), declaring OBL dead and calling Mullah Omar misguided... 
I wonder if the attempt to impose UN sanctions on foreign companies dealing with Iran is actually a rouse to enable Pakistan to control all the mineral resources of Afghanistan.Pakistan's India blockade and an international sanctions regime in Iran may put a spanner in Indian companies' drive to exploit the mineral bonanza in Afghanistan.
Pakistan's image on Capitol Hill received a much-needed boost on Thursday. Gen David Petraeus, head of the US Central Command, told a congressional hearing that he did not fully accept the findings of a recent study which alleges that Pakistani intelligence is providing operational support to the Afghan Taliban.
Although he maintained that Pakistan’s decades-old ties with Afghan insurgents “continue in various forms”, Gen Petraeus also pointed out that such links actually help intelligence-gathering. “[Y]ou have to have contact with bad guys to get intelligence on bad guys,” is how he summed it up. No one without blinkers on can deny that organs of the Pakistani state provided logistical and material support to the Taliban movement in the ’90s. But anyone who claims, as the London School of Economics ‘study’ did, that Pakistani intelligence is overseeing the ongoing Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan is clearly out of touch with the current reality. True, there may be individual Taliban sympathisers in the ranks of Pakistan’s intelligence agencies and it is incumbent upon our security apparatus to weed them out. But concerted institutional support to the extent claimed in the report? Hardly likely.
The top American military commander in Afghanistan hot-footed it to Washington-or was summoned-after his disparaging remarks about top Obama administration officials added to the growing impression that the United States’ Af-Pak policy is in total disarray.
Gen Stanley McChrystal, the top allied commander in Afghanistan, finds his job on the line after remarks and observations made by him and his aides about the US civilian leadership were published in a Rolling Stone profile. In the eight page spread headlined ''Runaway General,'' McChrystal is quoted by aides as being unimpressed and disappointed with President Obama, speaking contemptuously of vice-president Joe Biden and Af-Pak envoy Richard Holbrooke, dissing National Security Advisor Jim Jones as a ''clown'' who is stuck in the 1980s, and feeling betrayed by the US envoy in Kabul, Karl Eikenberry.
In several unguarded moments captured by a freelance journalist, the group mocks the grand poobahs in Washington who are trying to shape policy in a complex environment typical of a democracy, a process that has led some critics to dub the Af-Pak situation as a "Fak-Ap."
The crisis erupted even as many allies, including Afghan President Hamid Karzai, have begun to express doubts about the US purpose and resolve in Afghanistan. The confusing signals from Washington have even irked New Delhi. A group of Indian lawmakers who were in the capital this past week warned their U.S counterparts and officials in exchanges that the planned American withdrawal from Afghanistan in July next year without defeating Al Qaeda and Taliban would spell disaster for the region as well as the US and possibly ignite a renewed spurt of terrorism.
The confusion and disarray in Washington complicates India’s ongoing talks with Pakistan, which is emboldened to continue backing some Taliban and allied elements in the growing belief that U.S will leave Afghanistan. There is talk once again of ''good Taliban'' and bad Taliban and efforts to draw the former into the power structure in Kabul, a move engendered by the growing belief that the U.S is not going to win the war in Afghanistan.
Confidence Waning in Obama, U.S. Outlook
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142 ... 51230.html
By PETER WALLSTEN And ELIZA GRAY
Americans are more pessimistic about the state of the country and less confident in President Barack Obama's leadership than at any point since Mr. Obama entered the White House, according to a new Wall Street Journal/NBC News poll.
The survey also shows grave and growing concerns about the Gulf oil spill, with overwhelming majorities of adults favoring stronger regulation of the oil industry and believing that the spill will affect the nation's economy and environment.
Sixty-two percent of adults in the survey feel the country is on the wrong track, the highest level since before the 2008 election. Just one-third think the economy will get better over the next year, a 7-point drop from a month ago and the low point of Mr. Obama's tenure.
Amid anxiety over the nation's course, support for Mr. Obama and other incumbents is eroding. For the first time, more people disapprove of Mr. Obama's job performance than approve. And 57% of voters would prefer to elect a new person to Congress than re-elect their local representatives, the highest share in 18 years.
I think after the US exit from Af-Pak India should promote Pashtun takeover of TSP. TSP is too important to let the Pakjabis control. Pakjabis are too euunuchi to run a country.Afghanistan: Special comment: An important part of what is colloquially called "analysis" is a cognitive function called diagnosis. Work in the old Directorate of Intelligence, Joint Staff in the Pentagon, found that few good analysts are good at diagnosis, partly because they are not aware, have not been taught, the diagnostic options in national security affairs.
Diagnosis requires matching evidence to phenomena. A faulty diagnosis in medicine, or flawed definition of the case in law, leads to application of remedies that miscarry or make conditions worse. This is no less true in national security affairs.
For example, two distinct but related phenomena in internal instability problems are insurgency and uprising. As with many diseases, their symptoms mimic each other - violence, use of terror tactics, use of part time fighters that hide among the populace, to name a few.
But there are distinguishing characteristics whose significance is such that they require different remedies. Operations for fighting an insurgency will not avail in fighting an uprising. The Afghanistan has characteristics of both.
For example, nation-building operations incite and intensify an uprising because they are viewed as impositions by an outside power. They are not self-generated, thus they are resented. Nation-building might alleviate an insurgency, but only if security is high, sustained and predictable indefinitely.
A field known as counter-factual analysis also is helpful in bringing the differences into focus. Thus, in Afghanistan would Pashtun hostility to foreigners be less without the Taliban leadership in Quetta and Karachi? A strong case can be made that it would be less lethal, but no less strongly felt. That is a characteristic of an uprising more than of an insurgency.
This excursion would be theoretical except it helps explain the failure of the Marjah operations. One assessment pointed out that during the Marjah operations the US forces numbered one soldier for every four Afghans in the district. That is an astonishing figure because it means US forces vastly outnumbered the Taliban fighters. That force concentration should have been enough to exterminate the insurgents in most of Helmand, on the numbers.
Another counter-factual excursion is to explore whether Pashtun hostility to foreigners would dissipate if the Afghan government were not corrupt. If the unrest is an uprising, government corruption would be a multiplier of hostility, but is fundamentally not a driver in anti-foreign sentiment.
Cultural studies by Huntington and Harrison suggest that the solution to an uprising is a cultural shift that emerges from within the group in revolt -- something like the Awakening in Iraq. Those scholars argue that a solution cannot be imposed from the outside, but emerges from within the community.
In contrast, an insurgency can be defeated militarily, as the Sri Lankans showed last year, and the Indians last decade. Nation-building and good government is not solutions to insurgency without sustainable, predictable security. US forces provided security in Marjah, but did not sustain it and were disdained by the residents in doing it. The same attitudes have helped frustrate and delay an operation in Kandahar. The Kandaharis don't want the US operation. Both look more like an uprising than an insurgency.
The diagnosis makes a big difference in the selection of a workable remedy in national security affairs, no less than in medicine and law.
Maybe instead of pushing for making border irrelvant in Kashmir, the US should make the Durand Line irrelevant and see how that contributes to TSP stability because of recognition of Pashtun self-determination rights.EDITS | Thursday, June 24, 2010 | Email | Print | | Back
Great game unfolds
G Parthasarathy
The members of Saudi Arabia’s royal family are legendary for their discretion and aversion to making strong statements. The monarch is, after all, not only the ruler of the kingdom but also bears the title and responsibility of being the Custodian of Islam’s holiest sites. Within the closely knit royal family, Prince Turki Faisal can be regarded as a figure who enjoys respect because of his educational background, his diplomatic abilities and his stewardship of the kingdom’s security services. As the youngest son of former King Faisal and nephew of king Abdullah, Prince Turki was head of the kingdom’s Al Mukhbarat al-A’amah (General Intelligence Directorate) and has been Saudi Arabia’s Ambassador to the UK, Ireland and also the US.
With his educational background of academic studies in Princeton and London universities and as a classmate of Mr Bill Clinton in Georgetown University, Prince Turki is regarded as a Saudi royal well disposed towards and well connected in the US. Moreover, as head of the Saudi Intelligence, Prince Turki realised that it was not in the kingdom’s interest to patronise the recalcitrant Taliban leader Mullah Omar, who arbitrarily rebuffed his efforts to get him to expel Osama bin Laden from Afghanistan during a stormy meeting in 1998 which the Prince had with Mullah Omar in Kandahar.
Prince Turki, however, surprised an audience in Riyadh last month by characterising American policies in Afghan- istan as “inept”, averring: “The way this (US) Administration has dealt with President Hamid Karzai beggars disbelief and amazement.” He advised the US Administration to “hunt down terrorists on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and get out and let Afghan people deal with their problems”.
Saudi Arabia is not alone getting exasperated by American flip-flops in Afghanistan. Like India and Afghan- istan’s Central Asian neighbours — Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan — Russia is deeply concerned about any prospects of the Taliban returning to power in Afghanistan. Moreover, in recent years, as the Taliban expanded its control over territories in southern Afghanistan, drug smuggling across Afghanistan’s borders with Iran and its Central Asian neighbours has shot up, with Russia emerging as the world’s largest per capita consumer of heroin. Over 30,000 Russians die every year from heroin addiction and another 80,000 experiment with heroin for the first time.
{WOW!!!So Afghanistan is back to being a drugs supplier. No wonder everyone wants to bring the Taliban back.}
Though Russia’s President Dmitry Medvedev and Mr Obama agreed to closely cooperate last year, the Russians allege that they receive precious little by way of American cooperation in dealing with the drug menace. Iran, which faces an equally serious problem of heroin addiction, has lost hundreds of its law-enforcement personnel in shootouts with drug smugglers operating across its borders with Pakistan and Afghanistan.
{Is there a parallel war going on which goes unreported?}
The Obama Administration’s National Security Doctrine speaks of building a “stable, multi-dimensional relationship with Russia, based on mutual interests”. It also asserts: “We will seek greater partnership with Russia in confronting violent extremism, especially in Afghanistan.” Sixty per cent of supplies for American forces in Afghanistan — comprising fuel, food and some equipment — are now routed through Pakistan, with around another 30 per cent coming by train through Russia and Afghanistan’s neighbouring Central Asian republics. A wider US-Russian strategic dialogue could seek to increase American supplies for its forces in Afghanistan via Russia and Central Asia, thus reducing the strategic salience of the supply routes through Pakistan. One of the major reasons why Pakistan brazenly continues to support the Taliban is that it knows that American dependence on supply routes through its territory is so large, that there is precious little the US and its Nato allies will do to eliminate terrorist havens on its soil. Reduction of dependence on Pakistan for sustaining operations in Afghanistan is, therefore, crucial in coming years.
It is time India resorts to some innovative diplomacy to bring together regional and interested powers to enable Afghanistan to adopt a policy that King Nadir Shah advocated in 1931, when he proclaimed, “Afghanistan must maintain friendly relations with its neighbours as well as all friendly powers that are not opposed to its a national interest. Afghanistan must give its neighbours assurances of its friendly attitudes while safeguarding the right of reciprocity.” During World War I, Amir Habibullah Khan steered a path of neutrality for Afghanistan, despite pressures to back Turkey. Afghanistan joined the League of Nations in 1934, waiting until the Soviet Union joined, so as not to appear to be taking sides in favour of the UK. In 1937, Kabul concluded the Saadabad pact, a non-aggression treaty with Iran, Iraq and Turkey. King Zahir Shah’s Government proclaimed its official and legal neutrality during World War II.
Afghanistan’s problems are, even today, exacerbated by developments and rivalries beyond its borders. Both Russia and China would welcome a return to stability and an end to Taliban-style extremism in the country. They are, however, holding back from providing whole-hearted support for the US-led Nato forces in Afghanistan, because of suspicions about a long-term American military presence in Afghanistan, undermining their interests in Central Asia. Iran, which has extended significant economic assistance to the Karzai Government and was in the forefront of opposition to the Taliban leadership, shares similar concerns about the US’s presence in Afghanistan.
India and Pakistan ‘likewise’ share mutual suspicions about the role of each other in Afghanistan. The Bonn Conference saw a request from participants to the UN “to take measures to guarantee national sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of Afghanistan, as well as the non-interference by countries in Afghanistan’s internal affairs.” This is possible only, if in the words of Indian diplomat C R Gharekhan and former US Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia Karl Inderfurth, the international community recognises that to attain “the long-term goal of a peaceful and stable Afghanistan, it must have better and more reliable relations with its neighbours and near neighbours, including Pakistan, Iran, China, India and Russia”.
India should supplement its economic assistance with a diplomatic effort that enables countries in Afghanistan’s neighbourhood to ensure that Afghanistan’s territory is not utilised to undermine the security of other countries, near and far, while guaranteeing observance of the principle of non-interference, in its internal affairs. One hopes that in the meantime, the Americans will get their act together in dealing with the threats Afghanistan faces from across its disputed border with Pakistan, the Durand Line. Virtually no Pashtun in either Afghanistan or Pakistan recognises the Durand Line as the international border.
Do you think this is real and the real intention of the US military. Such kind of map making was never known during the British days. These may be false flags to draw people to talk about it. It may be diversion for real things.darshhan wrote:Just have a look at the map that col Ralph Peters has proposed.In my opinion this is the most logical distribution of territory in middle east and central asia.
http://drksy.files.wordpress.com/2010/0 ... s-map4.jpg
On the contrary India is being uber pragmatic given the ground realities at the moment. Current negotiations with Pakistan very much includes access for India to get Afghan natural resources. Indian government is willing to make necessary adjustments with Pakistan without sacrificing our core interests to reap the bonanza. Hence all the talk about making borders irrelevant and latest bout of love making with Pakistan.ramana wrote: Maybe instead of pushing for making border irrelvant in Kashmir, the US should make the Durand Line irrelevant and see how that contributes to TSP stability because of recognition of Pashtun self-determination rights.
I think the solution to Af-Pak is the Pashtun take over of TSP.
No retired person will publish such map making without some official backing. The system works like thatdarshhan wrote:Acharya ji , This is not a US Military sponsored map.Ralph Peters is a retired military person and now works as a columnist for various journals(private owned).He usually writes on strategic and political matters.
darshhan wrote:Ramana ji ,sindh under Punjabi control.Even I don't like that.But if baluchistan,NWFP and FATA seperate from Pakistan I can bet you sindh will automatically follow suit.Also an ahmadi and shia territory can be carved out of Punjab.
But this is one of the best maps that I have seen till now. Ralph Peters has got it almost right.
Those of us who hoped for some kind of winding down of the longest war in US history will almost certainly be disappointed now. David Petraeus is the real Pope of counter-insurgency and if he decides that he needs more troops and more time and more resources in Afghanistan next year, who is going to be able to gainsay him? That's Thomas P. Barnett's shrewd assessment. Obama's pledge to start withdrawing troops in 2011 is now kaput. It won't happen. I doubt it will happen in a second term either. Once Washington has decided to occupy a country, it will occupy it for ever. We are still, remember, in Germany! But Afghanistan?
This much we also know: Obama will run for re-election with far more troops in Afghanistan than Bush ever had - and a war and occupation stretching for ever into the future, with no realistic chance of success. Make no mistake: this is an imperialism of self-defense, a commitment to civilize even the least tractable culture on earth because Americans are too afraid of the consequences of withdrawal. And its deepest irony is that continuing this struggle will actually increase and multiply the terror threats we face - as it becomes once again a recruitment tool for Jihadists the world over.
Pakistan is exploiting the troubled United States military effort in Afghanistan to drive home a political settlement with Afghanistan that would give Pakistan important influence there but is likely to undermine United States interests, Pakistani and American officials said.
The Taliban wins not simply by not losing but also because President Karzai seems to have made up his mind to strike a deal with it through the process of reconciliation.
It is abundantly clear, as of now, that there will be two winners and two losers in the Afghan war. The Taliban, and hence Pakistan, will emerge the gainer; The U.S., and hence India, will come out on the losing side. The Taliban wins not simply by not losing but also because President Karzai seems to have made up his mind to strike a deal with it through the process of reconciliation. Pakistan benefits by the Taliban remaining undefeated on the battlefield as well as through the Karzai-Taliban political deal, for which the Afghan President needs its good offices. This is true despite the fact that there is not much love lost between Pakistan and the Taliban. David Ibsy, an American strategic analyst, in his new book, Afghanistan: graveyard of empires, makes a pertinent observation. He says Pakistan wanted to create a ‘strategic depth' for itself in Afghanistan, but has ended up conceding a ‘strategic depth' to the Taliban, as well Al Qaeda, in Pakistan.
Good article. US is in trouble because favouring TSP to "balance" India is one of the tenets of its Asia policy. Now TSP has a nuke reactor deal with PRC, and is shutting US out of Afghanistan. Karzai is basically bending with the wind.Sanjay M wrote:Pakistan Is Said to Pursue a Foothold in Afghanistan
Pakistan is exploiting the troubled United States military effort in Afghanistan to drive home a political settlement with Afghanistan that would give Pakistan important influence there but is likely to undermine United States interests, Pakistani and American officials said.
Very interesting map. By expanding Afg. to share NE boundary with India and allowing TSP to keep PoK, what is unkil trying to do?darshhan wrote:Just have a look at the map that col Ralph Peters has proposed.In my opinion this is the most logical distribution of territory in middle east and central asia.
http://drksy.files.wordpress.com/2010/0 ... s-map4.jpg
Looks like US jarnails are heavily smoking weed in their offices. Sanjay M wrote:Pakistan Is Said to Pursue a Foothold in Afghanistan
Pakistan is exploiting the troubled United States military effort in Afghanistan to drive home a political settlement with Afghanistan that would give Pakistan important influence there but is likely to undermine United States interests, Pakistani and American officials said.
...Though encouraged by Washington, the thaw heightens the risk that the United States will find itself cut out of what amounts to a separate peace between the Afghans and Pakistanis, and one that does not necessarily guarantee Washington’s prime objective in the war: denying Al Qaeda a haven.
It also provides another indication of how Pakistan, ostensibly an American ally, has worked many opposing sides in the war to safeguard its ultimate interest in having an Afghanistan that is pliable and free of the influence of its main strategic obsession, its more powerful neighbor, India.
The Haqqani network has long been Pakistan’s crucial anti-India asset and has remained virtually untouched by Pakistani forces in their redoubt inside Pakistan, in the tribal areas on the Afghan border, even as the Americans have pressed Pakistan for an offensive against it.
What and how has the Haqqani network acted as TSP's crucial anti-India asset?The Haqqani network has long been Pakistan’s crucial anti-India asset
Lets give credit where its due. US has made Iraq a little pawn in its hip pocket, decimeated Sunni dominance, and made sure that Iraqi oil is US property. Of course, it was done at a great cost after the intital "shock and awe" brohuha. Now "cost" is again a pyschological state of mind it seems. Despite US loosing 1000s of troops and many more maimed for life, I doubt the cost US paid for Iraq is even on the consciousness of US minds. The dead fish and oil-soaked pelcians in Gulf coast waters garner more compassion these days. So I am not sure that was cost as such.Chinmayanand wrote:What a good map by the General , instead of drawing orgasmic maps , the good general should spend time on how to save his country's musharraf from the good taliban and the its all weather GUBO ally , pakistan.
I wonder , how a country that cannot beat a few yahoos in tora-bora will redraw maps of so many countries.
As US is losing its power , it has begun to hallucinate.
We need some proper analysis of the flurry of actions in Af-Pak and the US. Looks like The US is encouraging the TSP to move into Afghanistan while India is looking on like a deer in the headlights or the poor Plains Buffalo after its next of kin is shot by the hunters or tempted by unobtanium wealth.Pakistan-Afghan: Expressing dissatisfaction about the deteriorating Afghan situation, Pakistani Foreign Minister Qureshi said that talks are the only solution to the Afghan problem and no military means can bring peace. Qureshi spoke in a joint press conference with his Afghan counterpart Dr. Zalmai Rasoul.
Qureshi said they discussed the security situation, especially the efforts of the Afghan government to ensure stability through reconciliation. The countries agreed to enhance bilateral relations in politics, trade and economic among other fields.
The foreign minister said peace and security in Afghanistan is important for Pakistan therefore, Pakistan has sincerely offered assistance, cooperation and training facilities to Afghanistan in all the fields, including training Afghan military so that a well trained Afghan Army can take over the responsibility of the security in their country.
Comment: The meeting is significant as a sign of shifting relationships. An Afghan official tilt towards Pakistan is being reciprocated by Pakistani moves towards Afghanistan, as described in the New York Times. Since last year's presidential elections, President Karzai's relations with the US have become strained. The emergence of strain in the US relationship appears to be the precursor to a warming trend with Pakistan.
The shifting ties have mixed implications. Pakistan invested heavily in the Taliban regime in Kabul before 2001, as part of a strategy to provide depth against India. The Pashtuns were the primary beneficiaries of Pakistani support against the northerners who eventually sided with the US in overthrowing the Taliban.
Nevertheless, Pakistani behavior and continuing reports indicate the national security leaders in Islamabad have not, probably cannot, abandon that strategy. They only can de-emphasize it temporarily as a matter of expediency. The Times article and Qureshi's remarks both point in the direction of power sharing, starting with the ex-royalists, the Haqqanis.
Pakistan also is in a position to do much more, provided it has a key role in arranging the power sharing. Pakistan's tactics are more nuanced, but the policy of using Afghanistan to gain strategic depth against India appears to be still in place. Afghanistan's handling of Indian relations, aid and infrastructure construction companies will be a good indirect measure of rising Pakistani influence in Kabul. If Indian Border Roads Organization units are invited to leave Afghanistan, for example, the tilt to Pakistan
EDITS | Saturday, June 26, 2010 | Email | Print | | Back
But McChrystal has a point
Ashok Malik
What does one make of US President Barack Obama’s sacking of General Stanley McChrystal as Commander of the International Security Assistance Force and the United States Forces in Afghanistan? First, it would be pertinent to consider precedents.
Tensions and conflicts between military commanders and political leaders are not unknown. As far back as 1905, the tussle between George Nathaniel Curzon, then Viceroy of India, and Horatio Herbert Kitchener, then Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army, became very messy. Ostensibly, the argument was over military reforms. Actually, it was a power struggle, with Kitchener wanting to concentrate more and more authority in his office and reduce the oversight of the Viceroy.
In the end, Kitchener won and Curzon had to resign. A resourceful and cunning man, Kitchener lobbied politicians in London, masterminded an assiduous campaign in the British Press and outmanoeuvred Curzon. If nothing else, this proved a clever General could be a smarter politician than a patrician if even naïve civilian incumbent.
In 1998, India encountered a small-scale repeat of the Curzon-Kitchener battle. Mr George Fernandes, then Defence Minister, recommended the dismissal of Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat as Chief of the Indian Navy. Adm Bhagwat had refused to accept the right of the Union Cabinet to appoint the Deputy Chief of Navy Staff and had instead handed the job to another. He had also voiced his criticism in the media. After his sacking, his wife charged the BJP-led Government with prejudice because she was a Muslim.
It was patent nonsense, of course, and Adm Bhagwat was guilty of insubordination. Nevertheless, like Kitchener, he had his supporters in the media and got his 15 minutes of fame. The larger institutional battle — between a duly-elected civilian Government and a military commander — was, however, a no-brainer. Adm Bhagwat had to walk into oblivion.
America’s most famous General-President stand-off occurred 60 years ago, during the Korean War. As Commander of the United Nations forces on the Korean peninsula, Douglas MacArthur was not satisfied with the liberation of South Korea from invading North Korean soldiers. He wanted to expand the war deep into aggressor territory and came up with an audacious plan to neutralise the Chinese threat once and for all. MacArthur was clearly taking a politico-strategic call and seeking to impose revised political goals on the war. Had he succeeded, he may have ended the Cold War in Asia even before it had begun.
Understandably, President Harry S Truman was cautious and wanted to limit the war to narrow, achievable objectives. In 1951, he dismissed MacArthur from his command. This ended the career of one of the greatest warriors in human history.
As is evident, each of these cases is very different. Kitchener was more of an intriguing politician than Curzon. MacArthur was a visionary in that he foresaw the Cold War and the Communist threat, but few politicians would have bought into his proposal of a cataclysmic, all-out war. Having just come out of World War II, Truman may have calculated his country didn’t have the will for a second successive extended conflict. Also, the idea that MacArthur was reportedly open to using nuclear weapons may have worried Truman, who was still living down ordering the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Given this backdrop, what does one make of the McChrystal affair? There is no doubt that his interview-based profile in Rolling Stone magazine was not a good idea. While there are few if any direct quotes in the article to implicate Gen McChrystal — his aides are quoted as saying the more damaging things — the fact is the writer of the piece was an embedded journalist with the McChrystal team for a few weeks and the General must have known who was saying what to him.
In the article, Gen McChrystal comes across as a very different man from his President. He is instinctual, with an inspirational, let’s-get-out-there style. On the other hand, Mr Obama sees himself as a reserved intellectual. More important, as a soldier Gen McChrystal believes in clear-cut goals, while Mr Obama is decidedly wishy-washy in his positioning.
This does not justify Gen McChrystal’s utterly stupid actions in front of a journalist. As Rolling Stone records, the General refuses to read an e-mail from Mr Richard Holbrooke, Special Representative for Afghanistan-Pakistan, and allows his aides to tell the writer that he doesn’t think much of the US Ambassador to Kabul or of Vice-President Joe Biden or of Mr Obama.
Faced with such provocation, Mr Obama had to act. Already his ratings are slipping because of the handling of the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. It is possible that if there were no oil spill crisis, Gen McChrystal would have got away with merely an admonition. Yet, under siege, Mr Obama had to be seen to be doing something. The dismissal of Gen McChrystal offered the most convenient opportunity.
Even so, there is a larger point for Mr Obama to consider. As the Rolling Stone article stresses, despite their personality and background differences, citizen McChrystal did vote for candidate Obama in the presidential election of November 2008. If Gen McChrystal is now so disappointed with the man he helped elect, surely he is not alone. The broad-based coalition that Mr Obama put together — with his original White liberal supporters being joined by African-Americans and finally blue-collar Whites from the mid-western heartland of America — is now in tatters.
In sacking Gen McChrystal, Mr Obama can’t run away from the fact that the dozens of civilian busybodies he has appointed to deal with the AfPak region have left the US more confused than ever before. In particular, Lt Gen Karl Eikenberry, the American Ambassador in Kabul, has been accused of undermining Gen McChrystal’s military strategy to take on the Taliban. His controversial cables to Washington, DC, have pointedly been leaked to newspapers. Such bloody-mindedness is only matched by Mr Holbrooke, a self-appointed viceroy who is now the most unwanted man in not just South Asia but in the Obama Administration but who refuses to do the honourable thing and quit.
Maybe Mr Obama will now get rid of Lt Gen Eikenberry and Mr Holbrooke too. What will he do, however, about his rapidly declining, all-over-the-place presidency.
-- [email protected]
When I talk to Republican friend who knows a lot about foreign policy, his response was puzzling. He knew all about Pakis and Paki players which was surprising because most of the Americans have no clue who is friend or foe.Rudradev wrote:http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/25/world ... ed=2&fta=y
There is something funny about this Haqqani business.
The US is asking TSPA to mount an operation against Haqqanis in N. Waziristan. TSPA has declined.
TSPA earlier tried to broker a settlement between Haqqanis and the US. US was wary because of how "thick" the Haqqanis are with Al Qaeda. In the article I have linked, a Pakistani analyst as much as admits that Haqqanis could hand over OBL and Al-Zawahiri if they wanted.
Now TSPA is trying to broker a settlement between Haqqanis and the Karzai regime and the US is uncomfortable with that (or at least, some in the Obama administration are uncomfortable with it.) TSPA is also trying to tempt Karzai with overtures from other of its proxies, Hekmatyar and Mullah Omar, but Haqqani is the centerpiece.
The one missing piece in all this: the US has been drone-striking all kinds of Al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders, and according to recent media articles about McChrystal, it has been using black-ops to take out others as well. But apparently it has not hit Haqqani network very hard, because the leadership of that network still survives and its warfighting capabilities are intact and effective.
So why can't the US simply pound N. Waziristan to smithereens with airstrikes? It may not have the intel to kill Haqqani or the Al Qaeda top brass with Predators, but it could surely make a dent in the Haqqani group's warfighting capabilities no? Could it not reduce Haqqani from a lynchpin to another minor player with overwhelming military pressure?
Or is it that the US is also hedging some of its bets on backing Haqqani?
