Bharat Rakshak

Special Note: NightWatch has been studying the unclassified fighting reports in Afghanistan by district for the first two weeks of October. The NightWatch focus, as always, is on the now 400 districts because they are where the government succeeds or fails, much more than in Kabul. That means they are where the Taliban exploit corruption, bad government and the absence of government in order to expand. The fight for Afghanistan is not won in Kabul. That is just the prize that goes to the winner.

The data is incomplete and the findings are tentative. Nevertheless they support the NightWatch thesis that the insurgency as now constituted is self-limiting … to the Pashtun provinces in the south and the Pashtun enclaves in the north. There are no new districts showing the signs of a sustained presence of Taliban or other anti-government fighting cells that are not Pashtun, based on the unclassified research.

This means the Taliban and most anti-government groups remain, as they have for eight years, primarily Pashtun. They are having little to no success breaking out of the Pashtun “nation.” Districts in Konduz Province and other areas of the north, for example, that have anti-government cells appear to be those that have Pashtun communities as the result of coerced transmigration programs in much earlier periods.

These communities were outgrowths of the King’s version of a”lily pad” strategy. The King was a Pashtun and required loyal enclaves all over the country from which his forces could operate to maintain order among Tajiks and Uzbeks, for example. They tended to be hostile to their Uzbek and Tajik neighbors, who reciprocated the feelings, in the best of times.

The significance of these tentative findings is that the anti-foreign appeal of the Taliban and Pashtun nationalists is not resonating among the other tribes. The anti-government movement is limited to about half the districts of Afghanistan at most and shows no capability to move beyond them yet.

The good news is the northern tribes seem to be checking the Pashtuns. The other good news is the anti-government forces cannot win against the NATO/ISAF forces.

The bad news is most of the Pashtuns may be counted as being anti-government and anti-foreign. That means NATO/ISAF cannot militarily defeat the anti-government forces without many more forces and without imposing an occupation regime or martial law in the nine core Pashtun provinces. Control the nine Pashtun provinces and the rest will fall in line.

The larger implications are that the anti-government resistance is not monolithic. That means that one set of tactics does not fit all.

It also means that the Taliban expansion into the north, about which NightWatch warned in 2008, can be reversed, but will require using different tactics from those used in the Pashtun south. The Pashtun enclaves in the north require protection from their non-Pashtun neighbors. The Pashtun clans are far from united in their needs and wants.

Consolidation of the north and control of the center -- meaning Kabul and Jallalabad -- ought to be high priorities. Herat, the western anchor of the centerline, is doing okay, and the Hazaras, who occupy Bamiyan Province and hold the middle of the central line, hate the Sunni Pashtuns. Weaker leaders than Karzai and NATO have held the Herat to Kabul to Jallalabad line and the North, while retaining a strong presence in key southern cities.

The fighting data show the pro-government and NATO forces have more assets and more advantages than the international press report in reducing the violence and in establishing a national unity government. The fighting data by district shows the Kabul command might need several hundred separately crafted solutions to win the loyalty of the people in the 200-plus disaffected districts. In the era of the computer, that is not a particularly daunting task for smart people. That is, in fact, a bounded set.

When neither side can win on the battlefield, politics becomes the battlefield. That will become more apparent to the Taliban leaders as winter approaches. More on this later.

For now, Readers may take away that the security problem is not as dire as some suggest, is manageable, containable and even reversible, but it will take more creative and critical thinking than is evident in public releases.

ramana wrote:Rajamohan has an article saying TSP and PRC are winning in Afghania.

Security. The Iranian military said today the United States and Britain were responsible for a suicide bombing that targeted the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in the Pishin district of Sistan-Balochistan province, Haaretz reported.

Iranian state television said its sources indicated the British government was directly involved in organizing, supplying and employing the militants who conducted the attack, and that the attack was aimed at redirecting problems the West faces in Afghanistan to Iran. Both the U.S. and British governments have condemned the attacks and denied any involvement.

The Jundullah terrorist group, led by Abdolmalek Rigi, claimed responsibility for the suicide attack that killed 42 people, including at least five Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commanders, who were meeting in Sistan-Baluchistan province. President Ahmadi-Nezhad blamed terrorists in Pakistan for "cooperating" in the attack and urged the Pakistani government to arrest the responsible individuals.


Jundullah is a Sunni Arab Baluchi group that Iran and international news agencies claim is supported by the US from Pakistan and Afghanistan. Groups using the same name inflicted significant casualties on the IRGC this year, but the weekend attack was by far the most serious.

If this is a US-backed operation, it tends to explain press reports of IRGC support for the Taliban in the eastern border provinces of Iran, as retaliation and creation of a hostile buffer zone in western Afghanistan. A severe crackdown in southeastern Iran is likely as well as an increase in covert Iranian support to the Taliban in western Afghanistan.

- There will be no overt Western pressure to make peace. We will still get gratuitous advice, but there will be more understanding. The hostility will be recognized and understood. This will save a lot of diplomatic energy for us

I am entering the Hospital tomorrow (October 21,2009) for cistoscopy followed by biopsy. Yesterday and today, I had a series of tests---stress test, ECG, Echo etc--- to enable the doctors satisfy themselves that I will be able to withstand the procedure. According to the doctors,my heart condition is superb for my age (73). My energy level is very high. The biopsy will enable the doctors to grade my urinary bladder cancer---superficial affecting the bladder lining only in which case the treatment will be simple or deeper affecting the bladder muscle in which case it could be life-threatening calling for an aggressive treatment. According to my doctors, 85 per cent of the urinary bladder cancers are a nuisance, but not life-threatening. Fifteen per cent are life-threatening. They are hoping that the biopsy will show that I fall in the 85 per cent group. I expect to be out of hospital on Oct. 25. Thereafter, I will be in my brother's house awaiting the biopsy result. Regards. B.Raman. 20-10-09

...
Interestingly, India’s “aid diplomacy” has generated intense domestic debate, given the vulnerabilities its projects and personnel face in Afghanistan. While some would want India to send troops, others propound continuation of the ‘aid only’ policy. While the latter option would not be in India’s long-term strategic interests, an outright military response of troop deployment, apart from its limited utility, would work straight into propaganda of the Taliban and its sponsor.

What India needs in the near-term is a reinvigorated policy in terms of protecting its projects and carving out a larger regional role in the long-term stability of Afghanistan. Amid talks of U.S. withdrawal, India needs to consider long-term scenarios of its political, diplomatic and military options.

In a revamped diplomatic strategy, India can work towards the creation of a “concert of powers” — a regional grouping including the U.S., Russia, the EU, India, Iran, CAR (Central Asian Republics) and China.
...
At a local level, India needs to widen its web of engagement beyond the Karzai government. Its Afghan policy in the past few years has alienated its traditional support base among the Northern Alliance groups who have increasingly aligned with Iran. There are alienated Pushtun communities in southern and eastern Afghanistan, who are in need of India’s support in building local capacities. These groups can be cultivated as protectors of Indian aid projects by making community participation and local ownership a key plank of the aid policy. On the military front, India can enhance the training for the Afghan National Police in counter-insurgency given its experience in building a COIN grid in Jammu and Kashmir.
...
..
(Shanthie Mariet D’Souza is Associate Fellow, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. )

AFGHANISTAN: UNITED STATES EXIT OPTION DISASTROUS Disastrous for who???India/Pak/West/PRC?

By Dr. Subhash Kapila

Introductory Observations

President Obama, nor at apex levels of US Administration, has anyone given any indication that the United States is considering the ‘Exit Option’ from Afghanistan.

Yet the persistence with which this option is being discussed in US corridors of power and US media leads one to believe that in Washington such a discussion is being generated and contrived by vested forces who stand to gain from a US exit from Afghanistan. In an earlier Paper on Afghanistan this Author has pointed out that Pakistan and Saudi Arabia primarily, followed by China are the nations which badly want the United States to make an exit from Afghanistan.

The ‘Exit Afghanistan’ debate in Washington is being spearheaded by “Pakistani apologists” in the United States comprising retired senior Armed Forces officers and former US diplomats seconded by a number of strategic analysts.

United States “Exit Option” from Afghanistan is also being fostered by Western European countries of NATO on two grounds, namely (1) Reluctance to bear load of commitment of additional military forces to Afghanistan and (2) Mindful of sentiments and repercussions of large Muslim populations in their midst.

The United States standing and image as the global superpower would be fatally struck by such an ill-advised option. This too stands pointed out by this Author earlier. Additionally, it needs to be highlighted that an “Exit Option” from Afghanistan will not be viewed as a pragmatic military initiative but projected in the wider Islamic World as a victory of Islam over the United States.The United States can ill-afford such an impression being created.

Would the United States like to submit itself to such an ignominy?

However, the US “Exit Option” from Afghanistan is still being vocally discussed despite the above strategic losses to USA that could accrue in its wake.

Imperative therefore it becomes to highlight once again that such a move is disastrous for USA. Also a brief exploratory exercise of the ‘Exit Option’, however inadvisable, becomes necessary to set the facts straight. This Paper discusses the following issues:

United States “Exit Option” should be From Pakistan, NOT, Afghanistan
United States “Exit Option” From Afghanistan Examined
Afghanistan Scenarios likely in Wake of US Exit From Afghanistan
United States “Exit Option” Should be From Pakistan, NOT, Afghanistan

In this Author’s address at an Army Seminar followed up by a SAAG Paper on US Af-Pak strategy (SAAG Paper No 3316. Dated July 22, 2009) the following “Nightmare Scenarios” which the United States may soon have to face in Pakistan were painted as under:

Pakistan Government failing and its nuclear weapons falling in Islamic extremist hands
Islamist elements within Pakistan Army or extreme Islamic terrorists getting control of over one or more of Pakistan’s 60-100 nuclear weapons.
Civil War within Pakistan
In these worst case scenarios, the United States may be left with no option but to resort to direct military intervention in Pakistan.

For such a possible military intervention against Pakistan the United States has no other option but to use Afghanistan as the base and spring board.

United States continued military embedment in Afghanistan was again stressed in a recent Paper of his and that this emerges as an over-riding strategic imperative for the United States.

This Author’s Concluding Observations bear repetition, as they are even more valid today than a few months back:

Implicit in the Af-Pak Strategy in relation to Pakistan’s worst case scenarios is that:
1. Failure is not an option for the United States in the execution of Af-Pak Strategy

NOR

2. Is an Exit Strategy possible

Inevitably, the Af-Pak Policy has made this war as “America’s War” with all the connotations attendant.
Civil War is very much a possibility in Pakistan. Dangers exists of “Pashtun nationalism” merging with the Taliban movement.
Pre-empting Pakistan’s slide towards a “Nuclear Yugoslavia in the making” dictates “NO EXIT” of United States from Afghanistan.

This Author needs to be forgiven to harping back on his earlier summations on Afghanistan. It was being projected by this Author that the United States has a strategic dilemma as to whether to save Pakistan first or Afghanistan first. Implicit in this was the Author’s contention that it was beyond United States resources to concurrently save both.

This Author’s major conclusion was that this dilemma could be resolved by USA attempting to first stabilize Afghanistan and thereafter the United States could then be in a position to save Pakistan sequentially. Further, that if the first priority of USA was to save Pakistan then USA runs the risk of losing both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

United States “Exit Option” From Afghanistan Examined

While a US “Exit Option” from Afghanistan is being glibly argued by US Pakistani-apologists, none of them have cared to spell out as to what sort of US exit from Afghanistan are they envisaging.

On analysis, this Author can envisage only three types of US “Exit Options” from Afghanistan, and these are:

Vietnam Type, Saigon Style Exit
Iraq Pattern Planned and Graduated Exit
United States Exits Afghanistan after handing over Afghanistan to the United Nations
A Vietnam type, Saigon Style Exit would be an ignonimous disgrace for the United States and does not merit discussion. However to pre-empt such an eventuality the:

United States must make a firm commitment of long term embedment in Afghanistan
United States provides required force levels to its military commanders in Afghanistan.
United States does not dither in surgically disconnecting Pakistan from its overall strategic formulations in the stabilization of Afghanistan.
A US Iraq-pattern exit strategy would require at least 8-10 years to enable stabilization of Afghanistan and build-up the Afghan National Armed Forces to at least 400,000 strong to resist a Pakistan-Taliban combined takeover of Afghanistan. For these 8-10 years a sizeable US military embedment would be required in Afghanistan.

This option is no different from a firm declaration of US intent to stay embedded in Afghanistan as the end aims are the same. In both cases the United States would require enhanced troop levels, strategic endurance and strategic patience.

Finally, an option which envisages the United States handing over Afghanistan to the United Nations for peace-making and peace-building with UN Forces deployed there is something which the United State would not prefer. The United States has resisted “internationalisation’ of Afghanistan conflict.

Afghanistan Scenarios Likely in Wake of US Exit From Afghanistan

Pakistan aided by Saudi Arabia can be expected to make an instant grab of Afghanistan, should the United States exits Afghanistan in any of the patterns discussed above. Such regime take-over moves in Kabul by Pakistan would generate armed opposition from non-Taliban and non-Pashtun groups. The old Afghan war-lords era would return with a civil war like situation. This could lead to regional instability, disintegration of Afghanistan and a possible disintegration of Pakistan by extension.

Possibility exists of China at the sub-surface level aiding Pakistan’s ambitions in this direction. China’s involvement in the ensuing Afghanistan imbroglio would tempt other regional countries to step in and take sides, strategically muddying the Afghanistan situation so much that the United States may be forced to a military return to Afghanistan.

Another possibility that comes to mind is that sensing the likelihood of a US withdrawal from Afghanistan, regional powers like Russia, Iran and India who have strategic congruence on Afghanistan, could put their act together and step-in in a concerted manner to stabilize Afghanistan, provide security and initiate economic re-construction.

Pakistan then in a knee-jerk reaction would resort to its old policies of disruptive military and Taliban actions in Afghanistan on being thwarted of its strategic ambition to reclaim Kabul.

However, the Russia-Iran-India combine would have enough leverages of dissuasion of Pakistan in its military moves and possibly posing direct threats towards Pakistan’s disintegration. Supports my argument that Northern ethnic will hold the line and this will lead to Pakistan's disintegration.

More simply put, the Post-US Exit period in Afghanistan is likely to be murky, contentious and destabilizing for the region. It could invite responses from its regional neighbors to cut down Pakistan’s imperial pretensions to size. Is this not the whole objective and good for Indian interests. This why I am asking NATO withdrawal is disastrous for who? The author is not thinking out of the box

Concluding Observations

The United States needs to recognize the following strategic realties in relation to its military involvement in Afghanistan:

Stabilized Afghanistan with an independent self-reliant military capability to defend itself should be the top most priority for US national security interests.
Afghanistan can be stabilized by a surgical disconnect of Pakistan from US Afghanistan policy and military liquidation of Al Qaeda and Taliban harbored in Pak Army sanctuaries
The ‘Pakistan Threat’ to Afghanistan can be neutralized by US Special Forces and US drone operations. It does not require US molly-coddling of Pakistan.
All of the above require a long-term United States military embedment in Afghanistan. It is “America's War” now and the US public needs to rally around President Obama to protect US national security interests in Afghanistan and the region. There is no ‘Exit Option’ from Afghanistan for the United States in face of Islamists blackmail

(The author is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst. He is the Consultant, Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. Email: [email protected])

Paul wrote:

AFGHANISTAN: UNITED STATES EXIT OPTION DISASTROUS Disastrous for who???India/Pak/West/PRC?

By Dr. Subhash Kapila (The author is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst. He is the Consultant, Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. Email: [email protected])

Philip wrote:Karzai is now history.He should've condemned the "recount" and to preserve his honour simply kicked out the international team,who are doing everything in their power to see his rival Abdullah Abdullah,the US's one and future puppet, as his replacement.He has lost face and effectively is finished,unless he can display some Afghan cunning-as he did forging an alliance with Hekmatayar and sabotage Abdullah and the US's plans.

U.S. aiding the Taliban?
MCT News Service
October 29, 2009

MAZAR-E-SHARIF, Afghanistan To a foreigner, the rumor sounds preposterous. But to the average Afghan, it's well within the range of the possible: Western military forces are using their helicopters to ferry Taliban fighters around the country.

A soldier with the 209th Shahin Corps of the Afghan National Army, which has been battling insurgents in Kunduz province in northern Afghanistan, insists he's witnessed it with his own eyes.

"Just when the police and army managed to surround the Taliban in a village of Qala-e-Zaal district, we saw helicopters land with support teams," said the soldier who asked that his name not be used because he is not authorized to speak to the press. "They managed to rescue their friends from our encirclement, and even to inflict defeat on the Afghan National Army."

This story, in one form or another, is being repeated throughout northern Afghanistan. People claim to have seen Taliban fighters disembark from foreign helicopters in several provinces.

"Our fight against the Taliban is nonsense," said the soldier from Shahin Corps. "Our foreigner 'friends' are friendlier to the opposition."

For years, there have been widespread rumors that the Taliban are being indirectly financed or even directly supported by foreign military forces.

Such rumors gain credence in part because many Afghans can't believe that a ragtag group of insurgents have been able to outmaneuver the world's sole remaining superpower for more than eight years.

And in a country where foreign intrigue has existed for centuries, such suspicions appear perfectly normal.

In this case, the belief is that foreign forces are ferrying Taliban fighters from the volatile south to what had been a more peaceful north so that coalition forces will have an excuse to expand their reach all across the country.

Even Afghan President Hamid Karzai gave an unexpected boost to such rumors earlier this month when he announced that he was investigating reports that "unknown" helicopters were ferrying the insurgents from Helmand province in the south to Baghlan, Kunduz and Samangan provinces in the north.

The rumors have become so pervasive that top military commanders have felt compelled to issue public denials, a tactic that often only fuel public suspicion.

"This entire business with the helicopters is just a rumor," said Brig. Gen. Juergen Setzer, who was recently appointed commander of the International Security Assistance Force. "It has no basis in reality, according to our investigations." Capt. Tim Dark, of Britain's Task Force Helmand, was even more emphatic.

"The thought that British soldiers could be aiding and abetting the enemy is just rubbish," he said. "We have had 85 casualties so far this year." Engineer Mohammad Omar, governor of Kunduz province, refused to comment on the issue. But Enayatullah Enayat, governor of Samangan, also denied that the helicopters were moving the opposition around in Samangan.

"I am in contact with both national and foreign forces in Samangan," he said. "I have not seen any suspicious helicopters bringing in the Taliban." Still, local villagers insist they have seen Taliban fighters disembarking from helicopters with their own eyes.

In the Baghlan-e-Markazi district of Baghlan province, residents witnessed a battle last month in which they insisted that two foreign helicopters had delivered the Taliban fighters who then attacked their district center.

"I saw the helicopters with my own eyes," said Sayed Rafiq from Baghlan-e-Markazi. "They landed near the foothills and offloaded dozens of Taliban with turbans, and wrapped in patus (a blanket-type shawl)."

According to numerous media reports, the Taliban attacked the district center. The district police chief, the head of counter-narcotics unit and a number of soldiers, were killed in the attack.

Amir Gul, the district governor of Baghlan-e-Markazi, insisted that the Taliban fighters had been delivered by helicopter.

"I do not know to which country the helicopters belonged," he said. "But these are the same helicopters that are taking the Taliban from Helmand to Kandahar and from there to the north, especially to Baghlan."

Baghlan police chief Mohammad Kabir Andarabi said that his department had reported to the central government that foreign helicopters were transporting the Taliban into Baghlan.

The Baghlan provincial governor, Mohammad Akbar Barikzai, told a news conference on Oct. 21 that his intelligence and security services had discovered that unidentified helicopters were landing at night in some parts of the province. "We are investigating," he said.

In the end, the results of such an investigation may not matter. The fact that many Afghanis are ready to believe that coalition forces are somehow in collusion with Taliban fighters to keep the country destabilized indicates a deep level of distrust of Western involvement that will be difficult to overcome.

ABOUT THE WRITER

Ahmad Kawoosh is a reporter in Afghanistan who writes for The Institute for War & Peace Reporting, a nonprofit organization that trains journalists in areas of conflict. Readers may write to the author at the Institute for War & Peace Reporting, 48 Grays Inn Road, London WC1X 8LT, U.K.; Web site: www.iwpr.net. For information about IWPR's funding, please go to http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?topsupporters.html.

This essay is available to McClatchy-Tribune News Service subscribers. McClatchy-Tribune did not subsidize the writing of this column; the opinions are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent the views of McClatchy-Tribune or its editors.
(c) 2009, The Institute for War & Peace Reporting