Deterrence

[ShauryaT]

Its not lack of private players but a lack of dedication to the work at hand. The quality issues usually are people issues of not following process. For all we know the compoenents could be from private players. So lets see.

Patriotism or a comfy seat to warm are not the usual motivations for private players. A set of carrots and sticks will work best, along with some mature players, who would take a long term view of the matter. Invest today and hope to reap it big after 10 years. I remember Agni III components being completely sourced from private players, same must have been the case here.

[NRao]

I would be very concerned if one does not have questions or some doubts. Skepticism, that too accpeted.

Nothing wrong with any of that.

But, one needs to understand when to say what and how to say what depending on the circumstances.

A missiles systems such as this is not the same as building and maintaining roads (in India). And, associated concerns need to be communicated in appropriate ways even in public.

Having said that, perhaps, increase in all around maturity in India (without exception) is a good thing to expect.

[shiv]

OK, look at the words used in the above article, now tell me, if it is not reasonable for a skeptical mind to ask some questions and have some doubt.

It is perfectly reasonable to raise doubt.

The way I see it is - how much comfort do the Chinese get now if they used to think "Oh we can get hit by Indian nukes" but can now think" Oh the Indians nukes that hit us may not work"

We can never ever know what the Chinese are thinking. We can only know what Indians think. But we can reasonably hypothesize he thoughts the Chinese could be having as follows:

1964 - We have nuke. India has no nuke
1974 -Damn! India has tested but let's see
1998 - India has nukes - but not many and currently deliverable by air only
2008 - India has nukes some deliverable deep into China by missiles
2009 - India has nukes some deliverable deep into China by missiles, but some missiles and nukes may not work

What would it take for china to get to the comfort level regarding Indian nukes that it had in 1964 or 1974? There is no turning the clock back. Saying "We have more and bigger bombs" still does not reduce or eliminate the Indian threat.

So what is deterrence?

[Sanku]

We can never ever know what the Chinese are thinking.

Incorrect, thats why Govts have spy agencies and other think tanks

GoI needs to know -- excuses are not going to cut it.

[shiv]

Incorrect, thats why Govts have spy agencies and other think tanks

Yeah tell me about govt spy agencies. RAW and K Santhanam. "Information" 11 years late. People having to retire before speaking the "truth" and telling lies while working?

[Sanku]

Incorrect, thats why Govts have spy agencies and other think tanks

Yeah tell me about govt spy agencies. RAW and K Santhanam. "Information" 11 years late. People having to retire before speaking the "truth" and telling lies while working?

\Sarc on
Yes all India is like that onlee, we are lost, our spy agencies dont work, BARC is a fraud, Arjun's are canned because of Natasha's, Agni IIs dont fire, woe is me woe is me

\Sarc off

I dont think trying character association of a person, any person is going to cut it. GoI in general and parts of forum too have been trying their tack at dismissing issues on the basis of character assassination, unfortunately all it does is provoke others to play the same game but the issues dont die.

The point is raised had a statement on HOW the GoI should operate, I am well aware that it is not perfect however the issue I raised when discussing deterrence is still quite valid, as can be seen by the fact that the only counter to it was completely tangential.

[shiv]

I dont think trying character association of a person, any person is going to cut it.

So you admit that a person who indulges in character assassination is clearly wrong in indulging in character assassination?

[Jarita]

Hey guys. Any news on the firing across LOC?

[Sanku]

I dont think trying character association of a person, any person is going to cut it.

So you admit that a person who indulges in character assassination is clearly wrong in indulging in character assassination?

Rephrase the question, why do I have to admit anything, considering the character assassination is happening elsewhere.

[NRao]

'China bent upon cutting India down to size'

New Delhi, December 22: Describing China as hegemonistic and very aggressive, former National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra called on the Indian Government to adopt the right combination of strategic and diplomatic policies to counter Beijing's dangerous designs.

Describing India as the weakest among China’s three rivals in Asia – Japan and Australia – Mishra cautioned that China is just waiting for some years before it would assert itself.

Mishra noted that while Japan and Australia have nuclear umbrellas for their protection, India would have to defend itself from two fronts – both China and Pakistan.

“Though both fronts are not active simultaneously now, it is probable and possible that both fronts become active,” he said.

Mishra was releasing two books – ‘The Dragon’s Fire: Chinese Military Strategy and Its Implications for Asia’ (by Rajeswari Rajagopalan) and ‘Arming the Indian Arsenal: Challenges and Policy Options’ (by Deba Mohanty) published by Observer Research Foundation, a public policy think tank headquartered in Delhi.

[arun]

X Posted.

A whole bunch of heavy weights are signatory to this statement including Dr P.K. Iyengar, Prof. Ashok Parthasarathi, Dr A.N. Prasad, K. Santhanam and Dr A. Gopalakrishnan.:

Mainstream, Vol XLVIII, No 1, December 26, 2009 - Annual Number 2009

On Thermonuclear Weapon Capability and its Implications for Credible Minimum Deterrence

Statement by Deeply Concerned Senior Scientists

Saturday 26 December 2009

Soon after the Pokhran-II tests on May 11 1998, the scientists of the two organisations concerned, the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) and the Defence R&D Organisation (DRDO), had jointly evaluated the success of the two tests—the fission device (A-bomb) and the fusion device (H-bomb). While the former device performed perfectly including creating a crater of the expected size, the fusion device failed on many counts—very low yield, no crater etc. International monitoring centres also recorded low intensity of shock waves, resulting in low yield estimates—estimates that were more in consonance with the DRDO numbers. This was discussed among the BARC and DRDO scientists involved—and resulted in a dispute between them. A detailed report submitted by DRDO to the government fully corroborated its original assessment viz. that, while the fission device worked successfully as expected, the fusion device did not. The recent revealation by Dr K. Santhanam, who was in charge of all of DRDO’s activities at the site, testify to this. By all accounts—geological, radio-chemical as well as seismic—it is now quite clear that the fusion device yielded a very low value of explosive power. The articles by K. Santhanam and Prof Ashok Parthasarathi in The Hindu (September 17, 2009) and P.K. Iyenger in Outlook (October 26, 2009) go into considerable technical detail and present a credible case, beyond all reasonable doubt, that the H-bomb tested on May 11, 1998 failed.

These findings are extremely serious for the security of the nation, particularly in the context of our pronouncement of being a nuclear weapon power, along with our enunciated doctrine of ‘no first use’ and our ‘unilateral voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing’. They strike at the root of our weaponisation capability and compromise our strategy of Credible Minimum Nuclear Deterrence.

Soon after the Pokhran-II Tests, the then government almost succumbed to Western pressure to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) backing off only at the last moment due to an outcry in the country against doing so. The refusal of the US Senate to ratify the CTBT then released the pressure on the government. The renewed pressure from President Obama on us in recent months to sign the CTBT is causing the issue of our signing the CTBT to be raised again. We strongly urge the present government to remain firm in its opposition to our doing so, as the Prime Minister has publicly assured the nation more than once in recent months. ……………………….

We, therefore, strongly urge the government to immediately set up a High Level, Independent, Broad-Based Panel of Experts to define and monitor the implementation, on a continuing basis, of an effective course of action, in the realm of thermo-nuclear weapons, so central to our national security. All of us have worked on different aspects of this problem with a sound understanding of the harsh ground realities and the immense magnitude of what is at stake. It is now for the government to Take the Call—and without losing a minute more—as its counterparts in our adversaries have and are continuing to do so. …………………………………

Mainstream

[ramana]

First posted by Lilo in Mumbai Terrorist attack thread;

The Next Mumbai: The Future of India-Pakistan Deterrence

Bennett Ramberg | 08 Dec 2009

On the first anniversary of the Mumbai attacks, many observers discussed the implications of the events that took place last Nov. 26. But few have commented on the implications of what did not take place: New Delhi did not mobilize its armed forces. It did not retaliate against terrorist safe havens, nor did it go to war with the country -- Pakistan -- where they were located. Rather, it limited its response to calling upon its neighbor to shut down the terrorist cells and extradite the masterminds and abettors of the Mumbai attackers.

Islamabad responded half-heartedly. It failed to bring key players responsible for plotting the attack to justice, refused to shut down the organizations behind them, and offered no reassurance that it would not be the home for future attacks.

All of which prompts the question, why didn't New Delhi retaliate, as did Washington in Afghanistan following the attacks of 9/11? The answer remains murky, but history provides an inkling: Nuclear deterrence probably tempered the impulse.

But history also suggests that the same deterrence also provided militants with the shield to plan and execute the Mumbai assault. And if what appears to be a pattern holds, the possibility remains that another attack like that of last November may one day confront New Delhi with a stark challenge: In the next Mumbai, will it continue to restrain itself, or will it risk the sum of all our fears -- the first nuclear war of the 21st century?

From the inception of Pakistan's nuclear program in the 1970s, India wrestled with how to respond to the challenge. In the early 1980s, after Israel successfully eliminated Iraq's Osirak reactor, nuclear pre-emption appeared to provide a solution. But Indian decision-makers realized that Pakistan held a nuclear hostage: India's civil nuclear reactors. If attacked and destroyed, the plants could release immense inventories of radiation, putting at risk large populations. In this ironic twist, India's own nuclear infrastructure became Pakistan's shield to develop the atomic bomb. What A lie! The expert loses his credibility right here! Pakistan did not develop the bomb. It was gifted by PRC with US looking other way}

As Pakistan's nuclear arsenal matured, the tables turned against India again. Now it would be the fear of Islamabad's weapons that would allow Pakistan to take India on.

The first game of nuclear chicken played out in 1990, a year that saw growing agitation for secession among Kashmir's Muslim population explode into mass violence. Seizing the moment, Pakistan provided insurgents with training and material. Mounting tensions prompted Pakistan's largest military exercise in history. Indian mobilizations followed. Concerned about a nuclear rupture, Washington rushed in as peacemaker{Gates} as India suppressed the revolt. But Pakistan learned the value of having a nuclear bulwark to challenge its foe.

In 1998, both countries beat their chests in a series of tit-for-tat atomic detonations. Emboldened, Islamabad decided to go toe-to-toe with New Delhi over Kashmir, banking on its evident nuclear prowess to shield it from retaliation. In the Kargil war, fought in the snow line and glaciers of Indian Kashmir, infiltrators attempted to push India off its mountain perch as a wedge to contest New Delhi's hold on the broader region. Again India, pushing back, eschewed striking Pakistan, fearful of the escalatory consequences. {Looks like the expert hoped India would break down and let the TSp use its nukes! and is disappointed that India didint.}

In 2001, the boldest test of the nuclear shield played out, as militants struck the heart of India's democracy, its parliament. The adroitness of India's security forces spared the country's legislators in the shootout that followed. But rather than take revenge against known terrorist camps inside Pakistan, India puffed. It demanded the extradition of those responsible. It slowly mobilized an immense army that approached the Pakistani border. And then, as Pakistan mounted its own response, India stopped. The risks of a nuclear exchange loomed too great.

In the years that followed, India attempted to overcome its hesitancy by devising a new conventional blitzkrieg strategy, dubbed "Cold Start." The hope was that a certain response to provocations would intimidate its adversary. But doctrine proved hollow. Cold Start never received the required resources, and at the time of Mumbai, New Delhi remained self-deterred by fear.

The Indo-Pakistani relationship demonstrates that nuclear deterrence can be a double-edged sword. It proved remarkably durable in the face of the most "offensive" acts of Pakistan and its surrogates. We have seen this pattern before. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union repeatedly tested one another, with both sides betting that the other would not dare pull the nuclear trigger. No it doesn't. it shows that having the US by its fundamentals allows the TSP to harass its neighbors.}

Prudence worked then. Whether it will continue to work in South Asia depends on one side or the other being willing to give. Come the next Mumbai, the world would do well to cross its fingers.

Bennett Ramberg has served as a foreign policy analyst and/or consultant to the Department of State (Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs), the U.S. Senate, the Nuclear Control Institute and the Committee to Bridge the Gap, as well as other organizations. His academic appointments have included positions at Princeton, Stanford, and UCLA. He is the author of three books and the editor of three others on international politics. His scholarly writing has appeared in Foreign Affairs, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, and Arms Control Today, among other journals. In addition, he has published op-eds in the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Los Angeles Times, and many other major newspapers in the U.S. and around the globe.

[shiv]

The Next Mumbai: The Future of India-Pakistan Deterrence


In 1998, both countries beat their chests in a series of tit-for-tat atomic detonations.

Bloody monkeys - these stupid colored Asian good for nothing underdeveloped states! No sense of responsibility! Bomb the crap outta them

[ramana]

I posted the article. I didnt write it.

[shiv]

I posted the article. I didnt write it.

Indeed. And I merely used the forum quote function to quote part of the article that you obviously did not write. The sarcasm was not aimed at you but the supercilious patronizing crap that passes for scholarship and journalism must not pass unnoticed.

I have edited the post to remove your name from the quotes.

I only wish more Indians would use the same language to write about the countries from which these idiots originate.

[JE Menon]

The best you can say about the Bennet Ramberg article is that it is retarded. It is amazing that his man is a consultant to the Department of State. However, the mistakes he makes are common among apes like him - particularly prevalent in the Western media, but not scarce in our own either.

1. He thinks our response to a Mumbai-style attack has to be conventonal, which will then, by natural progression necessarily (or very possibly) end up in a nuclear war. No one can guarantee the latter part, one way or another. But to suggest that a conventional war, as indicated by cold start, is the only option is blinkered in the extreme.

2. The second is that such an attack is only likely one way. Even many on BR will consider the possibility of Indian "non-state actors" launching an attack on, say, the Pakistani parliament and increasing the average IQ of the Pakisatan next door, to be extremely low. But it seems to be totally dismissed even as a theoretical possibility. If it happens, will they then wonder whether Pakistan will "eschew" a conventional war over nuclear fears? Will they be worried about their strategic facilities? I've never seen such scenarios articulated by the likes of Ramberg. Why Monkey?

3. What it does show, however, is that psyops does work. All these people tend to think that it is India which fears escalation, it is India that will "retaliate" (or not) while Pakistan is the one that will "seize the moment" or "decide to go toe-to-toe" after, of course "tit for tat" (not sure in which order ). So when India goes into "active" mode, which is very rarely anyways, they are left squeezing their own balls in a blue-nut situation, wondering where TF did the "woman" in the scenario go...

Jackassically, he says "prudence worked then"? Huh? When? Until 26/11, or until the attack before that, or before that, or before that? Prudence did not work. Unless, for some reason , the Pakisatans at the ISI have decided that perhaps they should consider the impact of jihagra on their own (I mean the ISI's) well being.

The best is the advice at the end "the world would do well to cross its fingers". Why? India will not retaliate for fear of nuclear war right?

[negi]

1. He thinks our response to a Mumbai-style attack has to be conventonal, which will then, by natural progression necessarily (or very possibly) end up in a nuclear war. No one can guarantee the latter part, one way or another. But to suggest that a conventional war, as indicated by cold start, is the only option is blinkered in the extreme.

JEM to be honest isn't this the only manner in which GOTUS has reacted to any hostile act against the US ? Ramberg or anyone for obvious reasons would think that India or any other country would react in a similar manner .

[ramana]

If you have a hammer every problem is nail.

Unfortunately there is sledge hammer(US-PRC) backing up the nail(TSP).

So Indian approach is to make the hammer useless.

[JE Menon]

>>Ramberg or anyone for obvious reasons would think that India or any other country would react in a similar manner .

Indeed, boss. Hence the "ape" comment.

[Karna_A]

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NEWS/news ... wsid=12172

The cancellation of Tankers is a serious blow to deterrence, with Agni III also not ready.
It must be handiwork of few agents in Finance Ministry who are paid by someone to put brakes on such critical business transactions using flimsy excuses.

[ramana]

Not directly realted but gives an idea of what S Korea is thinking about the impending collapse of N Korea.

From Nightwatch, 20/1/2010

South Korea: Defense Minister Kim Tae Young today chief called for a pre-emptive strike on North Korea if there is a clear indication the country is preparing a nuclear attack, The Associated Press reported on 21 January. During a seminar in Seoul, Defense Minister Kim said South Korea should "immediately launch a strike" on the North if there is a clear intention of a pending nuclear attack.

This is the doctrine of Launch on Tactical Warning (LOTW). It means that South Korea has no intention of riding out a first strike by the North and then retaliating, which is India’s announced nuclear policy, for example. Another option would be to launch while under attack, that is when enemy missiles are in the air but before they have hit their targets.


The success of an LOTW policy hinges on the fidelity and detail of intelligence on enemy missile activities, so as to avoid strategic error because of a misinterpretation of enemy activities. On the other hand, LOTW tends to throw caution to the wind and puts the burden on the enemy to clarify his activities as non-threatening.

LOTW is a fail safe doctrine that forces the enemy to try to launch while under attack, if he can. Not mentioned are the complex issues associated with working with US intelligence. The implication is the South Koreans would make their own decisions for their national safety, but would certainly inform the US. If it adopts an LOTW strike doctrine, the South would not be looking for American approval or agreement.

Currently India's NFU is based on current politico-military setup in TSP and its linkages to PRC. However if the situation changes in TSP where fundamentalists come to power it might be good for the NFU to be nuanced.

[NRao]

Bill Sweetman :: India Boost For T-50

Specifically, ( (ret) Air Cmdr. Jasjit) Singh noted, "decisive military victory is a thing of the past between nuclear armed states - such as India and its neighbors, China and Pakistan. "Land war is limited to localized forces, below the nuclear threshold." Air power, he said, is the only instrument that can supply "the calibrated application of coercive force for political effect."

[NRao]

Agni-III launch a complete success

During its 800-second flight, it reached an altitude of 350 km. and its re-entry module sliced into the atmosphere, withstanding searing temperatures of 3,000 deg. Celsius.

The two-stage, surface-to-surface ballistic missile can carry nuclear warheads.

The nuclear triggering mechanism worked well although the missile carried only chemical explosives as payload.

An elated V.K. Saraswat, Scientific Adviser to the Defence Minister, called it “a fantastic launch and a hat-trick.”

Talking to The Hindu from Wheeler Island, he said, “it shows the maturity of the missile’s design and the quality of its systems because we have had three successes in a row without any blemish.”

“The flight gave us the full range and pin-point accuracy. The missile travelled accurately its entire range to its last decimal place as we had planned. ”

[Muppalla]

^^^ Good news admist gloomy news ( to be PC may be perceived gloomy news) of talks with TSP.

[NRao]

DRDO raises the bar, sets its sights on 5,000-km Agni-V

With three consecutively successful flights of Agni-III, the missile technologists of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) have raised the bar: they will now busy themselves with realising Agni-V which will have a range of 5,000 km.

The success of the Agni-III flight on Sunday, according to them, sent out several signals: it has become a proven missile; the decks have been cleared for its induction with nuclear warheads {This statement surprises me}, into the Army; it established {What about all these days?}the maturity of India’s nuclear deterrence programme and its second-strike capability.

It was the Army which conducted the successful flight. With this, the induction process of the missile has commenced. “This launch is a stepping stone to the DRDO realising its next intermediate range ballistic missile, Agni-V,” V.K. Saraswat, Scientific Adviser to the Defence Minister, said.

Dr. Saraswat, who is also Director-General of the DRDO, said the flight proved that the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which aimed at denying missile technologies to India, “has not affected our programme.”

“The development of the Agni-III took place independent of the MTCR. About 80 to 85 per cent of the components were indigenous. The indigenisation has gone to such a level where we are independent of any embargo,” Dr. Saraswat said.

W. Selvamurthy, Chief Controller (Life Sciences and Human Resources), DRDO, described the flight as “a milestone in strengthening our defence and developing our second-strike capability.”

Dr. Selvamurthy said that since India was wedded to the doctrine of “no-first-use” of its nuclear weapons, it needed to have a robust second-strike capability. If any country were to use nuclear weapons against India, the country should be able to retaliate in kind. “India should be able to deploy them [Agni-III missiles] in places where they cannot be detected,” he said.

...........................................................

Lt. Gen. B.S. Nagal, chief of Strategic Forces Command, witnessed the flight from the Wheeler Island.

[Chinmayanand]

I have a pooch to all the learned maulanas here " Why is the Indian Deterrence not working against pakistan?" Why does Indian deterrence fail to stop the paki terror in India? Paki deterrence is definitely working against India.How to make Indian deterrence work ?

[Prem]

I have a pooch to all the learned maulanas here " Why is the Indian Deterrence not working against pakistan?" Why does Indian deterrence fail to stop the paki terror in India?

Non technical answer is simple, Insanity . Pakis dont fear obliviousness as it will be a favour to them. They fear amputations of their various limbs to be put on public display and this is where Indians have not gotton it yet. Once Indians realize and come to term with this reality, No Paki inbreeder will be a issue in the neighborhood. Right now as far as Paquistan is concerned, its like pile of poop, you step into it ,it will stick to your shoes. Let it dry up in due time.

[shiv]

I have a pooch to all the learned maulanas here " Why is the Indian Deterrence not working against pakistan?" Why does Indian deterrence fail to stop the paki terror in India? Paki deterrence is definitely working against India.How to make Indian deterrence work ?

What do you mean by deterrence? When did Pakistan nuke India indicating a breakdown of deterrence.

[negi]

I have a pooch to all the learned maulanas here " Why is the Indian Deterrence not working against pakistan?" Why does Indian deterrence fail to stop the paki terror in India? Paki deterrence is definitely working against India.How to make Indian deterrence work ?

What do you mean by deterrence? When did Pakistan nuke India indicating a breakdown of deterrence.

India never had any deterrence in first place for two nuke armed adversaries the guy having a farce called NFU in place will never have deterrence as far as 26/11 type attacks or similar paki attacks are concerned , what is needed is a doctrine which clearly states in B&W that any terrorist attack on country found to be facilitated by state agents will be worthy of an overwhelming nuke strike. We shall then come to know at least if our MCD actually works or not.

In this case GOI considers 26/11 type casualties acceptable and several hundred human lives expendable as far as avoiding war with TSP is concerned as long as such school of thought exists and finds support in south block we won't see TSP being taken to task for its meticulously planned and executed mission "death by 1000 cuts".

[csharma]

Agni-III test-fired successfully

http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/holn ... 071441.htm

Unlike Agni-I and Agni-II, the Agni-III missile has been designed and optimised to carry lighter 200 KT thermo nuclear pay-load weapons.

[ramana]

Agni-III test-fired successfully

http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/holn ... 071441.htm

Unlike Agni-I and Agni-II, the Agni-III missile has been designed and optimised to carry lighter 200 KT thermo nuclear pay-load weapons.

Something doesnt add up. If its lighter than why is the payload heavier (1.5 Tonnes for AIII vs 1 tonne AI & AII )? Unless the 1.5 tonnes is for future bus?

[D Roy]

Given its a newer generation missile, it could be -

Better countermeasures package. Penaids.

future bus could naturally be a possibility as well.

[ramana]

To answer my own question, the article is circa May 2008 before all the revelations of the summer of 2009. Good they have a heavy payload. Makes it clear its not flowers.

I still worry about the beta.

[shiv]

One tonne plus was the weight of proven and reliable 4 kt Pokhran I device. Should be able to get 40 meter plus craters.

[ShauryaT]

To answer my own question, the article is circa May 2008 before all the revelations of the summer of 2009. Good they have a heavy payload. Makes it clear its not flowers.

I still worry about the beta.

Also, the article has no source and no author? Good you caught the date. Vardarajan is the key guy over at the Hindu on matters nuclear.

[sivab]

x-posted

http://arxiv.org/abs/0912.3991

On Yields of May 11, 1998 Indian explosions by network averaged teleseismic P-wave spectra
Authors: S.K. Sikka
(Submitted on 20 Dec 2009)
Abstract: We show here that the network averaged teleseismic P-wave spectra for Indian explosions of May 11, 1998, given by Barker et al, do not have an unambiguous interpretation. Barker et al had earlier demonstrated these were similar to the Shagan River testing site of former Soviet Union. We prove here that these are equally consistent with RUBIS (57 kt) and PILEDRIVER (62kt) explosions in French Hogger and US Nevada testing sites respectively.

http://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/0912/0912.3991.pdf

On Yields of May 11, 1998 Indian explosions by network averaged teleseismic P-wave spectra
S.K.Sikka
Office of the Principal Scientific Adviser to Government of India, Delhi
...
The above analysis clearly shows that the net work-averaged P wave spectra given by the US scientists now fully support the radiochemical yield estimates of Indian scientists and also the interpretation of close-in data and seismic analysis done earlier (Sikka et al [7- 9] and Roy et al [10]) and that the thermonuclear device performed as designed (see Table 1).

Technique
Yield (kt)

Close-in-acceleration
58

P-wave magnitude calibrated with Pok-1 yield
53

Net- work averaged P wave spectrum (reinterpreted)
57-62

Δm(Lg) between Pok 1 and Pok 2
58

Ms from regional and teleseismic stations
46-53

Δm (pcp) between Pok 1 and Pok 2
58-63

Radiochemical
Thermonuclear
Fission
50 ± 10
13 ± 3

[shiv]

Upping this thread for a reason

[shiv]

I just want to put down a few thoughts here.

Sticking to basics (WikI) let me post two theories of deterrence
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deterrence_theory
1) Deterrence is a strategy by which governments threaten an immense retaliation if attacked, such that aggressors are deterred if they do not wish to suffer great damage as a result of an aggressive action. Weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), conventional weapons strength, economic sanctions, or any combination of these can be used as deterrents. Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) is a form of this strategy, which came to prominence during the Cold War when it was used by the US to characterize relations between the United States and Soviet Union. Both nations were prepared to fight a full scale nuclear and conventional war, but were not willing to risk the carnage of a full scale nuclear war.

2)Deterrence by denial is a strategy whereby a government builds up or maintains defense and intelligence systems with the purported aim of neutralizing or mitigating attacks. Aggressors are deterred if they choose not to act, perceiving the cost of their action to be too high in relation to its likelihood of success.

As per these definitions. "Mutually Assured Destruction" forms one subset of means of deterrence. Unfortunately for the "lay public" (us) MAD is the most well known method and the only method that gets mentioned. The excuse I have heard about "MAD" is that it worked, but what is forgotten is that deterrence has been made to work even in the absence of MAD - eg US-China. The recent US confirmation of intent to reduce its arsenal to 1500 weapons indicates a further erosion of belief in the utility of "Mutually Assured destruction"

Clearly deterrence cannot occur without the threat of some kind of pain to an attacker. But if you look at the subject carefully you can build an analogy. imagine a man with a gun in a crowd holding people hostage. Imagine that he is surrounded by police who can blow his brain out, but either way the crowd of people is in danger. Whether the armed man carries out his threat or whether the police shoot first innocent people are likely to get hurt. In such a circumstance the "cheapest" method of disarming the man would be to get him to do it himself. The armed man will naturally want to know what's in it for him and so we have paradoxical situation in which the armed man, whose brain was to be blown out is actually given some sweeteners and promises (perhaps of fair treatment and redressing of grievances).

Now apply this scenario to the story of nuclear armed nations from 1945 onwards.

In the beginning it was the US and its allies versus the USSR. The tactic that was followed was MAD

Then China joined the game, and later India entered.

At this stage it was suddenly realised that every nation with nuclear arms could not be nuked out of existence without damaging life as we know it on earth. So MAD turned out to be a poor strategy once the number of players increased.

This led to a change of strategy where nations who were at greatest risk of being wiped out by others nuclear weapons were all convinced of the need to give up all nuclear ambition (CTBT) in exchange for certain nuclear sweeteners. What this treaty did was to eliminate any possibility of multiple MAD scenarios being developed by multiple nations, but left the P5 to sort out their own strategies.

But this was not good enough. The CTBT did not address the concerns of some very significant countries - notably India. And in any case in a world where the US (especially) and USSR acted as if they were the only two nations on earth, the CTBT and NPT were applied so loosely that a whole lot of nations acquired nuclear weapons from the P5.

This led to a situation in which multiple nations have nuclear weapons and technology. Already MAD was recognised as a situation that imperilled everyone, the nuclear antagonists and uninvolved parties. And MAD developing between two nations other than the US and someone else is as much of a risk to the US if the US were involved. What I am trying to say here is that nuclear war affects everyone on earth, not just the two parties involved.

Stemming from this statement are two further conclusions:
1) Any nation preparing for nuclear war is preparing to affect/damage the interests of every country on earth.
2) Threatening such a country with nukes will probably not make a difference because they are preparing for nuclear war anyway.

What this means is that if India is preparing for nuclear war with Pakistan, the threat that India may be destroyed by Chinese or American nukes will not deter India because it is set to lose either way, and if it is going to lose the best thing is to take someone down with you. Besides a Chinese or American attack on India will put the whole world at risk - which is the exact opposite of what is hoped to be achieved.

Similarly, if Pakistan is preparing for nuclear war with India and threat of combined US and Indian nukes will not deter Pakistan because it is set to lose either way, and the world loses either way.

This leads to the paradoxical situation that the world faces today:
1) Preparing for nuclear war puts the whole world at risk - not just the two nations who are fighting
2) But this power makes the development of nukes a powerful bargaining tool by which any nation with nukes can blackmail the entire world.

That means that the advantage that nations such as the US and Russia have gained with nuclear weapons is effectively neutralized by the smallest and latest nuclear armed nation. Any nation with nuclear arms can "upset the balance". Neither Pakistan nor NoKo are the least bit bothered about any nuclear threats they may face. Either they survive and have their way, or the entire world gets affected.

Interestingly I can include India along with NoKo and Pakistan in that sentence, but the reason I have not included India is that India was probably the first nation on earth to realise the paradox of possessing nuclear weapons. The actions of Pakistan (and to a lesser extent NoKo) are perfect examples of "You meet our needs or we take the world down with you"

The US's nuclear arsenal is powerless here, leave alone China's or India's arsenal. So what the hell can the world do about this situation?

Will write more thoughts later.

[shiv]

I just conjured up a little game where countries get points for acquiring nukes or lose points for not getting nukes.

In the simplest form of the game there are just two adversaries A and B. A gets nukes and scores +1, while B gets -1. Then B gets nukes to bring his score up to 0 while A's score comes down to 0. This is what mutual deterrence is all about.

But because the effects of a nuclear war can be global, both in terms of fallout and in terms of economy and trade, the game is essentially a global game. Each time any country gets nukes and acquires the power to target anyone with those nukes, everyone else gets a -1.

I will simplify this game to have less than 10 players. As each country gets nukes, that country gets +1 while everyone else gets -1

1) US gets nukes -
US +1
Russia -1
China -1
India -1
Pakistan -1
NoKo -1
Rest of the world -1 each

2) Russia gets nukes
US 0
Russia 0
China -2
India -2
Pakistan -2
NoKo -2
Rest of the world -2 each

3) China gets nukes
US -1
Russia -1
China -1
India -3
Pakistan -3
NoKo -3
Rest of the world -3 each

4) India gets nukes
US -2
Russia -2
China -2
India -2
Pakistan -4
NoKo -4
Rest of the world -4 each

5) Pakistan gets nukes
US -3
Russia -3
China -3
India -3
Pakistan -3
NoKo -5
Rest of the world -5 each

and so on - I think the trend is clear..

It is easy to see that every country ends up negative because no country can conduct a devastating nuclear attack on any other country without affecting other countries of the world and indeed the entire world. But there is a curious fact that is ignored here makes this fact even more ironically true.

Supposing Country X acquires nukes and suppose the whole world hates country X and the whole world gangs up to push country X down. Now can the US, Russia, China etc "gang up" to nuke the crap out of country X?

No. because nuking the crap out of country X affects the whole world and ultimately affects the people who use the nukes. Country X may be eliminated, but everyone else is also affected. This explains how the acquisition of nukes by any country makes it more and more of a disadvantage for all the other countries. Every country that acquires nukes neutralises the advantage that the US got by getting nukes in 1945 in the first place.

Most countries realised this very soon and tried to prevent or bypass this in different ways.

The US tried to bring in CTBT and NPT even as it continued its two way opposition to communism.

China in the meantime undercut the US because it was to China's advantage to run with the hares and hunt with the hounds. It signed the treaties but proliferated.

India too realised very early on that proliferation is good for you but bad for everyone else and did exactly what was needed to queer the pitch for others. Pakistan and NoKo have followed suit and others definitely will. Acquiring nukes is a win-win because you are reducing the chances of nuclear attack upon yourself in a rational world. Even the US cannot even afford to nuke NoKo - leave alone Pakistan, without affecting itself.

The thing to note her is that all the old calculations of "MAD" and nuclear balance of power etc have all gone awry. All are now outdated. The world has to move forward from here and do something in a situation where you cannot realistically nuke the crap out of anyone even if you have the capability assuming that you are a rational player. The irrational player has all the cards because if he does not care and he does not mind nuking someone - you still cannot create fallout over the whole world just to take out one tiny proliferator in some Pissingistan somewhere.

Where does the world go from here? More thoughts later.

[shiv]

If you were the US, what would you do?

Technically you can take out anyone you want with your nukes but there are some downsides
1) The fallout you create can come back and bite you
2) The signal you are sending to your desperate enemies is that they should nuke you before you get them and either way there is more fallout to affect you and your allies.

You have already tried to make others give up nukes except for a select few, but that has not worked. What are your options?

You could try to develop "clean" nukes - fusion only. Big bang - no fallout, but even if you did that you could not make it public to threaten or deter anyone. If you did that the risks to you would go up - with too many countries already developing dirty nukes. A few developing "clean nukes" (if that were feasible) would only increase the risk of war.

So what options are you left with? What are you going to do with your 10,000 plus nukes which you cannot use and which as going past their "use-by" date.

The simplest thing would be to try and get international agreement on stopping any further spread of nuclear weapons and technology as one step. France and the UK are your allies. You can trust them on this score, they too have too much to lose.

Russia used to be your main problem. You developed MAD just for Russia. But now the cold war is over. Russia has agreed to cut back on its nuclear arsenal and fissile material. So convincing Russia is not a problem.

China? China is clearly building capability to hit you. But MAD wont work with China because MAD is outdated. If you destroy China with tens of thousands of nukes, you have no world left for yourself, so that option is out. The worst you can do is to keep up the threat of nuking all that is dear to the ChiComs. At best you can get the ChiComs to cooperate with you economically.

India. India is a special problem. As with others you have no incentive to nuke India out of existence or even initiate nuclear war to take out India's nukes because of all the problems that ends up creating for you. But sanctions have not worked. India is not going to give up nuclear weapons. India again is not party to any of the agreements others have signed and has no incentive to do that. India is a headache because it sees threats from China and Pakistan and India cannot be made to limit its arsenal by punishment and sanctions - which have already failed. Leaving India out in the cold is not going to make the world safer in terms of nuclear war. India will need to be brought it by some means - that will have to be different from the traditional sanctions, punishment and "untouchable" status

Pakistan is another unique problem. Pakistan has a cast iron excuse for possessing nukes - India. Pakistan acquired those nukes illegally - but hey don't we all do a bit of funny stuff every now and again. That is excusable. But Pakistan was the creator of an entire clandestine network of illegal nuclear material and tech exchange and has actually supplied technology and material to North Korea, Iran and Libya - all current or past sworn enemies of the US. Libya has come into line but NoKo and Iran remain current headaches. In addition Pakistan is also probably the most unsafe place for nukes - where Al Qaeda - which has been more successful than Iran or NoKo in hitting the US is based. In terms of nuclear weapons and material Pakistan needs to be handled with special care. Pakistan needs to receive sweeteners for any cooperation but must not be rewarded for nuclear proliferation. Every gram of nuclear material in Pakistan is a global risk. Anything to make Pakistan cooperate should be tried - including pressure on India to give in the Pakistani demands.

NoKo is another headache - but is living on life support. It's current capabilities are limited. It is amenable to being bribed - to an extent.

Leaving Israel out here.

These are just my thoughts on how the US might see the issue of nukes globally. No claim that my views are correct. Just conjecture.