Karan M wrote:ramana wrote:Putin's gambit has saved Syria for now. But need to see how long Assad is able to stay in power and consolidate the state. This will turn the jihadis on their sponsors.
Is this the continuation of the Shia-Sunni fight all over again?
AlQ+ FSA/ Sunnis+ Chechens + Iraqis/assorted Islamists on one side versus the Syrian Army, Iranian Army and Hezbollah on the other.
I wonder what the Russians are doing in terms of weapons, training and techniques.
Karan ji, indeed. In fact, the alignment of forces is in some ways reminiscent of the situation in Europe exactly 100 years ago.
On one side, a Shia "Triple Entente" of Iran, Iraq and Syria with Russia and maybe China (more on this later) backing it. Unconventional assets include Kurdish militias, Hezbollah and other Qods Force-trained militias in Syria and the Peninsular Arab states.
On the other side, a Sunni "Double Alliance" of GCC (KSA, Qatar, Bahrain, UAE, Kuwait, Oman) and Turkey with the US, France, and Israel backing it. Unconventional assets include Hamas, FSA, and various Muslim Brotherhood/Al-Qaeda affiliated groups.
It is the unconventionals, of course, who will make this a little bit different from WWI. They have a presence in almost every country and they will be the leading edge of the fight, rather than a mere trigger as with Gaviel Princip.
Now from an Indocentric perspective, a primary matter of concern is how AfPak squares into the situation.
It could be said that the US has an additional reason (apart from downhill skiing) to see Afghanistan in Talib hands when the shooting starts. Taliban-controlled Afghanistan will side with the Sunni Double Alliance against Iran, rather than remain neutral as Karzai would. As for Pakistan itself, as Carl ji observed previously, there's no doubt that it will end up on the GCC/Turkey side of the war. In fact, it will likely become a primary front in a Shia-Sunni war against Iran, because of many factors. Firstly, the Saudis hate to fight any of their wars themselves, and because they are one of the Pakis' four-fathers, there is little question that they would demand (and get) full Paki cooperation in such a conflict. Secondly, it is quite possible that Saudi Arabia paid for Nawaz Sharif's election; certainly they paid for the Tanzeems who selectively failed to target Sharif's candidates during the election campaign. Thirdly, even if Pakistan is officially reluctant to go to war against Iran, the Tanzeems of Pakistan know on which side their naan is buttered; their money comes from Saudi Arabia and GCC, not the bhikari Pakistani state.
If Pakistan does get involved in a shooting war with Iran, this is of course a good thing for India. Firstly, the Taliban and Paki Tanzeems will be too preoccupied fighting the Iranians to pay much attention to J&K (in fact, such a war might provide the perfect opportunity for India to reclaim POK, and especially Gilgit-Baltistan, where the tribes are predominantly Shia.)
Secondly, the idea of cooperating with India in an anti-Taliban axis becomes more attractive from an Iranian-Russian point of view, since the open alignment of Taliban with GCC will obviate any possibility of a Teheran-Islamabad-Kabul-Beijing-Moscow "understanding" regarding the post-US dispensation in Afghanistan.
Thirdly, the atmosphere of a long and protracted shooting war in the region will queer the pitch for China in many ways. China wants to establish connectivity to the Arabian Sea via the Karakoram-Gwadar corridor... but this region, of course, will be on the frontlines of a Pak-Iran conflict. China wants to position itself for the economic exploitation of Afghanistan after US withdrawal... but this prospect will be equally skewered if the Taliban is fighting Iran and Iranian/Russian proxies in the area. The ideal situation for China is one in which it could take advantage of Paki connectivity and the post-US Afghan dispensation to build an overland pipeline from Iran to China, or facilitate easy access to Iranian oil via Gwadar, or both. Such a situation would make China safer from Indian (or other) interdiction of the Malacca Strait chokepoint upon its energy lifeline. If the Great Shia Sunni War begins, all of these Chinese pipedreams go for a toss.
Another thing to recognize is that moves are *already* being made to determine, through different kinds of international pressure, what role (if any) India would play in the coming Great Shia Sunni War. I am sure you will all laugh when you first read this... because we all know MMS is incapable of doing anything in India's long-term interest. The US has bought and paid for him with the Nuclear Deal... so much so that Putin gave a hint of his barely concealed contempt for MMS at the G20 summit, when he remarked how the Indian PM "unexpectedly" opposed the US proposal to strike Assad!
However, in the realm of international relations, other countries do not regard India from the prism of assuming MMS will be there forever. The measures other countries take vis a vis India are determined by New Delhi's perceived capabilities, not its perceived intentions. And that's why we're already seeing such measures being taken:
1) From Saudi/UAE/GCC, we've seen the unexpected gift of three most wanted terrorists: Tunda, Bhatkal, and Abu Jundal. The message being sent to Delhi is: we would-be Sunni Caliphs respect your concerns on terrorism, so don't join any axis against us even if we have the Pakis and the Taliban on our side of a future war. The GCC is genuinely concerned that we will to some or other extent take the Shia side in such a war. We have many reasons: shared concerns with Iran and Russia about the Taliban returning to Kabul, and also traditional ties to Russia which many of our veteran babus in the MEA still hold dear.
2) From Iran, we have not seen anything in the open, but there is no doubt they are angling heavily for India to take their side. As bargaining chips they offer continued access to Afghanistan via Chahbahar-Zaranj-Delaram, and renewed cooperation against the Taliban (should it come to power in Kabul and begin uprooting the infrastructure and Indian presence we've cultivated there over the last decade.) From our side, we could potentially offer the Iranians many things short of actually joining the war against the Sunni Double Alliance. We could at the very least keep Pakistan off balance and make it difficult for them to maneuver against Iran. As a step up from that, we could offer port facilities, landing and overflight rights etc. to Iranian ships and aircraft. As a step even further up, we could facilitate Shia militancy in Pakistan and POK; and still further, we could actually attack Pakistan and attempt to reclaim POK. Once again, don't think of MMS doing these things and laugh... for all the world knows, it may be Modi running the show in India when the Great Shia Sunni War begins in earnest.
3) From the Pakistani side, we're seeing something interesting. Pakistan's own Caliphate dreams are not quite in sync with either the GCC's or the Shia Triple Alliance's. They favour a Greater Khorasan model including AfPak, Iran, and many countries of Central Asia as the seed-land of the 21st Century Caliphate. War with Iran doesn't at all suit a powerful section of Paki Islamists in the TSPA and ISI, who have advocated developing closer relations with Iran and China in opposition to the traditional alliances of Pakistan with US and GCC.
However, the Pakis are realizing that they may not have a choice, because as I mentioned previously, GCC has bought and paid for many of their Tanzeems, their nuclear programme, and very likely for Nawaz Sharif's election as well. GCC is also their primary source of charitable energy, and a major contributor to keeping their excuse for an economy afloat. And GCC doesn't care a fig for their Khorasan pipedreams.
The Pakistanis see what is coming and want to take desperate measures to avoid it. Their worst nightmare is a situation where the Paki govt watches helplessly while Saudi-sponsored Tanzeems and Taliban militias rush westward to join the war against kufr Shias. This is not something they will be able to solve by GUBOing and double-timing, which has been their preferred tactic with Unkil for 12 years.
Therefore, the Paki Islamists (specifically, the Hamid Gul/Mirza Aslam Beg inspired faction of the TSPA/ISI, who are very anti-US and pro-Khorasan) have taken matters into their own hands and tried to change the course of events by heating up the border with India. This, I think, is a big reason why we have seen incidents like the Jalalabad attack, and the beheading and repeated incursions along the LOC. If Pakistan gets into an ongoing situation of border tension with India, it can beg the Saudis to let them keep out of the Great Shia Sunni War against Iran, using the "Islam Khatre Mein Hai" excuse. Such a situation will also help them to rein in the Tanzeems and bring about some semblance of unity, helping to avoid a situation where the Tanzeems race off westwards to fight their own jihad against Teheran.
Thus, I believe recent Paki policy towards India has been guided, at least in part, by the need to pre-empt involvement on the GCC side of a Great Shia Sunni War against Iran. Conversely, US and GCC pressure on India to "keep talking to Pakistan" may be interpreted in this light as well... they do not want India giving Pakistan an excuse to stay out of a war against Iran.
4) Finally, China. We've all been wondering, what exactly is behind the recent hostility exhibited by PLA on our borders? The prospect of a Great Shia Sunni War offers a few potential answers. First, they want to keep India off balance militarily, and discourage India from intervening to its advantage (e.g. trying to reclaim POK/NA) if Pakistan gets involved in a war against Iran.
Secondly, they sense that the outcome of the Great Shia Sunni War will be an unprecedented deficit of energy security for China; of course, India will suffer an energy shortage as well, but China in particular will become especially vulnerable to future Indian retaliations at the Malacca chokepoint. If China wants to prosecute a war against India and change the borders in its favour, they have a limited window before the shooting begins in West Asia.
So really, there are three, not two different factions of interests in the ongoing situation.
A) Those who want the war to happen: GCC, Turkey, Israel, the US and some of its Western Allies including France. They would like to see Iran subdued and a stable GCC-led Sunni Caliphate formed that is inextricably linked to the West by bonds of economic and security interest.
B ) Those who do not want the war to happen right now (since they are at a relative disadvantage), but will fight willingly to prevent West Asia becoming dominated by a GCC-led Sunni Caliphate: Iran, Iraq, Syria and Russia.
C) Those who
really, really do not want the war to happen, and will do anything they can to prevent or delay its occurrence, because they stand to lose the most as a consequence of Great Shia Sunni Conflict: Pakistan and China
