Bharat Rakshak

where a Plant is located on a Tributary of The Jhelum on which Pakistan has any Agricultural use or hydroelectric use, the water released below the Plant may be delivered, if necessary, into another Tributary but only to the extent existing Agricultural Use or hydroelectric use by Pakistan on the former Tributary would not be adversely affected.

manjgu wrote:q1.. how long did baglihar case linger on?

q2. could u explain why this long tunnel and whats its use.. quite lay abt these issues...

the dam which is sought to be built would raise the water level and so more head will be created?..

manjgu wrote: and obviously this head cant be achieved at the site of the dam ..right. due to geology/geography of the area...

Pakistan also objects to India’s decision to deplete the level of the reservoir level of the plant to “below the dead storage level (DSL)”. (this issue is settled in Baglihar Award) Its reason being that it says the treaty places strict limitations on drawdown of water.

Run-of-River projects are dramatically different in design, appearance and impact from conventional hydroelectric projects. Power stations on rivers with great seasonal fluctuations require a large reservoir in order to operate during the dry season, resulting in the necessity to impound and flood large tracts of land. In contrast, run of river projects do not require a large impoundment of water.[1] Instead, some of the water is diverted from a river, and sent into a pipe called a penstock. The penstock feeds the water downhill to the power station's turbines. Because of the difference in relief, potential energy from the water up river is transformed into kinetic energy while it flows downriver through the penstock, giving it the speed required to spin the turbines that in turn transform this kinetic energy into electrical energy. Additionally, there is no alteration of downstream flows, since all diverted water is returned to the stream below the powerhouse.

Most run-of-river power plants consist of a dam across the full width of the river to provide the head needed for running the turbines. Whatever water is not needed for generating electricity spills over the dam at a spillway. Such installations have a reservoir behind the dam but flooding is minimal and it is not used to store water for later generation

manjgu wrote:

my point is usually the dam itself provides the head , whats different in this case... . is the height of the dam restricted...

thanks..

http://www.flickr.com/photos/macgupta/4 ... 1/sizes/l/

DUBAI: Pakistan's 2010-2011 season rice crop is expected to drop by 14 per cent versus the year earlier as India limits water supplies to Pakistan, a board member on Pakistan's Rice Exports Association told Reuters on Sunday.

Pakistan's Indus river basin is supplied by melting snow and glaciers from the Himalayas. Both India and Pakistan make use of the Indus, with the river managed under a 1960 water treaty.

Pakistan has lately begun accusing India of taking more than its fair share from the headwaters by building a number of dams and waging water war against its downstream neighbour.

India denies this. “In 2010-2011 we expect to face a drop of 14 per cent in production because of limited water supplies because India is building dams and diverting water from the same river we share,” Sham Khan told Reuters on the sidelines of an industry conference in Dubai.

“This water issue is a serious problem and Pakistan is currently in talks with India to try to resolve this issue as agriculture represents around 23.3 of our GDP.”

The ‘differences' to be referred to a Neutral Expert will be regarding the compliance of the project features with the conditions and restrictions laid down in the Treaty (design of the project, quantum of pondage, need for gated spillways, placement of the gates, etc.). This reference, which will be somewhat similar to the reference to the NE in the Baglihar case, will not be discussed further in this article.

The main ‘dispute' to be referred to a Court of Arbitration is on the issue of whether the diversion of waters from one tributary of Jhelum to another is permissible under the Treaty. Art. III (2) of the Treaty requires India to let flow all the western rivers to Pakistan and not permit any interference with those waters, and Art. IV (6) calls for the maintenance of natural channels. If we go by these provisions, the diversion of waters from one tributary to another seems questionable. {This article is susumed by the Jhelum-specific one that the author himself writes next} On the other hand, there is another provision (Ann. D, paragraph 15 (iii)) which specifically envisages water released from a hydroelectric plant located on one tributary of the Jhelum being delivered to another tributary; this seems to permit inter-tributary diversion. The correct understanding of these provisions and the determination of the conformity of the Kishenganga Project to the Treaty is a matter for the two governments to agree upon, or for the Court of Arbitration to decide.

Assuming that diversion from the Kishenganga to another tributary is found permissible, there is a condition attached: the existing agricultural use and use for hydro-electric power generation on the Kishenganga in Pakistan must be protected. There is indeed some existing agricultural use along the Kishenganga (Neelum) in PoK. Pakistan is also planning the Neelum-Jhelum hydroelectric project at a point on the Neelum before it joins the Jhelum. These claims of existing uses will probably be contentious issues between the two countries, with reference to (a) the crucial date for determining ‘existing use' and (b) the quantum of existing use.

Thirdly, the outcome of the process is uncertain. There are three possibilities: a clear negative finding (that is, the diversion of waters is impermissible under the Treaty), in which case the project will have to be abandoned; or a clear positive finding (that the diversion is permissible) in which case, the project can go ahead as planned; or a mixed finding that the diversion is permissible but must be such as to minimise adverse downstream impacts, in which case India may have to reduce the planned diversion and let a larger quantum of waters flow down. It would be very rash to predict the outcome of the process, but undertaking that rashness, the author would venture to suggest that a mixed finding seems more likely than a categorical one (positive or negative).

If that tentative forecast seems plausible, is it really necessary to go through a costly and time-consuming process of arbitration to arrive at that result? {That was eminently the approach India suggested. It was the same approach in Baglihar too. The author perhaps does not realize that Pakistan has been an 'All or Nothing' country} Is it not possible — and more sensible — for the two countries to try for an agreed settlement of the dispute even at this stage ? {Unfortunately, reason & logic have never worked with Pakistan. Pakistani masses have been so much fed on Hindu cunning and hatred for the kufr that any agreement would be misconstued and even propagated as 'concession' or 'surrender'. The only time successful discussions took place and settled issues was during Ayub Khan's early days when both the border settlement (Ayub Khan was COAS at that time) and the IWT took place. In the prevailing condition of extremism and hatred, no Pakistani political leader would be willing to take the risk of bilateral settlement. Arbitration is a safer bet even if it were to go against them as it happened in Baglihar. They can always lie to their people that Pakistan won and India lost just as in 1965, 1999, Baglihar etc.}

A second issue that Pakistan proposes to refer to the Court of Arbitration is the legitimacy of drawdown flushing of the reservoir for sediment-control. This is not specific to the Kishenganga project but is a general issue applicable to all future projects. In the case of Baglihar, the Neutral Expert had strongly recommended periodical drawdown flushing of the reservoir as a means of sediment control, which (in his view) was part of proper maintenance, and had observed that while the dead storage could not be used for operational purposes, there was no objection to its use for maintenance purposes. Pakistan has been unhappy with that recommendation, but could not challenge it as the NE's findings are final and binding. It is now raising this as a general issue before the Court of Arbitration. Three questions arise:

(i) Can an issue on which a NE has given a final and binding finding be raised again before another NE or a Court of Arbitration?

(ii) If the NE's finding is applicable only to the particular project in question and not to others, should we accept the position that there can be substantially different (even contradictory) principles (laid down by different NEs) applying to different projects?

(iii) If drawdown flushing is ruled out, then must the corollary of heavy siltation and reduction of project life (as in the case of Salal) be accepted as inevitable? If so, does this not amount to ignoring the words “consistent with sound and economical design and satisfactory construction and operation” and again “unless sediment control or other technical considerations necessitate this” in the Treaty?

These questions will no doubt be argued before the Court by the two countries.

The decision of the Neutral Expert on all matters within his competence shall be final and binding, in respect of the particular matter on which the decision is made , upon the Parties and upon any Court of Arbitration established under the provisions of Article IX (5) .

"where a Plant is located on a Tributary of The Jhelum on which Pakistan has any Agricultural Use or hydro-electric use, the water released below the Plant may be delivered, if necessary, into another Tributary but only to the extent that the then existing Agricultural Use or hydro-electric use by Pakistan on the former Tributary would not be adversely affected ."

chaanakya wrote:If there are any such use than the question of adverse impact would arise(but not before).

“Sixty years have drastically reduced the comfort of 1950 on both sides. In Pakistan, the population growth from 50 million to 175 million has put an unacceptable burden. This has reduced the water availability per capita, per year, from 5,000 cubic feet in 1960 to 1,500 today. In our Punjab too, the population has increased over 60 years but at a lesser rate. In 1947, in east Punjab, 6,000 cubic metres of potable water was available per person, per year. Now it is only 1,600 cubic metres. It is estimated to fall further to 1,147 cubic metres in 2050.

“However, the nine lakh shallow tube-wells now dangle dry. The rich have started digging deep to 300 feet or more with submersible pumps to grab water. Small farmers who predominate cannot afford the cost and their wells are drying up. One deep tube-well will dry up 100 (tube-wells) around it. The water table has gone far down, and this situation will lead to social tension. …West Punjab too faces these grave questions.”

“What should the two Punjabs do?” One proposal is to license and regulate tube-well sinking, including the permissible depth. “All must share fairly, and not take the maximum by means of wealth and power.” Monitoring is easy in this computer age. A high commissioner for groundwater management for the Punjab, with a competent scientific staff, would report directly to the chief minister and present an annual report to the state assembly. “Our British canals are in a state of collapse and flood irrigation will not do.”

He has a word of advice “for my friends in West Punjab”. Only recently the foreign minister of Pakistan, Mr Shah Mehmood Qureshi, said in a TV interview that the total average canal supplies of Pakistan are 104 million acre feet while the water available at the four gates is about 70 million acre feet. “Where does the 34 million acre feet go? It is not being stolen by India. It has been wasted in Pakistan.”

As for Pakistan and India, they would render high service to the people of Kashmir if, without prejudice to their rights under the Indus Waters Treaty, they set up a single joint project on the Kishanganga-Jhelum-Neelam sharing electricity for both sides of the LoC rather than two rival hydroelectric projects in the same area. The power-starved people of Kashmir will thank them for it.

Neshant wrote:sharing of anything should be avoided.

don't turn into a Nehru.

This wave of dam construction is proceeding in the absence of a plan to optimize the regional benefits (and minimize the environmental costs) of water management, and with little concern for alternative proposals. The outcomes of these schemes
may have repercussions, and potential benefits, for countries not currently involved in negotiations. The significant involvement of the Chinese government, and its Exim Bank, in financing the Pakistan and Nepal projects suggests there could be value in bringing China to regional negotiations

Three kinds of obstacle have constrained intergovernmental negotiations over water in the past, and contributed to the rise of significant tensions between states. Firstly, the strict practice of bilateral negotiation has put blinkers on the discussants, exaggerating the importance of past disagreements, limiting discussants’ ability to evaluate the regional potential for cooperation, and
encouraging the rise of myths about the malevolent roles and limited needs of neighboring states. Secondly, the construction of grand national plans for river development has tended to crowd out plans with benefits for other nations or for the whole region. Thirdly, the limits of bilateral diplomacy have been confined further by the restrictions of barter exchange. Transactions are only possible, in this type of exchange, when each government has what the other government wants.

The expansion of diplomacy in ways prefigured by the agreements of 1996 and 1997 could overcome these obstacles of bilateralism, grand nationalism and barter diplomacy. Could negotiations about international river water management be taken out of diplomatic barter and transferred to negotiations among private and public-private agencies? This transfer would require the design and unfolding of a suitable regulatory framework. That framework could embody the concerns of sovereignty which currently limit the topic to interactions among states. It could also clarify property rights in water, and incorporate the latest thinking on unresolved environmental questions, such as those relating to falling groundwater aquifers and the looming impacts of climate change, which threatens water sources in a manner hitherto unimaginable. With an appropriate regulatory structure, crossborder transactions involving water services could be a significant source of employment, economic growth and livelihood security.

Our discussion of multi-track diplomacy gives us a conceptual framework for postulating some specific features of a potential regulatory institution. First, the technical issues involved in planning for the future with respect to water management in the region are highly complex. An international panel of experts focused on the specific characteristics and challenges of the regions river basins would be an essential part of a future solution. Participation by the governments concerned is also necessary, of course, and one would expect it to be through the appointment of seasoned foreign policy experts. Participation by national and international NGOs and even private sector bodies such as industry associations (rather than individual firms) would round out the membership of a new regulatory body. In terms of our multi-track classification, this would represent a hybrid of Tracks I and II, with the weight toward the latter. Track III would be implicitly present through grassroots linkages of NGOs – grassroots activism would be difficult to incorporate directly into the envisaged framework. A parallel suggestion for an independent body to deal with South Asian environmental issues was made by a report to the UNDP (Romm, Rose and Crow 1997). The case for a regulatory body is made more pressing than it was in that report by the issues of China’s development of the Tsangpo and the uncertainties raised by climate
change and glacial melting.

Unlike the case of SAARC, or even bodies that are designed to address international or cross-border environmental issues, the focus of the proposed body would be specifically on water management, with environmental issues such as climate change, pollution, groundwater depletion and soil degradation being a natural component of a focus on quality as well as quantity of water. This focus would distinguish such an institution from SAARC, or other kinds of regional organizations. In any case, the need to include China implies that a delinking from SAARC would be essential. Even then, the fact that some basin issues are strictly bilateral (though less so when climate change is factored in) would require something of a hybrid structure, so that different river basins might be addressed only by subsets of the membership. The opportunity to link and compare bilateral issues would still be valuable of course, as information-sharing about technical matters could enhance the quality of specific basin solutions.

China’s presence in such a body would unavoidably change the strategic balance of South Asian river discussions, especially in the direction of reducing India’s bargaining power, or ability to act relatively unilaterally as a result of its dominant position in South Asia. Yet the ability of China to drastically affect water supplies throughout South Asia, particularly as the impacts of climate change become more severe, means that its inclusion is necessary and potentially valuable to all parties.Through the presence of official government representatives in a regulatory body, there will inevitably be an implicit linkage between river water issues and other strategic interests such as trade and national boundaries. However, the presumed virtue of the multi-track approach is precisely to temper or ameliorate such conflicts, by keeping them contained, and by focusing on achieving agreement where mutually beneficial gains to cooperation are available, through investment, contractual relationships or integrated technical analysis.

At one level, the proposed institution may be seen as an international multi-basin version of bodies that attempt to regulate single river basins within national boundaries. In such cases, there are also subnational entities, such as states or provinces, with differing interests. One obvious difference is that a national government can exercise overriding sovereignty in such cases. With federal structures or relatively powerful or influential subnational governments, this exercise of sovereignty may be available only through carrots rather than sticks. In the absence of a world government, coalitions of national interests as represented through multilateral agencies may play a role, just as the World Bank did in the case of the Indus Waters Treaty.

To the extent that multilateral agencies are dominated by specific national interests (the US for the World Bank, or Japan for the Asian Development Bank), this may not be too different from the perspective articulated in Sahni (2006), where a case
is made for the US to further its strategic foreign policy interests by improving cooperation between India and Pakistan with respect to the Indus. The problem with such overt attention, of course, is that it brings traditional Track I approaches more to the forefront, perhaps diverting focus from the kinds of cooperation envisaged in this paper. The history of management of the Mekong basin, from the control of colonial powers to a Mekong River Commission that does not include major upstream nations (China and Burma), indicates some of the problems with traditional nationalist approaches to multilateral cooperation, as well as the limitations of investment-oriented multilateral institutions. Of course there is no ideal or easy solution to these tradeoffs, and the success of any such institution such as the one proposed here depends on the specifics of design and implementation. The Mekong River Commission can provide a starting point for thinking about the appropriate institutional design. The importance and urgency of the problem, to our minds, requires some institutional innovation, and design and implementation can only follow putting the idea on the agenda of policymakers in the countries at risk from future water shortages and crises.

An international expert consultation on climate change impact on Cryosphere of the Indus Basin and its implications on future water scenario has begun here at headquarter of International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD) in Nepali capital Kathmandu. Workshop will discuss over the establishment of an “Indus River Basin Initiative” to coordinate collaboration between different institutions and organisations.

The Indus River Basin will collect and analyse recent and ongoing research interventions and approaches. It will also provide platform for sharing knowledge gained from this analysis as well as for sharing current state-of-the-art approaches and interventions planned for future work on climate change and water resource management in the Indus River Basin, according to ICIMOD.

During the workshop, presentations and discussions will focus on study design and methodologies used in field work, modelling, and scenario analysis. The Indus River Basin is one of the most sensitive basins to impacts of climate change on water supplies and loss of livelihoods. Runoff is generated predominantly by melting snow and ice, and a large number of economic activities and human lives in the basin.

The Indus Basin covers an area of about 1,140,000 sq. km. A large part of the upper basin lies within the Hindu Kush, Karakorum,and Himalayan mountains. Afghanistan, China, India and Pakistan share the basin territory, according to ICIMOD.

The World Bank has refused to fund the Diamer-Bhasha Dam due to, what they claim, is the controversial legal status of Gilgit-Baltistan territory.

The revelation was made by Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) official who was briefing the National Assembly’s Standing Committee on Inter-Provisional Coordination on Friday.

Briefing the committee about the status of the Diamer-Bhasha project, the WAPDA official informed the committee that due to objections raised by India over the legal reforms introduced in Gilgit-Baltistan, the World Bank had refused to finance the project.

ISLAMABAD, July 2: Amid a controversy over the legal team to represent Islamabad, Pakistan and India will meet in New Delhi on Tuesday (July 6) to finalise a Court of Arbitration (COA) for adjudication of the Kishanganga hydropower project, being built by India on Neelum river in violation of the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty.

SSridhar wrote:World Bank refuses to fund Diamar-Basha Dam because of disputed status of Balawaristan

The World Bank has refused to fund the Diamer-Bhasha Dam due to, what they claim, is the controversial legal status of Gilgit-Baltistan territory.

The revelation was made by Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) official who was briefing the National Assembly’s Standing Committee on Inter-Provisional Coordination on Friday.

Briefing the committee about the status of the Diamer-Bhasha project, the WAPDA official informed the committee that due to objections raised by India over the legal reforms introduced in Gilgit-Baltistan, the World Bank had refused to finance the project.

ajit_tr wrote:Talks for Kishanganga arbitration court on July 6

They said the ministry of water and power, Pakistans commissioner for Indus Commission and relevant agencies of the armed forces had asked Mr Naqvi to continue with the job because they thought he was familiar with the case because of his long association with the Kishanganga project and his experience in the Baglihar case with India.

SSridhar wrote:World Bank refuses to fund Diamar-Basha Dam because of disputed status of Balawaristan

{Prior text Snipped} WAPDA official informed the committee that due to objections raised by India over the legal reforms introduced in Gilgit-Baltistan, the World Bank had refused to finance the project.

arun wrote:A view from Pakistan Occupied Jammu & Kashmir on the rapacious behaviour of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan who act as an “Imperial Power” when it comes to exploiting the resources of POK:

Neelam Jhelum Hydroelectric Project - exploitation of Kashmiri resources

This project, once completed will benefit Pakistan, but local people will not benefit from it in any form or shape. However, there will be serious economic and environmental consequences for the local people; and their future generations will face very serious economic and environmental problems.

This project has potential to benefit people of Jammu and Kashmir on the Indian side of the LOC, but it will surely reduce flow of water in the Neelam River when it enters Pakistani Administered Kashmir; and it will have severe impact on Neelam-Jhelum Hydro Electric Project.

This approach will create better understanding and promote goodwill between people of Pakistan and people of Jammu and Kashmir. If on the other hand they continue with their policies of exploiting Kashmir resources like imperial powers do, then it will surely back fire and will generate bad feelings for Pakistan.

I end with a quote of Mir Afzal Suleria, President of Kashmir National Party in Pakistani Administered Kashmir, who while talking to Human Rights Watch, said:

‘Pakistan says they are our friends and India is our enemy. I agree India is our enemy, but with friends like these, who needs enemies’?

As soon as anyone dares to speak to expose wrong doings of Pakistani officials in Pakistani Administered Kashmir or Gilgit Baltistan he is criticised as being ‘anti Pakistan’ or an ‘Indian agent’. Because of this fear and intimidation people are very hesitant to speak about their plight on this side of the LOC.

Pakistan has one of the lowest agriculture productivity per cubic metre of water in the world. Our cash crops like sugarcane, rice and cotton are all water guzzlers and therefore we really need to question whether it is worth using 97 percent of the water on them

“Only God knows” is the response we receive when we go in search of some extinct natural resource of this country. Energy has already become a lost cause and the negligence of water as a scarce resource is almost assuming criminal proportions. Any resource not taken care of diminishes. Nature has been astoundingly generous to us but the apathy of this nation to all that is good and rare has brought us to the brink of living in a land where creative destruction is the only art unmatched.

IWT- I want it, I don't want it; India conspiring to sabotage treaty

THE National Assembly Standing Committee on Interprovincial Coordination has been told that India has stopped the World Bank from funding the Bhasha Dam with the argument that the area of construction, Gilgit-Baltistan, was a disputed territory. This was revealed to the Committee on Friday by the Member (Water) WAPDA, Syed Raghab Abbas Shah, when he testified to it. This reveals the Indian mindset, which did its best to cause damage to Pakistan, but it also speaks volumes about the World Bank, which joined in the conspiracy to prevent Pakistan from developing its water resources, as well as ensuring the Indian sabotage of the Indus Waters Treaty. That is despite the fact the Bank itself is the guarantor of the Treaty, and the party which is responsible under the Treaty to help settle any disputes that might arise over the Indus Waters. This should show Pakistan also how lowly it is rated by the USA when compared to India, despite the help it has rendered in its war on terror, with the Bank so much under American control that its President is an appointee of the US President.
The refusal of the loan means that the component, which the World Bank was supposed to put in, of the Rs 900 billion cost of the dam, will now have to be raised by other means. However, this should not ignore the fact that the Bhasha Dam decision came prematurely, and should have been preceded by the Kalabagh Dam, an eminently feasible project to which the World Bank is already committed. Because of this refusal by Pakistan to undertake the use of Indus Waters, India has been encouraged to violate the Indus Waters Treaty. It must also be noted that the Mangla Dam, which lies in Azad Jammu and Kashmir, and thus in a disputed territory, was included in the Treaty, and was part of the deal the World Bank then brokered. There was then no objection raised about its status; and to raise it now merely indicates that Indian posturing in the region also carries American backing, as it builds India as a regional counterweight to China. Even if the World Bank is not investing in the disputed territory on the Indian side, its massive investments in India are freeing up resources for it to engage in heavy spending there, all meant to sabotage the Treaty.

He said Pakistan and India get water from common source. He added that Pakistan will move to settle the water issue bilaterally in case India tries to stop our share of water in violation of Indus Water Treaty.

And if, bilateral talks failed to address the issue then Pakistan will go for the third party option. The Minister, however, added “we also have to see how we are utilizing the water resources flowing towards Pakistan”.

ISLAMABAD, July 3: The government on Saturday said talks between Pakistan and India on the Kishanganga arbitration court would not be taking place next week as a date for further negotiations on the river dispute was yet to be finalised.

Kamal Majidulla, the prime minister’s Special Assistant on Water Resources and Agriculture, in a statement issued here said if a mutually agreed list of experts to resolve the issue cannot be agreed upon, the two countries will rely upon a single negotiator to reconcile differences with respect to a common list. He was responding to a news report published in Dawn on July 3, titled “Talks for Kishanganga arbitration court on July 6”.

SSridhar wrote:World Bank refuses to fund Diamar-Basha Dam because of disputed status of Balawaristan

{Prior text Snipped} WAPDA official informed the committee that due to objections raised by India over the legal reforms introduced in Gilgit-Baltistan, the World Bank had refused to finance the project.

Editorial in the paranoid Nation on the report that the World bank has declined to finance the Diamer Bhasha Dam owing to Indian objections :

India conspires again

This is what internationalisation of J&K means endian eshtyle

Leading Pakistan newspaper alleges that following Indian objections over it, the World Bank has refused to extend loan to Pakistan for the construction of Diamer Bhasha Dam, saying the region is a disputed territory. This was disclosed during the meeting of National Assembly Standing Committee on Inter Provincial Coordination on Friday. Pakistan claims that India has expressed objections over the construction of the dam, after which World Bank has refused to extend loan for its construction.

According to sources, the World Bank, sensing complexities in the constitutional status of Gilgit-Baltistan, has refused to release funds for the construction of Diamer Bhasha Dam. The World Bank has offered a loan of Rs 900 billion to Pakistan. Meanwhile, sources confirm that Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) has not objected to the World Bank about construction of the dam but objected to fact that large parts of Jammu and Kashmir are occupied by Pakistan. Finance Ministry which deals with World Bank has also not objected to the dam.

chaanakya wrote:

Leading Pakistan newspaper alleges that following Indian objections over it, the World Bank has refused to extend loan to Pakistan for the construction of Diamer Bhasha Dam, saying the region is a disputed territory. This was disclosed during the meeting of National Assembly Standing Committee on Inter Provincial Coordination on Friday. Pakistan claims that India has expressed objections over the construction of the dam, after which World Bank has refused to extend loan for its construction.