfortunately we would need to care about Aegis for the purposes of this discussion, wouldn't we? It is the only ship-based ABM deployed today. So it serves as a good model what is realistically achievable.
[Pratik] It is one model - and an old model. It doesn't constrain what IN chooses to do.
2. No. India doesn't own Arabian Sea. Neither does USN own atlantic or pacific. But try enforcing your actions on their carrier group. The idea is that we have enough power projection for Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal. We maintain UAV, MRP, ship-based patrols in these waters. Its just not trivial to slip past them.
For eg: When the PLAN deployed warships to Somalian waters, they were tracked for the entire duration of passage in the Indian Ocean. We do have that capability.
[Pratik]Can you track every submarine? I'm talking about SLBM defence.
3. Why does shooting down an SLBM make more sense than trailing the SSBN and killing it?
Both of them are apparently difficult tasks but the Navy is better equipped right now for protecting Indian waters.
[Pratik]Major coastal cities are fewer in number than the number of submarines IN would have to follow, assuming IN knows about all Pak and PRC sub locations in the Arabian Sea or Bay of Bengal
4. a. Our ABM's LRTR is to have its range extended to 1500KM. There is not exactly any need to have it placed into the sea.
[Pratik]Would we then be able to fire the ABM from 1500 km away? No the ABM missile doesn't have the range! We'd have to wait and watch the incoming missile get closer and faster, and possibly multiply into MIRVs. You keep ignoring this point.
b. And how do we make sure that the ABM ship is near the launch point of the SLBM?
Bay of Bengal has an area of 2172000 km^2. How many ships do we need to protect the entire area?
[Pratik]Stay on track. I said the ABM needs to be put offshore. When did I say the ABM needs to be all over the Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal? There are a few coastal cities. The ABM range from these cities can be extended by 3 ABM platforms per city, to a distance determined by the ABM system range - which would be the minimum of the radar or missile.
5. Extending the radar's range does not imply ABM's range extending? You still have to kill it.
While detecting the missile as soon as possible is a good point, you still have the question of how to kill it.
[Pratik]Exactly why the ABM missile needs to be taken offshore to create a buffer between the incoming missile and the city being defended.
The point being made is that fixed ABM makes more sense than ship-based ABM for the points listed above.
[Pratik]Sorry. When India gets a 1500km PAD or AAD missile, you would have a point, but until then land-only ABM is the minimum requirement, not the exclusive requirement.
~Ashish.
1. Of-course it does. We don't even have technology for Aegis-like capability yet. Something that they have had from latePratikDas wrote:Misraji wrote: ....
1. Unfortunately we would need to care about Aegis for the purposes of this discussion, wouldn't we? It is the only ship-based ABM deployed today. So it serves as a good model what is realistically achievable.
[Pratik] It is one model - and an old model. It doesn't constrain what IN chooses to do.
2. No. India doesn't own Arabian Sea. Neither does USN own atlantic or pacific. But try enforcing your actions on their carrier group. The idea is that we have enough power projection for Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal. We maintain UAV, MRP, ship-based patrols in these waters. Its just not trivial to slip past them.
For eg: When the PLAN deployed warships to Somalian waters, they were tracked for the entire duration of passage in the Indian Ocean. We do have that capability.
[Pratik]Can you track every submarine? I'm talking about SLBM defence.
3. Why does shooting down an SLBM make more sense than trailing the SSBN and killing it?
Both of them are apparently difficult tasks but the Navy is better equipped right now for protecting Indian waters.
[Pratik]Major coastal cities are fewer in number than the number of submarines IN would have to follow, assuming IN knows about all Pak and PRC sub locations in the Arabian Sea or Bay of Bengal
4. a. Our ABM's LRTR is to have its range extended to 1500KM. There is not exactly any need to have it placed into the sea.
[Pratik]Would we then be able to fire the ABM from 1500 km away? No the ABM missile doesn't have the range! We'd have to wait and watch the incoming missile get closer and faster, and possibly multiply into MIRVs. You keep ignoring this point.
b. And how do we make sure that the ABM ship is near the launch point of the SLBM?
Bay of Bengal has an area of 2172000 km^2. How many ships do we need to protect the entire area?
[Pratik]Stay on track. I said the ABM needs to be put offshore. When did I say the ABM needs to be all over the Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal? There are a few coastal cities. The ABM range from these cities can be extended by 3 ABM platforms per city, to a distance determined by the ABM system range - which would be the minimum of the radar or missile.
5. Extending the radar's range does not imply ABM's range extending? You still have to kill it.
While detecting the missile as soon as possible is a good point, you still have the question of how to kill it.
[Pratik]Exactly why the ABM missile needs to be taken offshore to create a buffer between the incoming missile and the city being defended.
The point being made is that fixed ABM makes more sense than ship-based ABM for the points listed above.
[Pratik]Sorry. When India gets a 1500km PAD or AAD missile, you would have a point, but until then land-only ABM is the minimum requirement, not the exclusive requirement.
~Ashish.
The point is that you're not going to guarantee boost-phase intercept, but you can increase the chances of doing that....you'd need to have the ABM on a ship. This would increase your chances of a boost phase intercept.
Did you even read this? No matter what the range of the radar in the near future, having the ABM on the ship will bring it closer to the incoming missile. Without an on-ship radar, coordinating a land-based radar with a ship-based ABM missile is definitely possible but having an additional on-ship radar will help and make the task easier.4. Boost phase intercept is not compulsory! But getting the radar out in the waters, detecting the SLBM sooner, getting a lock sooner, and then utilising the lock to react immediately from the nearest platform - i.e. the ship with the radar certainly helps!
This is undeniable, no matter what the range of the radar or the ABM missile.5. Radar range is extended, ABM range is extended.
Fine. Lets assume that we are not looking at boost-phase interception.PratikDas wrote:^^^^^
Before you get a centralise your critique around the boost phase idea, read what I have said:The point is that you're not going to guarantee boost-phase intercept, but you can increase the chances of doing that....you'd need to have the ABM on a ship. This would increase your chances of a boost phase intercept.Did you even read this? No matter what the range of the radar in the near future, having the ABM on the ship will bring it closer to the incoming missile. Without an on-ship radar, coordinating a land-based radar with a ship-based ABM missile is definitely possible but having an additional on-ship radar will help and make the task easier.4. Boost phase intercept is not compulsory! But getting the radar out in the waters, detecting the SLBM sooner, getting a lock sooner, and then utilising the lock to react immediately from the nearest platform - i.e. the ship with the radar certainly helps!This is undeniable, no matter what the range of the radar or the ABM missile.5. Radar range is extended, ABM range is extended.
My central point of view is that no ABM system gives 100% guarantees and launching ABMs from land only leaves too less time for a 2nd or 3rd attempt if the first fails. Getting the ABM offshore, in addition to land-based ABM, gives an extra buffer of protection determined by the range of the ABM.
I haven't claimed anywhere that offshore ABM will guarantee nationwide security. I'm not sure how you inferred that.
that's ok, just that there is some misconception about what the SoP attempts to achieve and in what timeframe. right now they don't have much use beyond listening posts and intel stations.PratikDas wrote:^^^^ Alright. I assume that you are convinced the "string of pearls" are for commerce and humanitarian purposes?
Added later: I don't mean this as a knock. I just thought the "encirclement" was supposed to amount to something.
I think this is a question that you can answer yourself, using comon sense. If you have an aircraft carrier:sgyl wrote:I have a question as a newbie. I have read several accounts of 1971 war where INS Vikrant was taken to an unknown location near ANC when PNS Ghazi was on prowl.
Did IN not have efficient anti-sub force in 1971? Could we have used Foxtrot class in ASW role? How about any air-based ASW or ASW Corvettes?
If 1 PNS Ghazi can force us to send our AC off, how will IN manage the new gen PNS Agostas? Is my question relevant?
In the end 1960s, the Navy evaluated at sea the panoramic sonars fitted in the Russian Petya class submarine chasers. Concurrently, it was evaluating the European panoramic sonars being offered for the Leander class frigates to be built at Mazagon Docks. To achieve self-reliance in shipborne sonars, the Navy projected to the NPOLits requirement for a state-of-the-art, medium range, panoramic sonar, designed specifically for Indian tropical and hydrological conditions.
The sinking of the frigate Khukri during the December 1971 Indo-Pakistan War led to intense efforts to remedy the inability of the subsequent Hunter-Killer operation to destroy the Pakistan Navy submarine.
The successful design, development, production and testing, between 1976 and 1983, of the Navy's first indigenous hull-mounted sonar, which in Indian waters performed better than all other sonars of that time, was the finale of a combination of unique circumstances. The derivatives of that outstanding sonar continue to be fitted in the Navy's latest ships.
Well almost correct. But given that nothing (well almost nothing) is absolute, it needs a profit/risk analysis. You try to protect your AC but does it mean that you pack it up in a war scenario. Definitely you have other means such as hunter killers, ASW aircrafts and surface combatants to protect the AC in a way that it can still operate. My question was along these lines.shiv wrote: If you lose your carrier, you cannot use it. That means that you can only use your carrier in circumstances where you will not lose it. If the enemy has a submarine on the prowl and you don't know where that sub is, do you indulge in foolhardy bravado, or do you do whatever it takes to protect your carrier?
Thanks Negi Saar for this information. It answers my questions.negi wrote:Dr. Paulraj's page and his work on Sonar will give one an idea about Indian sonar capabilities (specially ASW) during the time of 1971 conflict.
http://indiannavy.nic.in/t2t2e/trans2em ... _sonar.htm
Lets think about it....how long was IN using an AC at the time of '71(also it was our sole carrier)....what kind of CBG it had and what was IN's situation viz a viz submarine warfare at that time.sgyl wrote:@ Shiv Saar
Were IN's Foxtrot class subs,ASW aircrafts & surface ships deemed not enough for ASW role against 1 PNS Ghazi? We definitely needed Vikrant for blockading East TSP as evident by its role after 4th Dec.
I am just concerned about 60+ subs from chinks and AIP Agostas from TSP forcing our ACs to be futile in future wars.
I think you are asking for an absolute answer when no absolute answer is available. Ultimately it will have to be a matter of judgement of people in place during a war scenario. In 1971 clearly it was judged that the single Ghazi was dangerous enough to move the Vikrant to safety. We have no access to teh particular bits of information that the Naval high comand may have had when they made that decision.sgyl wrote:
Well almost correct. But given that nothing (well almost nothing) is absolute, it needs a profit/risk analysis. You try to protect your AC but does it mean that you pack it up in a war scenario. Definitely you have other means such as hunter killers, ASW aircrafts and surface combatants to protect the AC in a way that it can still operate. My question was along these lines.
Were IN's Foxtrot class subs,ASW aircrafts & surface ships deemed not enough for ASW role against 1 PNS Ghazi? We definitely needed Vikrant for blockading East TSP as evident by its role after 4th Dec.
I am just concerned about 60+ subs from chinks and AIP Agostas from TSP forcing our ACs to be futile in future wars.
Shiv Saar,shiv wrote: But after the confirmation of sinking of the Ghazi, the Vikrant was freed up to attack targets in BDesh. Now why was the Indian navy not afraid of the other subs that Pakistan had? The sinking of the Ghazi was not the end of the Pakistani submarine threat.
The most likely explanation is that the Ghazi was considered as the most serious threat. How the heck did India know the Ghazi ws in the Bay of Bengal? Surely it was either humint or surveillance. Why was the IN particularly worried? Perhaps the Ghazi had given them the slip and nobody knew exactly where it was.
Other reasons - I think on of them was that despite all precautions and all, there was a chance of the fleet getting overwhelmed by a submarine force of the PN. From Vice Admiral Krishnan, then CinC ENC.CalvinH wrote:one of the reasons Vikrant was bought back to Vishkhapatnam was to lure Ghazi to get the prize catch
Secondly, in any war at sea, VIKRANT would obviously be the most worthwhile target for the enemy. The three Daphne class submarines, newly acquired by Pakistan from France and fully operational, posed a great potential threat to the carrier. The sophistication of their detection capability as well as the homing devices of their torpedoes were such that once the ship was picked up and the screen of escorts pierced, the VIKRANT would stand in mortal danger. Even as many as six escorts would not guarantee any complete immunity to the carrier.
The problem of VIKRANT's security was a serious one and brought forth several headaches. By very careful appreciation of the submarine threat, we had come to the definite conclusion that the enemy was bound to deploy the submarine GHAZI against us in the Bay of Bengal with the sole aim of destroying our aircraft carrier VIKRANT. The threat from the GHAZI was a considerable one. Apart from the lethal advantage at the pre-emptive stage, VIKRANT's approximate position would become known once she commenced operating aircraft in the vicinity of the East Bengal coast. Of the four surface ships available, one ( the KAVARATTI ) had no sonar and unless the other three were continually in close company with VIKRANT ( within a radius of 5 to 10 miles ), the carrier would be completely vulnerable to attack from the GHAZI, which could take up her position surreptitiously and, at leisure await her opportunity. Even assuming that no operational defects developed, it would still be necessary to withdraw ships from the area of operations for fuelling. The basic problem was that if reasonable anti submarine protection had to be provided to VIKRANT and the escort ships had be in close company for this purpose, then how were 18,000 square miles to be kept under surveillance? We had decided to commit the entire striking power of VIKRANT's aircraft to offensive operations against enemy ships and installations and could not, therefore, afford the luxury of aerial surveillance
Shiv Saar,shiv wrote: we could extend the logic of this question to other things like:
"What's the point dropping bombs from and An 32 when it would get shot out of the sky the minute it tries to enter hostile airspace". In fact one person had argued in the Military Aviation thread that within minutes of war breaking out all Indian air bases would be put out of action, so what's the point of an Air Force?
I read that Vikrant had a problem in one of its boilers that reduced its maneuverability and probably was one of the reasons it was moved out to Bay of Bengal.shiv wrote: In actual fact of course oceans are huge and ships can sail much faster than submerged submarines - so with some care there will be areas where an aircraft carrier can make all the difference.
I believe you are missing the point, and with respect may I point out that you have applied madrassa math. I will explain. By madrassa math I mean "I have have 6 sons. It is OK if two of them die. If I had only one son, I want him alive"sgyl wrote: Shiv Saar,
AN32:IAF :: Vikrant(AC):IN (This ratio proportion equation does not work out)