Bharat Rakshak

FIRST POST - NOVEMBER 23, 2013 - WHY SAUDI ARABIA FEARS IRAN; WHY SAUDI ARABIA CANNOT AFFECT IRAN; WHY DO WAHHABISM AND ZIONISM GO HAND IN HAND

WHY SAUDI ARABIA FEARS IRAN

If we look back before Arabians knew they had marketable, profitable petroleum with massive reserves, we would be looking at a race of mostly wandering Bedouins with no axe to grind and no grievances. After all, living the life of a vagabond inevitably erases wrongs and offenses by the mere fact of leaving them behind in the sand. To be sure, Arabians are fond of their poetry and will vilify an offender in rhyme....sometimes with trenchant sarcasm that resonates - reverberates back to the perpetrator of the offense with stinging effect. But, having a gripe against another people outside the blinding glass of the desert would be unthinkable. It is very likely that Arabians didn't even know that Iranians existed. They might have heard of Persians, but that is in the old poesy.

In the late 18th Century, the heretical beliefs of Muhammad Ibn 'Abdul-Wahhaab, a Najdi cleric heavily influenced by the crackpot theologian Ibn Taymiyya, had succeeded in allying himself to the rising Ibn Saud tribe with obvious results. When 'Abdul-'Aziz Ibn 'Abdul-Rahman Ibn Sa'ud, a cat burglar, highwayman, terrorist, polygamist and pederast, became King of Arabia, Wahhabism was a part of the package.

The Saudis under the influence of Wahhabism, already had a history of attacking Shi'ites in Karbala and Al-Najaf where sites holy to them were barbarously destroyed in acts of callousness typical of the ignorant, obnoxious, black-and-white simplism that would become emblematic of the Wahhabist style of seeing the world. But, Iran was still not a part of their Weltanschauung because Arabians had not yet absorbed the way oil would transform them from a worthless, shiftless, shallow, shoddy, shabby Bedouin people into a worthless, shiftless, shallow, shoddy, shabby but inordinately rich Bedouin people. It was like "The Beverly Hillbillies Go to Mecca". Or, maybe, "Ma and Pa Kettle Dock at the U.N". Or even more telling: "Tarzan's Cheetah Loves Geneva".

It was all so nice during the Cold War. Saudis, who have the perspicacity of an old divan, were satisfied with the Manichaeism of the time. Everybody knew where they stood. Even the Iranians, who would become a bete noir for the Arabian simpletons later in the 20th Century, were subject to American skulduggery as when the beacon of democracy, America, overthrew the legitimate government Mossadegh.
They were to do the same thing, of course, with the unlucky Chilean president, Salvador Allende, a few decades later. But that was okay to the narrow-minded Wahhabists because it was in pure hypocrisy that they found their niche. No diplomatic finesse here; just hypocrisy, the oldest method to a successful enterprise.

Because they rarely, if ever, read history, Arabians are the people most likely to repeat it. And as ignorant savages, they could never have figured out that the Iranian culture was starkly different from their own as far as intellectual accomplishments went. Whereas, on the one hand, the Arabians have contributed a solid zero in the areas of science, medicine, philosophy - only having excelled in generating ludicrous, draconian, empty-headed, constipated fire-and-brimstone religious cults, Iranian culture, on the other hand, is so filled with a thematic adoration for the intellect that it is hard to imagine they could have accomplished so much throughout the millennia being so close geographically to the pathogenetically stultifying gravitational pull of the Peninsular Arabians. (I make an exception here for the founder of Islam, the Messenger Muhammad, although I do it grudgingly.) It is not as though Iran and the Arabians are separated by a mere Gulf, greedily referred to by the latter as "Arabian", they are more accurately separated by the Andromeda Galaxy.

As decades of prodigal and dissolute spending continued unabated with anecdotes of Saudi Arabian idiocy reaching mythic levels, Iranian oil wealth was spent on domestic institutional development. Whereas the Arabians imported Filipino nurses for their hospitals, Iranians trained Iranians to do the same. Whereas Saudi Arabians were sent off to study in America as a welcome therapeutic break from the asphyxiating tedium of Wahhabist life, Iranians were studying abroad in order to return and teach in their own country. Where Saudi Arabia had to buy Pakistani mercenaries to fly their jets, Iran was training Iranians to build jets ............and fly them.

Now, throughout all this, the U.S., U.K., France and all the other pasty-faced white people in Europe had to put on a big smile as atrocity after atrocity emanated from the "magical" kingdom of Arabia. Hypocrisy is not easy to maintain with the right pallor of the skin- it's like a British motor vehicle - you have to keep a record of it else you'll find yourself sticking the old proverbial foot in your mouth. So, with Arabia, when women are not permitted to drive based on nothing more than some shaman's opinion, American diplomats have to be prepared to mouth expressions like this: "Oh, we're working on this with our Saudi friends". When the Saudis execute a woman for sorcery, the British ambassador, his mouth all full of rabbit marbles, has to utter his most Oxonian response: "Oh, well, deeeya. Really? Hmmmm. Are there sorcerers in Arabia still? Anybody up for a nice round of tennis?" When the Saudis arrest a man for offering "free hugs", the French must be prepared to shrug and say: "Bien. When in Mecca, you must do as the Meccan's do. Let him do it in Paris." And the hypocrisy goes on and on.

The Saudis were evidently very happy with the Shah of Iran. He was trusted by the U.S. He was a monarch; actually, the Shah of Shahs. He bought American military products and used them to police the Gulf, a form of free protection for the otherwise useless race of prosimian derelicts who populated the "Peninsula" ("Al-Jazeera"). When he was overthrown, the Saudis began to detect a change in the atmosphere. Imam Khomeini's extermination of the communists (Tudeh) might have made them feel somewhat comfortable, but his Marg bar Amreekaa (Death to America) and anti-Zionism mantras seemed over the top. In fact, the entire episode smacked of a resurgent Iranian regional assertion of power that necessarily challenged the status quo.

Saddam Hussayn had a huge army ornamented with the required equipment to undo Khomeini's revolution. Since the Arabians were, are and always will be incapable of doing anything proactively, they hired Saddam to do their dirty work. It is hard to tell if the U.S.'s own support for Saddam at this time was motivated by either a desire to antagonize the Iranians or not antagonize the Arabians. Whatever the case, the U.S. threw its full weight behind the Bad Boy of Baghdad, giving him technology to develop his own WMDs, SatInt and even sage advice on how to defeat the hundreds of thousands of Iranians who kept hectoring him with massive human waves across the marshes of southern Mesopotamia.

The Saddam gambit cost the Arabians, all of them, including the Kuwaitis, a bundle of cash and it resulted in a typical Arabian "ZERO". Saddam did not overthrow the Khomeini government. What happened instead was his own invasion of Kuwait! Well! As the feckless, useless, malodorous Kuwaiti Sabaah family headed for the dunes of Arabia to avoid Saddam's well-known tender mercies, so to speak, the U.S., ever mindful of its obligations to the etiquette of hypocrisy, took up the cause of - No! not destroying Iran - but, instead, attacking Saddam! (All these sentences are punctuated with exclamation marks to emphasize the surreal nature of this particular history.) But, then, when the U.S. could have decapitated the government in Baghdad, the Old Bush and his coterie of brainiacs decided that it was nice, after all, to have Saddam there as a cushion against the Iranians who are the cause of all this trouble anyways!

Nobody said American foreign policy was "neat". It's actually quite messy. Saddam was now the enemy of the Arabians. And so were the Iranians, but for different reasons. The Arabians, who "think" in the way that baboons have sensory input, maneuvered themselves into a genuine SNAFU for it was only a few years later that "Teeny-Weeny Bush" would be elected by the sagacious citizenry of America to finish the job. He had a real chip on his shoulder - bearing in mind Saddam - ever, the assassin - had plotted revenge against his "Pappy" during a visit to Teeny-Weeny Kuwait. Saddam never forgave the Elder Bush for April Glaspie's slip of the tongue. But, the Saudis would pay a heavier price for Saddam's fall and the U.S. failure in Iraq that would bring to power a Shi'i government under Noor Al-Maaliki.!!

As all of you probably know, hypocrisy makes strange bedfellows. Neoconservative-Zionist popinjays, largely Jewish Zionists and paid agents of the Khazar Settler State, had started to infest Washington with their ideology of using "military force" to bring about democratic change in the world. The truth is that Michael Ledeen couldn't give a rat's derriere about democratic change in the world. His only commitment was to the longevity of the counterfeit Zionist Settler State in historic Southern Syria (Palestine). Oh, but didn't they inveigle their way into the White House, cajoling intellectual powder-puffs like Cheney whose evil lies more in his ignorance than in any perfervid lust for lucre? They snookered Zionist Christians like Bush and his "base" of ranting, snorting, sniveling, cupiditous Televangelists. They even suckered Fouad Ajami, their resident satrap, into believing their paeans to democratic change were sincere, not meant to abase the Arabs but to release "their profound energies" in a world so Utopian it's amazing Ajami fell for it in the first place.

The neo-cons infiltrated the White House with personalities like Douglas Feith, Elliott Abrams and Paul Wolfowitz. These neo-Trotskyites, in reality, were agents of the Zionist Entity. Whatever the cause, it had to be seen through the prism of Zionism and the overarching impetus to extend the life of the Neo-Colonial Eastern European Jewish Ghetto State. Here, the bedfellows are the Saudi Arabians, who suddenly had a friend in Washington - (not the ineffectual, effete Arab lobbyists) - and the Neo-Cons who sniffed a rich old dowager slag (desperate for their affections) to finance their perverse world view. Bandar Bin Sultan, the "hawkish" but mentally sterile Saudi intelligence chief, is a neo-con in the meaning of "tolerated WOG". He languishes in the aura of acceptance by individuals he deems "vastly superior" to the Arab detritus among whom he must wallow. The neocons, for all their sufferance, withhold criticism of Saudi Wahhabist culture. After all, the Saudis bought their jingle, hook-line-and-sinker and were committed to "Israel's" durability.

So, what does Iran have to do with this? Very simple. What the Saudis have only lately realized is that the Iranians are smarter than the neocons. What the Saudis perceived as "Israeli" genius has turned out to be a canard, even a red herring. When in July 2006, Hizbollah, a paramilitary militia, beat the stuffing out of the Zionist army in South Lebanon with Iranian/Syrian planning, arms and finance, the Saudis knew something was amiss. All of you remember George Bush's public confidence in the Zionist army's ability to annihilate Hizbollah. Hmm. Didn't turn out that way.

The Saudis knew, as of July 2006, that Syria was a part of this Hizbollah-Iranian military axis. That Syria's president hailed from the Alawi sect was not an issue as long as he affirmed Syria's "Sunni" character and kept the Iranian beast far hence. But, Dr. Assad, like his father, saw something in Iran that he did not find in Arabia: raw internal power that can translate into tangible assets to fight the war to liberate Arab lands. As Syria was building up its missile manufacturing capabilities with the help of Iran and North Korea, the Saudis were aghast at Iran's massive, domestic nuclear program which outstripped the Zionist one by light years. Unlike Saddam and his Osirak Reactor which was destroyed by "Israel" in one fell swoop on June 7, 1981 with the help of the Saudi government, the Iranian project was much more complex, more protected, more well-thought-out, more impenetrable. Now, it was clear that the U.S. had to do the job for Saudi Arabia's fear of the Fatimid Crescent is embedded in Iran's Shi'ite character linked to the weaponization of its nuclear program. But, what if the U.S. saw it as too dangerous?

Sanctions upon sanctions were imposed on both Iran and Syria. No two nations in recent memory - not even North Korea - had suffered so much deprivation due to the confluence of Euro-American Zionist hegemonics. Yet, the Saudis watched in horror as General Vaheedi of Iran pooh-poohed the sanctions and praised them as having given Iran the impetus to develop internal capabilities far beyond what they would have been otherwise if Iran were still a part of the interlocking technological world run by the West. The Iranians had, in essence, thumbed their noses at the Arabians who, themselves, could not last 24 hours without the help of their Pakistani manservants, Filipina nurses or Ethiopian gardeners. Iran was on its way, inexorably, to regional superpower status - and all that at the expense of the Wahhabist heresy.

To break Iran, Saudia took it upon itself to make it clear that this was an "existential" matter which the Americans had better understand. Like the Zionist Entity, the Saudis positioned themselves in a square defined as "threatened minority reactionary unit committed to survival to protect the interests of a minority". It is the same logic as Zionism which is why Saudia and "Israel" are in the same bed for it is hypocrisy, not politics, that makes the strangest bedfellows.

The reader should note that the U.S., while publicly trying to assuage the hurt feelings of the Wahhabist monkeys, has also embarked on a new track, perhaps motivated by the same epiphany which persuaded Hafez Al-Assad to sign on with Iran against Saddam. Very courageous back then. Maybe, Obama has gotten the impression that Saudi Arabia is a relic of a pre-Iron Age society with no future and that the Iranian model could be the linchpin for a new American-Islamic engagement. It is precisely this volte-face that terrifies the Saudis as much as the Zionists for they are both in the same bed, sharing the same blanket and pillow. Their interests are one and the same. If any of you wonder if the Saudi regime cares a whit about the Palestinians, think of their relationship as no different from that of Zionism. When the Palestinians finally figure that out, they will know who their allies really are.

Iran has analyzed all of this. The evolution of their missile industry capable now of manufacturing anti-missile, anti-aircraft, anti-ship......anti-Saudi weapons is a sign of Armageddon for Riyadh and its noisome ideology of cultural suffocation. Iran knows why it is feared by the Saudis. The Saudi persophobia is not fear of Iranian Shi'is, it is fear of the intellect - what the Saudis cannot have for all their money and all the tea in China. ZAF

As Middle Eastern nations attempted to elbow one another aside in their efforts to offer encouraging statements about the recently concluded nuclear talks between Iran and six world powers on Sunday, Saudi Arabia took its time. More than a day later the Cabinet offered its own pallid take: “If there is goodwill, then this agreement could represent a preliminary step toward a comprehensive solution to the Iranian nuclear program.” Behind the gritted-teeth delivery there lurked an almost palpable sense of frustration, betrayal and impotence as Saudi Arabia watched its foremost foe gain ground in a 34-year competition for influence in the region.As discussions leading up to the historic agreement in Geneva unfurled over the past several months, Saudi did its utmost to express its discontent, lobbying behind closed doors for greater restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program and rejecting at the last minute a long-sought seat on the U.N. Security Council. Saudi officials even threatened to get their own nuclear weapons; just before the talks concluded the Saudi ambassador to the U.K., Prince Mohammed bin Nawaf bin Abdulaziz, told the Times of London: “We are not going to sit idly by and receive a threat there and not think seriously how we can best defend our country and our region.”“It’s as if Saudi Arabia and Iran suddenly traded places,” marvels Riyadh- and Istanbul-based Saudi foreign-affairs commentator Abdullah al-Shamri. “Now [U.S. President] Obama and [Iranian President] Rouhani are talking on the phone while their Foreign Ministers shake hands, and it’s Saudi Arabia that is throwing the temper tantrums at the U.N., shouting about nuclear weapons and trying to show the world that they are angry.”

Saudi Arabia’s frustration with the Iranian deal has little to do with nuclear weapons, and everything to do with insecurity, says F. Gregory Gause III, a professor of Middle Eastern politics at the University of Vermont. “It comes from a profound and exaggerated fear that a nuclear deal with Iran is a prelude to an American-Iranian geopolitical agreement that in essence leaves Iran as the dominant power in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq.” The U.S., of course, is unlikely to turn the keys to the region over to Iran anytime soon, but the Saudis are not entirely wrong in thinking the Obama Administration wants to disengage from the region, says Gause. The U.S. “backed off in Syria, it’s not taking an active role in Iraq, and it does want better relations with Iran.” From this, he says, the Saudis have pieced together a convincing narrative of abandonment that is causing them to lash out in unpredictable ways.As the first round of nuclear talks got under way on Nov. 7 in Geneva, select leaks to the Western media suggested that Saudi Arabia was planning to buy nuclear weapons from Pakistan. A month before, former Israeli military intelligence chief Amos Yadlin told a conference in Sweden that if Iran got a bomb, “the Saudis will not wait one month. They already paid for the bomb, they will go to Pakistan and bring what they need to bring.”There may be truth to Yadlin’s comments. Saudi Arabia has backed and at times helped fund Pakistan’s nuclear program, according to proliferation experts. (The program became public in 1998.) That doesn’t mean that acquiring a nuclear bomb is as easy as shipping it across the Arabian Sea. Saudi, as a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, would risk global reproach, possible sanctions and the launch of a regional arms race if it had its own bomb. A more likely scenario, says Gary Samore, Obama’s former arms-control adviser and director for research at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, would be some sort of pact that could see Pakistani nuclear weapons moved to Saudi Arabia. “Even if U.S. diplomacy fails and Iran gets nuclear weapons, Pakistan isn’t just going to hand over nuclear weapons; it’s more likely that Pakistan would station forces in Saudi, and those forces will have the ability to deploy nuclear weapons from Saudi soil” — much like American troops are able to do in Europe, without contravening those country’s nonproliferation treaties.Still, such a pact would have significant drawbacks, points out Gause. Pakistan may not be willing to attack its neighbor Iran for fear of repercussions, and it would be a death knell for the U.S.-Saudi friendship. “In terms of putting at risk relations with the United States, a Pakistani nuclear pact would be the most provocative Saudi foreign policy decision since the 1973 oil embargo,” says Gause. That might serve Saudi pique at being sidelined by its old ally America as that ally pursues a lasting deal with Iran, but it would ultimately be self-defeating. Better for Saudi in the long run would be a deal that brings Iran closer to the U.S., and further from a bomb.

Britons protest over Israel plan to remove 70,000 Palestinian Bedouins
More than 50 public figures including Antony Gormley and Brian Eno put names to letter opposing expulsion from historic land

Harriet Sherwood in Jerusalem
The Guardian, Friday 29 November 2013 18.49 GMT

Bedouin children walk to school in the Negev desert. Photograph: Karen Robinson

More than 50 public figures in Britain, including high-profile artists, musicians and writers, have put their names to a letter opposing an Israeli plan to forcibly remove up to 70,000 Palestinian Bedouins from their historic desert land – an act condemned by critics as ethnic cleansing.

The letter, published in the Guardian, is part of a day of protest on Saturday in Israel, Palestine and two dozen other countries over an Israeli parliamentary bill that is expected to get final approval by the end of this year.

The eviction and destruction of about 35 "unrecognised" villages in the Negev desert will, the letter says, "mean the forced displacement of Palestinians from their homes and land, and systematic discrimination and separation".

The signatories – who include the artist Antony Gormley, the actor Julie Christie, the film director Mike Leigh and the musician Brian Eno – are demanding that the British government holds Israel to account over its human rights record and obligations under international law.

According to Israel, the aims of the Prawer Plan – named after the head of a government commission, Ehud Prawer – are economic development of the Negev desert and the regulation of Palestinian Bedouins living in villages not recognised by the state.

The population of these villages will be removed to designated towns, while plans for new Jewish settlements in the area are enacted.

But Adalah, a human rights and legal centre for Arabs in Israel, says: "The real purpose of the legislation [is] the complete and final severance of the Bedouin's historical ties to their land."

The "unrecognised" villages in the Negev, whose populations range from a few hundred to 2,000, lack basic services such as running water, electricity, landline telephones, roads, high schools and health clinics. Some consist of a few shacks and animal pens made from corrugated iron; others include concrete houses and mosques built without necessary but unobtainable permission.

The Bedouin comprise about 30% of the Negev's population but their villages take up only 2.5% of the land. Before the state of Israel was created in 1948 they roamed widely across the desert; now, two-thirds of the region has been designated as military training grounds and firing ranges.

Under the Prawer Plan, between 40,000 and 70,000 of the remaining Bedouin – who became Israeli citizens in the 1950s – will be moved into seven over-crowded, impoverished, crime-ridden state-planned towns. The Israeli government says it is an opportunity for Bedouins to live in modern homes, take regular jobs and send their children to mainstream schools. They will be offered compensation to move, it adds.

Miranda Pennell, a film-maker and one of the letter's signatories, said: "Citizenship counts for nothing in Israel if you happen to be an Arab. Tens of thousands of Palestinian Bedouin are being forcibly displaced from their homes and lands. At the same time, there are Israeli government advertisements on the web that promise you funding as a British immigrant to come and live in 'vibrant communities' in the Negev – if you are Jewish. This is ethnic cleansing."

The actor David Calder said: "The Israeli state not only practices apartheid against the Palestinians in the occupied Palestinian territories, but it seems they have no hesitation in practicing apartheid on their own citizens – in this instance, the Bedouins. When is the west going to find these actions intolerable?"

Ian Black in Riyadh
theguardian.com, Friday 29 November 2013 12.52 GMT
Foreign workers waiting to be deported in Riyadh. Photograph: EPA

Under the watchful eyes of Saudi policemen slouched in their squad cars along a rundown street, little knots of Ethiopian men sit chatting on doorsteps and sprawl on threadbare grass at one of Riyadh's busiest junctions. These are tense, wary times in Manfouha, a few minutes' drive from the capital's glittering towers and swanky shopping malls.

Manfouha is the bleak frontline in Saudi Arabia's campaign to get rid of its illegal foreign workers, control the legal ones and help get more of its own citizens into work. This month two or three Ethiopians were killed here after a raid erupted into full-scale rioting.

Keeping their distance from the officers parked every few hundred metres, the Ethiopians look shifty and sound nervous. "Of course I have an iqama [residence permit]," insisted Ali, a gaunt twentysomething man in cheap leather jacket and jeans. "I wouldn't be standing here if I hadn't."

But he didn't have the document on him. And his story, in broken Arabic, kept changing: he was in the process of applying for one; actually, no, his kafeel (sponsor) had it. It didn't sound as if it would convince the police or passport inspection teams prowling the neighbourhood.

Until recently, of the kingdom's 30 million residents, more than nine million were non-Saudis. Since the labour crackdown started in March, one million Bangladeshis, Indians, Filipinos, Nepalis, Pakistanis and Yemenis have left. And the campaign has moved into higher gear after the final deadline expired on 4 November, with dozens of repatriation flights now taking place every day. By next year, two million migrants will have gone.

No one is being singled out, the authorities say. Illegal workers of 14 nationalities have been detained and are awaiting deportation. But the Ethiopians, many of whom originally crossed into Saudi Arabia from Yemen, are widely portrayed as criminals who are said to be mixed up with alcohol and prostitution. "They'd rather sit here and do nothing than go home because maybe they will get some kind of work," sneered Adel, one of the few Saudis to brave Manfouha's mean streets. "In Ethiopia there is nothing for them."
Manfouha Ethiopian men in Manfouha, southern Riyadh. Photograph: AP

The Ethiopian government said this week that 50,000 of its nationals had already been sent home, with the total expected to rise to 80,000. Every day hundreds more trudge through the gates of the heavily guarded campus of Riyadh's Princess Noora University, awaiting a coach ride to the airport, fingerprinting, a final exit visa and their one-way flight to Addis Ababa.

Incidents involving Ethiopians are reported almost obsessively on Twitter and YouTube and across mainstream media outlets. Ethiopians complain in turn of being robbed and beaten, and of routine abuse and mistreatment by their Saudi employers. Protests have been held outside Saudi embassies in several countries. Prejudice is so rife that the Ethiopian ambassador had to insist that the Muslim or Christian beliefs of his compatriots prevented them from practising sorcery.

Yet other foreign workers show little sympathy or solidarity. "These people believe this is their country," said Mohamed, a Bangladeshi who runs a petrol station in the centre of Manfouha. "They are big trouble, and dangerous. I've seen them carrying long knives."

Mokhtar, a Somali, had no problem with them. "I'm not afraid of the Ethiopians because we are neighbours," he grinned. "But the Saudis are. I have heard the stories about them breaking into houses and I've seen them smashing up cars on this road." Ansar, another Ethiopian who blamed his boss for withholding his iqama, condemned his violent compatriots as kuffar – infidels.

Saudi Arabia's addiction to cheap foreign labour goes back to the oil boom and religious awakening of the mid-1970s. In recent years it has come to be seen as an enormous problem that distorts the economy and keeps young people out of the labour market. But the government turned a blind eye and little happened until March. And it remains to be seen whether the notorious kafala (sponsorship) system – responsible for many abuses – can be reformed or replaced. Saudis say one of the biggest problems is foreigners who have fled their original kafeel and effectively disappeared.

"We will need two decades to get back to where we were in the 1970s," predicted Turki al-Hamad, a writer who grew up in the eastern city of Dammam, where Saudis used to work in the Aramco oilfields. "We are better off economically than we were then, but much worse off socially."
Foreign workers in Riyadh Foreign workers wait with their belongings before boarding police buses in Riyadh. Photograph: Fayez Nureldine/AFP/Getty Images

The "regularisation" campaign has had some unintended though probably predictable consequences. The sudden acceleration of departures, both voluntary and forced, has left building sites deserted and corpses unwashed. Some schools have closed due to an absence of caretakers. In Jeddah a septic tank overflowed disastrously because the cleaners had all fled after hearing word of an impending police raid. Rubbish is piling up everywhere. In Medina undocumented foreigners dressed up in robes to blend in and avoid attention.

"Two friends of mine were arrested in a furniture shop," said Mohamed Shafi, a driver from Kerala in India. "Their kafeel said it was too expensive to regularise their status so he sacked them. Now they are in a detention centre and there's no way to contact them."

Middle-class Saudis bemoan the sudden disappearance of their maids and drivers (an economic necessity for women, who are banned from driving) and find themselves sucked into a costly labyrinth if they try to intervene. "I had to use the black market and I've paid 100,000 riyals [£16,000]) to regularise my workers," complained a British manager. Embassies are being overwhelmed by nationals frantically seeking the documents they need to allow them to leave the country. "You could see this was a disaster waiting to happen," said another European resident. "It just wasn't thought through. It's all about incompetence."

In the long term the expulsions should help the wider "Saudisation" programme, based on the nitaqat or quotas for employing Saudis in certain sectors depending on the size of the enterprise. But this is not only about the menial work that pampered Saudis refuse to do. Hundreds of thousands of Europeans, Lebanese, Syrians and Egyptians work in the private sector. According to the latest figures from the IMF, 1.5m of the 2m new jobs created in the last four years went to non-Saudis. Entire areas of the economy are controlled by foreigners.

Oil prices are still high and growth enviably healthy but everyone knows that the vast state sector – providing jobs for the boys, if not for the girls – will have to shrink in years to come. Officially unemployment is already 12%; it is probably more than twice that among the two-thirds of the population who are under 30. Every year about 100,000 graduates enter the job market. Technical colleges are now providing vocational training.

"Saudisation can only succeed if a company really wants to do it," argued Abdelrahman al-Mutlak, a businessman. "It can't be done by regulation. Too many Saudis still think it's a lot more prestigious to hire a foreigner even if there is perfectly good Saudi candidate available."
Ethiopian worker in Manfouha An Ethiopian worker argues with a member of the Saudi security forces in Manfouha. Photograph: Reuters

Economists point out that with fewer foreign workers sending remittances home, more money will stay in the country and help boost consumer spending. Official accounts of the expulsion campaign have an almost apologetic tone and stress the efforts the security forces are making and the difficulties they face. But the Saudi Twittersphere echoes to complaints that Prince Mohammed Bin Nayef, the interior minister (and a likely future king) has been too soft on what one angry tweet called "criminal gangs of Ethio-Israelis".

It seems clear that the public is cheering on the government on the foreign labour issue. "It is the right thing to do," said Fawziya al-Bakr, a lecturer. "We've reached the point where people were trading in these workers and women were running away to become prostitutes. This is a problem that has built up over 40 years. It can't just be swept up in nine months. But it has to be done. When everything is legalised it will be easier to control."

For Kamel, a Shia businessman from Qatif, in the Eastern province, the expulsions are long overdue. "These people live in ghettoes run by gangsters," he said. "If they are not here legally we don't want them. It just creates problems. They had a period of grace but didn't do anything about it. In Manfouha the Ethiopians started attacking the properties of Pakistanis and Afghans. That was a big mistake. The government says it can solve this problem – so it's really acting tough."
Abuses and exploitation

More than eight million migrant workers in Saudi Arabia – more than half the entire workforce – fill manual, clerical, and service jobs. "Many suffer abuses and labour exploitation, sometimes amounting to slavery-like conditions," says Human Rights Watch.

The kafala system ties foreign workers' residency permits to sponsoring employers whose consent is required for workers to change jobs or leave the country. A Pakistani man employed as a driver, for example, needs permission to work in a shop. Employers often abuse this power in violation of Saudi law to confiscate passports, withhold wages and force migrants to work against their will or on exploitative terms.

Thousands work illegally under the so-called "free visa" arrangement, with Saudis posing as sponsoring employers and importing workers to staff fictitious businesses. Workers who enter Saudi Arabia under this scheme work outside the regulatory system for companies and businesses that are happy to avoid official scrutiny while the worker pays often extortionate annual and monthly fees to the free-visa sponsor to renew residency and work permits.

The Kuwaiti news outlet Al-Jarida reports that President Obama is seeking to arrange a trip to Tehran, Iran next year.The headline of the article reads, "Obama would like to visit Tehran, official invitation after details resolved.""Al-Jarida has learned from a U.S. diplomat that President Barack Obama is seeking to visit Tehran in the middle of next year," the report reads, based on a translation using Google Translate."The source said that the desire to visit is shared, and that Tehran and Washington are waiting for the conclusion of the arrangements prior to Iranian President Hassan Rohani issuing an official invitation to his American counterpart to visit Tehran.
"He pointed out that the most important detail that is outstanding regarding the meeting is the question of a meeting with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the possibility of not holding the meeting."The source said that Obama was waiting for the invitation to devote his new administration's policy in the region based on the principle of non-military involvement and balance. He wants to be the first U.S. president to visit Iran since the Khomeini revolution in order to show that he is an advocate of peace and dialogue even with those who chant death to America."The article was originally published in Arabic.A State Department spokeswoman did not respond to a request for confirmation of the Al-Jarida report.But in an email, one former high ranking U.S. national security official says, "I don't believe it."

France has counted between 300 and 400 European rebel fighters in Syria; Germany has counted more than 220; Belgium puts its number at 150-200, according to the International Center for the Study of Radicalization, citing recent figures that double previous estimates. Sweden is about to double its estimates to 150-200, according Magnus Ranstorp, a terrorism specialist with the Swedish National Defense College. Britain's total has stayed stable at less than 150, according to recent estimates from U.K. security officials. The Netherlands estimate, which officials said is rising rapidly, is 100-200, according to government and analyst figures. Denmark's intelligence service estimates "at least 80" fighters from there — with similar numbers from Spain, Austria and Italy. Norway believes about 40 of its citizens have left for Syria in the past year."Ranstorp agreed: "In the last two months, there has been an acceleration in the number of people going to Syria."
The first Europeans to leave for Syria tended to do so haphazardly — catching a flight to Turkey, hopping a bus and hoping for the best. That's how the 21-year-old Danish man first went, meandering into a refugee camp and stumbling upon people who told him where to go. Those men are returning home or contacting friends and acquaintances by Skype, Facebook, text message, YouTube, or word of mouth to encourage them to follow. They provide the travel arrangements, and say the life of a fighter in Syria is one of comfort punctuated by the adventure of war."I talk to fathers and mothers of young people who have left my city. It's all well-organized. The air tickets are paid for," said Hans Bonte, mayor of Vilvoorde, a city of 41,000 in Flemish-speaking Belgium that has seen at least 22 young people leave for Syria, including the most recent group in early November. Bonte, who is chief of security for his town as well as a federal lawmaker, speaks at length to each family and is in constant touch with both them and Belgium's intelligence services.Bonte said Belgians who are leaving are younger now — teenagers instead of men in their late 20s, and adolescent girls are beginning to appear among the lists of the missing. "It's a process of following others (who) are trying to convince people to go over there. They are telling stories that it's fun over there ... they are living in a villa with a pool."
One Vilvoorde mother, whose older son had already left for Syria, was sleeping on her front steps to keep her 15-year-old from slipping out to follow his brother, Bonte said. One night this fall, the boy pushed his mother aside — threatening to kill her if she stopped him from joining the fight in Syria — and stepped into a waiting car. She has heard from neither son since.Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister Faisal Mekdad said the Assad government is discussing the issue with Western officials "and there is cooperation," although he did not name any countries.
And authorities have encountered teens trying to board airplanes, including some carrying large amounts of cash for the rebellion, said Martin Bernsen, a spokesman for the police security services. "Of course it is difficult to prove where the money goes," Bernsen said, "so we are worried that it goes to terror-related activities."was among thousands of Muslims to wage battle against Soviet forces. .
.

V_Raman wrote:I feel that this USA-Iran deal will end up boxing India with sunni countries. Iran/Iraq/Kurdistan will provide oil to western countries and we will be left to deal with getting oil from sunni countries. We get most expat remittances from sunni countries, majority of IM is sunni, pak/BD is sunni etc. etc. etc.

Karan M wrote:Re rapprochment betwen US and Iran. A few points if I may.

1. It reduces Indian influence in that we lost an opportunity to be the sole/useful assist for Iran when it was under an international vice. But given how confused our foreign policy generally is, and how US pasand MMS led GOI currently are (for better or worse, they will not defy any US diktat), this was a stretch at best. Plus Iran has been hostile too (attacks on Indian soil)
2. Its really good for India in that
1. Iran - India energy ties will boom (we should be careful to prevent MMS led Pak pappi jhappi being part of this, with overground lines etc). We save money and more opportunities for Indo-Iran ties to bloom. Balances and in fact overhauls 1
2. India stops being a proxy warground for Israel-Iran. The attacks in India were a step too far.
3. Some in Israel and most in KSA will be gnashing their teeth
1. Pragmatists/centrists in Israel will be happy that Iran stops n-weaponization. Extreme right wing will be unhappy Iran is now in US orbit and conventional capability may increase
2. KSA for many reasons will loath this announcement.

Kudos to Obama for pulling this off, if this was indeed his initiative. Will reshape middle east if carried out.

Nick Giambruno: Jim, can you give us a summary of the health of the petrodollar in the past, what it looks like now, and what you think it will look like going forward? What is the significance of all this for the dollar's role as the world's premier reserve currency, the international monetary system in general, and the nominal price of gold?

Jim Rickards: The term "petrodollar" is shorthand for an understanding between Saudi Arabia and the United States that the US will guarantee the security of the House of Saud in return for the Saudis agreeing to price oil in dollars, to manage the dollar price of oil, and to redeposit those dollars in the banking system where they can be used to support international lending by major banks.

This lending, in turn, supports purchases of US and Western manufactured goods and agricultural exports by developing economies. From this deal, the US got cheap energy, exports, banking profits, and the ability to operate a fiat currency system. The Saudis got rich and survived. This system has existed implicitly since 1945 and explicitly since 1974 when it was negotiated by Henry Kissinger on behalf of the Nixon administration.

Now the petrodollar system is collapsing for two reasons. The US has abused its privileged reserve currency position by printing trillions of dollars in an effort to create inflation. More recently, President Obama has taken steps to anoint Iran as the regional hegemon of the Middle East, and to ease the way, in stages, toward Iran's possession of nuclear weapons capability. This is viewed as a stab-in-the-back by the Saudis and the Israelis and will lead quickly to Saudi Arabia obtaining nuclear weapons from Pakistan.

There is also a newly emerging alliance among Saudi Arabia, Israel, Egypt, and Russia. The new alignment will have no particular use for US dollars and no reason to support them. This turn of events marks the beginning of a significant diminution in the role of the dollar in the international monetary system. Since the price of gold is, in large part, simply the inverse of the value of a dollar, the decline of the dollar will presage a major increase in the dollar price of gold.

Nick Giambruno: Saudi Arabia is the lynchpin of the petrodollar system, and they feel the US is not holding up its end of the deal, i.e., keeping the region safe for the monarchy. It also appears that the Saudi regime is not militarily self-sufficient and needs an external protector of sort. That said, what actions can the Saudis realistically take to diversify away from the US, and what initial steps would signal they are not bluffing?

Jim Rickards: When the US withdraws from the rest of the world, as it has been doing since 2009, the world does not sit still but instead seeks regional alliances and other alignments to protect their respective security interests. With the US moving closer to Iran and away from Saudi Arabia, it can be expected that Saudi Arabia will react by creating new alliances. It will receive nuclear weapons from Pakistan, conventional weapons from Russia, intelligence cooperation from Israel, and troop strength, if needed, from Egypt. This is basically an alignment of powers that are all disaffected by the recent US tilt toward Iran.

Saudi Arabia will also expand it energy exports to China. Russia and China are two major powers who have expressed dissatisfaction with the dollar system in the recent past. With Saudi Arabia now aligning more closely with Russia and China, the pieces are in place to diminish the role of the dollar and replace it with either a system of regional reserve currencies or a new global currency based on the Special Drawing Right issued by the IMF. These developments will not be completed overnight, but they have begun and will assume greater prominence and visibility in the next several years.

Nick Giambruno: In gauging the sustainability of the petrodollar system, what other factors should we keep a lookout for: alternative economic/monetary/security arrangements from the BRICS countries, a GCC central bank, and the possibility of a yuan denominated oil futures contract on the Shanghai Futures Exchange?

Jim Rickards: All of the developments you mention, a GCC central bank, a BRICS multilateral bank, and the increasing use of the yuan are significant straws in the wind all pointing in the same direction—the decline of the dollar as the global reserve currency. Other similar developments could include a regional ruble zone on the Russian periphery and the creation of a true Eurobond backed by the full faith and credit of all members of the European Monetary System. While no one of these developments is decisive, each one of them represents an alternative to the dollar for a specified set of transactions. Cumulatively these developments could push the dollar past a tipping point, where it collapses suddenly and unexpectedly after an initially slow decline.

Nick Giambruno: Do you think the US has any aces up its sleeve or will otherwise be able to somehow pull a rabbit out of a hat and prevent the diminution of the dollar's role in the international monetary system?

Jim Rickards: There is a set of policy choices the US could make that would preserve and even strengthen the dollar's role as the leading global reserve currency. These include lower taxes, higher interest rates, breaking up big banks, reduced regulation, repeal of Dodd-Frank, reinstatement of Glass-Steagall, banning most derivatives transactions, improved educational outcomes, smart investment in infrastructure, reduced entitlements, and other structural adjustments. I see little prospect of any of these things happening, let alone all of them. As a result, one must conclude that the dollar is heading for collapse even thought that outcome is not inevitable. It is not too late to make structural adjustments, but it is extremely unlikely.

Nick Giambruno: Jim Rickards, thank for your time and insight into this critical issue. I'd like to encourage our readers to check out your upcoming book, The Death of Money: The Coming Collapse of the International Monetary System, which will no doubt be an international hit. I have already pre-ordered it, and our readers can do the same here.

http://www.internationalman.com/78-glob ... d-for-gold

On Nov. 25, barely a day after the signing of the historic agreement between Iran and the world powers, a large air-combat exercise took place in Israel. It saw the participation of several foreign air forces from Israel, the United States, Greece and Italy.

Contrary to the alarmist stance of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, past and present chiefs of Israel's Defense Establishment do not reject the agreement signed with Iran.
Author Ben Caspit Posted November 26, 2013

The Israeli air force assigned seven squadrons to this exercise, a huge number of planes considering its overall size. The [Blue Flag] exercise was said to simulate a war with a country that has a large army and a modern air force. It seems to me that Iran, in the setting of this exercise, would suit well the definition of “enemy.” On the other hand, this exercise, the kind of which cannot be mounted overnight, had been scheduled long before. Thus, its proximity to the signing of the Geneva agreement could easily fall under the category of “coincidence.” While that may very well be the case, the Middle East is a region where bizarre coincidences could quickly spiral into a bloody reality.

In recent days, a debate has been taking place in Israel out of sight. On one side of the barricade are those supporting the policy of Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Voicing scathing public criticism, this policy collides head-on with the agreement and those who signed it while declaring that “Israel is not bound by it” and that “Israel will prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, even if it has to do it on its own.” Pitted against them are those who believe that the agreement is a done deal and that Israel would be well-advised to quickly toe the line with reality and use diplomacy in a bid to influence the final agreement, which should be achieved within six months.

A delegation from Israel’s National Security Council headed by the newly appointed Director and former Mossad official Yossi Cohen is leaving for the United States to meet with its US counterpart to “start consultations,” as US President Barack Obama put it, ahead of the resumption of the talks with Iran.

It is against the backdrop of this debate that some interesting questions are being asked in Israel. The first one is what would have happened if Israel had attacked Iran on its own in September 2009 or September 2010. These are two dates for which the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) prepared to mount a large-scale military operation in Iran. Back then, the political echelon —to wit, Netanyahu and then-Defense Minister Ehud Barak — instructed Israel’s defense establishment to “cock its gun” and be ready for action. Tension peaked, yet defense establishment chiefs refused to “cock” the establishment without an explicit order from the cabinet, as required by Israeli law. Details from the tumultuous backrooms leaked to the media, suggesting a veritable historic drama.

The bottom line is that Israel did not strike. Netanyahu can accuse defense chiefs of defeatism, but history will credit him for Israel’s inaction. An Israeli prime minister can and is able to secure approval for any strike if he really wants to see it carried out and if he is determined and believes in the move. Considering that courage cannot be counted among his most prominent traits, Netanyahu is a prime minister who has never launched a serious strike anywhere. He has always skirted large-scale confrontations.

These days, he is tormenting himself for having missed out on a historic opportunity. (Back then Iran had not yet entered its “immunity zone,” since most of its important installations were not buried underground.) He is now drafting the indictment sheet that he might one day submit, or not, to his predecessors and generals.

The idea of an Israeli strike was predicated on the assumption that such an operation would prod the United States into finishing the job. Israel knows that such a job cannot be completed without a real, heavy-weight power (that also has aircraft carriers) — one which would be able to continue the momentum and the airstrikes against the nuclear sites until the ayatollahs accept that their dream has gone up in smoke. At the same time, there was a need to rally the international community to impose a genuine naval blockade on Iran the day after, in a way that would hamper the Iranians' efforts to rebuild whatever can be rehabilitated.

Many question marks came up in connection with these two premises, eliciting doubt among Israel’s generals. In the end, this is what tilted the scale against a strike. Notwithstanding, there is no shortage of people in Israel’s political and defense establishments who believe that a massive, focused and successful Israeli strike against Iran’s nuclear sites two or three years ago could have delivered the goods, prompting an international move that would have brought the hoped-for results. However, those espousing this notion still remain a small minority in Israel.

Another question is whether Israel’s military option remains in effect. The answer to this is also complex. Technically speaking, it does. Israel invested a staggering 12 billion shekels (approximately $3.5 billion) in this option. It is able to dispatch a large number of — manned and unmanned — aircraft to Iran. It is able to fire surprisingly highly effective and penetrative munitions against the nuclear sites. It is able to do it more than once. It is also able to surprise the enemy with various devices and special ploys that can inflict real damage to the Iranian program.

The problem is that this is not enough. A US or international follow-up move today is both infeasible and nonexistent. Imposing sanctions and blockades following a strike today are also infeasible and nonexistent.

Replacing Iran, Israel has stepped into the shoes of the pariah state, the one that nobody really takes into account and that goes unheeded. This happened, people in Israel are saying, because of Netanyahu’s “gevald” (alarmist) policy. He is the last doomsday prophet who threatens to bring down the house, knock the table over and be a party pooper. This policy has its price, which came in the form of a British statement two days ago [Nov. 24], warning Israel not ''to undermine'' the agreement with Iran.

At this point in time, an independent and defiant Israeli military action against Iran would be tantamount to committing suicide, hastening Iran’s nuclearization. Tehran will not feel bound by any constraints and able to break out toward a bomb uninterruptedly.

The third question pertains to the opinion of Israel’s past and present defense professionals about the agreement.

As for the first group, the answer is clear. Former Mossad Director Meir Dagan and former Shin Bet Director Yuval Diskin believe that the agreement with Iran — while not perfect and with a few holes — has benefits that outweigh the damage. Stopping Iran’s stampede, it sparks hope for a positive final agreement. These two are fully at peace with their historic stance that blocked an Israeli offensive. This position is also shared by the IDF’s former chief of staff Gabi Ashkenazi and former Military Intelligence Director Amos Yadlin, who hinted at his position on several public occasions. Yadlin’s predecessor, Maj. Gen. Aharon Ze’evi-Farkash, is also of the same opinion.

And where do the incumbent officials stand — namely chief of staff Lt. Gen. Benny Gantz, Military Intelligence Director Maj. Gen. Aviv Kochavi, Mossad Director Tamir Pardo and Shin Bet Director Yoram Cohen? They cannot speak up and express their feelings, yet in internal forums they continued all along to oppose an independent Israeli military move. As for the agreement, the voices that come out of the IDF’s Military Intelligence Directorate are slightly different from what Netanyahu and his senior ministers are saying. An analysis of the Geneva agreement by military intelligence points to its pros and cons. The agreement has advantages and achievements but also drawbacks, mistakes and problems. The main thing that Israel’s military intelligence does not demonstrate — in contrast to the government’s position — is panic.

There’s no panic at all among Israel’s professional military echelons. Nobody talks about a catastrophe or an imminent second holocaust. People discuss the merits of the agreement with levelheadedness and discretion. After all, doomsday prophecies are not their thing. For this we have Netanyahu.

Ben Caspit
Columnist

Since the announcement of the interim agreement in Geneva on Iran’s nuclear program, the deal’s sharpest critics have included Israel and Saudi Arabia. Some have suggested that an overlap of interests in opposing Iran’s rehabilitation into the international community portends a closer relationship between these two enemies. In fact, Israel and Saudi Arabia have a long history of tacit and covert cooperation against mutual foes, but the kingdom has no interest in anything more. Indeed, it is likely to use any Iran deal to try to curb Israel’s own nuclear program.

Saudi Arabia has long been willing to work behind the scenes with Israel against common foes, but the kingdom is uninterested in anything more than the occasional clandestine connection.
Author Bruce Riedel Posted November 29, 2013

Led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel has sharply and publicly denounced the Geneva deal. The Saudis have characteristically been more restrained. The kingdom has publicly welcomed the agreement as a good first step if it works, while the government-controlled media has been more critical. Privately, Saudi officials have been very critical of any deal with Iran that ends sanctions. Saudi officials have been particularly angry to learn of back-channel US-Iranian contacts after the fact. One official has said that the administration of US President Barack Obama lied to Saudi Arabia. Neither Jerusalem nor Riyadh wants Iran rehabilitated into the international community; both prefer it remain isolated. Some sources have reported that the Saudis provided Israel with a tip that US diplomats had opened the secret back channel to Iran in Oman earlier this year.

But a mutual aversion to Iran and annoyance with the United States probably does not augur a closer relationship between the Jewish state and the kingdom. The Israelis would welcome one, but the Saudis don’t trust Israel. They support Palestinian rights and want to see Israel’s nuclear program eliminated.

That said, the kingdom has long been willing to work behind the scenes with Israel against common foes. A good example can be found in the Yemen civil war in the 1960s. Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Egypt orchestrated a coup against the monarchy in Yemen in 1962. With massive Soviet support, Egypt sent 70,000 troops to back the republican government in Sanaa. Saudi Arabia backed Imam Mohammad al Badr and his royalist insurgent army in the mountains of north and east Yemen.

Under King Faisal’s leadership, the kingdom provided money and other logistical assistance to the royalists. It provided safe havens and sanctuary for royalist leaders and soldiers. It recruited British, Belgian and French mercenaries to assist the royalist tribes. The operation was run out of an office on Sloane Street in London, but was all paid for by Saudi intelligence. Former British intelligence officers did much of the work to recruit the mercenaries.

To get more arms to the royalists, the Saudis and their mercenaries turned to another enemy of the Egyptian dictator, Israel. In early 1964, the Israeli intelligence service, the Mossad, made arrangements for the Israeli air force to begin flying clandestine supply missions down the Red Sea from Israel to parachute weapons to the royalists. The mission was approved by the senior leadership in Israel, and the flights were code-named Operation Leopard. Between 1964 and 1966, the Israelis flew more than a dozen resupply flights to aid the royalists. Israel had every interest in bogging down the Egyptian army in its own Vietnam-like quagmire. Faisal’s intelligence chief, Kamal Adham, a graduate of Cambridge University and a descendant of Turkish and Albanian Ottoman rulers of the Hejaz, supervised the operation on the Saudi side. Direct Saudi-Israel encounters were kept to a minimum; British mercenaries communicated between them.

It was a classic example of covert operations by two enemies against a common shared, and perceived to be more dangerous, third. Israel and Saudi Arabia cooperated covertly on other fronts during the Cold War and after. Some of their covert common efforts undoubtedly remain secret to this day.

But the Saudis are not interested in more than the occasional clandestine connections. The Saudi royal family opposed the creation of Israel. At the first US-Saudi summit in 1945, King Ibn Saud warned Franklin Roosevelt not to allow the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine, predicting it would lead to decades of war and constant problems in US-Saudi relations. Faisal was especially extreme in his anti-Israel views, and cut off oil to the United States during the 1973 war. By the 1990s, Riyadh had reluctantly conceded the permanence of Israel’s position in the Middle East (but not its legitimacy) and accepted the Madrid and Oslo processes. But it had not abandoned its support for the Palestinians by any means. King Abdullah, for example, refused to meet then-US President George W. Bush for two years because of Bush’s support for then-Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon.

So for now, Saudi Arabia finds itself uncomfortably aligned with Israel against the P5+1 Iran deal. The two will tacitly cooperate in criticizing the deal. But Riyadh seems prepared to wait and see if the negotiations can produce a more permanent solution that removes the risk of a nuclear Iran. King Abdullah reportedly told Obama in a phone call that he wants more consultation on the negotiations, but that Saudi Arabia shares the goal of a nuclear deal if it is a good one.

In fact, the Saudis are already laying the predicate for what they would want after an Iranian deal: a weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-free zone in the Middle East. Their statements have consistently cited that objective. With Syrian chemical weapons on the path to destruction and an Iranian nuclear accord perhaps in the works, that leaves only Israel’s nuclear arsenal as an obstacle to a WMD-free zone. Look for the Saudis to lead the campaign for a UN-backed zone if an Iran deal is done next year. Of course, giving up their seat at the UN Security Council lost them a propitious perch from which to lead that charge.

Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/origina ... z2mc4RZUJu

U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel addressed those worries at the annual IISS Regional Security Summit in Manama, Bahrain.
“We have bought time for meaningful negotiations, not for deception,” he said of the six-month deal, intended as a preface to a long-term agreement with Iran. “All of us are clear-eyed, very clear-eyed about the challenges that remain to achieving a comprehensive nuclear solution with Iran. I know Iran’s nuclear program is only one dimension of the threats Iran poses to the region.”“The other region-wide worry is the U.S. will abandon its commitment to allied Arab states once concern over Iran diminishes. Hagel spent much time dispelling that notion, saying America’s commitment to the region is “proven and enduring.”And he spoke about the U.S.’s plans to continue supporting regional ballistic defense, as well as a better coordinated defense system between the Gulf Cooperation Council nations. He also promised access to the U.S.’s most advanced, weapons systems, when suitable, to Israel and allied Gulf states.Meanwhile, Iran’s possible integration into the Gulf region as ally, rather than adversary, was discussed. The Islamic Republic had been on a charm offensive, of late. Saudi Arabia’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Nizar Bin Obaid Madani, reminded those in attendance that Saudis and their neighbors are desert people, and thus always trying to distinguish between an oasis and a mirage, meaning he hopes Iran’s gestures toward engagement are the real thing.
There has been a lot of discussion about the fact the Gulf Arab states, as well as Israel, were not present at the negotiating table with Iran, and thus unable to directly promote their interests during the talks. Egypt’s Foreign Minister, Nabil Fahmy, said, “Not only should the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) be involved in these negotiations, the Arab League should be, as well. Not necessarily negotiating partners, but closer.”Britain’s Foreign Secretary, William Hague, acknowledged as much, adding Arab states not only needed to be kept closely in the loop but also made to understand the present engagement of Iran does not represent a realignment of long-standing alliances, but rather a single bargain, struck on behalf of all concerned.“We have to see the nuclear deal as a transaction on the nuclear issue, which is in the interest of all the parties concerned,” he said. “But it is a transaction at this stage and maybe it will turn into (more). Maybe it can provide opportunities for better relations, but that would depend not only on progress on the nuclear issue, but on changes in policy on the part of Iran on a whole range of other issues.”

» Magazines » Proceedings Magazine - December 2013 Vol. 139/12/1,330

Proceedings Magazine - December 2013 Vol. 139/12/1,330
By Captain Thomas R. Fedyszyn, U.S. Navy (Retired)
As NATO and the United States deprioritize a former strategic center of gravity, Russia eagerly moves in to fill the void.

Amidst the flurry of diplomatic and political activity accompanying the Syrian crisis, the Russian Navy made a series of pronouncements, declaring on consecutive days that at least four warships, a spy ship, and a repair ship located at Tartus, Syria, would join other units of Russia’s new permanent Mediterranean Task Force. While these sorties were of little strategic significance, alert naval strategists may have noticed their “back-to-the-future” quality. As the U.S. military “rebalances” to the Asia-Pacific theater, the Russian Navy is pivoting back into the same European waters it became very familiar with during the Cold War. Russia apparently is deploying, and intends to continue to deploy, its navy into the vacuum created by the United States’ absence in the Mediterranean Sea. America should respond by adding various ships—an afloat forward-staging base (AFSB) and several littoral combat ships (LCS)—to the guided-missile destroyers (DDGs) we plan to home-port in the European theater in 2014 and 2015.
Cold War Chessboard

The new U.S. strategy, commonly labeled the Defense Strategic Guidance , characterizes the world’s regions as follows: Asia-Pacific will be the new strategic center of gravity; the Middle East will continue to be in turmoil and unstable; Africa and Latin America will become low-cost and small-footprint theaters; and Europe, our principal partner, will become the theater from which we will rebalance since it has become a producer rather than a consumer of security. 1 Accepting the realist’s vision of power politics, we are the stage managers of the Russians’ move to the Mediterranean, as our departure from the area triggered their arrival.

Past generations of American sailors viewed their Med deployments as opportunities to be central players in the naval portion of the Cold War with the Soviet Union. Although a small, confined space, the Mediterranean attracted large numbers of advanced warships from both sides. There was always one U.S. carrier battle group, sometimes two, operating in this enclosed area. Indeed, the United States even had plans to do a reverse-pivot, redeploying three American carrier battle groups from the Pacific to the European theater should NATO war plans be executed. No group was without its Soviet “tattletale,” which reported all the carrier’s movements to Soviet fleet headquarters and was poised and positioned to launch cruise missiles. Similarly, NATO antisubmarine-warfare forces—air, surface, and subsurface—watched every movement of Russian subs operating near Europe.

Those heady days have long since passed. The Soviet 5th (Mediterranean) Eskhadra, sometimes as big as 30–50 ships and submarines, largely melted away with the fall of the Soviet Union. At the same time, NATO’s war plans were superseded by the need to station American naval forces in areas central to conducting the war on terrorism and responding to global instability. This made the Mediterranean not much more than a transit stop for Atlantic Fleet warships en route to the Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean, and Gulf of Aden. The combination of the Russian Navy’s demise and shifting U.S. priorities left the Mediterranean, once the planet’s maritime center of gravity, bereft of any navy of serious consequence for most of the 21st century.

The Bear Reappears

Russian President Vladimir Putin, never shy of taking advantage of an opportunity to expand his country’s international influence, became keenly aware of the Mediterranean power vacuum several years ago. He was equally aware that his naval fleet had been emasculated by years of neglect. Naval inventories were a shadow of their former selves, and readiness levels were precariously low. Since then, Russia made sizable improvements to its fleet’s size and readiness and stepped up patrols in the region, roughly coinciding with the escalation of tensions in Syria. During the past calendar year, the Black Sea Fleet alone conducted 17 operational voyages and 39 port visits in the Mediterranean, spending 650 days at sea. 2

In January 2013, Russia conducted its largest naval maneuvers in the Mediterranean since the end of the Cold War. During his visit to the Black Sea Fleet in February, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu stressed that the “Mediterranean region was the core of all essential dangers to Russia’s national interests” and that continued fallout from the Arab Spring increased the importance of this region. 3 Shortly thereafter, he showcased a new Russian naval policy by announcing the decision to establish a Navy Department task force in the Mediterranean “on a permanent basis.” 4

The details of that move became a hot discussion topic in the Russian military press. Many believe the Black Sea Fleet will provide the permanent core of the task force owing to its proximity to the region, with the missile cruiser Moskva its likely flagship. However, other naval experts point to the Northern Fleet as the main source of ships, as it has the most numerous and modern vessels. Russian naval officials will also consider Pacific Fleet and Baltic Fleet ships for inclusion.

The underlying consensus of the unclassified press reporting is that there will be around ten modern warships from various Russian fleets operating permanently in the Mediterranean. This force will be under the tactical control of an afloat staff drawn primarily from the Black Sea Fleet, but led operationally by Navy staff in St. Petersburg. Commander Admiral Viktor Chirkov added that the number of ships in the task force could be enlarged to “to include nuclear submarines,” and the carrier Admiral Kuznetsov was also rumored to become part of this force, despite her midlife upgrade scheduled for year’s end. 5 This permanent task force is already working to schedule future exercises with any interested NATO navy in the Mediterranean littoral, as well as with Israel and China. Precise timelines for deployments are necessarily vague and somewhat tied to Russian access to logistical and maintenance support in the region.

Russia also has yet to nail down which Mediterranean ports it will use. Its naval base in Tartus is its only one outside Russian territory; with ongoing military developments in Syria, naval officials are considering other locations as their primary regional port. Unofficial rumors suggest Russia is considering ports in Cyprus, Montenegro, and Greece in addition to Syria. Of these, Cyprus has gotten the most attention, owing to the close economic relations between Moscow and Nicosia. Cypriote Defense Minister Fotis Fotiou acknowledged a close relationship with Russia but denied any discussion about a “permanent base” in Cyprus for Russia. 6 He did not, however, rule out a relationship in which the Russian Navy could use port facilities, much as the U.S. Fleet does in many European countries.

Why Move to the Med?

The Russian naval movement back into the Mediterranean can be explained by a number of rational calculations; however, no one of them is either conclusive or persuasive. This realignment is perhaps best understood by a simple confluence of supply and demand. From a supply perspective, after talking about rebuilding its defense forces for many years, Russia has finally begun to do so. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute lists Russia at a comfortable third in global defense spending, behind the United States and China, with an impressive 113 percent growth over the past decade. The Russian Navy shipbuilding and modernization account is receiving an increasingly large share of national defense appropriations, amounting to more than $132 billion between now and 2020, according to Reuters .

Additionally, Russian shipyards are finally delivering vessels to the fleet. Russia has reported that the “Navy will receive 36 warships in 2013, an unprecedented number in Russia’s history.” 7 This statement should be taken with a grain of salt, because it includes a large number of very small craft, yet one cannot deny that larger ships— Yasen -class submarines, Steregushchiy -class frigates, Gorshkov -class corvettes, Ivan Gren –class amphibious ships, Dagestan -class gunships, and Borei -class ballistic-missile submarines—are also beginning to become operational. Russia’s desire to expand its fleet has also resulted in the purchase of Mistral-class amphibious assault ships from France, a dramatic increase in Russian naval-school enrollment, and significant growth in cruise-missile production. All told, the Russian Navy is showing signs of growth in geographical deployments, inventory, and sophistication.

On the demand side, Russian President Vladimir Putin insistently asserts that the drastic upgrade in Russia’s defense forces is a logical response to U.S. and NATO efforts to “tip the strategic balance,” while making pointed reference to the new NATO missile-defense system in Europe. 8 Putin further contends that Russian military responses must be “well calculated and quick.” Any responsible Russian naval adviser would naturally point out that “quick” suggests the need for forward presence.

Why does the Mediterranean—a body of water with no Russian seacoast—qualify for this even more aggressive response? Firstly, Russia’s only exit to the open ocean for its Black Sea Fleet is the Mediterranean. Russia also has long-standing economic ties to many regional states, including Greece, Libya, Cyprus, and Algeria, and is buying or selling arms with a number of the Mediterranean littoral states, including France and Algeria. Another consideration is the logistical node in Tartus, a location of increasing strategic importance during this period of ongoing Syrian conflict, especially if Russian citizens need to evacuate the country. Finally, the Russian Navy would be able to increase its readiness and develop more sophisticated training by operating in the Mediterranean during the winter months. 9

However, no one of these is sufficient to invite a ten-ship Russian armada to set up a permanent presence. The most likely logic behind this naval movement to the southwest is probably the iron law of power politics: Nature abhors a vacuum. The regional NATO navies have been suffering an inexorable decline for years. The French and Italian naval orders of battle are shadows of their former selves, while NATO’s Standing Maritime Groups are spending less time in the Mediterranean. This is partly attributable to diminishing inventories, and also to NATO’s counterpiracy Operation Ocean Shield, conducted in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. America’s European allies are more willing to leave the theater simply because NATO proclaimed that the European theater has diminished in strategic significance. In effect, the West has placed a low-cost “for rent” sign on very valuable property, and Putin has responded like any canny investor.

A U.S. Response?

American strategy would do well to consider the Mediterranean not a European subregion, but rather the nexus of the Middle East, North Africa, and Southern Europe. Thus, our allotted military force there should reflect the aggregate security-environment demands of these three locales. It must also recognize the economic constraints faced by the Pentagon and operate with “economy of force.” Furthermore, the United States should take into account balance-of-power considerations, informing the Russians that there is, in fact, no security vacuum in the region.

The U.S. Navy’s current presence in the Mediterranean does not match the strategic capabilities called for by the NATO Maritime Strategy during a time of instability and violence (as is the current state of affairs given recent turmoil in Libya, Egypt, and Syria). 10 While the Maritime Strategy emphasizes the need for information sharing, interdiction missions, improved maritime-domain awareness, and potential mine-warfare and special-forces insertions, the United States and its NATO allies are instead creating a ballistic-missile defense (BMD) network (the European Phased Adaptive Approach, or EPAA) in accordance with agreed-upon NATO policy. The core of the alliance’s second phase of EPAA is the insertion of four BMD-capable Aegis DDGs to be home-ported by pairs in Rota, Spain, in 2014 and 2015.

These impressive multipurpose ships are officially designated to protect our European allies from small ballistic-missile attacks from “rogue” states, notably Iran. However, should these ships, in the performance of their designated role, be America’s sole naval presence in the Med, we could be walking in exactly the wrong strategic direction. In fact, the NATO BMD capability is likely to provoke more Russian naval activity than it deters.

The Russians have been very clear that any American deployments supporting BMD will be viewed as a challenge to their nuclear strategic force. The United States would be better served by downplaying the BMD role and accentuating all the other high-end military capabilities the U.S. Navy brings to the table. Its unsurpassed antiair- and antisubmarine-warfare capabilities should, in turn, evoke a NATO desire to conduct more multinational naval exercises with the United States. The deployment patterns of U.S. ships in the region should take them to the Eastern Mediterranean when a clear ballistic-missile threat occurs. Otherwise, they should act as an all-purpose, permanent American Mediterranean task force. The naval capabilities provided by these ships should first and foremost be the U.S. high-end response to crisis and conflict in the regions of the Mediterranean littoral, from Gibraltar to the Suez. Significantly, this home-port change need not come at an exorbitant price to American taxpayers. In fact, U.S. naval leadership has characterized it as an efficiency, not an expense. 11

Additional home-port changes also would be a good idea. The United States should augment the DDGs following the examples set by both the 5th and 7th Fleet areas of operation. First, to respond to the need for capability against terrorism and illicit transnational trafficking, the United States should establish an AFSB in the Mediterranean, which would then be easily employable in any of its subregions. 12 Such a ship, along the lines of the 5th Fleet’s USS Ponce (LPD-15), would be a cornerstone for evacuation operations and special-forces insertions, while providing the helicopter capability crucial to any humanitarian-assistance operation. Her capabilities would be closely aligned with NATO Maritime Strategy as well as the requirements posed by both African Command and Central Command. Second, to support counterterrorism, countertrafficking, forward presence, and mine warfare, America’s growing fleet of LCSs could be employed much as we are doing in Singapore for the 7th Fleet. Their beauty is not just that they should be available in large numbers, but their small size, low maintenance cost, and ability to get into Europe’s small and shallow harbors make them ideal for the 6th Fleet commander. To complement the homeporting of destroyers in Spain, the AFSB would be best situated in the central Med, co-located with the 6th Fleet command ship in Italy, while the LCSs would be best positioned in the Eastern Med, preferably in Greece or Turkey.

The cost of moving this small handful of ships to the Mediterranean, while not trivial, would not begin to compare with the cost of rebalancing to the Pacific. The benefit, however, would be substantial. First, the message to our closest allies in NATO couldn’t be clearer: We are making European security a high priority, while still keeping “economy of force” in mind. This is classic “assurance of allies”—a theme emphasized in the U.S. National Security Strategy—at an affordable cost. Signaling our support to NATO allies now will likely pay off in the future: It is precisely these allies to whom we are most likely to turn to for assistance down the road. Along with assurance, we also gain credibility and persuasiveness when asking our allies to spend more on defense in NATO forums.

Second, this low-cost Mediterranean force pays a triple dividend in that it responds to the strategic challenges faced by three geographical commanders: Central Command, African Command, and European Command. Finally, the Russians will see a powerful naval response, and not one necessarily aimed only at them. Most important, they will perceive that a security vacuum no longer exists in the Mediterranean.

‘Prudent Strategic Choice’

For several decades, the Russian Navy has disappointed in its ability to do what navies aim to do: assure allies, show the flag, project power, and influence power balances. Today, however, this meager but growing force is expending considerable effort to operate in waters the United States and others have vacated on a permanent basis. The reasons behind Moscow’s move are manifold, but certainly one is pure opportunity based on NATO’s absence. While its actions rarely match its rhetoric, Russia has decidedly amped up its presence in the Mediterranean at the same time NATO allies appear to have lost their motivation to control this region.

Many American policymakers decry the negative consequences of removing all troops from Afghanistan, but this is what we and our allies have nearly done in the Mediterranean. A small naval reinvestment in the Mediterranean would be a very prudent strategic choice for both deterring Russian ascendancy in the region and demonstrating American commitment to European allies. In other words, a stronger U.S. presence in the region would be a low-price offering with the potential for a significant strategic return on investment.

Donors in Saudi Arabia have notoriously played a pivotal role in creating and maintaining Sunni jihadist groups over the past 30 years. But, for all the supposed determination of the United States and its allies since 9/11 to fight "the war on terror", they have showed astonishing restraint when it comes to pressuring Saudi Arabia and the Gulf monarchies to turn off the financial tap that keeps the jihadists in business.

Compare two US pronouncements stressing the significance of these donations and basing their conclusions on the best intelligence available to the US government. The first is in the 9/11 Commission Report which found that Osama bin Laden did not fund al-Qa'ida because from 1994 he had little money of his own but relied on his ties to wealthy Saudi individuals established during the Afghan war in the 1980s. Quoting, among other sources, a CIA analytic report dated 14 November 2002, the commission concluded that "al-Qa'ida appears to have relied on a core group of financial facilitators who raised money from a variety of donors and other fund-raisers primarily in the Gulf countries and particularly in Saudi Arabia".

Seven years pass after the CIA report was written during which the US invades Iraq fighting, among others, the newly established Iraq franchise of al-Qa'ida, and becomes engaged in a bloody war in Afghanistan with the resurgent Taliban. American drones are fired at supposed al-Qa'ida-linked targets located everywhere from Waziristan in north-west Pakistan to the hill villages of Yemen. But during this time Washington can manage no more than a few gentle reproofs to Saudi Arabia on its promotion of fanatical and sectarian Sunni militancy outside its own borders.

Evidence for this is a fascinating telegram on "terrorist finance" from US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to US embassies, dated 30 December 2009 and released by WikiLeaks the following year. She says firmly that "donors in Saudi Arabia constitute the most significant source of funding to Sunni terrorist groups worldwide". Eight years after 9/11, when 15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudis, Mrs Clinton reiterates in the same message that "Saudi Arabia remains a critical financial support for al-Qa'ida, the Taliban, LeT [Lashkar-e-Taiba in Pakistan] and other terrorist groups". Saudi Arabia was most important in sustaining these groups, but it was not quite alone since "al-Qa'ida and other groups continue to exploit Kuwait both as a source of funds and as a key transit point".

Why did the US and its European allies treat Saudi Arabia with such restraint when the kingdom was so central to al-Qa'ida and other even more sectarian Sunni jihadist organisations? An obvious explanation is that the US, Britain and others did not want to offend a close ally and that the Saudi royal family had judiciously used its money to buy its way into the international ruling class. Unconvincing attempts were made to link Iran and Iraq to al-Qa'ida when the real culprits were in plain sight.

But there is another compelling reason why the Western powers have been so laggard in denouncing Saudi Arabia and the Sunni rulers of the Gulf for spreading bigotry and religious hate. Al-Qa'ida members or al-Qa'ida-influenced groups have always held two very different views about who is their main opponent. For Osama bin Laden the chief enemy was the Americans, but for the great majority of Sunni jihadists, including the al-Qa'ida franchises in Iraq and Syria, the target is the Shia. It is the Shia who have been dying in their thousands in Iraq, Syria, Pakistan and even in countries where there are few of them to kill, such as Egypt.

Pakistani papers no longer pay much attention to hundreds of Shia butchered from Quetta to Lahore. In Iraq, most of the 7,000 or more people killed this year are Shia civilians killed by the bombs of al-Qa'ida in Iraq, part of an umbrella organisation called the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Isil), which also encompasses Syria. In overwhelmingly Sunni Libya, militants in the eastern town of Derna killed an Iraqi professor who admitted on video to being a Shia before being executed by his captors.

Suppose a hundredth part of this merciless onslaught had been directed against Western targets rather than against Shia Muslims, would the Americans and the British be so accommodating to the Saudis, Kuwaitis and Emiratis? It is this that gives a sense of phoniness to boasts by the vastly expanded security bureaucracies in Washington and London about their success in combating terror justifying vast budgets for themselves and restricted civil liberties for everybody else. All the drones in the world fired into Pashtun villages in Pakistan or their counterparts in Yemen or Somalia are not going to make much difference if the Sunni jihadists in Iraq and Syria ever decide – as Osama bin Laden did before them – that their main enemies are to be found not among the Shia but in the United States and Britain.

Instead of the fumbling amateur efforts of the shoe and underpants bombers, security services would have to face jihadist movements in Iraq, Syria and Libya fielding hundreds of bomb-makers and suicide bombers. Only gradually this year, videos from Syria of non-Sunnis being decapitated for sectarian motives alone have begun to shake the basic indifference of the Western powers to Sunni jihadism so long as it is not directed against themselves.

Saudi Arabia as a government for a long time took a back seat to Qatar in funding rebels in Syria, and it is only since this summer that they have taken over the file. They wish to marginalise the al-Qa'ida franchisees such as Isil and the al-Nusra Front while buying up and arming enough Sunni war-bands to overthrow President Bashar al-Assad.

The directors of Saudi policy in Syria – the Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal, the head of the Saudi intelligence agency Prince Bandar bin Sultan and the Deputy Defence Minister Prince Salman bin Sultan – plan to spend billions raising a militant Sunni army some 40,000 to 50,000 strong. Already local warlords are uniting to share in Saudi largesse for which their enthusiasm is probably greater than their willingness to fight.

The Saudi initiative is partly fuelled by rage in Riyadh at President Obama's decision not to go to war with Syria after Assad used chemical weapons on 21 August. Nothing but an all-out air attack by the US similar to that of Nato in Libya in 2011 would overthrow Assad, so the US has essentially decided he will stay for the moment. Saudi anger has been further exacerbated by the successful US-led negotiations on an interim deal with Iran over its nuclear programme.

By stepping out of the shadows in Syria, the Saudis are probably making a mistake. Their money will only buy them so much. The artificial unity of rebel groups with their hands out for Saudi money is not going to last. They will be discredited in the eyes of more fanatical jihadis as well as Syrians in general as pawns of Saudi and other intelligence services.

A divided opposition will be even more fragmented. Jordan may accommodate the Saudis and a multitude of foreign intelligence services, but it will not want to be the rallying point for an anti-Assad army.

The Saudi plan looks doomed from the start, though it could get a lot more Syrians killed before it fails. Yazid Sayegh of the Carnegie Middle East Centre highlights succinctly the risks involved in the venture: "Saudi Arabia could find itself replicating its experience in Afghanistan, where it built up disparate mujahedin groups that lacked a unifying political framework. The forces were left unable to govern Kabul once they took it, paving the way for the Taliban to take over. Al-Qa'ida followed, and the blowback subsequently reached Saudi Arabia."

New Delhi miffed as Iran asks India Inc visitors for HIV, Hepatitis, TB tests
indianexpress.com

Iran wants a high-level business delegation from India to test for HIV before issuing visas, angering New Delhi as such a demand is seen as discriminatory and politically incorrect.

Most countries have done away with this requirement and India too ended mandatory HIV testing for visa applicants more than a decade ago.

The 97-member delegation has been put together by the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), and has 68 executive director-rank officials from firms such as Oswal, Metro Tyres, Luminous Power, Kohinoor Foods, and RP Goenka.

The group is scheduled to visit Tehran from December 15 to 17 to showcase Indian products and for a buyer-seller meet in Isfahan on December 19 on the invitation of the Tehran Chamber of Commerce and Iran Chamber of Commerce.

Members of the delegation have also been asked to test for Hepatitis C and Tuberculosis, all for the first time, sources said, forcing New Delhi to raise the issue through diplomatic channels with Iranian authorities.

The Indian government, through a November 22, 2002 order, had announced a change in policy, ending all mandatory HIV testing for foreign-born residents and visa applicants, including foreign students.

While no specific reason has been given for this move by Iran, India sees this as barriers being created and considers it a worrying sign. New Delhi feels that hurdles such as these are indicative of why business ties don't seem to take off despite the best of intentions.

The main objective of the delegation is to increase India's exports to Iran, which registered a fall of 3.77 per cent during 2011-12, mainly due to problems with banking channels. Although latest figures are not available, they are expected to have dipped further.
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