https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/11/17/bi ... -on-track/
Biden Can’t Avoid Erdogan, but He Can Keep the U.S.-Turkish Relationship on Track
Turkey’s leader has caused many headaches in Washington in recent years, but letting ties deteriorate further would be disastrous.
By Michael Singh, Sinan Ulgen | November 17, 2020
When Joe Biden assumes office as U.S. president in late January, one of the thorniest foreign-policy challenges he will inherit is not one of his predecessor’s creation. Indeed, the problem of U.S. relations with Turkey has wrong-footed U.S. administrations from both parties in the past two decades.
From Ankara’s refusal to permit U.S. troops to cross the Turkish-Iraqi border in 2003, to sharp bilateral disagreements over Syria policy during the Obama administration, to Turkey’s more recent acquisition of Russian air defense systems despite its NATO membership, the U.S.-Turkish relationship has given headaches to a long series of American presidents.
Yet lingering threats in the region and rising risks globally underscore the continuing value of U.S.-Turkish cooperation to both countries, and they highlight the importance that a Biden administration seek to rescue the relationship from its sharp deterioration, which under President Donald Trump deepened further due to disagreements over Turkey’s incursion into northeast Syria and its opposition to Arab normalization agreements with Israel.
Turkey, which bridges Europe and Asia, also finds itself straddling the fault line of a seismic shift in U.S. foreign policy. U.S. strategy is consciously moving away from an emphasis on fighting terrorism and nonstate actors to a focus on great-power competition, particularly with Russia and China. Washington and Ankara have clashed on both fronts under Presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump, disagreeing over how to fight terrorism in Syria, for example, as well as how to manage relations with Moscow.
In any reformulation of U.S. policy in the Middle East, the role Turkey chooses to play will be important—for better or for worse.
The coronavirus pandemic may not usher in a new world, but it has accelerated a transition in the global order. The crisis has exacerbated U.S.-China tensions and has highlighted for many states the risks of supply chains heavily dependent on Beijing. While the resulting shift in U.S. foreign policy in East Asia is plain to see, its implications for U.S. strategy elsewhere have not been clear.
In the Middle East, which has been the prime focus of U.S. foreign policy for the first decades of this century, it is unclear whether Washington intends to execute the same strategy—defending a broad array of U.S. interests, especially counter terrorism, through direct intervention and heavy support for allies—with fewer resources, or forge a new regional strategy.
This new strategy would consciously seek to look at Middle East issues through a great-power competition lens—preserving close relations with the region’s medium-sized powers and preventing inroads by Moscow and Beijing even at the expense of other concerns such as terrorism, as the Trump administration’s National Defense Strategy foreshadowed.
The likely answer is a bit of both. Facing a need to shift resources toward Asia, the U.S. government will increasingly look to outsource to its regional partners the safeguarding of mutual interests. Yet it will also seek to recruit those partners in a broader effort to buttress global order and norms against increasingly bold challenges from great-power competitors.
In any such reformulation of U.S. policy in the Middle East, the role Turkey chooses to play will be important—for better or for worse. It is the region’s largest economy, with a GDP reaching $750 billion.
.....
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
https://www.israelhayom.com/2020/11/15/ ... or-turkey/
What a Biden administration means for Turkey
President-elect Joe Biden's history with Turkish President Reccep Tayyip Erdoğan gives mixed indicators of how he might deal with Ankara's increasingly authoritarian leader.
By Burak Bekdil, 11-15-2020
President-elect Joe Biden's history with Turkish President Reccep Tayyip Erdogan gives mixed indicators of how he might deal with Ankara's increasingly authoritarian leader.
From the first day of the US presidential race, pro-Erdogan media and pundits vocally supported the incumbent, even though Donald Trump's planned design for the Mideast, including Arab-Israeli normalization, clashed with their Islamist, anti-Israeli, pro-Hamas militant raison d'être. "Devil you know" thinking fails to fully explain that support, especially as Trump was widely viewed as an anti-Islamic racist. Why, then, would Turkey's Islamists side with a pro-Israel, allegedly Islamophobic president? Because they viewed a prospective Biden administration as potentially devastating to the Erdogan government.
When in 2019 a perfect storm was expected in Turkey's relations with the United States, Trump confounded expectations by warmly praising Erdogan shortly before his state visit to Washington. "He's a friend of mine, and I'm glad we didn't have a problem because, frankly, he's a hell of a leader, and he's a tough man," said Trump. "He's a strong man, and he did the right thing and I really appreciate it, and I will appreciate it in the future."
The meetings in Washington went much better than expected, despite several deeply problematic dossiers. They ended with an exchange of compliments and paved the way for Trump to put off the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), which would have imposed sanctions on Turkey at a time when its economy was on the brink of collapse.
The sanctions garnered massive support in Congress after Turkey insisted it would activate a Russian-made long-range air- and anti-missile defense system on its soil. Washington feared that activation of the S-400 system would compromise US and NATO aerial military assets stationed in Turkey. Trump apparently did not share this fear. And as it turned out, there was more to his generosity to Turkey's Islamist strongman than sidestepping the CAATSA.
It eventually surfaced that Erdogan had been pressing Trump for months to quash a criminal investigation into a Turkish state lender—an investigation that threatened not only the bank but members of Erdogan's family and political party. Halkbank was being probed on charges that it had undercut Trump's policy of economically isolating Iran, a centerpiece of his Middle East plan. Without Trump's help, Halkbank could have been slapped with sanctions to the tune of several billions of dollars. And it still can—unless Joe Biden morphs into another Erdogan fan.
Biden's history with Erdogan gives mixed signals as to the possible future direction of his dealings with an increasingly authoritarian leader.
As vice president, Biden paid four official visits to Turkey between 2011 and 2016. His portfolio with Erdogan contained difficult dossiers, such as northern Syria, the fight against Islamic State (ISIS), and US military and logistical support for Kurdish fighters. But Erdogan got his much-wanted go-ahead for a military incursion into northern Syria from Trump, not his predecessor, in October 2019. Turkish troops have deployed there, tensely neighboring Kurdish troops who are viewed by Ankara as terrorist forces and by Washington as allies.
.......
Gautam