http://www.expressindia.com/latest-news ... -b/333942/
Let us wait for a second opinion from Sai Baba

What about power sector reforms?We are going to pay for a very hefty sum if we go the whole hog as mentioned for this imported nuclear fuel and power plant technology,costing billions and producing power at a questionable cost.
Check out slides 13 and 14 from AK's presentation.As a votary of sustainable enrgy achieved through holistic efforts,from all the available disciplines of power production,despite the zillions of words on the N-deal,the inescapable fact remains that even at full stretch we will be able to achieve not more than 7% through nuclear power.Where is the rest going to come from?
Man, I posted his views on Kashmir in the J&K thread. Wonder whats cooking.Suppiah wrote:joshvajohn wrote:Sri Sri Ravi Shankar asks opposition parties to back N-deal
http://www.expressindia.com/latest-news ... -b/333942/
Let us wait for a second opinion from Sai Baba
It would be a huge challenge. For sure DAE has the ultimate say over nuclear sector - for now at least. So, even what private sector has in mind will be governed by what actually DAE has in mind.Gerard wrote:What about power sector reforms?We are going to pay for a very hefty sum if we go the whole hog as mentioned for this imported nuclear fuel and power plant technology,costing billions and producing power at a questionable cost.
Let private industry raise the money, build the plants and operate them. If they choose to use imported LWR technology then so be it. Whether it be nuclear or coal, they will be producing power and selling it to SEZs and SEBs.
Once it is profitable to produce and sell power in India, why should the GOI have to pay for any of this?
The Associated Press
Thursday, July 10, 2008
VIENNA, Austria: A senior U.S. envoy welcomed India's move to open some civilian nuclear facilities to international perusal, but critics said the agreement on how the oversight will be carried out is flawed.
The U.S. comments Thursday came a day after India started circulating its so-called safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency among the 35 nations on the agency's board, which is expected to approve the deal within weeks.
India's initiative "will help strengthen the global nonproliferation regime and help India meet its growing energy demands in an environmentally friendly way," Gregory L. Schulte, the chief U.S. delegate to the IAEA, told reporters.
The document aims to allow India to do business with 45 nations that export coveted nuclear fuel and technology. A copy of the restricted draft was obtained by The Associated Press on Wednesday.
Much of the 23-page document is in line with other safeguard agreements. But a clause appears to call into question the effectiveness of any International Atomic Energy Agency effort to make sure New Delhi's civilian nuclear activities do not aid its atomic weapons program.
The draft notes that India "may take corrective measures to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies." The phrasing appears to open the door for India to end IAEA oversight of some facilities, potentially using the plants to manufacture not fuel but fissile weapons material.
And a section where India lists the facilities to be under IAEA supervision is left blank. Although those facilities 14 of the nation's 22 reactors are listed in a separate and widely published Civil Nuclear Separation Plan drawn up two years ago by India, the empty annex raised questions among critics.
"The board should ask what 'corrective measures' are supposed to mean," said Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association in Washington. "It could mean 'we will withdraw from safeguards those facilities that we need to withdraw from and we will use in those facilities other, unsupervised fuel sources.'"
As for the blank list, "it matters which facilities you are placing under safeguards because some of India's facilities have greater or lesser relevance to its (military) nuclear program," said Kimball.
Without IAEA safeguards, India cannot hope to gain the business of countries exporting nuclear technology, which are grouped in the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
India is scrambling to find enough uranium to supply both is power sector and its nuclear weapons facilities.
But even if the board approves the India-IAEA agreement later this month or in early August, the Nuclear Suppliers Group nations are not expected to discuss an exemption to the rules for India until September.
That would likely delay attempts by the U.S. administration to push Congress to approve a landmark 2005 US-India deal that foresees the U.S. sharing its civilian nuclear know-how with India. Both countries are eager to finish the deal under the tenure of U.S. President George W. Bush, a point emphasized Thursday by Schulte.
India first conducted a nuclear test 24 years ago as it broke out of its foreign-supplied civilian program to develop atomic arms.
Nuclear Suppliers Group states, including the United States, have restricted nuclear trade since 1992 with states that have not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty or don't have comprehensive safeguards.
R Vaidya wrote:This came in mail --I am trying to get link--
Ajit Ranade is Chief Economist with Aditya Birla Group .But clear and incisive and never awed by Washington consensus!
rvaidya
______________
Mumbai Mirror
Two treaties, same villain
India is being painted as the party spoiler in WTO and the nuclear deal. Maybe we should gloat Posted On Saturday, June 21, 2008
Ajit Ranade
The nuclear deal is stalled and India is being blamed by Western commentators
(Warning: If you are ultra gullible, who quickly accepts conspiracy theories, read no further. If you are easily aroused into xenophobia, stop here)
India's 2007 GDP measured in dollars, and adjusted with American prices instead of Indian prices, is about $ 4.5 trillion. Last December, the World Bank, which calculates these adjusted GDPs for 146 countries, abruptly lowered India and China's numbers substantially.
So instead of boasting that we were the third largest economy, we are now fifth (behind Japan and Germany).
Last month, while our official data was showing India's inflation to be eight percent, the Economist of London screeched that it was actually well above 10 per cent.
More recently the World Bank ranked India a low 117 out of 125 on its trade restrictiveness index. If you thought India has quite an open trade policy, you are wrong!
According to the WB, we are much worse than Russia, China and Brazil and in fact 116 other countries. Last year, a report of the National Bureau of Economic Research of the USA ranked the Reserve Bank of India as the least transparent among Asian central banks.
An IMF report of February also said that RBI lacked clarity of communication. So RBI's frequent communiqués, broadcasts, consultations, pro-active policy announcements, an up-to date website and database apparently don't add up to much, according to the IMF assessment. GDP downgrade, overstating our inflation prematurely, bottom rank on openness, severe criticism of RBI. Do you see a pattern here? It looks like a lot of foreigners are suddenly throwing stones at us.
We are in the midst of negotiating two important and far-reaching agreements. One is called the Doha round of the WTO and the other is the nuclear deal with the US.
On the former, more than 150 countries are trying to hammer out an agreement to lower trade barriers and increasing free trade in goods and services. But despite seven years of discussions and negotiations at the highest levels (of trade ministers), no agreement is in sight.
That's because we insist that there's no deal unless Western nations dismantle their farm subsidies which hurt our farmers. We can't afford any more farmer distress here, just because America wants to keep cotton prices low through subsidies.
The Doha deal is stuck. Who then is blocking this deal? Who is the stick-in-the-mud?
If you read the Western press, it is India who is the chief spoiler.
There is an attempt to isolate India as villain number one, who is stalling a deal that would benefit all developing countries. On the nuclear deal too, American commentary is sounding increasingly frustrated.
The gist of this commentary is that the deal is so damn good for India and its energy needs, and India is just shooting itself in the foot by being so adamant.
About meaningless things like the right to test weapons in the future.
Didn't the US make a huge concession by amending its own Atomic Energy Act to allow a civilian nuclear cooperation with India? Why then is India stuck on trivialities? Why are the "baddies" of domestic politics holding a historic deal to ransom?
The reality is that this ridicule and threats from the West means that it is "them" who stand to benefit much more from Doha or the nuclear deal.
At this stage, India has to merely do nothing, and wait for them to come around. Mahatma Gandhi in a different context had scaid, "First they ignore you, then they ridicule you, then they threaten and fight you, and then you win."
With slowly but surely rising economic might, we seem to have transited from the "ignore" to "take seriously" stage. Once we get past being painted as villains, and if we don't capitulate, we may finally get to being treated as adults at the global geopolitical table.
________________
Corrective measures are corrective measures and can only be decided once root cause is fixed. So they cant be a fixity (to use Jaswant Singh's terminology) to defining them. They cant be defined now for it depends on the situation and have to be tailored in future as required."The board should ask what 'corrective measures' are supposed to mean," said Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association in Washington. "It could mean 'we will withdraw from safeguards those facilities that we need to withdraw from and we will use in those facilities other, unsupervised fuel sources.'"
I have never seen more naive posting than this one. Political system is always complex and internal politics in every major democracy does not tie itself to any foreign relations while debating on major international deals.amit wrote:
And what about the BJP? If they now vote to boot out the UPA government, they will for a long time to come burn its bridges with the US - whom Vajpayee called India's natural ally. And for sure it can never negotiate a new nuclear deal as it will have to deliver something that is substantially better than what's in this one. I don't see how that would be possible in the next five-six years (that is assuming the NDA comes to power after elections).
NDA will have its work cut out for itself. It will have to oppose the government in the debate prior to the no-confidence motion and then it will have to seriously decide if it will vote for the motion or stage a walk out. BTW which party will bring in the No-Confidence motion? The Left or NDA?
It could very well be, as you speculate, that the BJP was in the loop. But there's likely to be a No-confidence motion in Parliament, which would be a sort of referendum on the deal. I really wonder how the BJP will handle that? I suspect it could be fiery speeches and a walk-out.
I thought BJP opposition is to do with Hyde act and testing clause in relation to US-India deal. It is only left wanted to block GOI going to IAEA that too not for text itself but in general to halt the process.paramu wrote:I have never seen more naive posting than this one. Political system is always complex and internal politics in every major democracy does not tie itself to any foreign relations while debating on major international deals.amit wrote:
And what about the BJP? If they now vote to boot out the UPA government, they will for a long time to come burn its bridges with the US - whom Vajpayee called India's natural ally. And for sure it can never negotiate a new nuclear deal as it will have to deliver something that is substantially better than what's in this one. I don't see how that would be possible in the next five-six years (that is assuming the NDA comes to power after elections).
NDA will have its work cut out for itself. It will have to oppose the government in the debate prior to the no-confidence motion and then it will have to seriously decide if it will vote for the motion or stage a walk out. BTW which party will bring in the No-Confidence motion? The Left or NDA?
It could very well be, as you speculate, that the BJP was in the loop. But there's likely to be a No-confidence motion in Parliament, which would be a sort of referendum on the deal. I really wonder how the BJP will handle that? I suspect it could be fiery speeches and a walk-out.
JEM:JE Menon wrote:Amit
>>But there's likely to be a No-confidence motion in Parliament, which would be a sort of referendum on the deal. I really wonder how the BJP will handle that?
So do I. Which is why I put "so far" and "yet" in brackets... You can never be sure, but I'm thinking they know how this cookie crumbles very well. So, I guess, we'll just have to wait and see... what else is new?
It is a coordination and Uncle handlers may have sensed that the govt is falling and to give a helping hand released it through the NPA. There is still confusion since too many players are coordinatingramana wrote:The wonk is an US NPA. He must have got it from his admirers among the cogniscenti with access. There must be some reason for doing it and could be out of scope for the forum. In the balance it could be the Opposition truculence - political and civic and that ensured the clean draft with the halalhal in the bilateral 123s which could be specific.
So it could be a Bharata natya sastra script with all the players being equally responsible for the success of the play!
Why not before. It should have been part of the debate in beginning of 2007 or by the middle of the year. All the Indian debate is waste now.Rangudu wrote:Come on Acharya garu. The document was leaked because IAEA leaks like a sieve. It is not governed by any national secrecy laws. These NPAs all have their own email lists and things get circulated fast.
Russia stocks up on uranium
Tatyana Sinitsyna on Moscow's rush to beat others in the queue
Russia has overtaken Niger to become the world's fourth largest uranium producer, after Canada, Australia and Kazakhstan. Russia received its new rating in 2007, when it produced 3,527 tonnes of uranium. It has ambitious plans to mover even further up the league, based on promising deposits in eastern Siberia and other regions, and opportunities for mutually advantageous cooperation with countries rich in uranium ore.
Today, the uranium market is characterised by a high level of monopolisation -- three-fourths of all uranium is produced by five countries. Having placed its stake on nuclear energy, Russia has no choice but to replenish its uranium reserves. In 2006, Russia launched cooperation with Kazakhstan. It owns 49 per cent shares in the Zarechnoye joint venture which is in charge of a 19,000-tonne uranium deposit. Last year, Russia signed a bilateral agreement with Australia, which will supply it with $ 1 million worth of uranium for civilian purposes every year.
Russia has also set up joint ventures with Canada's Cameco Corporation to undertake uranium prospecting and extraction in both countries. Potential for uranium production has also been assessed in Armenia; and Russia and Armenia have signed an agreement on uranium prospecting and production. Mongolia may also occupy a major place in the global nuclear industry. In theory, its untapped uranium resources are the largest in the world.
Meanwhile, Russia has to supply uranium to nuclear power plants that were built abroad in Soviet times, and it also has to execute contracts for uranium enrichment and processing. If we take into account all these factors, the gap between demand and supply adds up to 6,000 tonnes a year. Russia currently makes up for the shortfall with uranium from 'secondary reserves' -- depots of fissionable material, converted nuclear weapons, and so-called 'depleted uranium tails' (uranium ore used twice). But these secondary reserves, which every nuclear power has stockpiled since the start of the nuclear era, will last no more than 15 years.
The world is not short of uranium. On the contrary, nature has preordained a future atomic renaissance. Experts believe that there are billions of tonnes of uranium ore in the entrails of the earth -- much more than silver or mercury.
ramana wrote:But IAEA said they do keep confidenitality among their own members. Whatever the document was put out by a NPA and that is significant.
However the EAM was shown up in bad light. Some better coordination should have ensured the gaffe didnt occur. Pranab Mukherjee has taken the sword many times earlier for his party.
Curious thing is how the NPA poster boys/gods- Scandinavian, Ozzies and all rolled over and agreed to the draft. Not to mention PRC. The only ones isolated are the ummah brothers. So what happened and is the Kabul Embassy bombing precursor?
Hate to see him defamed as he did a lot for the INC in his years.Red-faced Pranab meets Manmohan
Pioneer News Service | New Delhi
Amidst demand for his resignation by the CPI, External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee met Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on his return from Japan on Thursday morning.
The Government's decision to approach the IAEA for formalisation of the safeguards text to the India-US civil nuclear deal has left Mukherjee in an embarrassing situation because he had announced that the Government would first prove its majority and then go to the IAEA.
Even as the Congress leaders defended Mukherjee throughout the day, the External Affairs Minister neither interacted with the media nor issued any statement.
Mukherjee met the Prime Minister on his return from Japan on Thursday. But there was no official word on what the two leaders discussed.
Bardhan had said the Government's move had made the position of Mukherjee 'untenable'.
"Twice he had said something and both the time the Government did something else. He wrote a letter on July 10 but before anything could be done the Prime Minister went on air saying that the Government would move IAEA.
"Then again he made a solemn commitment that the Government would not proceed to the Board of Governors of the IAEA till it proved its majority," he said.
Asked whether Mukherjee should quit, a top CPI leader said it was 'up to his conscience'. Meanwhile, defending Mukherjee, Science and Technology Minister Kapil Sibal said, "It is unfortunate to blame an individual or caste aspersions on him."
{Yes when its a Cabinet decision and collective repsonsiblity and all that. I suspect Sibbal is the turd here.}
He clarified the role of Ministry of External Affairs and said that it is a "facilitator" in international agreements.
"It is not a decision-making Ministry. It is not the MEA that decides on circulation of draft. It was the request of the Department of Atomic Energy. They requested that the draft should be circulated following a proper procedure," said Science and Technology Minister Kapil Sibal.
I was under the impression that this observation was open secret on BR but not talked about. Regardless Left will/has come out as looser on national scene and if so its a good omen.Raju wrote:yes Bade, this seems to be the right conclusion.Bade wrote:The timing of this push to IAEA so late after much dilly dallying with the left (drama) seem to be only to give as little time as possible to the NSG countries to sign in their approval.![]()
Seems all well orchestrated in advance by the GOI babus with GOTUS consent.
While as the Left seems to have been kept out of this deal just as a domestic political gesture in view of upcoming elections. Gives them something to cry about to their captive audience in WB, Kerala & Tripura. So both sides are happy.
While supporters of the deal have looked for "concessions" in the draft, the fine print reveals that the Agreement will pin India to a strict non-proliferation regime with stringent action in case of default. Additionally, while the text is specific about IAEA safeguards in perpetuity, it holds little assurance for India on fuel supply in perpetuity.
Unlike the impression created in July 2005 -- that the IAEA would accord special status to India with India-specific safeguards -- the Agreement in its current form strongly resembles all such accords with non-nuclear weapons states, not acknowledging India as a nuclear power.
As for the "corrective measures" India can take in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies, those against the deal in the US and those for it in India have interpreted this phrase as granting India de facto right to block some of its civilian nuclear facilities from IAEA oversight in order to employ the same for fissile weapons material manufacture. The IAEA text does not provide such licence
...........
Contesting this belief, Brahma Chellaney, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Centre for Policy Research says, "corrective measures" is merely a "cosmetic reference" in the preamble of the Agreement, which in fact denies India the right to take any such measures. Pointing to the 123 agreement with the US which instead of granting
India the right to take corrective measures in the event of fuel supply disruption, merely said New Delhi should seek such a right with the IAEA, Chellaney says "no such right has been secured in definable terms" in the agreement.
The preamble says, "India may take corrective measures to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies." Asserting it is a question of "may" and not "shall", Chellaney says India has no "legal entitlement."
Indeed, while the text dwells at length on the make-up of the safeguards regime complete with IAEA inspections and reports, it does not elaborate on India's rights in case of fuel disruption. What is apparent instead is that under the safeguards agreement India will find it difficult, if not impossible, to walk away from its non-proliferation commitments
.........
At a whopping cost of 1.2 million euro annually for each facility -- India will open up 14 facilities -- India has committed a high price, albeit to be shared by the IAEA.
In effect, Chellaney feels "India has agreed to be subject to rigorous safeguards, not the token inspections the IAEA carries out in nuclear weapon states."
N or M ( Title of Agatha Christie novel)narayanan wrote:What is your take on the complaints that
1. "there is nothing India-specific in the draft" and
2. "there is no mention of India's weapon status".
I thought paragraph 1B5 was very very clear that IAEA did not mean to get in the way of India's "other activities". So isn't (2) a big relief?
Regarding (1), the question may be asked, so what was the big deal in going to the IAEA at all? It seems to be like saying to the NSG: "If you guys want to go into this restaurant, we won't raid the place".
What did the "scientists" who are, expect from the IAEA agreement? Are they saying that BARC and TIFR are still going to be hindered by sanctions, or have to be opened to nosy foreign Inspecteurs, so we haven't gained anything?
So there was a misperception/misrepresentation on this aspect. Again my comment was IAEA is a UN body and cannot confer treaty status as was expected.Unlike the impression created in July 2005 -- that the IAEA would accord special status to India with India-specific safeguards -- the Agreement in its current form strongly resembles all such accords with non-nuclear weapons states, not acknowledging India as a nuclear power.
MUMBAI: Atomic Energy Commission chairman Anil Kakodkar has described the draft accord with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as a broad umbrella agreement that recognises India’s “autonomous and indigenous” nuclear programme, free from any safeguard.
The non-hindrance provision in the draft excludes from the safeguards any Indian activity using Indian research, know-how, material and components independently for its own purpose, Dr. Kakodkar pointed out at a press conference here on Thursday.
This was a de facto recognition of India being a nuclear weapon state, free to pursue its own atomic weapons development with no interference from the IAEA. It was not a comprehensive safeguards agreement. But, as its title suggests, it was about safeguards to civilian nuclear facilities.
Dr. Kakodkar pointed out that the IAEA safeguards were applicable only to those facilities India would declare voluntarily as civilian. What was civilian and what was not will be the decision of the Government of India.
He said the task now was to convince the member-states of the IAEA board of governors and secure ratification. The AEC chairman parried a question whether he expected any member to express reservation or seek amendment to any provision in the draft. “We are seeking approval of the Secretariat of the IAEA,” he said.
Did he see the necessity to amend the Indian Atomic Energy Act in response to the provisions of the Hyde Act, Dr. Kakodkar was asked. “We will ensure that Indian interests are protected,” he replied.
India’s three-stage nuclear power programme would be implemented and there would be no compromise on that. The new opportunities would bring in additional ties. He said that the agreement allowed India to stockpile nuclear material to meet the lifetime fuel requirement of imported reactors, reprocess the spent fuel and follow its closed fuel cycle programme to get the full benefit of the imported fuel.
Better shore up domestic uranium resources
R. Ramachandran
A temporary shortage has arisen because of a supply-demand mismatch. Why resort to imports through an undesirable deal?
The need to meet uranium shortage through imports is one of the arguments advanced by the proponents of the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal. In a recent interview to a TV channel, Union Minister for Science & Technology Kapil Sibal said: “Manifestly, the deal is about uranium… to breathe life into our nuclear reactors which are running at half the capacity. Without uranium they will soon come to a grinding halt.” While the deal is aimed at enabling India to a ccess the world nuclear market, which at present is not possible because of the existing trade regime underpinned by the nuclear order dictated by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, contrary to what Mr. Sibal says, the shortage is only temporary and has arisen because of a supply-demand mismatch between the domestic uranium mines and an expanding indigenous nuclear programme.
Resource break-up
The three-stage Indian nuclear programme is premised on the possibility of generating in the first stage 10,000 MWe based on Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs) using 61,000 tonnes of natural uranium (containing 0.07 per cent of fissile uranium-235) from ‘reasonably assured resources (RAR)’ over an average reactor lifetime of 40 years. (This is based on the fact that the annual charge required per 1,000 MWe is about 150 tonnes.) Besides the RAR, there is a domestic potential of 30,000 tonnes from various ‘inferred resources,’ 50,900 tonnes from ‘prognosticated resources’ and 17,000 tonnes from ‘speculative resources.’ However, Indian ores being lean, the cost of production is high, at $100-130/kg of uranium.
The shortage, no doubt, is serious. It has forced the 15 indigenous PHWRs to be operated at low capacity factors (CF). From an average CF of 60-65 per cent in 2006, the Nuclear Power Corporation (NPC), under the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), is striving today to run the plants at 48-50 per cent CF.
(According to the DAE, nuclear power tariff calculations are based on an average CF of 65 per cent.)
Inadequate funding
But this crunch is essentially a consequence of the inadequate funding throughout the 1990s when Manmohan Singh was Finance Minister and Montek Singh Ahluwalia, the present Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission, Finance Secretary. This lack of funding prevented the DAE from expanding its uranium exploration, mining and processing activities. In fact, it forced the department to shut down some old mines in Jaduguda ( Jharkhand). In the other exploitable sites in Andhra Pradesh and Meghalaya, besides lack of funds, opposition on environmental grounds has been responsible. As a result, mining operations have not matched the expansion of the programme with its greatly reduced construction time (of around five years) and the highly improved performances (with nearly 90 per cent CF) of the indigenous PHWRs.
As Dr. Anil Kakodkar, observed in his Founder’s Day talk in October 2007: “The present fuel demand-supply mismatch would not have arisen had these projects been pursued in the same spirit with which Dr. Bhabha started activities at Jaduguda … our uranium exploration programme has seen a paradigm shift in terms of far greater mobilisation of resources and technologies and we should not rule out a PHWR capacity much larger than 10,000 MWe, should we be successful in finding more uranium. Given the capability of our uranium geologists and the unprecedented programme thrust, I see no reason why this should not happen.”
While this potential was always there, the investments in mining and exploration were nowhere commensurate with that. Not only during the 1990s, even during 2000-2006, the total expenditure by the public sector Uranium Corporation of India Ltd. and the DAE on uranium exploration and development was almost flat. Only during 2007-08 and 2008-09, did the budgeted amounts show some increase.
Just when the nuclear deal appears to be in its most critical phase, media commentators in support of it have once again begun to raise the issue of domestic fuel shortage. Such reports appeared last August as well just before the joint Left-UPA Committee was formed. At that time the NPC, in a press release, said the temporary mismatch between demand and supply from the operational mines would soon be rectified following the commissioning of new mines at Banduhurang and Turamdih (also in Jharkhand) and the new processing mill at Turamdih. This, it said, “would add to the uranium production in a short time. With this we expect the plant load factors (PLF) of plants going up in a few weeks time.”
Indeed, in mid-2007 the DAE commissioned a new mill to process mined uranium ore at Turamdih. The existing mill at Jaduguda can process 2,190 tonnes/day with a nominal production capacity of 175 tonnes of uranium/year. The Turamdih mill has a capacity of 3,000 tonnes/day with a nominal production capacity of 190 tonnes of uranium/year, according to the figures provided by the DAE to the International Atomic Energy Agency in January 2007. In fact, in recent years, faced with the shortage, production at Jaduguda was jacked up to about 230 tonnes of uranium/year. A new opencast mine at Banduhurang was opened (with the largest ore mining capacity so far of 2,400 tonnes/day and the foundation for a new underground mine in Mohuldih (with an ore capacity of 500 tonnes/day ) laid. There are also plans to expand these facilities: the Jaduguda mill to process 2,500 tonnes/day, the Turamdih mill 4,500 tonnes/day, the Banduhurang mine 3,500 tonnes/day, and the Turamdih mine 1,000 tonnes/day up from 550 tonnes. Things are likely to change further with the government approving construction of a new mine and mill at Tummalapalli in Andhra Pradesh. In all, roughly Rs. 3,100 crore is the estimated investment to open new mines and set up processing plants in Jharkhand, Andhra Pradesh and Meghalaya. In Jharkhand alone, Rs. 650 crore is being invested. An investment of Rs. 1,800 crore is proposed for setting up two uranium mining and milling plants in Andhra Pradesh. New uranium projects are expected to be taken up in Karnataka, Rajasthan and other places. Most of these sites have been known for long, and would perhaps have been taken up much earlier but for poor funding.
Given the required annual recharge of about 150 tonnes of uranium per 1,000 MWe, the total requirement for the present installed capacity of 4,120 MWe is about 600 tonnes. But the new mill at Turamdih did not begin production because of teething technical problems. So, the current production remains at 45-50 per cent of the annual requirement. However, according to Dr. S.K. Jain, CMD of NPC, the problems at the Turamdih mill were tackled and production should begin soon, and would gradually be increased to its full capacity.
Even then, the plants will still fall short of the requirement by about 40 per cent. The shortfall is likely to be overcome from domestic sources only when the mines and processing plants — those currently being established as well as those planned till the end of the 11th Plan — become operational. If the Indo-U.S. deal fructifies — even in the face of Left opposition — and the world nuclear trade regime relaxes its controls, imports would be a possible source. But imports will not land immediately. Currently all world uranium suppliers are overbooked. Given the demand, the market price too has been increasing steadily to around $85/lb, which, in fact, renders Indian uranium competitive.
The units planned to be started up during the 11th Plan period (up to 2012) include the Tummalapalli mine and processing mill (of 3,000 tonnes/day capacity), which is expected to begin production(217 tonnes/year ) by 2010; the Lambapur-Peddagattu mine and the associated mine at Seripally (of 1250 tonnes/day capacity) in Andhra Pradesh, which will begin production (130 tonnes/year) by 2012; and the Kylleng-Pyndengsohiong-Mawthabah (KPM) mine and the associated KPM mill (of 2000 tonnes/day capacity) in Meghalaya, which is also expected to begin production (340 tonnes/year) by 2012. So, in addition to the current installed annual capacity of 365 tonnes, the capacity that will be created during the current Plan is projected at 687 tonnes.
The total capacity at the end of the Plan should then be about 1,050 tonnes, more than enough to cater also for the additional 2 x 220-MWe PHWRs expected to come up during the Plan period.
Therefore, if there are no glitches and hitches in implementing the planned schemes, the mismatch in uranium availability should be overcome by 2010. Of course, this will not suffice to meet the requirement of the 8 x 700-MWe PHWRs that are expected to come up during the 12th Plan up to 2017. Presumably, establishment of additional production capacity (of about 500 tonnes/year), to process ores from other potential sites, is on the cards. The temporary shortfall, which is likely to see some relief soon, is something that a programme that contributes a mere 2.9 per cent of total installed capacity of power can live with in the short-run. It is better to shore up domestic resources than resort to imports through an undesirable deal. Of course, now the proponents have suddenly begun to talk of large-scale import not just of fuel but also about 40,000 MWe of nuclear power during 2012-2020 ostensibly for long-term energy security! That proposition, in fact, is far more serious.
Dont you think he was acting up. He should have done this when the other details were being published. He was opposed to any kind of agreement.narayanan wrote:
Malarkey's reaction shows why GOI was smart not to publish this stuff before - and why the NPAs leaked it now.
Ayatollah David Albright dismisses this as a "fool's errand". He uses a rather insulting analogy with police searching a house for drugs when one room is placed off limits.But they still will try to "pursue" if they find evidence that there is transfer out of the safeguarded facilities, so some special features may have to be built into the agreement to keep out arguments over "searches" on the basis of false "suspicions". Interesting.
America ‘twists arms’, nuke rivals bristle
US ‘threat’ to quit NSG if it delays nod
K.P. NAYAR
Washington, July 10: The Bush administration is privately threatening to leave the Nuclear Suppliers Group if it does not expeditiously approve the Indo-US nuclear deal by allowing member countries to engage in nuclear commerce with Delhi, a highly respected American arms control expert has alleged.
Henry Sokolski, who worked in the US defence secretary’s office as deputy for non-proliferation policy and was later a member of the CIA’s senior advisory panel, wrote in The Wall Street Journal today that “the US actually has been twisting arms at the NSG... and so dissolve the group if countries critical of the India deal did not fall into line on India”.
Sokolski’s allegation, though sensational, is not entirely fanciful. The US has a history of standing by its friends on nuclear issues.
In autumn 1982, after Israel’s expulsion from the IAEA General Conference, the agency’s highest policymaking body, for its bombing of Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor, the US withdrew from the IAEA and suspended its contributions to the budget of the UN’s nuclear watch- dog.
The boycott did not last very long. Although Washington returned to the IAEA in early 1983, the episode was today being recalled widely within the strategic community here in the context of Sokolski’s allegation.
Making the NSG defunct is actually easy as pie. It is not even a structured body and has no secretariat.
Besides, the NSG was created in response to India’s nuclear test in 1974 and if the IAEA is integrating India into its “atoms for peace” framework, there could be logical questions about the need to continue with the 45-nation group.
Sokolski’s article about India’s safeguards agreement with the IAEA, appropriately titled ‘Negotiating India’s Next Nuclear Explosion’, is part of a campaign that is being hastily revived against the Indo-US nuclear deal, which non-proliferationists here had taken for dead.
Jeffrey Lewis, an arms control expert on the US East Coast who started ArmsControlWonk, a blog that put out the “restricted” India-specific safeguards agreement within hours after it was circulated in Vienna yesterday, said the agreement “stinks” because the word “perpetuity” does not appear even once in the draft in connection with placing Indian nuclear installations under IAEA scrutiny.
Speaking for the influential Arms Control Association here, its top official, Daryl Kimball, has appealed to the IAEA governors not to rubber stamp the safeguards pact when they take it up for review shortly.
The recently chosen chairman of the US House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee, Howard Berman, has not spoken yet about the moves in Vienna, but he has already said any progress on the nuclear deal must be “completely consistent with the Hyde Act” which continues to raise hackles in India.
the preambular language repeating the GoI position re fuel bank and disruption is very unfortunate…. it makes the IAEA an accomplice in the event of a resumption of Indian N testing.
—MK