ramana wrote:Can you write a short note on this idea?
Thanks, ramana
Here goes the draft - comments are welcome.
Pakistan’s “Chandrasekhar” Limit
The maximum mass allowed for a stable star is referred to as the Chandrasekhar Limit, so named after the eminent scientist of Indian origin who discovered it. Any star above this mass would explode as a supernova, become a Neutron star or degenerate into a Black Hole. Prominent British Astrophysicist Eddington’s obdurate incredulity, when faced with Dr. Subrahmanyan Chandrasekhar’s meticulous mathematical proof of relativistic degeneracy that presupposed a Black Hole is now legend. You may ask what does this have to do with developing countries and the challenges they face. It would indeed be fanciful to compare nation-states to stars and find parallels in theories on stellar dynamics. However, in spite of solid proof of progressive degeneracy in the Pakistani nation-state, various global powers have expressed obdurate incredulity and refused to consider the obvious.
Nation-states are no less complicated than stars in that they can exhibit different degrees of success depending on the mass -- population, resources, geography, etc. They could be characterized as Strong, Weak, Failed, Nominal, Virtual, Rump or Collapsed. One could argue, at a point in time, the success of a nation-state is the result of intrinsic mass and external environmental conditions it is subject to. All states expend energy and must have sustainable resources and mass to ensure stability.
To begin, the success of a state can be characterized by measuring its ability to deliver politico-economic goods. This includes governance, security, infrastructure, health care, financial institutions, environment, etc.
Strong states are good at the delivery of the said goods and
Weak states have room for improvement.
Failed states, are not beyond repair, but are at risk of becoming Nominal or Collapsed states.
Collapsed states, similar to Black Holes, are beyond repair and require overwhelming measures.
Virtual and
Rump states form when either territory is partially or completed lost. Finally,
Nominal states, are states that have either failed or collapsed, but are nominally held up by external powers to pursue realistic geo-political goals in a neighborhood.
What type of nation-state is Pakistan today? By most measure, commentators from Pakistan and the world over have concluded that it is a failed state, even if no one wants to say it out loud. Governance, healthcare, education, financial institutions, infrastructure, etc. all exist in various states of decay and degeneracy. However, it would be difficult to make the claim that Pakistan is a collapsed state, given the nature of security and civil society has not reached the levels we see in Somalia, Sierra Leone, etc. External military aid sustains and holds the security apparatus in place to give them an apparition of a nation-state to claim their own. The response of the civilian apparatus to recent floods, continuing sectarian and terrorist violence removes any doubt one may have on the nature of this state. The state today exists nominally, with fewer and fewer areas under its control, supported by external players who bend the state to pursue their geo-political interests in the region. Pakistan’s geography is more crucial to external powers than her citizens or their well being. We see evidence for this in the disparity between the aid and assistance provided to the military versus that provided to civil society.
What is Pakistan’s “Chandrasekhar” limit? The Chandrasekhar limit approximately determines that for a star to remain stable it ought to be less than 1.4 times the mass of our Sun. It is much more difficult to determine a crisp limit for nation-states. However, if we were to establish a limit based on the ability to deliver politico-economic goods, then where does Pakistan fall in terms of such a limit? What is the intrinsic mass and what forces should one consider in determining the eventual stable point?
Pakistan was set up hastily by the British as a Muslim homeland. Yet, today there are more Muslims in secular but Hindu majority India. It seems tenuous, given the evidence over the last 63 years, that we will see a well adjusted nation-state in Pakistan. If such a miracle were to occur, then what would the raison d'être be for a secular democratic Muslim majority state right next to India – a secular democratic Hindu majority state with an even larger Muslim population than Pakistan. The conundrum is deeper especially given the common culture and civilization that the two countries share. Thus religious and political ideology has not provided enough mass to sustain the state.
Writer Fatima Bhutto estimates that 27 families control Pakistan a nation of 170 million citizens. If this is true and even if one were to assume 6-7 people in each family, roughly one person controls the destiny of a million people in Pakistan today. The top ruling feudal elite includes generals and military brass. Indeed, the whole country today is run by rent-seekers who service the geo-political needs of the highest external bidder. Therefore, the final state of Pakistan is much more dependent upon the geo-political desires of external powers, such as the United States of America, United Kingdom, China, Japan, Saudi Arabia and India among others. Given the intrinsic nature and external forces acting on the Pakistan nation, one can see evidence for two distinct end states. One where the inherent contradictions in the state leads it to collapse, the other option is the support provided by external actors causes the state to stabilize and nurture itself back to Weak state.
Collapse, similar to Somalia or Sierra Leone is possible. However, major external powers, including India surprisingly, do not seem interested in this becoming a reality. A Black Hole in this region has large implications for wider regional stability. Further, the cost of recovery from collapse provides sufficient incentive to all parties, to work together, to prevent this very unpalatable option. India in particular seems too anxious in preventing this situation, given the possibility of a major refugee crisis and the subsequent need to provide economic aid and stabilize the region. India has outsourced foreign policy to other external players and wants to be left alone to pursue 8-10% economic growth for the next 15 years. It is uncertain if India will be allowed this luxury by the other external players, or by a belligerent Pakistan that uses terrorism as an instrument of state against India.
The other possibility is where Pakistan turns itself around using external aid successfully. The dictator cycles of Ayub, Yahya, Zia, Musharaff and perhaps Kiyani does not instill confidence in this eventuality. Given such dismal history, one other less considered option is a restructuring that enables a more stable solution. This requires us to look briefly at the Indian sub-continent prior to the Mughals and British arrival in India. Traditionally, since the very beginning, the Indus valley culture including the culture that dotted the Saraswathi river and the later culture that flourished along the Ganga have had strong linkages. The drying up of the Saraswathi River and the slow process of desertification that set in subsequently caused the Indus culture to become increasingly cut off from the Ganga and susceptible to foreign invasions from North and West. This has established a culture of love and hate that predates organized religion, governance structures, etc. Today, it is only further exacerbated with the rise of modern India. On the other hand, Pakistan today with a 2% GDP growth and a 5% fertility rate presents strong evidence for a further declining Indus culture.
Understanding these cultural undercurrents and the rivalry for scarce resources that has now morphed into a religious and geo-political problem gives us a different perspective. This could explain why India has hesitation in allowing a breakup of Pakistan, as India understands the nature of this rivalry which is going to increasingly evolve into a fight for scarce resources especially water, better management of arable land and demographic pressures. India, till date, does not seem convinced that the cost of managing a Pakistan broken down into Baloch, Sindh, FATA and Punjab as lower than an engagement of the whole. Even though, there remains some confusion on who to engage in the whole. The question remains open on India’s patience and how many Mumbai like challenges or worse it will tolerate into the future. The other external players view the breakup as a collapse, not a change for a more stable alternative. Further, even if there are some who could tolerate a loose confederacy of states, the external actors including India suspect that the cost of managing unified policy would be more difficult with multiple actors.
Finally, the evidence so far seems to suggest that Pakistan will disintegrate into ethnic components, but for the external scaffolding providing a veneer to maintain a nominal state. Indeed collapse is likely, in spite of the best efforts of external powers. India, better realize that the security of the Gangetic plain is assured only when they provide good governance and influence if not control over the Indus plain. Ultimately, India’s economic dream will come to a naught if a Black Hole emerges to the West due to cultural reluctance to do what is necessary to maintain stability. The external powers are welcome to utilize their scarce resources, as long as their taxpayers indulge them, to intervene on Pakistan’s behalf. However, like Eddington, they vainly hope that Black Holes are mathematical fiction. It may be too late by the time they realize a collapse is inevitable. The cost of resurrecting a collapsed Pakistan will be far greater than the cost to manage a loose confederacy of states in strong politico-economic alliance with India.
