Military Acquisitions, Partnerships & Developments

[Karan M]

Check this one out - again Grad and IA, at 2:25. Jump there directly. Bak-baks on receiving end, full brown uniform only.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aXtSb-U5PxQ

[rohitvats]

Hmmm...get where you are coming from. BTW the rate of fire on that thing is amazing.

Guess further Pinaka orders will be Pinaka Mk2 version only once it gets ready.

I think more Pinaka Mk-1 are to follow the initial induction...IIRC, plan was 2 x Regiments per year under current 2012-2017 plan.

[A Sharma]

Antony defers decision on critical but controversial missile deals with Israel

Among the projects cleared were the Rs 3,794 crore one to acquire "night sights for carbines" from Indian companies, the Rs 682 crore procurement of Russian extended range Grad BM-21 rockets and the Rs 137 crore purchase of technical support vehicles for Russian T-90S main-battle tanks.

[tushar_m]

Grad BM-21 ????

I thought they must be phased out with induction of pinaka , smerch & prahar (pinaka)
their max range is 40km which is equal to pinaka.

also they were costly rockets to use some time back (some report i read )

[VinodTK]

India, US may make fourth generation Javelins

The ice seems to be breaking. Coming slowly out of an environment of mistrust which prompted major restrictions on defence technology transfers, the US wants to jointly produce with India its fourth generation of Javelin anti-tank guided missiles.

Washington has also upgraded its initial offer of a part transfer to a full transfer of technology for third-generation Javelins.

The technology transfer will include the 'seeker' software — which helps home in on the target.

The Defence Acquisition Council headed by defence minister AK Antony has asked the Indian Army to consider the US-made Javelin along with Israeli Spike missiles. The Javelin purchase will feature in meetings during Army Chief General Bikram Singh's trip to the US early next month.

[Austin]

Washington has also upgraded its initial offer of a part transfer to a full transfer of technology for third-generation Javelins.

The technology transfer will include the 'seeker' software — which helps home in on the target.

LOL....they are throwing bread crumbs at as instead of bread.

TOT of Seeker would be more useful for us then seeker S/W

[vic]

http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes ... e-ministry

Among the projects cleared were the Rs 3,794 crore one to acquire "night sights for carbines" from Indian companies, the Rs 682 crore procurement of Russian extended range Grad BM-21 rockets and the Rs 137 crore purchase of technical support vehicles for Russian T-90S main-battle tanks.

It seems a very massive Rs 3500+ crore deal for Night sights to improve the night fighting capacity of our infantry. I hope we are able to absorb and develop NV technology unless this order is again given to some DPSU (like BEL) who will just label foreign products. It seems like an order for around 200,000 units of Night Vision goggles, which means practically full scale coverage.

In April 2013 there was another deal as below:-

The DAC, which was headed by defence minister AK Antony approved the procurement of 2,000 pieces of night vision devices for T-72 tanks for Rs. 1,000 crore; 1,200 pieces for T-90 tanks for Rs. 960 crore and 1.780 pieces for infantry combat vehicles for Rs.860 crore

In Nov 2012 there was an order as below:-

The Army has placed orders worth Rs. 700 crore for a novel versatile device developed by the Instruments Research and Development Establishment (IRDE), Dehra Dun. The Integrated Multi-Function Sight (IMFS) can be used for surveillance and speedy engagement of targets, among other functions.

But we refuse to set up indigenous capacity, refer below

http://frontierindia.net/indian-army-br ... z2lA4Tlt9u

Tracing the development of night vision devices by DRDO from its earliest days, Dr. V K Saraswat, Scientific Adviser to defence minister, Secretary Deptt.of Defence R&D and DG DRDO highlighted the achievements of DRDO in the field of electro-optics. He also mentioned about the development of ‘Thermal Imaging based commander’s sight for T-72 and T-90 tanks as well as BMPs, thus removing the night blindness of these Armoured Fighting Vehicles. Mentioning about the progress made by IRDE in this critical area, he gave the example of recently developed Integrated Multi Functional Sight that weighs within 3.5 kg, as compared to the 1st generation devices of similar nature, that used to weigh around 55 kg.

Emphasizing the need to strengthen manufacturing infrastructure in the country, he stated that the country had to gear up to produce the advanced Thermal Detectors indigenously, “Our biggest weakness is the availability of infrared imaging detector fabrication facilities. In 80s we were chasing a sum of 60 crores(to establish this facility), in 90s we were chasing a sum of 100 crores and in 2000s we were chasing the sum of 1000 crores. There is a need to take a decision in regard to set up this facility with foreign collaboration, in order to fill this vital technology gap”.

[Austin]

Prime Minister hints at trimming defence budget

Hinting at a possible cut in the country's defence budget, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on Friday said the services will have to exercise prudence in acquisitions in view of the economic slowdown, stressing on the need to "cut our coat according to our cloth".

Addressing the Combined Commanders' Conference, he said the last two years have seen slow growth and the services, while taking into account the capabilities of adversaries, will have to "plan our long-term acquisition on the assumption of limited resource availability".

"For most of the past decade, we have had the benefit of average annual growth rates of 8 per cent. But the last two years have seen slow growth and we continue to face an uncertain international economic climate marked by volatile exchange rate fluctuations and the possibility of fragmenting trade regimes," the Prime Minister said.

"I have no doubt that we will overcome our current economic slowdown, but we will have to exercise prudence in our defence acquisition plans and cut our coat according to our cloth."

Terming the economic slowdown a "looming and serious challenge", he said, "We need to match our investment in military equipment and forces to our national resources."

The exercise will have to be done "with a high degree of priority and urgency", he added.

Because of the economic slowdown, the government had last year cut Rs. 14,000 crore from the defence budget.

This year, the armed forces have been allocated Rs. 2.06 lakh crore but there are possibilities of a further cut in that budget.

The armed forces have embarked on a major modernisation drive and were looking to spend Rs. 6 lakh crore on military purchases in the next five to 10 years.

[kit]

Would be quite interesting to see how the cloth is going to be cut ! Rafale going out ? Or trimmed down ? Those vital Co production missile ventures with israel ? Seems only khans coat is not cut ..... with the way they are going about making indian software companies miserable ..

[Karan M]

The worst PM India has ever had. Bar none.

[NRao]

The zombie has been reading someone's posts out here:

Hinting at a possible cut in the country's defence budget, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on Friday said the services will have to exercise prudence in acquisitions in view of the economic slowdown, stressing on the need to "cut our coat according to our cloth".

[Neshant]

Its the right move as the economy will only get worse from here on.

The debt bubble in the west is all set to implode and with economies around the world will get hit big time.

Military suppliers will be running pillar to post to sell their wares and it will be a buyers market - with no buyers.

[darshhan]

The worst PM India has ever had. Bar none.

That he is along with Nehru.

[Kakarat]

Defence Ministry clears procurement of Barak missiles

Defence Ministry today cleared procurement proposals worth over Rs 16,000 crore including that of the Israeli Barak missiles, whose acquisition was on hold for the last five years due to a CBI probe in an alleged bribery case.

The Ministry had put on hold procurement of Barak-I missiles because of a CBI probe in the case since 2006.

It also cleared a proposal for acquiring 2 deep submarine rescue vessels for the Navy while approving the indigenous construction of the 16 anti-submarine warfare shallow water craft at the cost of Rs 13,000 crore.
...

For the Army, the DAC cleared a proposal for acquiring 41 indigenously-built Advanced Light Helicopter Dhruvs. In the Rs 300 crore procurement, one of the choppers would be provided to the Navy.

[putnanja]

Looks like the Army is really happy with the ALHs. Good to see more helicopters being inducted into IA

[srai]

Looks like the Army is really happy with the ALHs. Good to see more helicopters being inducted into IA

The IAF's control of the Medium and Large helicopters has been a boon for the ALH. If the Army AAC had all the helicopters under it, there would have been far fewer Dhruv ordered.

[vasu raya]

Brahma Chellaney writes:

Arming India into dependency

The government-to-government weapon contracts between the U.S. and India, with no competitive bidding or transparency, are deepening India’s import dependency without arming it with a decisive edge.

The blossoming of ties with the United States has become an important diplomatic asset for India in recent years. Yet, the heady glow of the much-ballyhooed strategic partnership helped obscure prickly issues that arose much before the Devyani Khobragade episode. In truth, the Obama administration’s reluctance to accommodate Indian interests on major issues, coupled with the fundamental challenge of managing an asymmetrical relationship, has created fault lines that are testing the resilience of the partnership.

One aspect of the relationship, however, has thrived spectacularly — U.S. arms sales to India. In just a few years, the U.S. has quietly emerged as India’s largest arms supplier, leaving Russia and Israel far behind. This development is linked to the Indo-U.S. civilian nuclear deal. Although it remains a dud deal on energy, with little prospect of delivering a single operational nuclear power plant for years to come, it has proved a roaring success in opening the door to major U.S. arms sales. The 2005 nuclear agreement-in-principle incorporated a specific commitment to ramp up defence transactions.

The booming arms sales — rising in barely one decade from a measly $100 million to billions of dollars yearly — have seemingly acquired an independent momentum. Nothing better illustrates this than the fact that, at the height of the Khobragade affair, India, far from seeking to impose any costs on America, awarded it yet another mega-contract — a $1.01-billion deal for supply of six additional C-130J military transport aircraft. When Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited the White House last September, among the gifts he took for President Barack Obama was a commitment to purchase $5 billion worth of new arms.

Today, India’s largely one-sided defence relationship with the U.S. is beginning to look akin to its lopsided ties with Russia, with weapon sales serving as the driving force. However, unlike the torpid Indo-Russian non-military commerce, the two-way Indo-U.S. trade has quadrupled in just seven years from $25 billion in 2006 to about $100 billion in 2013.

Still, few Indians are raising the key questions: How are India’s security interests being advanced by substituting the corrosive import dependency on Russia with a new dependency on the U.S., without progress to build a domestic arms-production base? What makes the strategic partnership “special,” given that Washington also has special relationships with India’s regional adversaries — a security alliance since 2004 and strategic partnership since 2006 with Pakistan, and a “constructive strategic partnership” with China since 1997 that predates the strategic partnership with India? Is a relationship locking India as a leading U.S. arms client sustainable in the long run?

Let’s be clear: India can never emerge as a major international power in a true sense, or acquire a military edge regionally, if it remains dependent on imports to meet even its basic defence needs. The capacity to defend oneself with one’s own resources is the first test a nation must pass on the way to becoming a great power.

Leading arms importer

Ominously, a still-poor India has emerged as the world’s biggest arms importer since 2006, accounting for 10 per cent of all weapons sold globally. Such large-scale imports might suggest that India is pursuing a well-planned military build-up. In truth, such imports lack strategic direction, given the absence of long-term political thinking or joint tri-service planning and command. They are being made in a haphazard manner, although any imported weapon makes India hostage to the supplier-nation for spares and service for the full life of that system.

The rising arms imports, far from making India secure, are only exposing new gaps in its capabilities to decisively win a war. The inveterate dependency burdens Indian taxpayers, forcing them to subsidise foreign military-industrial complexes. Worse still, defence transactions remain the single largest source of kickbacks for India’s corrupt and compromised political elites. This factor alone explains why India has failed to replicate in the conventional-arms sector its impressive indigenous achievements in the fields where imports are not possible — the space, missile and nuclear-weapons realms.

For the U.S., displacing Russia as India’s largest arms supplier has been a diplomatic coup. Rarely before has America acquired a major arms client of such size so rapidly. The U.S.’s India success indeed parallels what happened in the early 1970s when Egypt switched sides during the Cold War, transforming itself from a Soviet arms client to becoming reliant on American arms supplies. The difference is that unlike the perpetually aid-dependent Egypt, India buys weapons with its own money.

With U.S. military spending slowing and other export markets remaining tight, American firms are eager to further expand arms sales to India. The fact that the U.S. now conducts more military exercises with India than with any other country creates a favourable political milieu for its defence firms to aggressively push their wares for sale. Even so, the troubling lack of competitive bidding or transparency in the arms deals — all clinched on a government-to-government basis — has become conspicuous. In the one case where India invited bids — to buy 126 fighter-jets — American firms failed to make it beyond the competition’s first round.

Diplomacy without leverage

The annual value of India’s arms contracts to the U.S. already surpasses American military aid to any country other than Israel. Diplomacy, to be effective, must be backed by leverage and cross-linkages to minimise the weaker side’s disadvantages. Yet, New Delhi has not tried to leverage its contracts either to persuade the U.S. to stop arming Pakistan against India or to secure better access to the American market for its highly competitive information-technology and pharmaceutical companies, which are facing new U.S. non-tariff barriers. India’s new frontier of dependency has emerged even as the U.S. bolsters Pakistan with generous military aid.

To be sure, the U.S. signed a four-point declaration of intent with India last September to move beyond the sale of complete weapon systems to co-production through technology transfer. Translating that intent into practice won’t be easy, though. According to the joint declaration, efforts to identify specific opportunities for collaborative weapon-related projects will be pursued in accordance with “national policies and procedures.” But if U.S. policies and procedures do not evolve in the direction of facilitating such collaboration, the declared intent will remain little more than pious hope.

The declaration clearly sought to pander to India’s desire for a less inequitable defence relationship. By dangling the carrot of India being upgraded to the same level as America’s “closest partners,” the declaration also peddled a catchy slogan excitedly lapped up by the Indian media. The U.S. is now willing to co-produce some smaller defensive systems with India, such as the Javelin anti-tank missiles. Such restricted technology transfers, the U.S. believes, will pave the way for securing additional multibillion-dollar contracts to sell large readymade weapons to India.

Significantly, U.S. arms to India fall mainly in the category of defensive weapons. Russia, by contrast, has transferred offensive weapon systems to India, including strategic bombers, an aircraft carrier, and a nuclear-powered submarine. Will the U.S. be willing to sell high-precision conventional arms, anti-submarine warfare systems, long range air- and sea-launched cruise missiles, and other conventional counterforce systems that could tilt the regional military balance in India’s favour?

The China factor

Another issue relates to the strategic benefits from a closer defence relationship. True, such a relationship will have a countervailing value vis-à-vis China. Yet, it is also true that America has a deeper engagement with China than with India. Indeed, China is now central to U.S. economic and strategic interests. This fact helps to explain why the Obama administration has chartered a course of neutrality on territorial disputes between China and its neighbours, shying away from holding joint military exercises in Arunachal Pradesh.

A wake-up call for Asian states that rely on the U.S. as their security guarantor was Obama’s inaction on the 2012 Chinese capture of the Scarborough Shoal, located within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone. America’s indifference to its commitment to the Philippines under their Mutual Defence Treaty emboldened China to effectively seize a second Philippine-claimed shoal. This is proof that despite its “pivot” toward Asia, the U.S. won’t act in ways detrimental to its close engagement with China. Obama’s foreign policy bears a distinct transactional imprint.

A wise India would consider declaring a moratorium on arms purchases from all sources to give itself time to strategise its priorities and clean up its procurement system. A moratorium of just three years will save the country a whopping $20 billion without compromising national security. With non-traditional threats — ranging from asymmetric warfare in the form of cross-border terrorism to territorial creep through furtive encroachments — now dominating India’s security calculus, procurement of more mega-weapons to meet traditional security challenges must wait until the nation has added strategic direction to its defence policy.

(The writer is a geostrategist and author.)

[Philip]

Tx Vasu,I posted this in the LCA td too,as it has significance there for our desi ambitions. BC raises some v.important questions.I've earlier exposed how sales of C-17s etc.,nowhere on the priority list for the IAF, were meant to help Boeing before it closed down the line.These aircraft are also twice as expensive s the far superior AN-124 whose production is restarting which can carry double the capacity of cargo or troops! We can also buy 3 IL-476s ,upgraded versions of the IL-76 for the price of one C-17.Look at the speed with which US arms sales have been pushed through .These sweeheart deals were all done by MMS at his master's bidding.

But the crux of the issue is that there is truly no genuine "strategic relationship" with the US which continues to arm Pak,allows it to wage terror against India and is inveigling India into a dubious and dangerous US-led military alliance in Asia ,hoping to turn us into its proxy to underwrite some of the the expense of security in the IAP (Indo-Asia-Pacific) region and wage war with China in the future.

[kit]

Brahma Chellaney writes:

Arming India into dependency

The government-to-government weapon contracts between the U.S. and India, with no competitive bidding or transparency, are deepening India’s import dependency without arming it with a decisive edge.

The blossoming of ties with the United States has become an important diplomatic asset for India in recent years. Yet, the heady glow of the much-ballyhooed strategic partnership helped obscure prickly issues that arose much before the Devyani Khobragade episode. In truth, the Obama administration’s reluctance to accommodate Indian interests on major issues, coupled with the fundamental challenge of managing an asymmetrical relationship, has created fault lines that are testing the resilience of the partnership.

One aspect of the relationship, however, has thrived spectacularly — U.S. arms sales to India. In just a few years, the U.S. has quietly emerged as India’s largest arms supplier, leaving Russia and Israel far behind. This development is linked to the Indo-U.S. civilian nuclear deal. Although it remains a dud deal on energy, with little prospect of delivering a single operational nuclear power plant for years to come, it has proved a roaring success in opening the door to major U.S. arms sales. The 2005 nuclear agreement-in-principle incorporated a specific commitment to ramp up defence transactions.

The booming arms sales — rising in barely one decade from a measly $100 million to billions of dollars yearly — have seemingly acquired an independent momentum. Nothing better illustrates this than the fact that, at the height of the Khobragade affair, India, far from seeking to impose any costs on America, awarded it yet another mega-contract — a $1.01-billion deal for supply of six additional C-130J military transport aircraft. When Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited the White House last September, among the gifts he took for President Barack Obama was a commitment to purchase $5 billion worth of new arms.

Today, India’s largely one-sided defence relationship with the U.S. is beginning to look akin to its lopsided ties with Russia, with weapon sales serving as the driving force. However, unlike the torpid Indo-Russian non-military commerce, the two-way Indo-U.S. trade has quadrupled in just seven years from $25 billion in 2006 to about $100 billion in 2013.

Still, few Indians are raising the key questions: How are India’s security interests being advanced by substituting the corrosive import dependency on Russia with a new dependency on the U.S., without progress to build a domestic arms-production base? What makes the strategic partnership “special,” given that Washington also has special relationships with India’s regional adversaries — a security alliance since 2004 and strategic partnership since 2006 with Pakistan, and a “constructive strategic partnership” with China since 1997 that predates the strategic partnership with India? Is a relationship locking India as a leading U.S. arms client sustainable in the long run?

Let’s be clear: India can never emerge as a major international power in a true sense, or acquire a military edge regionally, if it remains dependent on imports to meet even its basic defence needs. The capacity to defend oneself with one’s own resources is the first test a nation must pass on the way to becoming a great power.

Leading arms importer

Ominously, a still-poor India has emerged as the world’s biggest arms importer since 2006, accounting for 10 per cent of all weapons sold globally. Such large-scale imports might suggest that India is pursuing a well-planned military build-up. In truth, such imports lack strategic direction, given the absence of long-term political thinking or joint tri-service planning and command. They are being made in a haphazard manner, although any imported weapon makes India hostage to the supplier-nation for spares and service for the full life of that system.

The rising arms imports, far from making India secure, are only exposing new gaps in its capabilities to decisively win a war. The inveterate dependency burdens Indian taxpayers, forcing them to subsidise foreign military-industrial complexes. Worse still, defence transactions remain the single largest source of kickbacks for India’s corrupt and compromised political elites. This factor alone explains why India has failed to replicate in the conventional-arms sector its impressive indigenous achievements in the fields where imports are not possible — the space, missile and nuclear-weapons realms.

For the U.S., displacing Russia as India’s largest arms supplier has been a diplomatic coup. Rarely before has America acquired a major arms client of such size so rapidly. The U.S.’s India success indeed parallels what happened in the early 1970s when Egypt switched sides during the Cold War, transforming itself from a Soviet arms client to becoming reliant on American arms supplies. The difference is that unlike the perpetually aid-dependent Egypt, India buys weapons with its own money.

With U.S. military spending slowing and other export markets remaining tight, American firms are eager to further expand arms sales to India. The fact that the U.S. now conducts more military exercises with India than with any other country creates a favourable political milieu for its defence firms to aggressively push their wares for sale. Even so, the troubling lack of competitive bidding or transparency in the arms deals — all clinched on a government-to-government basis — has become conspicuous. In the one case where India invited bids — to buy 126 fighter-jets — American firms failed to make it beyond the competition’s first round.

Diplomacy without leverage

The annual value of India’s arms contracts to the U.S. already surpasses American military aid to any country other than Israel. Diplomacy, to be effective, must be backed by leverage and cross-linkages to minimise the weaker side’s disadvantages. Yet, New Delhi has not tried to leverage its contracts either to persuade the U.S. to stop arming Pakistan against India or to secure better access to the American market for its highly competitive information-technology and pharmaceutical companies, which are facing new U.S. non-tariff barriers. India’s new frontier of dependency has emerged even as the U.S. bolsters Pakistan with generous military aid.

To be sure, the U.S. signed a four-point declaration of intent with India last September to move beyond the sale of complete weapon systems to co-production through technology transfer. Translating that intent into practice won’t be easy, though. According to the joint declaration, efforts to identify specific opportunities for collaborative weapon-related projects will be pursued in accordance with “national policies and procedures.” But if U.S. policies and procedures do not evolve in the direction of facilitating such collaboration, the declared intent will remain little more than pious hope.

The declaration clearly sought to pander to India’s desire for a less inequitable defence relationship. By dangling the carrot of India being upgraded to the same level as America’s “closest partners,” the declaration also peddled a catchy slogan excitedly lapped up by the Indian media. The U.S. is now willing to co-produce some smaller defensive systems with India, such as the Javelin anti-tank missiles. Such restricted technology transfers, the U.S. believes, will pave the way for securing additional multibillion-dollar contracts to sell large readymade weapons to India.

Significantly, U.S. arms to India fall mainly in the category of defensive weapons. Russia, by contrast, has transferred offensive weapon systems to India, including strategic bombers, an aircraft carrier, and a nuclear-powered submarine. Will the U.S. be willing to sell high-precision conventional arms, anti-submarine warfare systems, long range air- and sea-launched cruise missiles, and other conventional counterforce systems that could tilt the regional military balance in India’s favour?

A wise India would consider declaring a moratorium on arms purchases from all sources to give itself time to strategise its priorities and clean up its procurement system. A moratorium of just three years will save the country a whopping $20 billion without compromising national security. With non-traditional threats — ranging from asymmetric warfare in the form of cross-border terrorism to territorial creep through furtive encroachments — now dominating India’s security calculus, procurement of more mega-weapons to meet traditional security challenges must wait until the nation has added strategic direction to its defence policy.

(The writer is a geostrategist and author.)

Well timed and written article .. India s economy would be well served if its defense rupees and dollars are invested inside India !

[Philip]

In the DRDO,R&D td. there is an excerpt from the Kelkar commission,recommending that we follow the ISRO Model,where no one would give us the tech,the ISRO developed the same,passed it on to Indian industry and assured them of long term orders and it has succeeded in style! The same goes for the strategic and tactical missile tech progress and achievements.

[Vipul]

Tatas, M&M, Ashok Leyland eye Rs. 10,000-cr defence deals.

rocurement of armoured and specialist vehicles by the defence department has opened up a Rs. 10,000-crore opportunity for vehicle manufacturers. While private companies including Tata Motors, Mahindra & Mahindra, Asia Motor Works (AMW) and Ashok Leyland are eyeing a slice of the pie, global defence vehicle suppliers and public sector company Bharat Earth Movers Ltd (BEML) are also bidding for some of the contracts, industry sources said.

The trials, shortlisting, selection and supply of vehicles would likely take three to four years.

While Tata Motors, Mahindra & Mahindra and AMW will bid for the Army order for 1,200 units of light armoured multipurpose vehicle (LAM), Ashok Leyland will also participate in a tender for supply of 3,500 units of light specialist vehicles (LSV). The combined value of both these contracts could be around Rs. 4,000 crore.

Vehicle manufacturers are actively engaged in developing prototypes as the defence ministry may call for request for proposals (RFP) in the first half of this year.

In another defence tender for self-propelled air defence system (SPAD), vendors such as Tata Power and Punj Lloyd will face stiff competition from overseas players. Tata Power will partner with group company Tata Motors for this project.

Meanwhile, for the tender for procurement of 1,227 heavy trucks for Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launchers, Bharat Earth Movers Ltd has emerged as the front runner, sources said. Both these contracts together would be worth around Rs. 6,000 crore.

“These are the major defence contracts for automobile manufacturers that are on the horizon. But nobody knows how they will shape up. Elections and government’s financial constraints may cause uncertainties,” a top executive with a vehicle manufacturing company said.

Besides these contracts, a possible revival of the `60,000-crore futuristic inventory combat vehicle (FICV) segment make the defence sector an interesting battle ground for automobile manufacturers.

[tushar_m]

Possibly RAW's new ELINT Plane with unknown configuration

http://www.airliners.net/photo/India--- ... 264d8fa9a5

[Karan M]

Very interesting pic. There appears to be a combination oblique optical (check the shutter) & (perhaps) a SAR pod below, and a SATCOM antenna on top.

[krishnan]

whats that red thing at the back ???

[tushar_m]

some what like Raytheon_Sentinel ???

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Raytheon_Sentinel

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/c ... -08-16.jpg

[Karan M]

This was the aircraft before modification

http://www.airliners.net/photo/India--- ... 264d8fa9a5

Tushar, yes, only that the SAR on the Sentinel is much bigger - it was a wide area surveillance platform and it didnt have an optical sensor.

This aircraft was chosen to be modified after 2010 (if we see above pic) and is being flight tested now - so that sensor package on the plane is clearly state of the art.

The red thing being towed looks like a trailing wire antenna.

ARC did good stuff in Kargil per open reports, good to see them get better gear.

[Karan M]

For trailing wire antenna usage:

FAS

The E-6A communications relay mission is accomplished by trailing dual wireantennas while performing a continuous orbit maneuver. It is essential that thewires obtain as near a vertical attitude as possible for optimum very low frequencyconnectivity

http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/c3i/e-6-le-6sml.gif

[Karan M]

Looks like a mix of a LOROP (eg http://62.0.44.103/Elbitmain/files/Condor2.pdf) and a SAR (eg http://www.iai.co.il/Sip_Storage//FILES/9/27499.pdf)

[Anthony Hines]

Tx Vasu,I posted this in the LCA td too,as it has significance there for our desi ambitions. BC raises some v.important questions.I've earlier exposed how sales of C-17s etc.,nowhere on the priority list for the IAF, were meant to help Boeing before it closed down the line.These aircraft are also twice as expensive s the far superior AN-124 whose production is restarting which can carry double the capacity of cargo or troops! We can also buy 3 IL-476s ,upgraded versions of the IL-76 for the price of one C-17.Look at the speed with which US arms sales have been pushed through .These sweeheart deals were all done by MMS at his master's bidding.

But the crux of the issue is that there is truly no genuine "strategic relationship" with the US which continues to arm Pak,allows it to wage terror against India and is inveigling India into a dubious and dangerous US-led military alliance in Asia ,hoping to turn us into its proxy to underwrite some of the the expense of security in the IAP (Indo-Asia-Pacific) region and wage war with China in the future.

Sir,
I suppose if the deal to buy these "far superior" birds were to have been signed, we would still be waiting for the production line to start.
FYI - We have already started receiving C-17s.

[arun]

Possibly RAW's new ELINT Plane with unknown configuration

http://www.airliners.net/photo/India--- ... 264d8fa9a5

Certainly looks that way.

I had posted an article about two Bombardier Global 5000 aircraft being equipped with ELTA supplied multi-mission airborne reconnaissance and surveillance systems on Page 22 of this thread:

http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 4#p1278664

[arun]

This was the aircraft before modification

http://www.airliners.net/photo/India--- ... 264d8fa9a5

You seem to have mistakenly posted the post-modification picture of the aircraft. The pre-modification picture of the aircraft is this one:

Clicky

[Karan M]

Thanks Arun, thats the one.

[Karan M]

Possibly RAW's new ELINT Plane with unknown configuration

http://www.airliners.net/photo/India--- ... 264d8fa9a5

Certainly looks that way.

I had posted an article about two Bombardier Global 5000 aircraft being equipped with ELTA supplied multi-mission airborne reconnaissance and surveillance systems on Page 22 of this thread:

http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 4#p1278664

Great post! So it does have SAR & Electroptical payload

The jets are being uploaded with electronic intelligence collection packages in Israel and flight trials begin in July.

Fitted with synthetic aperture and electro-optical radars,

So it is this one, the SAR in the webpage looks bigger, but if the entire package has been taken, (cant make out the additional antenna though) :

http://www.iai.co.il/2013/24733-33784-en/IAI.aspx

The MARS2 sensor suit includes:

ELINT/ESM
COMINT/CSM/DF
SAR & GMTI Imaging Radars
EO/IR

This will be an excellent force multiplier!

[Singha]

how many do we have? RAW control indicates the IA field commanders cannot use it in wartime for finding targets.

IAF has infact floated a tender for around 9 elint birds of its own.

[Brando]

I remember reading sometime back that the UK and Raytheon had pitched the ASTOR ISR system with the same SAR/MTI Elint package on a Bombadier airframe to India. It's must burn them to know that India went for an Israeli system instead; perhaps cost played a factor.

In any case, it is a bit strange to see a civilian intelligence agency like RAW would acquire so many sophisticated ISR platforms, the Aviation Research Center already has a bunch of Gulfstream III SRAs AFAIK making this a "new" addition or replacement ?

[Singha]

I have a spider feel the civilian registration of these planes means less paperwork and legal hoops for them when they visit abroad or flit around in the neighbourhood and stop at friendly places.

I dont see what RAW gains from such tactical platforms..could just be a placeholder to run ARC that way.

[Karan M]

how many do we have? RAW control indicates the IA field commanders cannot use it in wartime for finding targets.

IAF has infact floated a tender for around 9 elint birds of its own.

Singha, per the ARC commanders blog linked before, the RAW does cooperate with IA/IAF for wartime intel. They did so at Kargil.

Per reports, the IAF is looking for something similar - the 9 birds you referred to which are a mix of various ELINT types. The IA is looking for chopper based IMINT platforms with similar payloads.

I am happy that while the above is going on, we will already have a capability in place with these 2 aircraft.

[Karan M]

I remember reading sometime back that the UK and Raytheon had pitched the ASTOR ISR system with the same SAR/MTI Elint package on a Bombadier airframe to India. It's must burn them to know that India went for an Israeli system instead; perhaps cost played a factor.

ASTOR is longer range, wider coverage but radar only.

In any case, it is a bit strange to see a civilian intelligence agency like RAW would acquire so many sophisticated ISR platforms, the Aviation Research Center already has a bunch of Gulfstream III SRAs AFAIK making this a "new" addition or replacement ?

The ARC is a common pool of platforms that can be used by the national command authority as they deem fit. Its manned by the IAF/ services anyway. It also a neutral perspective which is always valuable.

Going forward, if the CDS becomes a reality, ARCs-services integration may become much smoother.

[vaibhav.n]

I think the IAF is looking at something on these lines for SIGINT.

[KiranM]

The ARC is a common pool of platforms that can be used by the national command authority as they deem fit. Its manned by the IAF/ services anyway. It also a neutral perspective which is always valuable.

Going forward, if the CDS becomes a reality, ARCs-services integration may become much smoother.

Ideally ARC should be the 'air arm' of DIA. To have the advantages of a civil agency, DIA can be made quazi civilian/ military in function similar to DGSE/ NSA. RAW should be mandated only for HUMINT.