CT & COIN Operations in India: News, Images and Discussion

Aditya G · Post by **Aditya G** » 16 Sep 2011 01:25

Jingos not satisfied with "black cats" etc should be glad - we have our own "SWAT" team now

See the badge:

@Delhi HC blast site.

sum · Post by **sum** » 19 Sep 2011 08:54

X-post:

sum wrote:Really good read on how the GoI made Tripura come back to normal from the abyss:

How Tripura overcame insurgency

While some north-eastern States still grapple with insurgency, Tripura has overcome it. How did it do that? As in the case of the other States of the region, Tripura was, at different points of time, caught in the wave of insurgency that arose from Nagaland in the 1950s. What brought the region in its sweep was the geographical trap, the abysmal socio-economic-physical deficits in contrast to the mainland, dysfunctional governance in the region in general, rampant corruption at both the administrative and political levels, demographic changes and the alienation of tribal land.

The evolution of insurgency in Tripura can be traced to the formation of the Tripura Upajati Juba Samiti (TUJS) in 1971, followed by the Tripura National Volunteers (TNV) in 1981. The National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) was formed on March 2, 1989 and its armed wing, the National Holy Army and All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF), in July 1990, queering the pitch. The two outfits came up with a secessionist agenda, disputed the merger of the kingdom of Tripura with the Indian Union, demanded sovereignty for Tripura, deportation of “illegal migrants,” the implementation of the Tripura merger agreement and the restoration of land to the tribal people under the Tripura Land Reform Act, 1960.

Between 1990 and 1995, the insurgency remained low-key. But it grew in extent and magnitude between 1996 and 2004 — and then started melting. What gave punch to the insurgency was striking logistic and monetary prowess acquired from the rough, rugged terrain, and the porous and extensive trans-border corridors with Bangladesh. Safe havens in Bangladesh, logistic support from the then solicitous Bangladesh establishment and the external intelligence agencies based there, and networking with potential insurgent outfits aided it. A build-up of weapons, explosives and wireless communication systems, and extortion and “levies,” went into the making of the volatile insurgency.

Counter insurgency operations (C.I.Ops), a potent instrument in any fight against insurgency, formed the core of the interventions. These were not set as exclusive, hawkish, one-dimensional combat in the nature of conflict-management. The combat was invested with a broader meaning and constructive contents in the nature of a productive conflict-resolution aimed at defusing insurgency.

Remarkably, the counter-insurgency operations, intensive, extensive and covert as they were, did not take the Army on board — as had happened in other insurgency-bound States. Only the Central paramilitary forces and State police forces were drafted. Special Police Officers (tribals included) were inducted and channelled into the operations. This proved to be valuable in terms of gathering intelligence and keeping a tab on the activities and movements of the insurgents, collaborators and harbourers. The Central and State security forces were forged into a synergetic, coordinated and cohesive mode to derive optimal gains. Their conduct was under close observation at the highest level (including at the level of the Governor and the Chief Minister), in order to check personnel from going berserk and being ruthless, trigger-happy, oppressive and violative of human rights.

Oftentimes, an exclusively combative operation did not result in a sustained and abiding end to conflict. Therefore, here it was discreetly suffused with psychological elements, confidence-building measures and healing touches to achieve a sustained end to the conflict. Psychological interventions were focussed on correcting the tribal person's negative perception about the state and the mainland, and inducing confidence in and credibility about the State's intentions. Psychological operations were forged to work on the minds of the target group — for all conflicts, big or small, begin in the human mind. Brainstorming sessions centred on unwinding the deeds, misdeeds and subversive designs of insurgency and to unmask its hypocritical conduct, promotion of monetary interests, the lavish lifestyle of the leaders in contrast to the abject living conditions of the rank and file, sexual exploitation of women cadre, forced induction of adolescents into the outfits and a game plan to keep the region in perpetual backwardness. This strategy was carried through the media, both print and electronic, art groups, intellectuals, and interactive seminars and discussions.

Tripura scripted a story of triumph over insurgency and conflict-resolution, and demonstrated that insurgency was not an insurmountable phenomenon. What was needed to tackle it was a well-crafted, multi-dimensional strategy, a positive mindset, resolute will, the right vision and direction, sagacious, honest and credible leadership, sincerity of intent, creative responses to the challenge, even socio-economic-infrastructure dispensation to all sections of society, and modulated and humane combat operations intertwined with psychological operations to set a change in the psyche of the turbulent mind.

(D.N. Sahaya was Governor of Tripura from June 2003 and October 2009, and then of Chhattisgarh.)

ASPuar · Post by **ASPuar** » 19 Sep 2011 12:14

General Hasnain is currently a corps commander. If he becomes an army commander, he will be in a possible line of succession for COAS. Hes a very tough officer, and has a wide and varied experience, including UN OPS in Rwanda, and a very long tenure in the valley.

He's a History (Hons) grad of St. Stephen's college, Delhi, and has a Masters in International Relations from Kings College London.

He attended Staff College, Wellington, and later the Royal College of Defence Studies, London (equivalent to our NDC).

He is currently Colonel of the Regiment of the Garhwal Rifles.

I did some research on him, when I created this Wiki page on him.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syed_Ata_Hasnain

prithvi · Post by **prithvi** » 27 Sep 2011 19:12

7 Killed in Kashmir gunfight..
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/indi ... 141203.cms

sum · Post by **sum** » 27 Sep 2011 21:32

^^ The only silver lining ( if it can called that) with recent J&K reports is that almost 95% of the gunfights are security forces initiated based on precise intel....

The days of random IA jawan/group of soldiers/security offices/convoys being attacked or ambushed seemed to have long gone...

anirban_aim · Post by **anirban_aim** » 27 Sep 2011 21:33

ASPuar wrote:General Hasnain is currently a corps commander. If he becomes an army commander, he will be in a possible line of succession for COAS. Hes a very tough officer, and has a wide and varied experience, including UN OPS in Rwanda, and a very long tenure in the valley.

He's a History (Hons) grad of St. Stephen's college, Delhi, and has a Masters in International Relations from Kings College London.

He attended Staff College, Wellington, and later the Royal College of Defence Studies, London (equivalent to our NDC).

He is currently Colonel of the Regiment of the Garhwal Rifles.

I did some research on him, when I created this Wiki page on him.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syed_Ata_Hasnain

Sir, Ceteris Paribus I'm sure he'll make it to Army Commander!! COAS only time will tell.......

My guess is he would retire by the time Bikram Singh's tenure runs out.

P.S: Mods, OT alert: this might be moved to Indian Army thread

Aditya_V · Post by **Aditya_V** » 28 Sep 2011 15:58

Hunsur soldier dies in gun battle

Salute the Soldier and his family and expect punishment for the trainers of his killers oand those who support thier cause within and outside the country.

Prabu · Post by **Prabu** » 28 Sep 2011 18:10

RIP, for the soldier

nelson · Post by **nelson** » 28 Sep 2011 18:26

^^^OT- It is highly unlikely that Gen Hasnain will make it to be an Army Commander, unfortunate though. He is more likely to be the next MS.

sum · Post by **sum** » 29 Sep 2011 10:21

10:57 AM Kashmir gunbattle enters 4th day, jawan killed:

The fierce gunbattle between militants and security forces in north Kashmir's Kupwara district entered its fourth day today even as an army jawan injured in the operation succumbed to injuries. The jawan died last night, officials said.

A total of nine persons including five militants, an Army officer, a jawan and two policemen have been killed in the gunfight in Shamsabari forests, they said. The encounter broke out at Awathkul forest area of Kralipora, 130 kms from here, on Monday when police assisted by Army launched a search operation following information about presence of heavily-armed militants. Army sources believe the militants were six to seven in number and were part of the LeT group which had recently infiltrated from the Keran sector.

One terrorist, part of an infiltrating LeT group was apprehended by the army in the Machal sector yesterday. The terrorist Nisar Ahmed, who is the son of Ali Ahmed, a resident of Karachi claims that his group was assisted by ISI personnel during the infiltration.

Two armymen, 2 policemen and 5 pigs killed ( +1 arrested) so far and encounter still on....

Craig Alpert · Post by **Craig Alpert** » 29 Sep 2011 17:57

^^ some more details...

Brigadier AL Chavan of General Staff 15 Corps said that the encounter started on Monday when a group of Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorists tried to infiltrate into the region near Karlpora village around 130km from here.

"On the night 26th and 27th (September) some militants tried to infiltrate into Keran sector in the Kupwara district. Around 12.30am our troopers positioned at the Shamsabari range got information about this infiltration. At the same time this group of six to seven militants was surrounded by our troopers," said Chavan.

He said soon after the information was received, a battalion of the Jammu and Kashmir Police joined the Army officials. The Army's 18 Grenadiers and police's Special Operations Group (SOG) launched an operation in the mountains to nab the militants.

Chavan said that the militants started heavy firing confirming that they were in possession of huge cache of arms and ammunitions. "The gunfight is underway and the area is completely besieged," said Brigadier AL Chavan said. "So far 5 militants have been killed but in the standoff we have also lost two policemen, an Army officer and a soldier," the officer said.

The slain army officer has been identified as Lieutenant Sushil Khajuria.

"The area is a difficult hilly terrain and that is why this gun battle is taking a long time," said Chavan. He added that the encounter had been the 24th infiltration attempt by the militants in 2011. So far over two dozen militants have been killed in various gun battles.

atreya · Post by **atreya** » 03 Oct 2011 16:51

LeT commander and another militant gunned down in Pulwama and Kupwara, respectively.

http://www.thehindu.com/news/states/oth ... 508975.ece

ASPuar · Post by **ASPuar** » 03 Oct 2011 17:34

Too many young army officers are dying. Army brass should be made to realise that its just not acceptable.

ASPuar · Post by **ASPuar** » 03 Oct 2011 17:37

Lieutenant Sushil Khajuria's Funeral:

Surya · Post by **Surya** » 03 Oct 2011 17:47

sigh

what a waste of a young promising life.

Ashutosh Malik · Post by **Ashutosh Malik** » 03 Oct 2011 17:52

Surya wrote:sigh

what a waste of a life

Indeed. Nothing more to say.

Best.

pmund · Post by **pmund** » 03 Oct 2011 23:20

From the initial reports this kid gunned down two pigs at close range and was trying to drag two policemen, who were shot, to safety when he was killed

ASPuar · Post by **ASPuar** » 03 Oct 2011 23:23

Sigh.. what can I say?

These are bright young men, just like you and me. Someones sons, someones boyfriend, someones love. And they choose to serve their country. But we let them down at EVERY step.

This country is full of jerkwads who say things like "they knew what they were getting into", or "they are being paid to do this, its their choice".

Their logic of these flapping jaws is flawless: Who would choose to do something so dangerous but a fool? Yet, they dont realise that these brave, bright young men, are the best among us.

The day will come when noone will want to do this most honourable of jobs anymore. The way things are going, we are a doomed nation. This whole country needs a danda applied to its tender parts.

Nihat · Post by **Nihat** » 04 Oct 2011 00:06

Perhaps we need to afford a second look at the training for COIN Ops. and ambush techniques. Each life is precious as far as our Officers are concerned and it'll be a huge shame if any officer has to sacrifice his life when there was a safer method available to eliminate the pig.

sawant · Post by **sawant** » 04 Oct 2011 02:25

why can we not equip every such unit with a small hovering UAV for better intelligence... hand held or otherwise... does not matter how many pigs died ... they were successful in getting our youngest and bravest... some rules of engagements should be looked at... why does the officer have to do all the brave tasks... someone else could have dragged the policeman as he had already killed 2...

Gaur · Post by **Gaur** » 04 Oct 2011 11:04

ASPuar wrote:Too many young army officers are dying. Army brass should be made to realise that its just not acceptable.

ASPuarji,
I am curious. What can Army bass do about the situation? Your views on this would be very much appreciated.

Nihat,
What training changes and safer methods would you suggest?

sawant wrote:why can we not equip every such unit with a small hovering UAV for better intelligence... hand held or otherwise... does not matter how many pigs died ... they were successful in getting our youngest and bravest...

Sawantji,
UAV's are used for surveillance in CI ops. Though Of-course, every unit is not equipped with them. But even so, many a times UAVs become useless because of thick foilage.

some rules of engagements should be looked at...

can you give an example?

why does the officer have to do all the brave tasks... someone else could have dragged the policeman as he had already killed 2...

Who else could have dragged the policemen in the middle of a firefight? And also, its somewhat unfair to the fallen jawan to say that Officers have to do all the brave tasks, don't you think?

Officers in IA lead from the front, so they are obviously at greater risks. But that is what makes IA what it is.

Nihat · Post by **Nihat** » 04 Oct 2011 11:53

I'm not well versed with COIN Ops. training but perhaps certain improvements in training related to setting up a perimeter around hideouts, conducting Ops. at night using NVG advantages instead of waiting for day break, using gas when pigs are alone and rounded or maybe even when they have small number of hostages, sniping the pigs out instead of ambushing them and shooting them in the leg to disable them before asking them to surrender particularly when they are visibly armed and moving in a suspicious manner.

I for one have never understood the tactic of announcing on a loudspeaker and asking pigs to surrender , as upon hearing this the pigs inevitably open fire and cause casualties on our side.The terrorists seem to have figured out some of these standard protocols which may need another look.

Prabu · Post by **Prabu** » 04 Oct 2011 14:06

I completely agree with you. We need to improve our tactis, bullet proof jackets and upgraded arms ( NVG etc etc) immediately to couter these pigs. Regular Loss of lifes at our side is unacceptable !!

ASPuar · Post by **ASPuar** » 04 Oct 2011 18:55

Gaur, whats with the rather inappropriately placed smileys, buddy?

Sorry, lets discuss what could be changed at another time. Im just a bit upset at this young mans death right now, and I guess my remark was an emotional reaction, probably not grounded in much facts.

The truth is, that the Army shouldnt be running CI ops anyway. It totally takes away from their preparedness. And anyway, we now have about 600 battalions of CPMF's, and several hundred more India reserve battalions. Maybe they could take a hand. I dont know. Who knows really? Its just sad.

Gaur · Post by **Gaur** » 04 Oct 2011 21:38

ASPuarji,
The smilieys were merely to convey that I was genuinely curious about your opinion and not being sarcastic or challenging you. And yes, I totally agree that it is certainly not the job of IA to run CI ops. But on the other hand, what if things go really bad under CMPFs? In that case, all the progress made by IA will be lost and guess who will be brought in for damage control? Also, while I do think that CMPFs have enough strength, but do they have the proper mindset? Will they too be able to understand the necessity of "Winning the hearts and minds of people"? I have my doubts.
Merely thinking about the possbility of things going back to the way they were in 90s is enough to make me shudder.

Nihat,
Most of the suggestions you have made are already being implemented on ground for a long time. Snipers/Marksmen are being used when the terrain permits, and IA doesn't foolishly announce its presence every time. That can very well be determined by reading open source materials on past CI ops. So, all the political correctness being shown on TV is not practical to be implemented on ground.

Regarding other things:
BPJs: I think it is very well established by now that BPJs are in good supply at least in forward areas (thank god for small mercies). Also, the quality and weight is not a problem. If you have any doubts, you can ask any Officer or jawan you happen to come across on a journey. Or else, ask any CISF (or even CRPF) personnel guarding various Air Ports about their BPJs. You may rest assured that IA's selection procedures are much more stringent than CMPFs and therefore their BPJs are also superior.

Smoke: Rarely a good idea in open areas, specially considering that you cannot control the wind direction.

Night Vision: There I have to partially agree. Even though IA has full no of NVDs as per the sanctioned strength per batallion , the sanctioned strength itself is ridiculously low because of low availability. But the IA can hardly do anything about equipment purchases, can it? I feel that NVGs are just not sufficiently big ticket items to attract the gaze of Ministers and babus. Too less $$$ to siphon off, I guess. I somehow feel that the reason behind neglect shown towards infantry, which actually fighting everyday, is precisely that.

ParGha · Post by **ParGha** » 04 Oct 2011 23:52

Nihat wrote:I for one have never understood the tactic of announcing on a loudspeaker and asking pigs to surrender , as upon hearing this the pigs inevitably open fire and cause casualties on our side.The terrorists seem to have figured out some of these standard protocols which may need another look.

Psychological Warfare.

In a mixed group of militants, the local Kashmiris know they have a reasonable chance to negotiate a surrender (unless they have done something really dirty, like killing a policeman's family)... and the foreign militants know they will be dragged out and killed elsewhere. It creates division and suspicion in their gang.

Also in areas where there is, mmm divided loyalties, it tells everyone around who is the Lion that roars in the open and who is the Hyena that hides in fear. And operationally it doesn really put them in any great danger, because while the Lion roars and causes confusion... it is really the Lionesses that are hunting. Very elementary, but very effective.

Gaur · Post by **Gaur** » 04 Oct 2011 23:59

^^
That is very interesting. Hadn't thought about that.

prithvi · Post by **prithvi** » 05 Oct 2011 01:59

was watching the show Top Shot in History Channel where they showed Corner Shot..the Israeli Gun accessory... and searched a little in google to find out that NSG has acquired it post 29/11.. is it really an effective solution against a hostage situation or COIN/CT Operation?

here it is for you guys..

Gaur · Post by **Gaur** » 05 Oct 2011 06:44

^^
I'm no expert, but I guess it should come handy in close range urban environment. IIRC, cornershot is compatible only with handguns and shotguns. So, should be good for room clearing? However, one must ask how good is it for hostage situations? In hostage situations, the goal is to maximize the safety of hostages even if it comes at the cost of your safety. So, there are hostages is present in the area, will cornershot be an optimum weapon? I guess that will depend upon the particular situation and how ingeniously it is used.
IIRC, Shiv Aroor had once reported that PARA SF had shown some interest in this system. Don't know what came of it though.

ASPuar · Post by **ASPuar** » 05 Oct 2011 09:26

Gaurji, my point is that what do we have these 600bns of CPMF's for then? Apparently, they are "not trained" to do CI work (and apparently they dont want to be trained for it also). BSF was pulled out of CI ops because it was "not their core work" (as though it is the army's core work).

In times of war, BSF, ITBP, SSB are supposed to move back from the border, and let the army take over. In times of civil unrest, the army is called out, because the CPMF's are not equipped to handle riot like situations, or even disaster relief ops (though ITBP has done a good job in Sikkim recently).

So what do they exist for? As a jobs programme for sundry people, and a convenient deputation environment for IPS officers?

Fact is, they have more "infantry-type" manpower than the army itself does. Why are we wasting this vast resource?

The CPMF men and women are brave and committed. But they are being wasted in the current environment, and while they are led by the IPS.

Gaur · Post by **Gaur** » 05 Oct 2011 10:04

^^
I "totally" agree that CI ops is the job of local police and CMPFs and not IA. But you have described the situation yourself most succinctly.

ASPuar wrote:Apparently, they are "not trained" to do CI work (and apparently they dont want to be trained for it also).

Also, as you have said, there is a great leadership problem and without proper political will that is not going to get remedied anytime soon.
We are wasting so much resources by maintaining such a large force for nothing. But the problem is that no one wants to bleed, so IA has to bleed the share of others. You know all this better than anyone. So, do you think that the situation is going to change in near future? I don't think so. Its a sad thing, but then who cares? Its a callous statement to make but it is the truth. The politicians certainly don't care, the news outlets have never raised this issue and the general public therefore is not even aware of the situation. So, what other option does IA has then to bleed? IA knows that if things go back to the 90s level under CMPFs, then IA would have to bleed infinitely more.

Avik · Post by **Avik** » 05 Oct 2011 11:20

my point is that what do we have these 600bns of CPMF's for then? Apparently, they are "not trained" to do CI work (and apparently they dont want to be trained for it also). BSF was pulled out of CI ops because it was "not their core work" (as though it is the army's core work).

Puarji: The issues with the CPMFs and hence, internal security management is a little different...

The CPMFs are, as you know, not a monolith...the BSF is , on the whole doing ok..please remember, in the 90's and in this decade, they were the ones who brought urban terrorism under control in Kashmir, especially Srinagar city...there may have been failings, but all said and done, they did a good enough job to control Srinagar, Anantnag and Baramula cities..had they not been there, the IA would have had to put in atleast two more divs in the valley.
The ITBP, as you mentioned is again alright..
I dont know enough about the SSB to complain, but given its AoR, I am not too sanguine..
The real problem, amongst the CPMFs is the CRPF. It is this force which has 200+ battallions but is unable to deliver, and there are lots of weaknesses, one of which is its leadership. This force has unfortunately become cannon fodder for not just the Maoists, but also the stone throwing rascals in the valley...the key problem for the CRPF is that it is structured to operate in aid of the local armed police. In areas where the local armed police is robust, like in Punjab during the early 90s, the CRPF was quite effective. Unfortunately, the armed police in the Maoist territories and Kashmir valley ( with the exception of the SOG) is a pathetic joke, and hence, are unable to provide any local knowledge or intelligence to the CRPF..as a result the CRPF is getting hammered. Frankly, it is not correct to expect a Central reinforcement like the CRPF to have local knowledge..and that is where the state police has entirely failed..
So, the point about IPS leadership should be directed more at the state armed police rather than the CPMFs who barely have 1-2 officers from the IPS in their org structures...

The real problem with the CPMF is structural. They just do not have the kind of General Staff backbone that the IA has, nor do they have the vital supporting services on the scale the IA has - Signal units, ASC, Medical units, Intelligence Units, and this greatly degrades their performance. The major failing in the Home Ministry has been to just raise battalion after battalion of paramils without actually doing the hard work of creating the appropriate general staff and the logistics. This is why we have the CPMFs being rushed as penny packets to deal with insurgents..they arrive without the support infra, lack local knowledge, the local splice has packed up, or worse is in cahoots with the insurgents, and the Paramils get massacred. Contrast this to the IA, where even before deploying any battalion in CG, they first set up a sub-area-this is the general staff, that the CPMFs lack

ASPuar · Post by **ASPuar** » 05 Oct 2011 12:53

Avik wrote: Puarji: The issues with the CPMFs and hence, internal security management is a little different...

The CPMFs are, as you know, not a monolith...the BSF is , on the whole doing ok..please remember, in the 90's and in this decade, they were the ones who brought urban terrorism under control in Kashmir, especially Srinagar city...there may have been failings, but all said and done, they did a good enough job to control Srinagar, Anantnag and Baramula cities..had they not been there, the IA would have had to put in atleast two more divs in the valley.

Yes, I know, although IA was withdrawn from the towns only much later in the game. Even then, the officer responsible for much of BSF's success in J&K, first as IG BSF, J&K Sector, and later as DG BSF, was an EX Army Officer, EN Rammohan. His early experiences in the Army certainly stood him in good stead in his role with the BSF.

The ITBP, as you mentioned is again alright..
I dont know enough about the SSB to complain, but given its AoR, I am not too sanguine..

I have no complaint about the CPMF's per se. They are brave chaps, doing their best. But they are being horribly underutilised, and when used, not being used properly.

The real problem, amongst the CPMFs is the CRPF. It is this force which has 200+ battallions but is unable to deliver, and there are lots of weaknesses, one of which is its leadership. This force has unfortunately become cannon fodder for not just the Maoists, but also the stone throwing rascals in the valley...the key problem for the CRPF is that it is structured to operate in aid of the local armed police. In areas where the local armed police is robust, like in Punjab during the early 90s, the CRPF was quite effective. Unfortunately, the armed police in the Maoist territories and Kashmir valley ( with the exception of the SOG) is a pathetic joke, and hence, are unable to provide any local knowledge or intelligence to the CRPF..as a result the CRPF is getting hammered. Frankly, it is not correct to expect a Central reinforcement like the CRPF to have local knowledge..and that is where the state police has entirely failed..
So, the point about IPS leadership should be directed more at the state armed police rather than the CPMFs who barely have 1-2 officers from the IPS in their org structures...

The higher leadership of BSF, ITBP, SSB, CISF, CRPF are almost ALL IPS officers. All the IG level posts in important areas, (and all the IG level posts in Delhi, of course), are held by IPS officers. A large number (majority) of the DIG's are also IPS officers, although the VI CPC had clearly said that these should be set aside for cadre officers.

In fact, the Dantewada DIG, who was in charge during the massacre of CRPF personnel there, was also an IPS officer.

The real problem with the CPMF is structural. They just do not have the kind of General Staff backbone that the IA has, nor do they have the vital supporting services on the scale the IA has - Signal units, ASC, Medical units, Intelligence Units, and this greatly degrades their performance. The major failing in the Home Ministry has been to just raise battalion after battalion of paramils without actually doing the hard work of creating the appropriate general staff and the logistics. This is why we have the CPMFs being rushed as penny packets to deal with insurgents..they arrive without the support infra, lack local knowledge, the local splice has packed up, or worse is in cahoots with the insurgents, and the Paramils get massacred. Contrast this to the IA, where even before deploying any battalion in CG, they first set up a sub-area-this is the general staff, that the CPMFs lack

There is something in this, but frankly, the CPMFs have a highly developed Medical infrastructure, along with Signals, air component, etc.

Prabu · Post by **Prabu** » 14 Oct 2011 15:22

One more thing on NVG, very often I have seen in the reports of kashmir encounters that we waited for the day break, and militants escaped using the cover of darkness. is it not so ? I will be happy to be proved wrong in this.

nachiket · Post by **nachiket** » 14 Oct 2011 21:50

^^Wow, Gaur ji must have answered this a hundred times. I'll save him the trouble this time.
NVG's and thermal imagers do not give perfect visibility. It is only an improvement over complete darkness. This is especially a problem for the IA in Kashmir because it makes identification difficult and the IA must make sure they do not shoot a civilian by mistake. If the militants are suicidal and try to actively engage the IA then they can be located with the help of NVGs and eliminated. If they are content with hiding and escaping, that is easy to do in pitch dark even if every soldier trying to find them has an NVG.

atreya · Post by **atreya** » 14 Oct 2011 22:24

Add to that, the difficulties of operating the NVG in dense foliage. Most of the recent encounters were fought in dense forests, where the NVG is practically of no use. However, as Gaur pointed out earlier too, NVGs are NOT in short supply, soldiers in forward areas have enough number of the same. I am pretty sure they are put to good use.

Gaur · Post by **Gaur** » 14 Oct 2011 22:46

^^
Well, I have to admit that I have been somewhat wrong in my past posts regarding this topic. I had maintained that IA has adequate no of NVGs. That part is wrong. IA has full amount of sanctioned NVDs but the "sanctioned amount" per batallion is woefully low because of the low no of NVDs present with IA. On top of that, most of the devices are hand held. Perhaps you guys would have seen a relatively recent (aired within 6-8 months) program showing IA on night patrol (It was on NDTV or NewsX. I'll try to find and post it here). In that program, the whole platoon was moving night blind while a single guy with a hand held NVD was following them at the back and surveying the area for them. So, that accurately potrays the ground reality which is pretty sad.
Having said that, it does not imply that using NVGs will mean that night operations will be same as day ops for IA. The significant problems that I had mentioned in my past posts (loss of depth of field, deterioration in adverse weather conditions, range, image quality, unsuitable terrain etc) still very much hold. But even so, having NVGs/NVDs is certainly much better than not having them (or having them in woefully low amount).
Sadly, infantry being neglected is nothing new. I guess "big ticket" items hold more attraction for MOD.

ADDED LATER:
Found it. This program was aired on Aug 13. As this video was posted here at that time, perhaps many have already watched it.
http://www.ndtv.com/video/player/news/j ... war/207885

anjan · Post by **anjan** » 15 Oct 2011 03:31

Gaur wrote:^^
Well, I have to admit that I have been somewhat wrong in my past posts regarding this topic. I had maintained that IA has adequate no of NVGs.

I was told that the NVG difference(between what we have and the west) was stark. We had eqpt. a few generation older and bulkier and noisier. This was from an exercise with an american unit some time back.

Have you heard anything on induction of newer helmets? I keep hoping to hear something.

Gaur · Post by **Gaur** » 15 Oct 2011 06:25

^^
There are some recent pics which show Para SF wearing what seams to be Israeli orlite helmet. But anyway, IMHO helmets are hardly a priority. Western kevlar helmets only protect against 9mm round while patka is strong enough to protect against AK round from the front.

anjan · Post by **anjan** » 15 Oct 2011 13:25

Gaur wrote:^^
There are some recent pics which show Para SF wearing what seams to be Israeli orlite helmet. But anyway, IMHO helmets are hardly a priority. Western kevlar helmets only protect against 9mm round while patka is strong enough to protect against AK round from the front.

No I meant replacing the steel helmets that are the normal standard. The sheer weight difference IMO makes it a priority. It's been stuck on tender procedures with babus in the MoF since 2005. Not CI so probably the wrong thread.