Indian Military Aviation - 21 Sept 2015

fanne · Post by **fanne** » 28 Feb 2016 08:02

Hakim sir, Srai also alludes to the same doctrine shift (I can quote multiple interview from net), IAF has moved on from providing CAS through fixed wing craft, unfortunately IA has to fend for itself here. Having said that I humbly thinks it is a wring strategy, I guess we should go for something like su25. I will not change the engine, it is a copy of Mig 21 engine, we have produced a lot of it. Yup modernize it, 4.5 gen avionics, even fly by wire. Maybe over the wing aa missile? It will be cheap and we can have some 5-10 sq of it.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 28 Feb 2016 08:59

fanne wrote:Hakim sir, Srai also alludes to the same doctrine shift (I can quote multiple interview from net), IAF has moved on from providing CAS through fixed wing craft, unfortunately IA has to fend for itself here..

Sorry this is rubbish. Please feel free to quote. But it is complete nonsense. I also have refs to quote.

Armed forces cannot work that way. At least ours dont. The air force invariably reserves some of its resources for CAS. The air force embeds officers with the army. Ever since we nearly had the highway to Kashmir nearly cut off in 1965 and CAS was absent because the embedded iaf officers were too junior and too far removed from the decision making chain to call for timely CAS and CAP over Chhamb the Air Force has never made that mistake again. The Longewala success was a result of that coordination' Kargil again showed that coordination despite differences over CAS vesrus interdiction. But Air Force officers serving and retired are free to wag their tongues even if those wagging tongues do not reflect policy, Examples are "We are not flying artillery" and "Three legged Cheetah" There is a very specific example why the "Not flying artillery" comment was made. But that comment is not a general rule that the IA must fend for itself. That is utter nonsense .

The IAF has offered excellent CAS suport in all wars and nothing has changed. I would be happy to see any IAF policy reference that says "The Army must fend for itself". Sorry to say but BRF seems to be talking like Paki armed forces where army, navy and air force fought their own separate wars.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 28 Feb 2016 09:06

indranilroy wrote: 4. Curb the entusiasm of going ab-initio. Buy a design For example, the by the rights to the Su-25 airframe.

Combat Hawk is not ab initio.

Su 25 has a service ceiling of 5000 meters with weapon load and would probably be useless in the 5000 meter plus altitudes that the IA and IAF will need to wage war.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 28 Feb 2016 09:10

sudeepj wrote: Its a travesty to think that scarce squadrons could be wasted on CAS when they will be busy trying to establish air dominance. Hawk/Super Hawk is a bad bad bad idea.

Not true. For example - at the chokepoint near Chhamb where Pakistan has always attacked in strength in two past wars a dedicated Paki armoured thrust could not only cut off Kashmir but it would also overrun the Pathankot air base further south. CAS here in case of such a Paki thrust would be essential and call for having both local air superiority plus close air support. And CAS has always been provided in past wars. Chhamb is exactly the sector where India lost 4 Vampires in 1965. That did not stop CAS though. Will post map if I can find a suitable one

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 28 Feb 2016 09:22

The Longewala battle is a classic one that must not be forgotten. The Indian army had massed well away from Longewala - two days away to the North preparing for a thrust into the Rahim Yar Khan area of Pakistan. Down south near Longewala we had vistually no defences and the Pakis could have overrun Longewala and captured Jaisalmer in a day.

Imagine if the air force had responded to Major Kuldip Singh Chandpuri's request for air support with the statement "The Indian Army can fight its own battles"

For those who have forgotten, here is the story again, told by me in 6 minutes
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bVWY6aUpY90

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 28 Feb 2016 09:38

There are two more examples of timely close air support to the Army that aided a rapid Indian advance in Bangladesh

On one occasion Indian troops were being heli-lifted to bypass the town of Sylhet. Paki troops concentrated in Sylhet sent a probing attack. But air attack on them by the IAF scared them back and they did not reappear.

Later in the course of the Meghna airlift near Maulvi Bazar Indian troops were being pestered by artillery which was being guided by observers sitting on the top of a 300 foot grain silo. An IAF aircraft put rockets into the room where the observers were sitting and that ended the artillery fire on Indian troops. This story is there in Jagan's book.

Let us not have any naive statements that CAS will not be done or that the army will have to fight its own battles.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 28 Feb 2016 11:33

Papistan is a nice, timely touch.

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 29 Feb 2016 12:24

Arty and even MBRLs cannot match a flight of aircraft raining down fire and brimstone upon tanks and AVs caught out in the open without air cover. Hiding is futile from the air,esp in the open terrain for a large part of the Indo-Pak intl. border. With PGMs and the ability to fly above integrated MANPADS/anti-air arty,the enemy columns would be sitting ducks. Attck helos have their unique qualities,but in recent conflicts,have shown that they are vulnerable to various forms of anti-air weaponry,including RPG rounds. Apaches have taken a beating in Afghanistan.Casualties posted some time ago in the helo td. An air force cannot abdicate its duty to support ground forces ,preferably seamlessly.It is why we need "theatre commands" and commanders,not "integrated" forces. The Chinese have realised this and have just reorganised their forces in such manner.

member_29350 · Post by **member_29350** » 29 Feb 2016 13:34

shiv wrote:...
Let us not have any naive statements that CAS will not be done or that the army will have to fight its own battles.

Well, that was then, after Kargil, the Army simply went its own way by setting up the AAC by expanding it; got their helos by any which way.

Not that IAF wont provide CAS but the Army seems to have swung by to "I'll call you when I want to" to the IAF

Akshay Kapoor · Post by **Akshay Kapoor** » 29 Feb 2016 14:07

Sivaramn,

I don't know how you have come up with 'I'll call you when I want you'. It does show you have no idea how battle plans are made an executed. Also the army aviation corps is largely a surviellance, air transport and air lift provider not a fire power provider. Allow me to educate you on how air land battle plans are made in India.

1. Air land battle plans in India are made in synergy between Army and Air Force top down and bottom up. Lets start with bottom up. There is an IAF officer of the rank of Air Commodore embedded in every Corps who handles a team of 4-5 air officers to come up with air support for the Corps plan. They work very closely with the GS (Ops) branch in Corp HQ and keep updating air support plans on an ongoing basis. At any given time there may be up to 10-15 different plans for various contingencies.

2. Similarly at Army Command HQ level there is embedded air force team headed by an AVM which consolidates plans for all the Coprs under that command. The corp plans are vetted, seen if they agree with the Command plan and then sent on to Air HQ. At Air HQ they are then consolidated for all army commands and agreed with Army HQ.

3. The air officers at Corps and Command HQs will kepp updating plans as necessary and in war time ensure that the plans are executed. These plans are tested in exercises all the time.

I can assure you that the army is depending upon serious air support. In fact I have had discussions with army officers (armd bde commander recently, GOCs over the years) that army is depending too much on air support (my view). But whatever it is worth the army seems to have factored in significant air support and fire power.

So bottom up there are comprehensive plans.

From what I hear its the top down that has issues. The problem is the air force has a severe shortage of assets for executing the bottom up plans. So at Air HQ level it becomes hard to provide support to all command air support plans in addition to need for air dominance and deep strikes. We simply don't have enough squadrons.

Therefore innovative solutions like the combat hawk must atleast be studied. I am not convinced that its the right solution but it should be examined fully.

deejay · Post by **deejay** » 29 Feb 2016 14:45

sivaramn wrote:...
Well, that was then, after Kargil, the Army simply went its own way by setting up the AAC by expanding it; got their helos by any which way.

Not that IAF wont provide CAS but the Army seems to have swung by to "I'll call you when I want to" to the IAF

If you mean setting up AAC after Kargil - you are factually incorrect. Check link only for date of origin -https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Army_Avia ... ps_(India)

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 29 Feb 2016 15:07

Perhaps building up arty and AAC assets is the way forward.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 29 Feb 2016 16:39

sivaramn wrote:
shiv wrote:...
Let us not have any naive statements that CAS will not be done or that the army will have to fight its own battles.
Well, that was then, after Kargil, the Army simply went its own way by setting up the AAC by expanding it; got their helos by any which way.

Not that IAF wont provide CAS but the Army seems to have swung by to "I'll call you when I want to" to the IAF

You have missed about 50 years worth of information here. You have the choice of reading the official pdf of the air force doctrine which you can Google for, or read what I write below, or both or neither

Historically the British Indian army was the dominant armed force and the air arm was secondary. The Army chief was the supreme commander After all - air forces had hardly been around for 3-4 decades in 1947 but armies had always been there. Gen Chaudhuri - the Army Chief in 1965 had a tendency to act like supreme commander without consulting the sister services. In fact even in 1971, PC Lal is on record pointing out how Gen Manekshaw had also made a statement of that sort saying to someone "I will let my air force on you" as if "his" air force was a dog in leash under his control.

Unfortunately Army officers apparently do not understand the role of air power like the air force does and there have been times when army columns have asked the air force to do absurd things. It think it was in 1965 when one particular army leader (can't recall details) asked for the air force to carpet bomb a field in front of where the army was suspecting that it was a minefield. No one knows if this was simply a tactic to avoid going across the field but the air force did not appreciate it because the army request did not seem to realize that not only would the bombing be ineffective in clearing a path, the actual "path" where the bombs fell would be huge craters which would serve as obstacles. There were occasions in Kargil when the army wanted direct support for its troops but the Air Force saw that as a request they could not fulfil as it would be ineffective but the air force could go ahead and bomb supply routes and supply dumps like Muntho Dalo. These are the origin of the comments that the air force is not flying artillery.

However none of this means that the Air Force will not provide CAS. The need for coordination with the army to achieve war winning goals in a manner that both air force and army can be most effective is part of the IAF doctrine.
The presence of an army helicopter wing has two effects on the air force
1. It complicates the air scenario in wartime - where the IAF will need to know that a helo is army and not shoot it down. It also duplicates some resource allocation
2. To a small extent it reduces the number of CAS calls the IAF will get, but it will not eliminate them. No one should think that armed helicopters can do the job of aircraft in throwing some heavy munitions and kicking serious butt

Hence the doctrine calls for good coordination.

So I repeat:

shiv wrote:...
Let us not have any naive statements that CAS will not be done or that the army will have to fight its own battles.

I do recommend that those interested should, at the very least, get a copy of PC Lal's autobiography, although the reading matter on this subject in the Indian context is fairly large. Forget non Indian viewpoints. There is an Indian viewpoint based on the Indian environment and Indian requirements

Akshay Kapoor · Post by **Akshay Kapoor** » 29 Feb 2016 16:40

Karan,

I think the way forward is to have a several magnitude increase in firepower in all dimensions.

1. Starting from inf bns - move 120 mm mortars to inf bns from arty regts, induct rifles with UBGL for every soldier, induct much better MGs and increase density, increase density of RLs etc etc. Up gun and significantly increase arty density at all levels - brigade, div, coprs and command. Have offensive puch available to all commanders - Infantry Bn - 120 mm mortar platoon + battery of 105 mm mounted gun, Inf brigade - 155 mm gun regt with atleast 6 batteries so that Bde Commander can have flexibility of concentrating firepower + supporting his bns individually, Inf Div - Pinaka Regt (not considering organic arty bde), Corps - Prahaar Regt + Indp Arty Bde, Command - brahmos regt + arty div

2. Augment AAC which is already happening. But do understand that attack helicopters are also vulnerable and no substitute for IAF. They are still vulnerable to enemy aircraft. They have their uses but are no panacea.

3. Augment IAF. Air power is ultimately the deciding factor in war and we have no choice but to significantly enhance air power. Arty, AAC are no substitute for air power. I would much prefer a 50 sqdn IAF and a 25% smaller army than the manpower heavy and firepower hollow behemoth we are creating today.

Akshay Kapoor · Post by **Akshay Kapoor** » 29 Feb 2016 16:49

shiv wrote:

Hence the doctrine calls for good coordination.

which is happening, some BR posters not knowing about it nothwithstanding

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 29 Feb 2016 16:50

Unless there is seamless coordination between army and air force during war and full information sharing the air force may end up shooting down army air assets in war. Imagine a frontline army call for air support - say at 3 PM one afternoon is approved and two Indian Army helos are on the spot in 15 minutes. If the air force does not have information they may simply shoot them down. Or alternatively helos over a battle zone may be left alone imagining they are friendly assets while they may be enemy helos killing our men. And let it not be forgotten that CAP over a battle zone is also "Close Air Support". If enemy helos or aircraft attack it will be the Air Force that has to shoot them out of the sky.

So Independent Army Air assets come with a heavy dose of extra responsibility for army and air forces. The best method may be to continue the present system of embedding Air Force personnel with frontline army columns and have a near foolproof central system that approves the source and type of CAS. Did people who decide the future of CAS on BRF know that such a coordination system exists between army and air force?

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 29 Feb 2016 16:51

Akshay Kapoor wrote: which is happening, some BR posters not knowing about it nothwithstanding

+1

Akshay Kapoor · Post by **Akshay Kapoor** » 29 Feb 2016 16:59

Shiv,

I completely agree that inducting army air assets come with a lot of responsibility. AFAIK (and as I posted) the current army IAF coordination is in the context of full air support with the IAF. So the coordination needed for inducting AAC attack helicopters will have to be evolved (probably already be happening).

I will also say that jointness is even stronger these days than in the past. More and more army officers have interacted with IAF, there is a better understanding of air power in the army and lets not forget that service rivalry at the Chief level nothwithstanding, a lot of IAF and IA officers are course mates from NDA, DSSC, NDC and work quite closely together in formations and air bases, operations and aid to civil missions.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 29 Feb 2016 17:06

Akshay Kapoor wrote:Shiv,

I completely agree that inducting army air assets come with a lot of responsibility. AFAIK (and as I posted) the current army IAF coordination is in the context of full air support with the IAF. So the coordination needed for inducting AAC attack helicopters will have to be evolved (probably already be happening).

IIRC The last combined exercise - (was that late last year) which caused some jitters across the border was later reported precisely as the practice of close army-air force coordination.

On BRF I see a kind of "political party" like attitude towards the armed forces where one armed force becomes popular for its policies and another becomes unpopular. This is OK for a timepass forum but when those partisan attitudes are applied as statements claiming to illustrate warfighting doctrine or policy, the bullshit must be called. The armed forces are not political parties and they fight and die together. One does not thrive at the expense of the other.

Akshay Kapoor · Post by **Akshay Kapoor** » 29 Feb 2016 17:09

shiv wrote:
Akshay Kapoor wrote:Shiv,

I completely agree that inducting army air assets come with a lot of responsibility. AFAIK (and as I posted) the current army IAF coordination is in the context of full air support with the IAF. So the coordination needed for inducting AAC attack helicopters will have to be evolved (probably already be happening).
IIRC The last combined exercise - (was that later last year) which caused some jitters across the border was later reported precisely as the practice of close army-air force coordination.

On BRF I see a kind of "political party" like attitude towards the armed forces where one armed force becomes popular for its policies and another becomes unpopular. This is OK for a timepass forum but when those partisan attitudes are applied as statements claiming to illustrate warfighting doctrine or policy, the bullshit must be called. The armed forces are not political parties and they fight and die together. One does not thrive at the expense of the other.

+1

actually you just have to go to an IAF base or IN vessel (especially IN as their cook officers are just great) as an army officer to see how warmly you are treated. And the army returns the warmth. Im sure Deejay can give some examples

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 29 Feb 2016 17:27

Akshay Kapoor wrote:
actually you just have to go to an IAF base or IN vessel (especially IN as their cook officers are just great) as an army officer to see how warmly you are treated. And the army returns the warmth. Im sure Deejay can give some examples

They are often mates who have shared good times and bad times in college - NDA typically. I made similar friends in college - but I started losing them to the grim reaper only after they got to their 40s and 50s. In the forces it starts in their 20s.

deejay · Post by **deejay** » 29 Feb 2016 18:19

shiv wrote:Unless there is seamless coordination between army and air force during war and full information sharing the air force may end up shooting down army air assets in war. Imagine a frontline army call for air support - say at 3 PM one afternoon is approved and two Indian Army helos are on the spot in 15 minutes. If the air force does not have information they may simply shoot them down. Or alternatively helos over a battle zone may be left alone imagining they are friendly assets while they may be enemy helos killing our men. And let it not be forgotten that CAP over a battle zone is also "Close Air Support". If enemy helos or aircraft attack it will be the Air Force that has to shoot them out of the sky.

So Independent Army Air assets come with a heavy dose of extra responsibility for army and air forces. The best method may be to continue the present system of embedding Air Force personnel with frontline army columns and have a near foolproof central system that approves the source and type of CAS. Did people who decide the future of CAS on BRF know that such a coordination system exists between army and air force?

Shiv ji, while reading the to and fro between you and Karan was gripping and of course few others who had excellent posts over the last few pages, some posts have also reflected poor knowledge of CAS or IA and IAF relations.

Kapoor sir is right and to add some of my own POV:

Most poorly informed comments are based on high profile (though occasional) disagreements between IA and IAF on the matter. The institutional bridges built over time, lessons learnt from past operations (both successful and not so successful), plus evaluation of global conflicts have been done both by the IA and IAF. Air Power is discussed at Staff College and for serious pursuits there is College of Air Warfare (CAW). CAW infact started as School of Land and Air Warfare (SLAW) and is a tri service institution run by IAF. CAW is not just about CAS but CAS is definitely a part of studies at CAW.

To read more on CAW:
http://indianairforce.nic.in/show_page.php?pg_id=142
http://www.indiastrategic.in/topstories ... arfare.htm

CAS is a complicated operation given that own forces are in close proximity of enemy targets. For any air-force whether controlled by Army or by a dedicated Air Force, the challenge is not to harm own forces. This is a very complicated tasks. Also, a few ground based leaders are unable to assess true air capabilities or visualize actual utility of air assets and give incorrect requisition for CAS. You have explained such cases.

Next, it will be a fallacy to limit CAS to lethal or weapons only roles. Apart from the obvious CAS will also include:

>Battlefield casualty evacuation (If you've seen Platoon )
>Battlefield air logistics
>Battlefield surveillance (UAVs are becoming very popular here)
>EW Spectrum support from air

etc, etc. The list can increase infinitely.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 29 Feb 2016 18:32

CAS is a complicated operation given that own forces are in close proximity of enemy targets. For any air-force whether controlled by Army or by a dedicated Air Force, the challenge is not to harm own forces.

A good network is supposed to solve such specific issues. No?

deejay · Post by **deejay** » 29 Feb 2016 18:37

NRao wrote:
CAS is a complicated operation given that own forces are in close proximity of enemy targets. For any air-force whether controlled by Army or by a dedicated Air Force, the challenge is not to harm own forces.
A good network is supposed to solve such specific issues. No?

Yes, and this is where joint teams integrated with each other come into play. Today's technology also adds to this.

Raman · Post by **Raman** » 29 Feb 2016 19:03

Question to the knowledgeable: how will the proposed 114 LCH + 39(?) Apache be disbursed into the army force structure, i.e., at what level of command will these assets be available? Won't these assets significantly change the profile of CAS missions for IAF? At first blush, it seems like the IAF will have to change to principally providing air superiority over the battle area, or for really hard/difficult targets that are some distance away from the battle area (i.e., tending towards interdiction).

It certainly appears as if the army is keen to take over the majority of CAS missions for itself for valid reasons (easier to co-ordinate, organically embedded, etc.)

member_29350 · Post by **member_29350** » 29 Feb 2016 19:14

deejay wrote:
sivaramn wrote:...
Well, that was then, after Kargil, the Army simply went its own way by setting up the AAC by expanding it; got their helos by any which way.

Not that IAF wont provide CAS but the Army seems to have swung by to "I'll call you when I want to" to the IAF
If you mean setting up AAC after Kargil - you are factually incorrect. Check link only for date of origin -https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Army_Avia ... ps_(India)

Well, you left out the part of 'expanding it'; I meant it in the sense of minor kerfuffle over apaches and other helos numbers split between Army and AirForce.The impression I get from the Kargil notes, was the Airforce was too risk averse as per the Army and not getting the support when they wanted. That seemed to have spiraled into the AAC getting attack copters over the objections of the AirForce. Obviously I'm not suggesting that they're knifing each other this over turf encroachment as seen by AF

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 29 Feb 2016 19:27

sivaramn wrote:The impression I get from the Kargil notes, was the Airforce was too risk averse as per the Army and not getting the support when they wanted.

The army was essentially caught off guard. As far as I can recall they tried to make the best of the situation by sending teams up slopes under direct fire of Pakis up there. When they asked the air force for help the sort of help the army seemed to want was for the air force to take out the Pakis "up there" in the hill positions. Unfortunately the air force was simply not equipped to attack sangars on hillsides effectively - apart from causing the side effect of landslides cause by air force bombs raining down on Indian soldiers trying to crawl their way up. And when they tried it with helos and aircraft they got attacked by manpads. The Jaguars were no good at those heights in the mountains. The only way the air force could help was to find and choke off supplies and stores that the Pakis were depending on. But this meant that soldiers crawling up were not seeing their opposition fire being reduced by the air force. This has been translated as various things including "risk averse". The air force saw those risks as foolhardy and found themselves ineffective against direct attacks against individual bunkers hidden on mountaintops. In fact the air force could not even spot them most of the time as they flew past, let alone attack them effectively.

Ultimately the Air Force ended up attacking the supply dumps and camps while the Army resorted to direct fire from Bofors artillery and Smerch to suppress the hostile fire as men crawled up.

Both the army and the air force were simply unprepared for the type of war thrown at them. They won by grit and jugaad. But no special air force versus army war leading to divorce proceedings took place.

member_29350 · Post by **member_29350** » 29 Feb 2016 19:30

shiv wrote:
Not that IAF wont provide CAS but the Army seems to have swung by to "I'll call you when I want to" to the IAF

You have missed about 50 years worth of information here. You have the choice of reading the official pdf of the air force doctrine which you can Google for, or read what I write below, or both or neither

...

However none of this means that the Air Force will not provide CAS. The need for coordination with the army to achieve war winning goals in a manner that both air force and army can be most effective is part of the IAF doctrine.

...

So I repeat:

shiv wrote:...
Let us not have any naive statements that CAS will not be done or that the army will have to fight its own battles.

I do recommend that those interested should, at the very least, get a copy of PC Lal's autobiography, although the reading matter on this subject in the Indian context is fairly large. Forget non Indian viewpoints. There is an Indian viewpoint based on the Indian environment and Indian requirements[/quote]
[/quote]

I believe we are talking past each other. Far be it me to tell how and why/what/hows/whos of the doctrines for CAS, I will simply say, what counts is the actions being done by the Army.

Is the Army going ahead with an expanded mix in its AAC?
If yes, why?

Can it be traced to Airforce objections to the way CAS was needed(you gave instances) in the last action? I think it does. And I don't believe it be a vindictive action,distrust or a poke in the eye.Just that Army sees AAC with increased responsibilities that they themselves will manage and use the CAS of Airforce if they can't manage it. Else what explains the new need for attack choppers by the Army? And that which the AF still objects to?

And do note I'm not disputing CAS by Airforce to Army or CAS doctrines or strategy et al.

I see it as, the Army does NOT want to be limited by AF CAS logistics during its crunch time

deejay · Post by **deejay** » 29 Feb 2016 19:36

sivaramn wrote:...
Well, you left out the part of 'expanding it'; I meant it in the sense of minor kerfuffle over apaches and other helos numbers split between Army and AirForce.The impression I get from the Kargil notes, was the Airforce was too risk averse as per the Army and not getting the support when they wanted. That seemed to have spiraled into the AAC getting attack copters over the objections of the AirForce. Obviously I'm not suggesting that they're knifing each other this over turf encroachment as seen by AF

No, I saw the part and I wanted be clear hence I wrote "If you mean setting up AAC after Kargil ..."

But, point taken on IA - IAF turf issues. It is there and purely from perspective of military watcher I am not either 'for/against' on this issue, but that is my opinion. It is perfectly OK if IA or IAF delivers CAS, as long as it is delivered.

deejay · Post by **deejay** » 29 Feb 2016 19:44

Raman wrote:Question to the knowledgeable: how will the proposed 114 LCH + 39(?) Apache be disbursed into the army force structure, i.e., at what level of command will these assets be available? Won't these assets significantly change the profile of CAS missions for IAF? At first blush, it seems like the IAF will have to change to principally providing air superiority over the battle area, or for really hard/difficult targets that are some distance away from the battle area (i.e., tending towards interdiction).

It certainly appears as if the army is keen to take over the majority of CAS missions for itself for valid reasons (easier to co-ordinate, organically embedded, etc.)

A lot of discussions have been focussed on this issue. There is a thread for this - active not long ago.

For info on AAC and its future check these links (info may be dated but will give you an idea)
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ ... rmy-av.htm
http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news ... formation/

A perspective on AAC taking over most of the CAS role by Lt Gen B S Pawar (Retd):
http://www.dsalert.org/aerospace-power- ... d-tomorrow

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 29 Feb 2016 19:55

sivaramn wrote: Can it be traced to Airforce objections to the way CAS was needed(you gave instances) in the last action? I think it does. And I don't believe it be a vindictive action,distrust or a poke in the eye.Just that Army sees AAC with increased responsibilities that they themselves will manage and use the CAS of Airforce if they can't manage it. Else what explains the new need for attack choppers by the Army? And that which the AF still objects to?

The Air Force has objected to an army air arm for reasons of its own, which I believe need to be stated while stating why the army wants an air arm. My objection to many posts here is based on what I see as erroneous conclusions that seek to blame the air force such as "They will tell the army to fight its own war" or "Risk averse" etc. and that is why the army is justified in having its own air arm - or some conclusion to that effect

The primary reasons for the air force objecting to an army air arm can be equally "blamed" on the army because it is the army that has tended to imagine air power as an extension of artillery. With no institutional experience in applying air power the army has (my words) been "naive" in the way it wants to apply air power and the air force is at pains to point out that in a "nice" way in the air force doctrine where they list out how air power must be used as a war winning tool and not as some kind of competitive local game (do read that doctrine)

That apart, the air force has valid concerns about coordination and resources. The air force not only embeds its personnel with the army, but it also "reserves" a certain number of aircraft ("number of sorties") for the army on demand. The army may or may not use them - but they are there. There are jobs that only the air force can do. For example if army helicopters are supporting an Indian army advance and they are attacked by enemy aircraft will the army suddenly call for air support from IAF or will there be some sort of mechanism that keeps the air force in the loop? The Air Force has the institutional experience of sometimes being left out of the loop and then suddenly called upon to do something which the army rightly or wrongly imagines can be done - and this is what happened in Kargil. It happened earlier in 1965 as well. That apart, where will army helos be based and serviced. The air force has all the resources it needs. Is the army going to ask the air force to do that job, or will they set up parallel duplicate facilties? Where will the training be done? At an air force base or will the army have its own base? Will the air force need to depute someone there? Getting helicopters is the only thing "visible" to outsiders. It is the little details that are obscure and need to be sorted out so that everyone gains and there is no inefficiency from duplication or loss from unavailability of resource.

So the acquisition of air assets by the army could end up with some unwanted consequences unless there is close cooperation. The IAF felt that they could offer the support that the army wants. But the army has other ideas. That is OK provided the two forces practice jointmanship and there is no "rivalry" where the army says "We don't need you - we will go in" and then get into a mess. I stress here that it is not just about the air force "not giving" what the army wants, but it is also about the army wanting some things that it believes the air force cannot or will not give. Either way jointmanship and coordination is the only way forward. The fact of inter service rivalry should not be translated into ill informed partisan conclusions.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 29 Feb 2016 20:17

Rhetorical questions: Suppose tomorrow the LCH is integrated with Air to Air Missiles (SRAAM) for self defence. Now using the LCH for ground attack is one thing. But when it comes to defence against hostile enemy aircraft it translates into a totally new ball game. This calls for training and situational awareness. It also calls for stockpiles of AAMs and ancillary avionics to go with them and the maintenance requirements for those.

Currently the air force has facilities for all this . They may or may not have excess capacity (I don't know). So where will army aviation pilots be fitted into courses that help them come to grips with self protection and use of AAMs. To what extent does the Air Force have to free up resources and facilities for the army? Does the expansion of facilities for the Air Force come from the Army budget or the Air Force budget. Neither army nor Air force will decide this - it will be some MoD babu. If babu buys helos for army and does not pay air force to expand its facilities it will not be able to accommodate extra people from army.

Any ideas or inside knowledge anyone?

deejay · Post by **deejay** » 29 Feb 2016 20:27

shiv wrote:Rhetorical questions: Suppose tomorrow the LCH is integrated with Air to Air Missiles (SRAAM) for self defence. Now using the LCH for ground attack is one thing. But when it comes to defence against hostile enemy aircraft it translates into a totally new ball game. This calls for training and situational awareness. It also calls for stockpiles of AAMs and ancillary avionics to go with them and the maintenance requirements for those.

Currently the air force has facilities for all this . They may or may not have excess capacity (I don't know). So where will army aviation pilots be fitted into courses that help them come to grips with self protection and use of AAMs. To what extent does the Air Force have to free up resources and facilities for the army? Does the expansion of facilities for the Air Force come from the Army budget or the Air Force budget. Neither army nor Air force will decide this - it will be some MoD babu. If babu buys helos for army and does not pay air force to expand its facilities it will not be able to accommodate extra people from army.

Any ideas or inside knowledge anyone?

No answers that I know of. There are more problems and AAC guys know this. They face challenges more regularly. However, what will be, will be.

Picklu · Post by **Picklu** » 29 Feb 2016 20:42

Lets purchase a few sqd of c-hawk for AAC. The lines keep on humming and MRO etc are taken care of using the same 'live' jigs. However No augmentation of capacities at HAL.

The Army to manage CAS using its own resources then. AAC pilots can get trained using the hawks and then go to battle using the same one.

IAF can play the strategic role.

Viv S · Post by **Viv S** » 29 Feb 2016 20:54

shiv wrote:Rhetorical questions: Suppose tomorrow the LCH is integrated with Air to Air Missiles (SRAAM) for self defence.

No supposition required. The LCH will have AAMs integrated. The Dhruv Mk4 has them too. MBDA Mistral.

deejay · Post by **deejay** » 29 Feb 2016 21:49

Picklu wrote:Lets purchase a few sqd of c-hawk for AAC. The lines keep on humming and MRO etc are taken care of using the same 'live' jigs. However No augmentation of capacities at HAL.

The Army to manage CAS using its own resources then. AAC pilots can get trained using the hawks and then go to battle using the same one.

IAF can play the strategic role.

You are saying that C Hawks will complete all CAS requirements one can think of along with ALH, LUH and UAVs for IA. No other asset will be required for CAS at all?

Akshay Kapoor · Post by **Akshay Kapoor** » 29 Feb 2016 22:27

The key to CAS is understanding the objective. Its not only relieving the army when they come under fire but using firepower to achieve offensive goals bottom up. ie For 2 corps advance a key element to its over all firepower (in addition to its arty maneouver by fire ) is air power. So CAS will actually be factored in the op plans right from start with squadrons detailed for various tasks. Air power is not reactionary like in Longewala but will be needed right from the start. And that is exactly how the army and airforce are planning and exercising.

In addition we will need flexibility to respond as contingencies arise. There is no way AAC alone with or without Combat Hawks can do this. And thankfully neither are they planning to ! The army aviation brigades are meant to give some flexibility to Corps Commanders not to supplant the IAF's crucial battle winning role !

Even the Army Air Defence coordinate very closely with the IAF. And who do you think will train the AAC pilots in case AAC uses fixed wing aircraft (highly unlikely methinks) ? The IAF will. There is no other way. Who will maintain the aircraft ? The IAF will.

Also remember the army has no experience of using attack helicopters as of now. So the first task is mordernising the current AAC Chetak and Cheetah fleet, the next task is developing attack helicopter skills (with IAF helping them). No one is seriously thinking of fixed wing attack aircraft for the army. For recce and communication yes, but not for attack.

Akshay Kapoor · Post by **Akshay Kapoor** » 29 Feb 2016 22:47

http://www.spsmai.com/military/?id=138& ... ayee-Bhava

srai · Post by **srai** » 01 Mar 2016 02:52

shiv wrote:Rhetorical questions: Suppose tomorrow the LCH is integrated with Air to Air Missiles (SRAAM) for self defence. Now using the LCH for ground attack is one thing. But when it comes to defence against hostile enemy aircraft it translates into a totally new ball game. This calls for training and situational awareness. It also calls for stockpiles of AAMs and ancillary avionics to go with them and the maintenance requirements for those.

Currently the air force has facilities for all this . They may or may not have excess capacity (I don't know). So where will army aviation pilots be fitted into courses that help them come to grips with self protection and use of AAMs. To what extent does the Air Force have to free up resources and facilities for the army? Does the expansion of facilities for the Air Force come from the Army budget or the Air Force budget. Neither army nor Air force will decide this - it will be some MoD babu. If babu buys helos for army and does not pay air force to expand its facilities it will not be able to accommodate extra people from army.

Any ideas or inside knowledge anyone?

If past is any indication, facilities will be duplicated. The IAF will continue to have its helos while the IA's AAC will continue to expand. UK's concept of Joint Helo Command (asset distribution, training and logistics) between the services is not in favor in India from what I gather.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 01 Mar 2016 03:29

Operation Hard Top?