Bharat Rakshak

chola wrote:Iran is a rogue nation and Cheen and Pakistan are its natural fits.

chanakyaa wrote:Noticed that the map does not show any sign of life in the game-changer Goo-wa-dar port, as compared to some red/yellow in Cha-bahar or a fraction of well-lit neighboring Karrachi. Did Baki all-weather fliend give up on the project?

Is Goo-wa-dar Game Changer Over?

chetak wrote:^^^^^^^

Sirji,

Since that pakis have already hocked their shalwars, what's left to use as collateral now??

They are a non langot wearing culture too, so that's out.

So, how many thousands of square kilometers are they now going to hand over to the hans??

Is this is the beginning of the end??

Chinese engineers and other staffers, engaged in the construction of M4 Motorway from Bahawalpur to Faisalabad, attacked policemen deployed for their security after the foreign workers were barred from leaving their camp's premises without a security squad, DawnNewsTV reported.

Several mobile phone clips doing rounds on social media show Chinese nationals approaching the police officials in a provocative manner and attacking them.

another video showed several Chinese nationals trashing policemen and some local people in plain clothes.

Chinese engineers and other officials wanted to leave their camp in Khanewal and visit a "redlight" area on Tuesday night.

Later, the Chinese engineers also cut power supply to the police camp established within the main construction camp

On Wednesday morning, the Chinese workers stopped work on the project and abandoned heavy machinery and vehicles

Subsequently, the protesting Chinese engineers wrote a letter to Punjab Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif, claiming that police officials refrained them from discharging their duties and attacked them.

They also accused the security in charge of attempting to hit Chinese workers with his vehicle.

It was not the first time when Chinese nationals in Pakistan attacked local police. In 2016, a clash occurred between the police and Chinese workers as the latter insisted on staying at a construction camp at night, but the former opposed the idea due to security reasons.

some Chinese nationals associated with the Chinese army and trained in martial arts had attacked and injured police personnel deployed for their security.

Sauron
Just some tough love from iron brother

Some members of the federal cabinet on Tuesday raised concern over the fact that agriculture had been totally ignored in the multi-billion-dollar China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), sources told Dawn.

The concern was raised by Minister for National Food Security and Research Sika­ndar Bosan and Privatisation Minister Daniyal Aziz during a briefing by the officials concerned to the cabinet on CPEC projects.

Peregrine wrote:X Posted on theTerroristan and OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications Threads

MEA on China's OBOR: Can't accept a project that violates India's sovereignty

…………………….{Rest Snipped}……………………

Official Spokesperson's response to a query on media reports regarding possible cooperation with China on OBOR/BRI
April 05, 2018

In response to a query on media reports regarding possible cooperation with China on OBOR/BRI, the Official Spokesperson said:

"We have seen some media reports alluding to our possible cooperation with China in ‘One Belt One Road’ (OBOR)/‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI).

Our position on OBOR/BRI is clear and there is no change. The so-called ‘China-Pakistan Economic Corridor’ violates India’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. No country can accept a project that ignores its core concerns on sovereignty and territorial integrity.

We are of firm belief that connectivity initiatives must be based on universally recognized international norms, good governance, rule of law, openness, transparency and equality, and must be pursued in a manner that respects sovereignty and territorial integrity."

New Delhi
April 05, 2018

Foreign Minister Mr. Mammadyarov and I agreed that the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), of which both India and Azerbaijan are members,is an important initiative that can reduce time and cost by about 30-40 per cent. To popularise INSTC, a motor rally is being organised that would shortly pass through Azerbaijan.

Tell us about your meetings in Delhi, both bilateral and trilateral with Japan.

The momentum to this relationship is anchored by the two policies that govern our approach to the region: the U.S. South Asia policy and the Indo-Pacific policy. In the South Asia policy, the U.S. is working very aggressively to stabilise the situation and work towards a peaceful resolution that involves unprecedented engagement with Pakistan, and one in which India is playing an essential role as a net provider of assistance which is very different from a few years ago. On the Indo-Pacific side, that’s where the ambitions of the relationship lie. Our shared security interests are to see that the region doesn’t fall prey to some of the predatory practices being seen in the South China Sea, and how to offer alternatives.

On Afghanistan… the fact that this region has no regional trade is noteworthy and until we resolve that core conflict and open up the east and west, the potential for South Asia is not going to be achieved. We are deeply appreciative of the Indian efforts to use Chabahar to provide alternatives to Afghanistan to open up a channel to Central Asia. And we need to be creative in the absence of peace to ensure that Afghanistan can stabilise and grow.

Are you saying that the Chabahar route, with the port owned by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRGC-owned Khatam Al-Anbia) meets with the U.S.’s approval?

The standard set for Chabahar is that the deals should not benefit IRGC members, that’s for sanctions not to be imposed, and for business deals to go through. The legislation originally passed (JCPOA) has a specific carve-out for Chabahar and that’s an acknowledgment of the necessary role of giving land-locked Afghanistan access and alternatives as it seeks to build its economy. We have seen with the shipments of wheat that India has really helped to open up trade with Afghanistan including air corridors. Its been striking that Afghanistan-Pakistan trade has declined 50% in the last year. India has provided options, and Afghanistan now needs the support of India and Central Asia.

You were in Pakistan last week for several days. Are there any indications yet that Pakistan is taking action on terror?

As General (Joseph) Votel has testified, we see initial constructive steps and we want to build on that. Our conversation with Pakistan is about the unique influence it has and the unique levers it has in helping to shape Taliban expectations and to convince the Taliban to walk through what we all recognise is an open door. Those conversations are ongoing. We are not walking away from Pakistan, but we do not believe that yet we have seen the kind of sustainable and irreversible steps that are required to really change the situation on the ground.

Yet here in New Delhi, it looks as if since that tweet from President Trump on New Years day, India’s hopes from the U.S.’s new policy have not been realised. Terrorists targeting India like Hafiz Saeed and Masood Azhar still roam openly, issue statements, with no specific action taken against them except what is mandated by the U.N. Do you still think there is reason to hope that will change?

I was heartened by the press comments by General Bajwa where he said things like the ‘state must have the monopoly on violence’, and there is ‘no role for non-state actors’, and that ‘Pakistan cant be a normal states if there are extremist groups’. Those are extremely positive statements and now I think the challenge is to see them implemented. We are certainly in a very good faith conversation with Pakistan. We want the policy to succeed and for Pakistan to be both law enforced and economically secure country. We understand Pakistan is also a victim of terror and more than 400 civilians were killed by the TTP or other groups like AQ and ISIS operating in Pakistan. I always say that terrorists who attack Pakistan are also enemies of the United States. We have an agenda, we believe we have shared interests and Pakistan has a stake in a stable Afghanistan. So how do we make that calculus work?

But you’re basing all this on General Bajwa’s statement… this year marks 10 years since the Mumbai attacks, and there have been ten years of such statements. So what gives you hope that this time is any different from the past?

I think the South Asia strategy and the stance of the U.S. administration gives me hope. This is a strategy that has been implemented with greater force. It notes that this is a different world, and it is no longer acceptable or understandable to rely on proxy forces. And we are prepared, as we demonstrated with the suspension of assistance, to act on our concern when we don’t see sufficient action taken. The Trump administration has gone into territory not been entered before by the U.S. and that sends a very powerful message. We have a leadership role to play to close the chapter on proxy forces in South Asia. There is an urgency to this because of ISIS. We see ISIS in Afghanistan consists largely of Afghans and Pakistanis who have switched over from other terrorist organisations, but imagine if an insurgency became a nihillistic campaign that recognised no borders. We can’t afford the conflict and the ideological stew there to metastasise.

Yet eight months into the U.S. South Asia strategy, four months after CSF and FMF funding cuts, FATF action, IMF squeeze, the designation of Hafiz Saeed’s party MML as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation, there’s seems no impact on Pakistan actions. What are the markers that Pakistan should take, for the U.S., and possibly India to acknowledge they have taken some action?

We fully share your concern over Hafiz Saeed. He is a terrorist, with money on his head, he should be in prison, not on the streets, and we have concerns about his ability to operate freely..... [pause] This is a process, and while I know that’s not a satisfactory answer for a country that has suffered significant acts of terrorism emanating from Pakistan.

The U.S. has suffered as well, Americans died in the Mumbai attacks….

Absolutely…but this is a process. And it is a serious process, and even our Indian friends recognise the seriousness of purpose of the United States in adopting and implementing its strategy. So I would say, bear with us, this isn’t the end of our diplomatic game. We are continuously engaging in Pakistan because we do see the need for change.

Is there a timeline? Or a point at which the U.S.’s patience runs out?

We are evaluating as we go, in consultations with our allies and friends. But this is a process.

What are the markers of what you would like to see Pakistan do in the next few months?

I think Pakistan knows what it can do to change the calculus and to disrupt and make it harder for Taliban or family members [other groups] to take advantage of Pakistan’s territory. That isn’t a mystery. There will soon be a new civilian leadership in Pakistan, and we will see how the new government will take steps to demonstrate to the international community that Pakistan is serious about curbing terror financing and money laundering.

Again, there we have seen some positive steps: whether it is on the (LeT-owned) charities, whether it is the executive order designating U.N. terrorists under the Anti-terrorism Act, this is what we are going to be looking for. I believe that the international consensus was that the greylist was necessary as these were not irreversible actions, but I have to say, in my consultations in Islamabad, including among the business community, there is a lot of support for moving forward on terror. This is in Pakistan’s interest, as a big country that needs foreign investment, the way to attract it is to have a stellar reputation and stellar record. So many people I met welcomed the double-edged sword of FATF.

India and China must be frank with each other to prevent another Doklam, ambassador warns

New Delhi’s envoy to Beijing blames China for last summer’s military stand-off, saying it ‘changed the status quo in the region’

PUBLISHED : Saturday, 24 March, 2018, 12:04pm
UPDATED : Saturday, 24 March, 2018, 1:45pm ……………………

What’s your evaluation on the existing communication mechanism between India and China?

We have a lot of dialogue between India and China, especially at the political level, and also at the economic level. I just give you one example, we have something called the Joint Economic Group between India and China, which is led on the Chinese side by the commerce minister, and the commerce and industry minister from the Indian side.

Chinese Commerce Minister Zhong Shan will be in India later this week for the Joint Economic Group, and where they will discuss how to improve the trade relations and investments between India and China.

So these are the dialogues that already exist. But especially on the political level, we must be very frank and open and candid with each other. There are some issues and problems between India and China, if we have to solve those problems, we need to talk about the problems candidly.

That’s what I mean about the candid discussion. Also both governments of China and India have been saying that we must maintain strategic communication, and what I think when they talk about strategic communication, it means frank and candid discussion.

Only through talking frankly and candidly, we will be able to solve the issues and problems say boundary problem, and understand each other’s concerns. And I have said in my public remarks yesterday that the most important problem between India and China is the boundary problem. It is a leftover from history, but today’s governments are trying to tackle it. We are giving it a high priority. But only when both sides talk to each other very frankly and candidly, will we be able to resolve this boundary issue and decide on a boundary.

Is China transparent enough, maybe in relation to Doklam construction and army deployment?

We have good dialogue with China. We talk to China at many different levels, we talk to them at the official level, military authorities, foreign ministers and our leaders – Prime Minister Modi and President Xi Jinping – have an excellent communication.

Both national leaders meet at least two or three times a year because both nations are members of many important international organisations as G20, BRICS and SCO and they have their own bilateral discussions. So there is a very good communication between the leaders, but we need to have better communication down the line.

I agree with you to the extent that both sides must be candid with each other and frank with each other. We must say what is happening on the ground and so on.

Many people say that everything the Chinese are doing is kept in dark and that’s where the gap and misunderstanding always happens so in your communications with Chinese officials, do you think that they are transparent enough in addressing India’s concerns?

I think that both sides have to address each others’ concerns. In fact, there are two principles that India has suggested to China, and I think we have broad agreement.

One is that each side must be sensitive to the other side’s aspirations, their concerns, their priorities and so on. And the second is that we must not allow differences to become disputes.

For example, we might have differences of opinion on Belt and Road, but that we must not allow that difference of opinion to become a dispute.

And I think for this, we need to have frank and candid discussions. We already have frank and candid discussions, but I mean we need to be more frank and candid with each other.

What kind of lessons can be learned from Doklam issue and what are the reasons leading to the rise of tensions and confrontations?

The India-China boundary is un-demarcated and un-delineated, so we have to talk to each other to delineate and demarcate it, which means to draw the boundary line. Now in the meantime, while we are discussing where the boundary will lie, both China and India have agreed that we should maintain peace and tranquillity in the border areas.

Now for last 30 years, not a single shot had been fired between the India-China border, which shows that we have been successful at maintaining peace and tranquillity.

Even during the Doklam incident, a very serious incident, there was no firing, we were able to maintain peace and tranquillity.

I think this is a successful example of diplomacy between our two countries. But we need to move further to actually solve the problem, which is to draw the boundary line. The boundary is quite long between India and China – roughly 3,500km.

In order to maintain the peace and tranquillity, there are certain areas, certain sectors which are very sensitive, where we must not change the status quo. If anyone changes the status quo, it will lead to a situation like what happened in Doklam.

I can tell you very frankly and you can quote me on this. The Chinese military changed the status quo in the Doklam area and therefore India reacted to it. Ours was a reaction to the change in the status quo by the Chinese military.

So it is an issue as you say that even though the two countries have high level communications, it needs to be brought down to practical levels?

I agree entirely that it has to be brought down to practical levels. It shows that when incidents like Doklam happened last year, it means that we were not frank enough and candid enough with each other. So we need to increase the level of frankness.

What do you mean by not frank enough and candid enough?

In the sense that if the Chinese military are going to build a road, then they must tell us ‘we are going to build a road’. If we do not agree to it then we can reply that, ‘look, you’re changing the status quo. Please don’t do it. This is a very very sensitive area’.

After the Doklam incident some reports suggest that road construction and military deployment in the Western Theatre Command is actually increasing or at least continuing?

No, I can tell you that you in Doklam area, which we call close proximity or sometimes the face-off site, the area where there was close confrontation or close proximity between Indian and Chinese military troops, that there is no change taking place today. Maybe behind the Chinese may be putting more military barracks to put in more soldiers, but that is well behind the sensitive area. Those are the things you’re free to do and we are also free to do, because you’re doing it inside your territory and we are doing it inside our territory.

Has communication been stepped up after the incident?

At the political level communication has come back to place. So we had Yang Jiechi visit India last year in December. And we will continue to have such discussions. But more importantly, I think we need to have discussions between the two militaries. That has not fully resumed.

It has resumed to a certain extent, the troops on the ground can talk to each other, that has resumed, but the communication between the headquarters – say the Central Military Commission in Beijing and the Military Headquarters in Delhi – that communication has not yet resumed and we would like it to resume as soon as possible.

What’s the stumbling block?

There is no stumbling block, but we have to just move them to meet quickly, sooner rather than later. I think that it will happen sometime during the next few months.

At the political level, as you said Mr Modi and Xi Jinping are meeting 2-3 times a year, are there any high-level visits planned between the two nations?

Prime Minister Modi will visit Qingdao on June 9-10 for the Summit of the SCO. During that, we will definitely have bilateral meeting between Prime Minister Modi and President Xi Jinping. And before that happens we want to have a lot of other meetings. One example is the Commerce Minister’s visit. We will have a whole series of meetings in the next few weeks and months. Another example, on the 22 and 23 March, we will have a meeting of Director General of the Boundary Department of Chinese Foreign Ministry with his Indian counterpart. We are having these meetings to have candid and frank discussions.

Any State-level visits being planned?

At this stage, we know that Prime Minister Modi will come to Qingdao in June this year.

There are many concerns about the Belt and Road Initiative. China is purchasing and renting so many ports in South Asia especially Pakistan. How is the concern in India addressed? What are the tactics that India is thinking of using to counter rising Chinese influence in South Asia?

Let me tell you very clearly that India has its own relationships with all these countries. These are very strong relationships and India is also doing a lot of projects in all these countries, such as the Maldives, Nepal or Sri Lanka. So, our relationships with these countries are very strong, they are historical, people-to-people contacts. I give you an example. You know between Nepal and India, there is an open border. So people can come to India without any visa, and the reverse is also the case.

So, we have very strong relationships with all these countries and we are confident that this relationship will become even stronger and richer in the coming months and years. So I don’t think we are worried about what China is doing. Those countries are free to have relationships with any third country, including China.

So you don’t think there is rivalry between India and China?

No, no. Let me tell you very clearly. As far as India is concerned, India does not look upon China as a rival or a competitor. We look upon China as a partner in progress and development. And let me give you an example of this. The trade between China and India reached the highest level ever, US$84.5 billion in 2017, even after the Doklam problem. Still, investment from China into India is increasing and investments from India into China are also increasing.

In fact, last year, there have been two success stories in the economic sector that I kept telling everyone – not only in Hong Kong but in Beijing as well. One is, of course, Xiaomi becoming the single largest mobile headset provider in India. Samsung used to be the leader, but now it has become number two. This shows there’s a big market in India and we want more Chinese companies to come and invest and sell in India. Another success story is an Indian Bollywood movie called Dangal. It became such a big hit in China.

I will tell you why it is important. It shows that Chinese people are open to watching Bollywood movies. I think from watching those movies they understand India better. And by understanding each other better, we will be able to have greater trust between each other. That’s why these examples are very important.

Global Times interviewed me and asked me questions like this, ‘why do Indian people not like China and why you dislike Chinese people?’ And I asked them ‘where did you get this idea from? Actually we have great admiration for China and what China has achieved in the last forty years. If there is any such thing you were talking about, would Xiaomi become the number one handset maker in India?’ And, conversely, Chinese people have nothing against India. If it was the case, would Dangal had become a hit, one of the largest selling non-Chinese films in whole of China?

Talking about movies, there is a quota for the number of foreign movies in China.

We know that there is a quota reserved for non-Chinese movies. We are working with the Chinese Government to increase the quota for Indian movies in China, especially now when Chinese audiences are liking Indian movies.

But are there any investment restrictions or security screening that has impacted you?

No, that hasn’t really impacted us.

India is concerned about the Belt and Road initiative. On the other hand, it is a key member of AIIB (Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank). So what kind of project do you think AIIB should do?

We have said this very openly in international fora. When we talk about development projects or connectivity projects, they must be transparent, fair and equal. There are certain internationally accepted norms for such projects.

If a project meets those norms, we will be happy to take part in it. One of the norms is the project should not violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a country. Unfortunately, there is this thing called the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which is called a flagship project of Belt and Road Initiative, which violates India’s sovereignty and territory integrity. Therefore, we oppose it.

There is some discussion about a quadrilateral – India, Australia, Japan and the US – these 4 countries should step up their strategic alliance for infrastructure projects. What is India’s take on that?

We are ready to do infrastructure projects anywhere in the world, including in India, which meets these criteria: of being open, being open to everyone, being fair, being transparent, protecting the environment. We are willing to do projects. As far as four countries are concerned, let me tell you very clearly that India has never been a part of any alliance. I think countries like India and China are too big to be part of any alliance. We both have very independent policies; domestic policies as well as foreign policies. I do not see that India is going to be a part of any alliance.

India will work with all countries in the world to improve and increase its interests. Wherever our interests converge we will work together like in climate change and environment protection. India and China work very closely together on many international issues like environmental protection and counter-terrorism. We will continue to work with anyone, where we find that there is a synergy. We will work with China definitely on these issues.

I do not see India becoming part of any alliance. Let me also repeat what I have already said to you before. In fact if we do follow some of these principles such as not letting differences of opinion becoming disputes, of doing projects which are not opaque but open; transparent and meet ecological and environmental standards; does not violate anyone’s territorial integrity, then we will find a situation where the Chinese dragon and the Indian elephant will actually be dancing together.

{b]Does India have any common concerns or shared interests with Japan, the US and Australia concerning China’s rise?[/b]

No, we do not have any problem with China’s rise. I will talk about India; I cannot talk for the other countries. India has no concerns about China’s rise. In fact, India looks at China’s rise as something which also gives us encouragement that India can also do at least some of the things that China has done, which is to develop economically and develop rapidly. So, I don’t think that China’s rise creates any concerns in India.

In fact none of the things that India does with any country is aimed at a third country, including China. I can repeat myself that India and China are not rivals. India does not look upon China as a competitor or a rival; in fact we look upon China as partner in progress and development. We would like to learn a little bit from China about how to progress and, as I told you earlier, Hong Kong can play a very important role. I remember and, you will also remember, when in the 1980s China was just opening and the reform policy was just starting, it was Hong Kong companies and Hong Kong firms which built expressways, which built bridges, which built power plants in China. So I think Hong Kong can play a very important role in the development and progress of India also.

There is always concern that China is becoming more assertive or even aggressive at the international stage. Structurally, the presidential term is now removed and they are putting together a strong diplomatic line-up with Wang Qishan becoming the vice-president and taking care of China’s international affairs. Therefore, China looks more determined to raise issues of territorial integrity and its sovereign interests. What’s Indian’s assessment on that?

Look, the removal of the term limits and new team for foreign affairs and all that is China’s internal matter; I don’t want to say anything on that. That is for China and the people of China to decide. As far as China’s rise is concerned, as I told you we do not have any concern about it. We only look upon it as something which encourages us to do better in India’s economic development, India’s economic progress and social progress.

What is basically happening today is that both China and India also to a certain extent are re-emerging on the international stage and becoming very important players. Many centuries ago in the 1600 and 1700s, both China and India were very important economic powers in the world. Now in the 21st century, we are seeing a re-emergence, of both China and India to some extent, on the world stage from a geo-political and geo-economic point of view. Again, I will repeat myself, we don’t see any rivalry, competition or threats from China, we only look at China as a partner in progress and development.

arun wrote:X Posted from the India-US relations: News and Discussions IV thread to the Indian Foreign Policy, Iran News & Discussions, 26/11/2008: Never Forget. Never Forgive, CPEC and Terroristan threads.

Interview of U.S. Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asia, Alice Wells, by politician Subramanian Swamy’s daughter Suhasini Haidar for the Hindu.

US, far from being reluctantly acquiescent about Indian investment in the development of Chabahar Port in their archenemy Iran is actually “deeply appreciative of the Indian efforts to use Chabahar to provide alternatives to Afghanistan to open up a channel to Central Asia”:

Tell us about your meetings in Delhi, both bilateral and trilateral with Japan.

The momentum to this relationship is anchored by the two policies that govern our approach to the region: the U.S. South Asia policy and the Indo-Pacific policy. In the South Asia policy, the U.S. is working very aggressively to stabilise the situation and work towards a peaceful resolution that involves unprecedented engagement with Pakistan, and one in which India is playing an essential role as a net provider of assistance which is very different from a few years ago. On the Indo-Pacific side, that’s where the ambitions of the relationship lie. Our shared security interests are to see that the region doesn’t fall prey to some of the predatory practices being seen in the South China Sea, and how to offer alternatives.

On Afghanistan… the fact that this region has no regional trade is noteworthy and until we resolve that core conflict and open up the east and west, the potential for South Asia is not going to be achieved. We are deeply appreciative of the Indian efforts to use Chabahar to provide alternatives to Afghanistan to open up a channel to Central Asia. And we need to be creative in the absence of peace to ensure that Afghanistan can stabilise and grow.

Are you saying that the Chabahar route, with the port owned by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRGC-owned Khatam Al-Anbia) meets with the U.S.’s approval?

The standard set for Chabahar is that the deals should not benefit IRGC members, that’s for sanctions not to be imposed, and for business deals to go through. The legislation originally passed (JCPOA) has a specific carve-out for Chabahar and that’s an acknowledgment of the necessary role of giving land-locked Afghanistan access and alternatives as it seeks to build its economy. We have seen with the shipments of wheat that India has really helped to open up trade with Afghanistan including air corridors. Its been striking that Afghanistan-Pakistan trade has declined 50% in the last year. India has provided options, and Afghanistan now needs the support of India and Central Asia.

Suhasini Haidar reminds the Alice Wells that US citizens were also killed in the 26/11 Mumbai Mohammadden Terrorism attack sponsored by State Actors of the Punjabi Uniformed Jihadis of the Military Dominated Deep State of the Mohammadden Terrorism Fomenting Islamic Republic of Pakistan, that 10 years have passed since 26/11 and that US President Donald Trump’s New Year Tweet and new US South Asia Strategy on Afghanistan has signified more sound then fury. The RaRa US brigade that infests BRF from time to time may particularly note:

You were in Pakistan last week for several days. Are there any indications yet that Pakistan is taking action on terror?

As General (Joseph) Votel has testified, we see initial constructive steps and we want to build on that. Our conversation with Pakistan is about the unique influence it has and the unique levers it has in helping to shape Taliban expectations and to convince the Taliban to walk through what we all recognise is an open door. Those conversations are ongoing. We are not walking away from Pakistan, but we do not believe that yet we have seen the kind of sustainable and irreversible steps that are required to really change the situation on the ground.

Yet here in New Delhi, it looks as if since that tweet from President Trump on New Years day, India’s hopes from the U.S.’s new policy have not been realised. Terrorists targeting India like Hafiz Saeed and Masood Azhar still roam openly, issue statements, with no specific action taken against them except what is mandated by the U.N. Do you still think there is reason to hope that will change?

I was heartened by the press comments by General Bajwa where he said things like the ‘state must have the monopoly on violence’, and there is ‘no role for non-state actors’, and that ‘Pakistan cant be a normal states if there are extremist groups’. Those are extremely positive statements and now I think the challenge is to see them implemented. We are certainly in a very good faith conversation with Pakistan. We want the policy to succeed and for Pakistan to be both law enforced and economically secure country. We understand Pakistan is also a victim of terror and more than 400 civilians were killed by the TTP or other groups like AQ and ISIS operating in Pakistan. I always say that terrorists who attack Pakistan are also enemies of the United States. We have an agenda, we believe we have shared interests and Pakistan has a stake in a stable Afghanistan. So how do we make that calculus work?

But you’re basing all this on General Bajwa’s statement… this year marks 10 years since the Mumbai attacks, and there have been ten years of such statements. So what gives you hope that this time is any different from the past?

I think the South Asia strategy and the stance of the U.S. administration gives me hope. This is a strategy that has been implemented with greater force. It notes that this is a different world, and it is no longer acceptable or understandable to rely on proxy forces. And we are prepared, as we demonstrated with the suspension of assistance, to act on our concern when we don’t see sufficient action taken. The Trump administration has gone into territory not been entered before by the U.S. and that sends a very powerful message. We have a leadership role to play to close the chapter on proxy forces in South Asia. There is an urgency to this because of ISIS. We see ISIS in Afghanistan consists largely of Afghans and Pakistanis who have switched over from other terrorist organisations, but imagine if an insurgency became a nihillistic campaign that recognised no borders. We can’t afford the conflict and the ideological stew there to metastasise.

Yet eight months into the U.S. South Asia strategy, four months after CSF and FMF funding cuts, FATF action, IMF squeeze, the designation of Hafiz Saeed’s party MML as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation, there’s seems no impact on Pakistan actions. What are the markers that Pakistan should take, for the U.S., and possibly India to acknowledge they have taken some action?

We fully share your concern over Hafiz Saeed. He is a terrorist, with money on his head, he should be in prison, not on the streets, and we have concerns about his ability to operate freely..... [pause] This is a process, and while I know that’s not a satisfactory answer for a country that has suffered significant acts of terrorism emanating from Pakistan.

The U.S. has suffered as well, Americans died in the Mumbai attacks….

Absolutely…but this is a process. And it is a serious process, and even our Indian friends recognise the seriousness of purpose of the United States in adopting and implementing its strategy. So I would say, bear with us, this isn’t the end of our diplomatic game. We are continuously engaging in Pakistan because we do see the need for change.

Is there a timeline? Or a point at which the U.S.’s patience runs out?

We are evaluating as we go, in consultations with our allies and friends. But this is a process.

What are the markers of what you would like to see Pakistan do in the next few months?

I think Pakistan knows what it can do to change the calculus and to disrupt and make it harder for Taliban or family members [other groups] to take advantage of Pakistan’s territory. That isn’t a mystery. There will soon be a new civilian leadership in Pakistan, and we will see how the new government will take steps to demonstrate to the international community that Pakistan is serious about curbing terror financing and money laundering.

Again, there we have seen some positive steps: whether it is on the (LeT-owned) charities, whether it is the executive order designating U.N. terrorists under the Anti-terrorism Act, this is what we are going to be looking for. I believe that the international consensus was that the greylist was necessary as these were not irreversible actions, but I have to say, in my consultations in Islamabad, including among the business community, there is a lot of support for moving forward on terror. This is in Pakistan’s interest, as a big country that needs foreign investment, the way to attract it is to have a stellar reputation and stellar record. So many people I met welcomed the double-edged sword of FATF.

From The Hindu:

Yet to see irreversible steps for change on the ground in Pakistan, says U.S. envoy Alice Wells

One Belt, One Road, One Thrashing: How China took Pakistan hostage

TUNKU VARADARAJAN 9 April, 2018

Unlike many in India, I derive no pleasure from the squalid little news clip that shows workers from China beating Pakistani cops and civilians at a Chinese work-camp outside the Punjabi town of Khanewal. Pakistan’s news media described the policemen as having been “thrashed”, a word reflecting the humiliation and feelings of emasculation that have swept through that country in the aftermath of the event.

This violent act of criminal assertiveness on foreign soil lays bare the contempt that the Chinese have for the Pakistanis. The Chinese workers wanted to leave their camp to let off steam at a local brothel. The police who were there to ensure the workers’ security tried to stop them from leaving unescorted, hence the brawl.

The cops’ submissiveness in the face of this assault shows the extent to which Pakistan has become a slavish sidekick of neo-imperial China. The image of a Chinese worker standing atop the bonnet of a police car captures the swagger of a dominant power, and the servility of its vassal.

How did Pakistan plummet so low? Pakistan separated from India in 1947, and, after Jinnah’s death, very quickly abandoned his soothing but hare-brained idea of being an Islamicate (to use a reputed historian’s coinage) version of India—in other words, a Muslim-majority secular, democratic republic.

In truth, Jinnah’s conception of Pakistan was always that of a welfare state for north India’s Muslim elite masquerading as Indo-Muslim nationalism. From the earliest years of its existence, Pakistan has searched hungrily—often desperately—for a raison d’etre. It was no longer India—but what was it instead? Its Independence Day, August 14, doesn’t—like India’s—unequivocally mark a final liberation from the British. It is also the day it parted ways with India, and with the Hindu.

So, Pakistan has had to be, by definition, the un-India, and it proceeded to be the un-India with an almost lip-smacking relish. Its genocide in East Pakistan was its pursuit of un-Indianness in its most hideous form, comprising the physical elimination of those of its citizens who were a reminder of Pakistan’s Indian past, Bengali citizens for whom being Pakistani didn’t mean the abandonment of a Sanskrit-based language and of a culture—song, dress, syncretism and literature—that was deeply rooted in a pre-Pakistani past.

In all of this, Pakistan erased much of its own history. The erasures were replaced by propaganda, and by selective memory. Pakistan embraced the Islamic-era history of India as its own exclusive narrative, and in a magical twist in this narrative, the Mughals were deemed, in spirit, to be Pakistani. (In an unlovely imitation of this process, India’s Hindutva chauvinists today also regard the Mughals as Pakistani.)

But a severing from their own truthful history produces a moral and spiritual rudderlessness in a people. Every people wishes to be the product of a past, and to belong to a culture rooted in that past; and so, Pakistan/un-India came to give itself Persian and Arab and Turkic dimensions as a substitute for the rejected Indic one, and Pakistanis became Persian and Arab and Turkic postulants, or wannabes.

I can think of no other country in the world where the linguistic majority regards its own language as a bumpkins’ tongue, inferior to the national language imposed upon it a mere 70 years ago. Punjabi, in Pakistan, has been reduced to the level of an informal patois, spoken off-duty and among friends, rarely in the office or the classroom.

An existentially rudderless country, Pakistan is always in search of meaning and of friends, and of outlets for its civic and political frustrations. These frustrations have led to the growth of Islamist radicalism in Pakistan, and these radicals have been exhorted onward by the forces of Wahhabi internationalism fanning out of Arabia. Islamist radicalism dovetails conveniently with the project of being the un-India, and terrorism in Pakistan now works overtime (and in partnership with the state) to bleed Hindu India by a thousand little cuts.

Given the economic and military shortcomings of Pakistan, it cannot take on India by itself. This is where China, with its own implacable hostility to India, comes on Pakistan’s stage. Pakistan has, for decades, been China’s complaisant little crony as a way to stiffen its defences against India. As the United States draws closer to India—while growing ever more distant from terrorist-infested Pakistan—the panicked Pakistanis have come to regard China as a life-support machine. Their fatal error is not just to rely so extensively on China for almost every single one of their needs, but also to fail to anticipate the python-like grip China would have over Pakistan in their bilateral relations. The very army (and ISI) that boasts most loudly of keeping Pakistani sovereignty safe from all aggressors has consigned Pakistan to the most profound vassaldom.

China’s helping hand has not come to Pakistan for free. Pakistan is now tethered to the Chinese, bound to Beijing as a hostage of its own history. Pakistan’s knack for self-delusion has largely prevented it from seeing how thoroughly it is being exploited by China. It has signed away significant amounts of northern land to China (including land that is lawfully Indian), and has practically gifted China a deep-water port in Gwadar that the Chinese are unlikely ever to vacate. And with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), Pakistan is now in a painful debt trap, Made in China.

The Chinese workers and engineers who rioted in Khanewal are in Pakistan to build a highway from Bahawalpur to Faisalabad. What would Jinnah think, one wonders, of the fact that the country for which he sundered a millennial civilisation cannot even put together its own highways?

There is a long history of Chinese workers going abroad to build infrastructure. Think of the railroad in the American West, and the role of the Chinese “coolie.” He went, then, as a semi-indentured serf, abused and vilified by the natives around him. Today he builds highways, but no one abuses him. In Pakistan, in fact, he is the abuser. He knows that he is among supplicants—and he knows that he owns them. One Belt, One Road…One Thrashing.

Tunku Varadarajan is the Virginia Hobbs Carpenter Fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution.

SSridhar wrote:Xi Jinping defends BRI; says China has no geo-political calculations - PTI

Oh, yeah !

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Outlining India's concerns, Indian Ambassador to China Gautam Bambawale told the state-run Global Times in a recent interview that both the countries should resolve their differences over the CPEC.

"This is a major problem for us. We need to talk about it, not push it under the carpet," he said.

About BRI, he told the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post recently that "the development connectivity must be transparent, fair and equal".

"If a project meets those norms, we will be happy to take part in it. One of the norms is the project should not violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a country. Unfortunately, there is this thing called CPEC, which is called a flagship project of BRI which violates India's sovereignty and territory integrity. Therefore, we oppose it," Bambawale had said.

…………………….{Rest Snipped}…………………

It appears that even a casual remark from a low ranking official about “support” for OBOR or suggesting a country’s “interest” in a project in a neighbouring country can be sufficient to see that country listed as a participant in OBOR.

Interestingly enough, not only does Belt and Road stretch into the indefinite future, it also reaches into the past. Some of China’s old projects, like the construction of Gwadar Port in Pakistan, which began in 2002, are now listed among the Belt and Road’s flagship achievements. This approach allows Beijing to re-package old deals and projects in OBOR wrapping, and present them to the world as Belt and Road deliverables.

In 2013, when Xi Jinping announced the SREB initiative in Astana, the new project was met in Moscow with suspicion. Russia’s economic growth trajectory was flat (the recession coming in 2014 after collapse of the oil price and international sanctions following the war in Ukraine), so the Kremlin didn’t have financial resources to jostle for power with China in Central Asia. The extravagant ambitions of the SREB project, supported by the size of Chinese economy, looked like an attempt by Beijing to insert itself into what Moscow has claimed to be its privileged sphere of influence. In the context of the rift in relations with the West and rapprochement with China, The Kremlin’s attitude towards Belt and Road underwent a U-turn in the autumn of 2014. Increasing numbers of Russian officials began to see it as a megaproject to export Chinese overcapacity and build continental trade routes to Europe that would go through Russia and offer constructive synergies with the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). In fact, the Customs Union between Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus provides Chinese producers in the Western part of the PRC the shortest land road to Europe, and an opportunity to reach European customers by crossing just two borders. In Moscow, on May 8, 2015, Putin and Xi signed a political declaration linking OBOR to the EEU. China and the EEU have started talks on a trade agreement, and Russia has pitched over 40 investment projects to Zhang Gaoli, China’s Vice-Premier of the State Council and chairman of the leadership small group on OBOR in Zhongnanhai. Given the political green light, many of Russia’s oligarchs rushed to Beijing with their projects, trying to wrap them in Belt and Road slogans.

The last two years have been a rude awakening for Russia and its EEU partners. The experience has been that adding the “OBOR” brand to a project did not elicit any additional concessions from the Chinese side, and that in most cases Beijing has looked for profitable projects with a good internal rate of return. For example, out of 40 projects that support transport connectivity between Western China and Europe through EEU states, Beijing declined to invest in a single one, citing unsustainable financial models and unclear prospects for returns

Problems facing OBOR / BRI for China. From China itself. Read on.

#ThreadOfTheDay

https://twitter.com/avarakai/status/983756038091390976

sunnyP wrote:It’s remarkable that Russia's Ambassador to India can, on Indian soil, praise Pakistan in such a way.

Russian envoy to India defends country’s growing ties with Pakistan

In my take…after this country joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, after this country started to take serious measures to curb the financing of terror, the credibility of Pakistan is growing and there is no reason, no sense to deny its wish, its will to be a part of regional and global efforts to fight terror, to search for stability and to enhance economic integration,” he said during the question and answer session.

Earlier in his speech, Kudashev said Russia is “open for contacts with every country” to ensure regional stability. Without naming Pakistan or the US, he also said “excessive pressure” on any of Afghanistan’s neighbours would “just antagonise them and make numerous problems even more complicated”.

https://m.hindustantimes.com/world-news ... hnhXM.html

“The credibility of this country (Pakistan) after it joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), after it started to take serious measures on the financing of terror, the credibility of Pakistan is growing. There is no reason, no sense to deny its wish to be part of the regional and global effort to fight terror, to search for stability and enhanced economic integration,”

WASHINGTON D.C: The ongoing over USD 60 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project, which forms a part of Beijing's ambitious transnational Belt Road Initiative (BRI), is according to a report, turning out to be an economic as well as a security headache for both China and Pakistan.

"For Pakistan, rising debt is imperiling the country's long-term economic viability. For China, sunk costs in infrastructure assets and personnel on the ground are drawing Beijing deeper into Pakistan's internal security concerns," says the report prepared by the Center for Advanced Defense Studies (C4ADS), a Washington D.C.-based non-profit organisation dedicated to data-driven analysis and evidence-based reporting of global conflict and security issues. {Perhaps that was the Baki desire from the start. Enmesh China deep enough in Bakistan to deter an Indian attack AND use this as leverage to milk China as it has milked US.}

The Gwadar Port branded and promoted as a signature Pakistan-China development model Gwadar that will eventually be built into an "industrial powerhouse" with planned manufacturing facilities, a free trade zone and a liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal, is turning out to be unprofitable, with a ship berthing averaging of one-and-a-half per month.

Add to this is the worrisome and shocking statistic that China gets to retain 91 percent of the port's profits, as financial and lease control of this port for the next 40 years remains with the state-owned China Overseas Ports Holding Co. Ltd., says the C4ADS report.

It's surprising that the first-ever container ship arrived in Gwadar only in March 2018.

"The Port of Gwadar is over a decade old. Construction began in 2002 with a 198 million USD loan from the China EXIM Bank and it was completed in 2007, at which point the Port of Singapore Authority (PSA) assumed control of the port's operations. For six years, China took a largely backseat role, while PSA and the Pakistani government struggled with the port's development, with no meaningful additions to port infrastructure during this time.

PSA abandoned the project in 2013 due in part to Pakistan's worsening internal security environment.China quickly picked up the port's operation and has committed over 270 million USD to rehabilitate the port," the C4ADS report reveals.

The report further states that commercial activity at the Gwadar port is well below its potential. Satellite imagery data analyzed by C4ADS suggests the port relies primarily on transshipments rather than import or export routes, with only an estimated 200 ships calling in on the port between 2008 and 2017.

The C4ADS quoted Gwadar Port Authority Chairman Dostain Jamaldini as saying last month, "We receive one or two ships in 15 days."

China, according to C4ADS is looking at Gwadar as a long-term economic investment, as an "end-point" on a route stretching from Gwadar to China's western provinces, a corridor that would shorten China's energy routes by almost 10,000 miles and bypass the Malacca Strait.

"Shipments from the Pakistani coast to Kashgar in China that previously took a month would be completed in 10 days, and the port's strategic location outside of the Gulf of Oman, serves as a gateway between Middle Eastern sources of oil and Indo-Pacific sea lanes, thus alleviating the Malacca Dilemma if a proposed oil pipeline were ever built. The corridor also serves another of Beijing's goals - to bring economic development to inland China." {First part about Kashgar is true but the 2nd part on Malacca dilemma is again wrong. Cutpaste of logic. 1) Malacca is not just about oil but trade. 2) The Oil is needed to the eastern seaboard not Kashgar. 3) Terrain + Cost 4) What about South China trade with neighbors? If the Eastern seaboard is blocked then that trade in theory too will have to be routed via Gwadar and will have to transit in the opposite direction to the oil trade and there it will have its tryst with Malacca}

The report, however, reveals that the CPEC is bedeviled with major structural impediments, the most significant of which is the threat from militants and insurgents.

"At present, the road from China to Pakistan begins with the Karakoram Highway; one of the world's most dangerous mountain passes.a route that is regularly closed for snow during several months each year. Much of trade then passes through areas of sovereign territorial disputes and insurgency. In Balochistan, where Gwadar is located, attacks by militants on CPEC projects are estimated to have killed 44 workers and injured over 100 from 2014 to 2016. Once goods finally arrive at Pakistani ports, they typically incur higher dock charges and longer wait times than they would at regional competitors," says the report.

Ongoing investments by Beijing notwithstanding, another global concern, is the huge number of Chinese entering Pakistan for work.

According to the Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FPCCI), roughly 250,000 Chinese expatriates arrive in Pakistan each year for work.

"The increasing numbers of Chinese citizens; and other interests on the ground are pushing Beijing to take an increasingly direct role in Pakistan's internal security."

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi is on record as saying, "How to protect China's ever-expanding overseas interests is an urgent concern for Chinese diplomacy."

It is now a well known fact that Chinese officials have quietly interacted with insurgent groups in Balochistan and along the China-Pakistan border to persuade militants to lay down their arms and engage in negotiations with the Pakistan government.

India and the United States share a common view that Gwadar will eventually be used to establish a Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean. A U.S. Department of Defense report to the U.S. Congress has specifically revealed that if there is any country that Pakistan would agree with to have military bases on its soil, it would be China.

According to the C4ADS report, "China is rumored to be constructing a permanent air force and naval base in Jiwani, Pakistan, near Gwadar, while observers have noted that Gwadar itself could serve many of the PLAN's maritime logistics needs. China has officially denied any military intentions driving CPEC and Gwadar. Nevertheless, the Chinese military's presence in Pakistan is increasing. Under the stated objective of helping secure Gwadar's security, China has officially stated that it is in the process of increasing its marine forces from 20,000 to 100,000 troops, in part to facilitate overseas rotations to Gwadar."

The limited transparency on CPEC-related investments puts a cloud over how much Pakistan will eventually benefit.

"If completed as planned, CPEC's productivity would be equivalent to 17% of Pakistan's 2015 gross GDP, and as many as 700,000 jobs would be created. As a result, Pakistan could see economic growth of 2.5%. Yet this is highly speculative as few credible studies have been conducted on the structures and economics of CPEC deals. The State Bank of Pakistan's governor has publicly called on CPEC to be more transparent, saying, "I don't know out of the $46 billion how much is debt, how much is equity, and how much is kind."

Available evidence suggests CPEC projects, including Gwadar, disproportionately favor China while unfavorably burdening Pakistan in the long term.

The extent to which these projects will, in the interim, stimulate local employment and investment is also uncertain. According to some reports in local media, Pakistan is allegedly only considering bids for CPEC construction projects that come from Chinese state-owned enterprises, firms which, some Pakistani economists note, rarely subcontract with local partners.

Similarly, the job market for Baloch locals on CPEC projects is reported to be relatively limited, ostensibly because they lack skills. Instead, Chinese businesses allegedly rely on Chinese workers, whose growing numbers are exacerbating an already tense socio-political divide in Balochistan.

Excellencies,

Connectivity with SCO countries is India’s priority. We want connectivity to pave the way for cooperation and trust between our societies.

For this, respect for sovereignty is essential. Inclusivity, transparency and sustainability are imperative.India has cooperated extensively with international community for enhanced connectivity.

This is evident from our involvement with the

(i) International North-South Transport Corridor,
(ii) the Chabahar Port Development,
(iii) the Ashgabat Agreement,
(iv) India-Myanmar-Thailand Highway Project,
(v) Bangladesh-Butan-India-Nepal (BBIN) Initiative amongst others.

India has operationalized the air freight corridor between Kabul, Kandahar, New Delhi and Mumbai last year.

All these initiatives would further strengthen the entire spectrum of multi-modal networks in the SCO space.