Bharat Rakshak

out of a current arsenal of over 10000 warheads, the US only has 50 bombs with yields over 3 megatons.

Amber G. wrote:NY times report about US...
Panel Sees No Need for A-Bomb Upgrade

Viv Sreenivasan wrote:you want me to believe

samuel wrote:How long before hydrodynamic technology proliferation,

S

The US has conducted over 1000 nuclear tests to extensively verify the capability and effectiveness of their Nuclear arsenal. India has conducted a bare handuful and that only with low yeild weapons and you want me to believe that India has an effective deterrerant nuclear arsenal?? .

Worst case scenario- we have untested nuclear bombs that when it comes to a showdown will fizzle rather than go BANG!.

- that is why the key is fissile material

Gerard wrote:Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
Worldwide deployments of nuclear weapons, 2009

NRao wrote: I would suggest that you use the Toman curves in the V Sunder article I posted a few posts ago to come up with a table.

To me this entire episode revolves around:

Santhanam's observations and expectations: Depth 120 meters, crater radius 72 meters, estimated yield about 25 Kt. Observed: No crater, dust rising, shaft in tact, A-frame in tact. The point being EVEN at 15 Kt yield (forget about Santhanam's estimated yield) there should be a crater. Why was there not one at yield estimates way above 15 Kt?

RC/Sikka: Depth 230 meters, estimated yield 45 Kt. Observation: No crater, shaft in tact, A-Frame in tact, some rising dust that settles with a small bulge in the middle. Point being EVEN at maximum yield of 45 Kt there can be no crater and there was none.

So, to me BOTH go against Santhanam's position. (That is not a knock on Santhanam, but I am certainly questioning his position based on numbers from both sides.)

Anything beyond that - he could have, may have, think he may have, could be that ........ is speculation beyond what we have. Which is fine, but I am really not interested in that.

I do think the one entity that can break this situation is the IA. They should have the depth to which S1 shaft was dug.

ShauryaT wrote: We are not going to solve this issue with the Toman curves or with data available to us in the public domain, is the realization I have come to.

Reasonable doubt with available public data is all that is needed, and we have that.

Santhanam refused to divulge the DOB in September. He still has a tremendous level of largely self imposed sense of responsibility in him not to divulge data. Data that he has access to in spades and was in charge. He came out with the DOB information, only and only after the Ramachandran article, obviously fed by the BARC crew. If you go through Ramachandran’s previous articles, his confidential access to BARC is clear.

Another thing is the more sqeaky clean the BARC calculations appear, my sense of doubt of the underlying data being manipulated increases. KS, has not yet divulged any of the CORRTEX information or other data, he has access to. What he desires is an investigation of this entire matter, instead of a judgment call based on a few set of leaders. When the government appointed the DRDO to measure certain aspects of the test, they cannot selectively throw out certain results. When there is a case for a credible doubt, by the agency responsible, the logical answer is to retest.

We are not going to solve this issue with the Toman curves or with data available to us in the public domain, is the realization I have come to.

ShauryaT wrote: RC believing that the tests were not even needed..

ShauryaT wrote:

NRao wrote: RC believing that the tests were not even needed..

samuel wrote:

- that is why the key is fissile material

You mean in the trivial sense of that being part of the bomb or in the sense of FMCT?
Either way, it doesn't matter when the nations that could far more easily deny technology proliferated and now hope that nations with far more material and little technology (say) won't. So,in what sense is fissile material key in the face of proliferation?

NRao wrote: Fat fingers I guess, but that is actually a ShauryaT quote ..................... not mine.

NP though.

Just exploding a 'nuclear device' doesnt mean youve got an effective deterrant (even NK can do that).

The 'device' needs to be compressed so that it can fit in a missile, it needs to be timed so that it detonates at the right time, AND it needs to be proven that its RELIABLE.

Viv Sreenivasan wrote: Shiv im not trolling, im pointing out the basic fact that we cant have confidence in our nuclear arsenal after a handful of tests. We dont even know if these tests involved actual missile design parameters. Just exploding a 'nuclear device' doesnt mean youve got an effective deterrant (even NK can do that). The 'device' needs to be compressed so that it can fit in a missile, it needs to be timed so that it detonates at the right time, AND it needs to be proven that its RELIABLE. If war does come tommorow with Pakistan, can we be confident that if we lauch a Prithivi missile at an armoured division across the border that the nuke will actually work?? I dont have this confidence from what ive seen.

Basic point- more nuclear tests needed ASAP.

NRao wrote: >>ShauryaT
>>We are not going to solve this issue with the Toman curves or with data available to us in the public domain, is the realization I have come to.


Why?

(I have explained why it can be.)

>>Reasonable doubt with available public data is all that is needed, and we have that.


Again a statement without an explanation (unless I am missing something).

>>Santhanam refused to divulge the DOB in September. He still has a tremendous level of largely self imposed >>sense of responsibility in him not to divulge data. Data that he has access to in spades and was in charge. He >>came out with the DOB information, only and only after the Ramachandran article, obviously fed by the BARC >>crew. If you go through Ramachandran’s previous articles, his confidential access to BARC is clear.


Certainly. I do NOT expect him to divulge data that he cannot.

HOWEVER, I do expect him be aware that whatever data that he does divulge will be subjected to scrutiny. And, that is all I have done. Taken an acceptable equation (used for decades) and used Santhanam's data to see where we stand. It does not fit!!! Nothing to do with me - except for the donkey work I did and expected someone else to verify it.

What Santhanam has divulged so far just does not fit - else prove that it does, which is fine with me and have requested it many a times.[/qoute] Answered above.

>>Another thing is the more sqeaky clean the BARC calculations appear, my sense of doubt of the underlying data >>being manipulated increases. KS, has not yet divulged any of the CORRTEX information or other data, he has >>access to. What he desires is an investigation of this entire matter, instead of a judgment call based on a few set >>of leaders. When the government appointed the DRDO to measure certain aspects of the test, they cannot >>selectively throw out certain results. When there is a case for a credible doubt, by the agency responsible, the >>logical answer is to retest.


I do not agree with you on most of these things - from a technical angle. I will reserve the right (as they say) to respond at a later date.

The rest is not my cup of tea. Such things happen and the fact that the parties kept quite for so long is proof that ALL of them are part of this entire mess. Personally I did not and do not see any reason for this to surface at this point in time. As I have said (perhaps in not so few word) 1) India has deterrence, 2) CTBT is NOT an issue and 3) S1 was tending towards a sizzle, if not a total sizzle.

shiv wrote:

ShauryaT wrote: RC believing that the tests were not even needed..

There is a cite from Chengappa recalling events of from 1995 in which he quotes RC and Kalam as asking PVNR for tests

There is quote from Bharat Karnad after the 1998 tests saying RC said that more tests would be needed if the GoI changed its definition of minimum credible deterrence

Both are linked on earlier pages of this thread. Do you have a cite for the above statement that you have made?

NRao wrote:A couple of questions.

1) S2 was at 150+ meters deep and @ 12+ Kt and had a crater with radius (estimated) 40 meter. How come a 45 Kt would be placed at 120 meters? Just asking.
2) Any idea what soil is at 120 and 150 meters?

ShauryaT wrote:
Contrast these quotes with what AN Prasad has said and there is an entire BARC board resolution, questioning RC's stand.

Viv Sreenivasan wrote:Shiv do you have any answers buddy?

ShauryaT wrote: The request of KS goes out directly do the PM and Parliament of India.

Experts disagree on whether states can have reliable nuclear arsenals – especially ones using advanced warhead designs, such as hydrogen bombs and miniaturized weapons – without testing, though all agree that it is very unlikely to develop significant nuclear innovations without testing. One other approach is to use supercomputers to conduct "virtual" testing, but the value of these simulations without actual test result data is thought to be slim.

Nuclear testing has since become a controversial issue in the United States, with a number of politicians saying that future testing might be necessary to maintain the aging warheads from the Cold War. Because nuclear testing is seen as furthering nuclear arms development, many are also opposed to future testing as an acceleration of the arms race.

We are at a critical juncture that requires the U.S. to invest now in the capabilities
needed to maintain a credible deterrent at the lowest level of nuclear weapons.
Without assuming serious risk, further reductions in the total stockpile are only
achievable with a responsive nuclear infrastructure. Without a responsive nuclear
infrastructure, the United States must continue to manage the technical risks
associated with an aging stockpile of Cold War-era nuclear weapons, and the geo-
political uncertainties of the years ahead, by maintaining a sizable inventory of
reserve weapons to support the operationally deployed force. This is an increasingly
expensive and potentially risky approach to stockpile stewardship. Successive efforts
at extending the service life of the current inventory of weapons drives these weapons
farther away from the original source data derived from underground nuclear tests,
and risks incorporating or accruing technical changes that could, over time,
inadvertently undermine their reliability and performance. The skills and
technologies needed to refurbish and maintain these older weapon designs are
increasingly difficult to sustain or acquire. Furthermore, some of the materials
employed in these older weapons are extremely hazardous. Moreover, it is difficult to
incorporate modern safety and security features into Cold War-era weapon designs.
Finally, as the United States continues to observe a moratorium on underground
nuclear testing, it becomes increasingly difficult to certify the existing stockpile of
weapons.

For weapon primaries, the Livermore team is evaluating changes that occur over time to the pit's special nuclear materials and to various types of high explosives. For example, plutonium irradiates itself and, given enough time, may change shape ever so slightly.
..

The Livermore team then characterized the material standards associated with various weapon systems. It found that many of the compounds absorbed in some high explosives may be traced to the use of other materials. For example, significant levels of toluene arise from its use as a solvent in the synthesis of the high explosive TATB.

However, the Air Force general expressed concern that a time would come when confidence in one or more "families" of weapons in the arsenal would diminish, perhaps due to the discovery of a serious problem. It could be that the prospects for fixing such a problem without explosive testing would be dim, he said.
Nuclear weapons currently fielded are "all well past" their 15-year design lives, Chilton said at a breakfast speech sponsored by the National Defense University Foundation and the National Defense Industrial Association. "They're not static. When they're sitting on the shelf, they're actually little chemistry experiments that are cooking away."
Gradual degradation of the chemicals inside an atomic weapon can "affect the non-nuclear components that are associated [with] -- and are absolutely critical to -- the function of the weapon system," he said.
Thus, Chilton said, "I sense there's a cliff out there someplace, and I don't know how close I am to the edge of that cliff."

Acquiring fissile material — plutonium-239 or highly enriched uranium (HEU) —
is the key hurdle in nuclear weapons development.3 Producing these two materials is
technically challenging; in comparison, many experts believe weaponization to be
relatively easy.4

The key data points of BARC are suspect.

Do we really expect to resolve the soil conditions at varying depth levels before there is agreement on other key data points.

The 150 meters is a leaked BARC data point.

The counter data point we have is that the yield of S2 was 20-25 KT.

Are you saying that expecting a crater of 60-70 meters at a burst at DOB 120 meters with about a 45KT yield is absolutely wrong for Pokhran?

shiv wrote:

ShauryaT wrote:
Contrast these quotes with what AN Prasad has said and there is an entire BARC board resolution, questioning RC's stand.

Shaurya - I need to know where these statements have been made or reported so i can read them myself and archive them as I have been doing every source.

shiv wrote:

ShauryaT wrote: The request of KS goes out directly do the PM and Parliament of India.

Shaurya what request are you talking about? I do not recall reading any such request by KS.

NRao wrote: Again, you make a statement without providing any data to back it. See below, as far as I can tell they are as close to perfect as can be.

Santhanam's - by that standard - is also a leak.

"Counter points" need to add. Or better still ALL points need to add up. My point is that what Santhanam has provided does not add up.

IF either or both sides are manipulating the data then - like I said before - the BARC side has done a fantastic job of making absolutely sure that - from what is in open source (equations and data) - that everything adds up. Santhanam on the other hand is no where close OR needs to settle the data to make it come close. Santhanam (conversely) has done a horrendous job - so far - of 1) Communicating his ideas and 2) making his fudged data add up (NOTE: I am assuming that BOTH Santhanam AND BARC are fudging data).

Simple straightforward answer - Yes (assuming soil composition - which is why I brought up 120 vs. 150, etc). (BTW, ranges like 60-70 may be trivial to most of us, but that is a very large deviation. Even 70-72 meters radius is sometimes very large. So, please be very, very careful in your posts. Please stick to what Santhanam has stated. Similarly with depths too.) (After all it is a matter of proving/disproving something.)

Not just that. (And, for the nth time - please read posts carefully, it is getting very tiring.) Even we accept that it was a fizzle, but the primary worked? So, the primary at 15 Kt SHOULD have produced a crater - NO MATTER what soil type. And, it DID NOT. So, what gives (I am open to a technical answer, NOT some assumption, interpretation, whatever.)

ShauryaT wrote:Worse, the DAE has tried to hide facts from successive governments, Parliament and the people, causing damage to our nuclear programme and national security. The Prime Minister and the Union Cabinet must help stop this. The nation waits with bated breath if they can or will.