This is the key. It is dothiwala show right from the begnning to the end. It was a trap.ramana wrote:What if there was political decision not to ruffle feathers and hence no orders were given?
Kargil War Thread - IV
Ramana
With due respect, there may be times we over analyze.
The reality may be that these were straightforward goof ups at best due to over cautious procedures or at worst - foolishness.
Asprinzl has a point which Ved is dismissing as 007 stuff.
The Israelis will punish someone for being cautious and screwing up rather than making a bold decision and screwing up.
I find it absurd that the guy who has 5 to 10 aircraft tasked for ELINT\recce etc. did not fly a mission BECAUSE he was not asked to. What the hell did they do for 7 months? They had to fly some mission. Wouldn't it feel silly not to fly a mission in somepart of your country for 7 months!!!
Now you get an idea why the the AJT takes donkeys years, why simulators took so long to be asked for, etc.
John Snows simple statement is a lot more palatable at such momnets
With due respect, there may be times we over analyze.
The reality may be that these were straightforward goof ups at best due to over cautious procedures or at worst - foolishness.
Asprinzl has a point which Ved is dismissing as 007 stuff.
The Israelis will punish someone for being cautious and screwing up rather than making a bold decision and screwing up.
I find it absurd that the guy who has 5 to 10 aircraft tasked for ELINT\recce etc. did not fly a mission BECAUSE he was not asked to. What the hell did they do for 7 months? They had to fly some mission. Wouldn't it feel silly not to fly a mission in somepart of your country for 7 months!!!
Now you get an idea why the the AJT takes donkeys years, why simulators took so long to be asked for, etc.
John Snows simple statement is a lot more palatable at such momnets
way way before Kargil happened the Pakis went on shopping spree for their Kargil episode ... as later internet reports indicated.....
also the tamasha by dhoti wallahs including dear Kaka was based on the info the C-in-C passed on as his asesment and counter actions..
Our general in general win from enemy mistakes, than pro active planning and execution, except for the brilliant team work of 1971 Bdesh liberation
only after BR started talking about lightening fast reaction to an event supported by enemy inside our territory or interests we started hearing about cold start etc.
we have to await a long time before encore of Mrs IG, Jagit singh Arora Kao kinda team comes to the table to sort out things till then, we all can get TS promotions and play Golf in Poland .....
also the tamasha by dhoti wallahs including dear Kaka was based on the info the C-in-C passed on as his asesment and counter actions..
Our general in general win from enemy mistakes, than pro active planning and execution, except for the brilliant team work of 1971 Bdesh liberation
only after BR started talking about lightening fast reaction to an event supported by enemy inside our territory or interests we started hearing about cold start etc.
we have to await a long time before encore of Mrs IG, Jagit singh Arora Kao kinda team comes to the table to sort out things till then, we all can get TS promotions and play Golf in Poland .....
JohnJohn Snow wrote:The more we read about Malik the less izzat he commands.[/code]The day was saved by young commissioned and non commissioned officers upto the rank of Lt Col, and may be Cols,
Others were just sitting on their butt and asking jawans and yopung Lts to perform Guns of Navarone style climb up the mountains facing the Nothern Flight Infarty were phiring away...
He was phutting his Izzat with Clubs in Poland.The more we read about Malik the less izzat he commands.
Let us look athe time line of facts to draw the right conclusion.ramana wrote:How and what trap?
1998
June 1998 - first and most important warning was a June 2, 1998 note, personally signed by the then Intelligence Bureau Director, Shyamal Datta
In June 1998 the Kargil Brigade Intelligence Team (BIT) reported that ammunition supplies were being dumped and that terrorists had been seen in Skardu, Warcha and Marol awaiting infiltration through the Kargil sector.
July 1998 - July, Intelligence Bureau informants reported the deployment of M-11 missiles on the Deosai Plains and new mine-laying activities.
Aug 1998 - In August, the BIT and the Intelligence and Field Security Unit reported the presence of terrorists preparing to cross the LoC. Pakistani artillery flowed in as winter approached, a reversal of the normal practice.
Oct 1998 - Pervez Musharaff appointed COAS
By October, RAW was sufficiently concerned about developments to issue an express warning about the prospect of a "limited swift offensive", pointing in particular to the "constant induction of more troops from peacetime locations like Mangla, Lahore, Gujranwala and Okara into Pakistan-occupied Kashmir." Its assertion that a war was possible provoked an immediate challenge by the Director-General of Military Intelligence, and an inconclusive verbal discussion followed.
Nov 1998 - Northern Command, in its own internal assessments, recorded that November 1998 saw a three-fold increase in Pakistani troop movement in the Kargil sector when compared with November 1997. Vehicular movement doubled, while pack-animal movement increased nine-fold. As late as November 1998, the Intelligence Bureau's Leh station issued warnings that Pakistan was "training Taliban troops who were undergoing military training as well as learning the Balti and Ladakhi language." These irregulars, the warning stated, were likely to be inducted into the Kargil sector during April 1999.
1999
Feb 1999 - On February 9, 1999, troops of the 5 Para Regiment spotted movement on the top of Point 5770, a strategic height in the southern Siachen area on the Indian side of the LoC.
Feb 1999 - The Lahore Declaration was a historic declaration signed by the Indian Prime Minister, Mr. A. B. Vajpayee, and the Pakistan Prime Minister, Mr. Nawaz Sharif, in Lahore on February 21, 1999.
Mar 1999 - Again, on March 4, between eight and ten Pakistani soldiers were seen removing snow from a concrete bunker to the west of the summit of Point 5770. That evening, fire was exchanged over the area.
Strangely, the Siachen-based 102 Infantry Brigade removed the officer who had reported the intrusion, Major Manish Bhatnagar, not the Pakistani troops who had occupied the position. On the eve of Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's visit to Pakistan, it is likely that India had no desire to initiate a bruising exchange of fire on Siachen. The 121 Brigade, which ought to have been told that Pakistan troops had demonstrated aggressive intent in an adjoining area, was not even informed of the development.
For one, despite both the flow of intelligence on possible infiltration in the Kargil sector, troops were actually pulled out from frontline positions. Soon after the loss of Point 5770, 9 Mahar Regiment was removed from its defensive positions along the Yaldor Langpa stream and stationed at a rear position near Leh. The 26 Maratha Light Infantry, which protected the crucial infiltration route from Mashkoh to Dras, was also pulled off forward duties.
Despite the summary removal of approximately a quarter of its troops, there is evidence to show that 121 Brigade did act. Troops were withdrawn from the Mashkoh area for just 80 days in the winter of 1999, down from 177 days in 1997 and 116 days in 1998. Yaldor was left undefended for 64 days from February to April, where troops had been withdrawn for 120 days in 1997 and 119 days in 1998. Kaksar, another key area, was undefended for just 38 days, where it was left open for over 200 days in previous years.
April
April 11 - India says it has successfully test-fired a longer-range model of its Agni ballistic missile.
April 14 - The AIADMK withdraws support from the ruling coalition. President K.R. Narayanan asks the government to seek a confidence vote in parliament.
April 17 - India's 13-month-old BJP-led government falls after losing a confidence motion by just one vote. THis may have been a trigger.
April 26 - India's parliament is dissolved and early elections are called.
why was it that commanders in Leh and Srinagar were so slow to respond not just to the intelligence warnings that were available, but to the growing worries of their own subordinates?
General Malik argued that no troops were withdrawn by XV Corps from 3 Infantry Division's area of responsibility. This is, without dispute, true, since 9 Mahar and 26 Maratha battalions remained around Leh. Yet, General Malik's letter does not explain why General Budhwar chose to pull back soldiers needed to guard the LoC to rear positions when both intelligence warnings and field commanders believed threat levels were escalating.
General Malik also pointed out that the headquarters of 70 Infantry Brigade was inducted into the Dras area in October 1998, suggesting that the Army was indeed taking the warnings it received seriously. However, he omitted to mention the critical fact that only its headquarters' staff, not the fighting force, had been deployed when fighting broke out in May 1999.
May
May 1999 - Chinese moves in LAC Ladhak
"Chinese had inducted one company in the area opposite Chantze, with the rest of the battalion waiting in the wings," Malik discloses in the book. He says it was not only at Kameng, but the Chinese army enhanced its level of activity along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh as well from where some of the forces had been thinned down to be redeployed in Kargil.
"This enhancement in PLA activities along the LAC coincided with the start of the conflict in Kargil" Malik says which at military level, indicated a demonstrative support to Pakistan. Malik says this ran contrary to Beijing's assertions in recent years that it was pursuing an independent foreign policy and that its relations with Pakistan would not be at the cost of India. The Chinese forces also made a show of force in Demchok, in eastern Ladakh, constructed a track from Spanggur to south end of Pangong lake and a track in Trigg heights. He says India also received intelligence reports that PLA's Director in the Department of Armament had visited Islamabad during the conflict to help Pakistan army overcome its critical deficiencies in conventional armament, ammunition and equipment.
May 7 - Chinese Embassy Bombing in Kosovo - China US relationship problem. This may have kept Chinese from entering thewar.
May 16 - 6 choopers discovered in Kargil sector
May 24 - First report of infilterators.At a meeting of the Unified Headquarters in Srinagar on May 24, 1999, General Pal insisted that there "were no concentration of troops on the Pakistani side and no battle indicators of war or even limited skirmishes."
May 26 - India unleashes two waves of air strikes to flush out guerrillas on its side of a Kashmir ceasefire line, sharply raising temperatures in the region. The next day India confirms it has lost two fighter jets which Pakistan says they shot down.
May 28 - In Kashmir, a stinger missile brings down an Indian helicopter killing all on board.
June
June 12 - India and Pakistan hold "businesslike" talks over their Kashmir dispute but fail to resolve it; India says Pakistan tried to infiltrate the Turtuk Sector and puts the death toll at 267 Pakistanis and 86 Indians.
June 16, 1999 -The External Affairs Minister, Mr. Jaswant Singh has said his visit to Beijing has led to better understanding between India and China on regional and global issues, including the security perceptions of the two countries. Speaking to newspersons in Beijing at the end of his two day visit, he said new initiatives are already on the anvil.
July
July 4 - India says it has recaptured the strategic Tiger Hill on its side of a military line of control in Kashmir.
July 9 - In Kashmir, the Indian army reports that it has all but ousted the infiltrators from the Batalik zone on India's side of the ceasefire line.
July 17 - India signals the end of the flare-up with Pakistan by announcing that all infiltrators have withdrawn from Indian-held Kashmir.
July 26 - India says its troops have cleared all infiltrators from their side of the Line of Control that divides Kashmir.
Last edited by svinayak on 16 May 2006 21:27, edited 4 times in total.
The point is, the Israelis, like us, have a system which takes these decisions - their system is every bit as detailed as ours, as they do a lot of this stuff and cant afford to make mistakes - the point is, the system works, including every decision resulting in action on the ground. So a punitive strike may go out in a few hours, but the decision to launch that strike is processed all the way to the top, and not by the CO of the chopper unit or even the Mossad. That is my point - the decision making process cannot be dispensed with, all the more in the case of Israel where tempers always run high as every chopper crew/ Int boss has lost people to the other side. It is our decision making chain which has let us down.Surya wrote:Ramana
Asprinzl has a point which Ved is dismissing as 007 stuff.......
The Israelis will punish someone for being cautious and screwing up rather than making a bold decision and screwing up.
You heard Air Marshal Goel showing pics of the Paki choppers at Muskoh valley - he cant play Rambo on behalf of the people of India when there is no demand from the guys who are in charge of the warfighting - for all he knows, by doing so he may be screwing up a bigger plan which he is unaware of.I find it absurd that the guy who has 5 to 10 aircraft tasked for ELINT\recce etc. did not fly a mission BECAUSE he was not asked to. What the hell did they do for 7 months?
The six choppers were discovered on May 16. This is after the seven month gap.Surya wrote:Ved
I don't expect Goel to launch a raid - but I am surprised that he did nto keep the monitoring\listening operation.
If the 6 choppers (not clear at what stage they were) were discovered and then for 7 months nothing was done then that is even more disappointing.
Folks did you note that 7 months prior to Kargil, when the air patrols stopped was the month of October 1998 when Mushy took over as Chief of Army Staff for th RATs replacing J Kramat. This was right after the airstrikes on Taleban camps when a whole bunch of TSP terrorists got hit.
What was Mushy's first moves after becoming in CAS? I know he is said to have dusted off the old plans for Kargil but what was the meaning of that? Were there aggressive moves afoot in POK?
What was Mushy's first moves after becoming in CAS? I know he is said to have dusted off the old plans for Kargil but what was the meaning of that? Were there aggressive moves afoot in POK?
I think everybody has been sleeping on the job. The folks at RAW probably waited for some kind of request from the army. When no request came they probably thought "alls quiet in the western front. While the folks at the army probably thought there is a continous intel flight by RAW along the western border in the meantime. When no news came from the RAW, they probably thought "alls quiet in the western front" too.Surya wrote:Thanks Jagan
So if Goel had tasked some missions through some BS even once a month int he seven months, they could have seen something.
So all nine blind men were thinking the elephant was whatever he was holding in his hand. Luckly for India, its an alephant that is not easily overcome by the enemy due to its sheer size. This has been true historically which afforded the folks in power to sleep in their offices.
Unfortunately as we progress with time, size would not matter for long and Delhi or where ever the center of power are located would need to wake up sooner or later. Blaming one person would not do. Its become the culture and the system.
Its this culture/system that also breeds sychopancy, nepotism, embezzlements and what not that I find in Sir Shiv's Chakra. I think Sir Shiv could add dynasty too to that chakra. It all boils down to accountability. Am I accountable to whatever I did or didn't do ?
AS
If posing a quiz is called quizzicalramana wrote:Folks did you note that 7 months prior to Kargil, when the air patrols stopped was the month of October 1998 when Mushy took over as Chief of Army Staff for th RATs replacing J Kramat. This was right after the airstrikes on Taleban camps when a whole bunch of TSP terrorists got hit.
What was Mushy's first moves after becoming in CAS? I know he is said to have dusted off the old plans for Kargil but what was the meaning of that? Were there aggressive moves afoot in POK?
Then posing a test is called testicle? (Tom and Ryan Car talk)
Mushy as usual wanted to be brilliant in testing (his testicles) and started the Kargil as a diversionary tactic with unkils blessing in ousting Sherif badmash.
“Prior to September 11, United States policy toward the Taliban was largely influenced by oil. In a new book published in Paris, "Bin Laden, la verite interdite" ("Bin Laden, the forbidden truth"), former French intelligence officer Jean-Charles Brisard and journalist Guillaume Dasquie document a cozy relationship between George W. Bush and the Taliban. The book quotes John O'Neill, former director of anti-terrorism for the FBI, who thought the U.S. State Department, acting on behalf of United States and Saudi oil interests, interfered with FBI efforts to track down Osama bin Laden.
Before he was tapped as Bush's running mate, Dick Cheney was CEO of Halliburton, the biggest oil services company in the world. In a 1998 speech to the "Collateral Damage Conference" of the Cato Institute, Cheney said, "the good Lord didn't see fit to put oil and gas only where there are democratically elected regimes friendly to the United States. Occasionally we have to operate in places where, all things considered, one would not normally choose to go. But, we go where the business is."
KARGIL WAR
COMPLETE TIMELINE
COMPLETE TIMELINE
1998
June 1998 - first and most important warning was a June 2, 1998 note, personally signed by the then Intelligence Bureau Director, Shyamal Datta
In June 1998 the Kargil Brigade Intelligence Team (BIT) reported that ammunition supplies were being dumped and that terrorists had been seen in Skardu, Warcha and Marol awaiting infiltration through the Kargil sector.
July 1998 - July, Intelligence Bureau informants reported the deployment of M-11 missiles on the Deosai Plains and new mine-laying activities.
Aug 1998 - In August, the BIT and the Intelligence and Field Security Unit reported the presence of terrorists preparing to cross the LoC. Pakistani artillery flowed in as winter approached, a reversal of the normal practice.
Oct 1998 - Pervez Musharaff appointed COAS
By October, RAW was sufficiently concerned about developments to issue an express warning about the prospect of a "limited swift offensive", pointing in particular to the "constant induction of more troops from peacetime locations like Mangla, Lahore, Gujranwala and Okara into Pakistan-occupied Kashmir." Its assertion that a war was possible provoked an immediate challenge by the Director-General of Military Intelligence, and an inconclusive verbal discussion followed.
Nov 1998 - Northern Command, in its own internal assessments, recorded that November 1998 saw a three-fold increase in Pakistani troop movement in the Kargil sector when compared with November 1997. Vehicular movement doubled, while pack-animal movement increased nine-fold. As late as November 1998, the Intelligence Bureau's Leh station issued warnings that Pakistan was "training Taliban troops who were undergoing military training as well as learning the Balti and Ladakhi language." These irregulars, the warning stated, were likely to be inducted into the Kargil sector during April 1999.
1999
Feb 1999 - On February 9, 1999, troops of the 5 Para Regiment spotted movement on the top of Point 5770, a strategic height in the southern Siachen area on the Indian side of the LoC.
Feb 1999 - The Lahore Declaration was a historic declaration signed by the Indian Prime Minister, Mr. A. B. Vajpayee, and the Pakistan Prime Minister, Mr. Nawaz Sharif, in Lahore on February 21, 1999.
Mar 1999 - Again, on March 4, between eight and ten Pakistani soldiers were seen removing snow from a concrete bunker to the west of the summit of Point 5770. That evening, fire was exchanged over the area.
Strangely, the Siachen-based 102 Infantry Brigade removed the officer who had reported the intrusion, Major Manish Bhatnagar, not the Pakistani troops who had occupied the position. On the eve of Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's visit to Pakistan, it is likely that India had no desire to initiate a bruising exchange of fire on Siachen. The 121 Brigade, which ought to have been told that Pakistan troops had demonstrated aggressive intent in an adjoining area, was not even informed of the development.
For one, despite both the flow of intelligence on possible infiltration in the Kargil sector, troops were actually pulled out from frontline positions. Soon after the loss of Point 5770, 9 Mahar Regiment was removed from its defensive positions along the Yaldor Langpa stream and stationed at a rear position near Leh. The 26 Maratha Light Infantry, which protected the crucial infiltration route from Mashkoh to Dras, was also pulled off forward duties.
Despite the summary removal of approximately a quarter of its troops, there is evidence to show that 121 Brigade did act. Troops were withdrawn from the Mashkoh area for just 80 days in the winter of 1999, down from 177 days in 1997 and 116 days in 1998. Yaldor was left undefended for 64 days from February to April, where troops had been withdrawn for 120 days in 1997 and 119 days in 1998. Kaksar, another key area, was undefended for just 38 days, where it was left open for over 200 days in previous years.
April
April 11 - India says it has successfully test-fired a longer-range model of its Agni ballistic missile.
April 14 - The AIADMK withdraws support from the ruling coalition. President K.R. Narayanan asks the government to seek a confidence vote in parliament.
April 17 - India's 13-month-old BJP-led government falls after losing a confidence motion by just one vote. THis may have been a trigger.
April 26 - India's parliament is dissolved and early elections are called.
why was it that commanders in Leh and Srinagar were so slow to respond not just to the intelligence warnings that were available, but to the growing worries of their own subordinates?
General Malik argued that no troops were withdrawn by XV Corps from 3 Infantry Division's area of responsibility. This is, without dispute, true, since 9 Mahar and 26 Maratha battalions remained around Leh. Yet, General Malik's letter does not explain why General Budhwar chose to pull back soldiers needed to guard the LoC to rear positions when both intelligence warnings and field commanders believed threat levels were escalating.
General Malik also pointed out that the headquarters of 70 Infantry Brigade was inducted into the Dras area in October 1998, suggesting that the Army was indeed taking the warnings it received seriously. However, he omitted to mention the critical fact that only its headquarters' staff, not the fighting force, had been deployed when fighting broke out in May 1999.
May
May 1999 - Chinese moves in LAC Ladhak
"Chinese had inducted one company in the area opposite Chantze, with the rest of the battalion waiting in the wings," Malik discloses in the book. He says it was not only at Kameng, but the Chinese army enhanced its level of activity along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh as well from where some of the forces had been thinned down to be redeployed in Kargil.
"This enhancement in PLA activities along the LAC coincided with the start of the conflict in Kargil" Malik says which at military level, indicated a demonstrative support to Pakistan. Malik says this ran contrary to Beijing's assertions in recent years that it was pursuing an independent foreign policy and that its relations with Pakistan would not be at the cost of India. The Chinese forces also made a show of force in Demchok, in eastern Ladakh, constructed a track from Spanggur to south end of Pangong lake and a track in Trigg heights. He says India also received intelligence reports that PLA's Director in the Department of Armament had visited Islamabad during the conflict to help Pakistan army overcome its critical deficiencies in conventional armament, ammunition and equipment.
May 7 - Chinese Embassy Bombing in Kosovo - China US relationship problem. This may have kept Chinese from entering thewar.
May 16 - 6 choopers discovered in Kargil sector
May 24 - First report of infilterators.At a meeting of the Unified Headquarters in Srinagar on May 24, 1999, General Pal insisted that there "were no concentration of troops on the Pakistani side and no battle indicators of war or even limited skirmishes."
May 26 - India unleashes two waves of air strikes to flush out guerrillas on its side of a Kashmir ceasefire line, sharply raising temperatures in the region. The next day India confirms it has lost two fighter jets which Pakistan says they shot down.
May 28 - In Kashmir, a stinger missile brings down an Indian helicopter killing all on board.
June
June 12 - India and Pakistan hold "businesslike" talks over their Kashmir dispute but fail to resolve it; India says Pakistan tried to infiltrate the Turtuk Sector and puts the death toll at 267 Pakistanis and 86 Indians.
June 16, 1999 -The External Affairs Minister, Mr. Jaswant Singh has said his visit to Beijing has led to better understanding between India and China on regional and global issues, including the security perceptions of the two countries. Speaking to newspersons in Beijing at the end of his two day visit, he said new initiatives are already on the anvil.
July
July 4 - India says it has recaptured the strategic Tiger Hill on its side of a military line of control in Kashmir.
July 9 - In Kashmir, the Indian army reports that it has all but ousted the infiltrators from the Batalik zone on India's side of the ceasefire line.
July 17 - India signals the end of the flare-up with Pakistan by announcing that all infiltrators have withdrawn from Indian-held Kashmir.
July 26 - India says its troops have cleared all infiltrators from their side of the Line of Control that divides Kashmir.
I'm not sure if Acharya's May date timing is complete. Wasn't there heavy shelling going on by the Pakis in late Apr-early May leading to evacuation of many border towns/villages like Dras/Kargil/Mushkoh. An Indian patrol was lost in the 2nd week of May. In the 1st and 2nd week of May, there were various reports by civilians and troops of sightings of armed men inside the LoC.
http://www.paksearch.com/DJ/2001/December/alikuli.html
Lengthy interview with Lt Gen (Retd) Ali Kuli Khan.
Lengthy interview with Lt Gen (Retd) Ali Kuli Khan.
(Retired as CGS Pakistan Army)How was the stint as Corps Commander and CGS?
I was appointed as Commander 10 Corps in October 95 and consider it as one of the most enjoyable periods of my career, having been the Chief of Staff 10 Corps for three years not too long ago, I knew the terrain and issues very intimately and thus took to the job of commander as duck would take to water! During my command a few major events took place which I would like to mention in a little more detail.
a. Neelam Valley Closure. As soon as I took over in October 95, I was told that because of Indian Firing only half the winter dumping of rations had been completed for Upper Neelam Valley. This was serious trouble and hence the first place I visited was the place where they were interdicting our movement. I personally moved on the road at night, was fired upon by the Indians but it gave me a fair idea of the problem. We took remedial actions by arranging effective return of fire and am very happy to say that within a week our traffic flowed up and down Neelam Valley without any interference. We were lucky that the snows came late that year and we were comfortably able to complete our dumping.
b. Construction of Bypass. In order to thwart any further interference, we immediately began the construction of a Bypass from Kaghan and completed it in record time, from within with the corps resources.
c. Counter - Interdiction in the Northern Area. In the Kargil Area, the enemy road is visible to some of our posts. In case the enemy ever again resorted to firing on the Neelam Valley Road we planned for interdicting the movement of Indian vehicles on this road. Accordingly, with great difficulty and innovation we were able to move special weapon systems into these very high altitude posts from where they could with direct firing weapons effectively interdict Indian vehicular movement. I am also very glad to say this was also done and in later days these weapon systems played a very effective role, Allah be praised!
d. Helicopter War. All Theatres of War usually have their own rules likewise in the War in Siachen also there was an unwritten law between the adversaries, that unless very seriously provoked they would not fire unnecessarily on each others helicopters. One fine day the Indians broke this convention by firing and downing our helicopter with a missile while it was landing at a very high and dangerous post. Fortunately, our pilots in this helicopter were safe but it certainly incensed us all and we began to retaliate in the same coin. I am again glad to report that without any further loss to us, within a period of one year, we were able to down around 6-7 Indian helicopters including an MI-17. Apart from damage to the helicopters, this caused great consternation and acrimony between the Indian Army and their Air Force operating in the Siachen Region, where they depend a great deal on helicopter support.
In April ‘97, I was posted as the Chief of General Staff and for the first time I sat in the same chair in which my late father had sat over forty years ago. I consider it a great privilege and was very happy to enjoy the wide span of this appointment and the fact that the CGS virtually runs the Army for the COAS, I also became fully alive to the acute shortage of resources/finances from which the Pakistan Army suffers. There were many exciting events during my tenure as CGS but probably the most interesting period was the time when Pakistan had to work out our response to the Indian Nuclear tests of ’1998!!
Two aircraft, 1xCheetah and 1xMi-8 are known to have been lost to enemy fire in Siachen in different incidents - leading to fatalities. However, six could have been lost in a year due to other reasons (say engine failure) while on mission. The Pakistani estimate might include damaged a/c but imho it is the usual Paki bull.
It reminds me of a saying '' Lying is an art and not many people have and can master this art'' .Fortunately, our pilots in this helicopter were safe but it certainly incensed us all and we began to retaliate in the same coin. I am again glad to report that without any further loss to us, within a period of one year, we were able to down around 6-7 Indian helicopters including an MI-17. Apart from damage to the helicopters, this caused great consternation and acrimony between the Indian Army and their Air Force operating in the Siachen Region, where they depend a great deal on helicopter support.
But to make Pukees realise this fact is like ' making an elephant wear the rupa underwear ' 
On a more serious note. he is saying 6-7 , its like they have no clue , and maybe i know politicos do such talk in approximate numbers but never heard about such from armed forces who always state the exact numbers once verified at highest level but then they r Pukees ,
Kernail to Sepahi Abdul: How many halikaptar you saw?
Abdul: 6 Saar
Kernail: how many missile you are shooting?
Abdul: 7 saar
Kernail: how many dirty kaffir dushman you are killing?
Abdul: er...
Kernail: must be 6-7 isnt it?
Abdul: ji huzoor (thinks: now please approve my home leave away from this ice hole...)
Kernail to Jernail: Saar, we are shooting 6-7 missiles at halikaptar
Jernail: wah wah
Jernail to Journalisht: we are killing 7 dirty kaffirs in halikaptars
Journalisht: Pak Army sources today are saying that 7 Hindu Helicopters have been downed along the Line of Control
Abdul: 6 Saar
Kernail: how many missile you are shooting?
Abdul: 7 saar
Kernail: how many dirty kaffir dushman you are killing?
Abdul: er...
Kernail: must be 6-7 isnt it?
Abdul: ji huzoor (thinks: now please approve my home leave away from this ice hole...)
Kernail to Jernail: Saar, we are shooting 6-7 missiles at halikaptar
Jernail: wah wah
Jernail to Journalisht: we are killing 7 dirty kaffirs in halikaptars
Journalisht: Pak Army sources today are saying that 7 Hindu Helicopters have been downed along the Line of Control
LalMohan BossLalmohan wrote:hmmm... in an open society like India, 6 helicopter losses would have been widely reported
did i miss something or is the good general smoking some of afghanistan's finest?
General is on Pure Meth from land of pure. Seems like he didn't get enough hugs from young TFTA Jawans.
I am sorry but what does having a similar sounding name in hyderabad has to do with the legitimacy of lineage of someobdy in pakistan? Its not only irrelevant, but unsubstantiated and contributes to the decline of the discussion.
Countery that guys assertations and disproving his claims work better than saying "ha! you must be a ********!!"..
Countery that guys assertations and disproving his claims work better than saying "ha! you must be a ********!!"..
The Lie Nailed
NDA claim of intelligence failure untrue, shows expunged report
* IB chief Shyamal Datta’s signed report to the PM, home minister and army in June ’98 on infiltration ignored
* 45 intelligence inputs sent between May 1998 and April ’99. Only 25 per cent sent to the Joint Intelligence Committee (JC) for action.
* JIC reports not taken seriously at the highest political and bureaucratic levels
* Lack of awareness of critical and assessed intelligence
* Leadership lulled into complacency by the 1999 Delhi-Lahore bus yatra
The ARC missions are in response to firm demands - even with all their ships servicableSurya wrote:Ved
I don't expect Goel to launch a raid - but I am surprised that he did nto keep the monitoring\listening operation.
they would never be able to meet all demands in time - in case they had time to spare, what you say makes sense. But, unfortunately, they seldom have the opportunity (or justification!) to follow a hunch at the cost of pending, firm demands.Found this posted at a place I wont mention (as it is unmentionable )
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j80E1mHA ... 0air%20war
)http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j80E1mHA ... 0air%20war
I quote from the archives.... 'The IAF was first approached to provide air support on 11 May 99 with the use of helicopters. This was followed by a ‘go ahead’ given on 25 May by the Cabinet Committee on Security to the IAF to mount attacks on the infiltrators without crossing the LoC. While there was considerable pressure from outside the IAF to operate only attack helicopters, the Chief of Air Staff succeeded in convincing the Govt. that in order to create a suitable environment for the helicopters, fighter action was required.' In other words, the IAF wanted to enter the fray on its own terms - professionally understandable, considering the factors involved.spuneet wrote:http://www.tribuneindia.com/2006/20060524/edit.htm#7
Dubious victories in Kargil
by Maj Gen (retd) Himmat Singh Gill
Why did it take so much time and so much effort on the part of General Malik to be able to convince his other two colleagues for an all out air effort? Air Marshal A.K.Singh, AOC-in-C, Western Air Command has rubbished the charges of late intervention.
I totally agree.As regards a CDS, there is no guarantee that a CDS from another Service would not actually have further slowed down the process of decision making and subsequent execution..... A CDS System in itself cannot guarantee victories, and with our inter-service rivalries it is not time for us as yet to adopt such a system.
I recall reading that ACM Tipnis wanted to make sure that he had all necessary units activated as using air assets could lead to escalation. It was this posture that limited the fizzles to stay on their side of the LOC. And the tide turned after the Mushkoh plastering. So what is the cribbing about?
Posting fro rajatP's link above
andf i r s t p e r s o n
In Enemy Territory: A Soldier's Story
He spent 77 days on Indian territory, fighting and suffering at elevations of up to 5,400 m--on one of the highest battlefields in the world. He is a Pakistani soldier, and this is his own account of the combat near Kargil. His story contradicts Islamabad's official claim that it has never sent troops across the Line of Control that divides Kashmir. The 30-year-old soldier returned to Pakistan in mid-June for reasons he wouldn't specify. Thin, bearded and badly sunburned from exposure in the mountains, he spoke to TIME on the condition of anonymity, for fear of being court-martialed.
In February, I was ordered to cross the Line of Control and climb some mountains that the Indians controlled. My commanding officers would not allow me to take my AK-47 rifle. I was against going to an Indian hill without a weapon, but I saw that everybody who was being sent across the LOC was going there empty-handed. We were told it was for the sake of secrecy.
It took us three days of walking and climbing to reach the Indian posts near Kargil. We found they were empty, and our job was to prepare some makeshift bunkers. All we had were tents.
The first five days were hell. The M-17 military helicopter did not come with our food supplies. We just had Energile [a protein-enriched food pack used in high-altitude warfare] and ice. Sometimes we ate ice with sugar. There was jubilation when the helicopter came with real food.
The skirmishes with the Indians started in May. In the early days we mowed down many of them. Those Indians were crazy. They came like ants. First you see four, and you kill them. Then there are 10, then 50, then 100 and then 400. Our fingers got tired of shooting at them. We felt sorry for them. Sometimes they came in such large numbers we were afraid of using up all our ammunition. There is no instant resupply, so you have to be very careful. We were always worried that we would use up all our ammunition on one attacking Indian party and would have none left when a new group came. But God was always with us. You could see lots of bodies strewn down below or in the gorges. They were just rotting there. We also suffered a lot of casualties, many more than officials in Pakistan are claiming. During my stay up there, 17 of my friends died while fighting the Indians.
There is so much exchange of fire that you cannot eat the ice now or drink the water, which is laced with cordite. Even the streams down below the mountains are contaminated. Lots of soldiers are facing stomach problems because of this. We had no proper bunkers, so we dug a 5-m tunnel into the snow. When the Indian shells started landing on us, we would crawl into this tunnel for safety. You don't get enough space to spread your legs in the tents. You always sleep sitting up. Sometimes there is so much firing, you cannot relieve yourself even if you want to.
On the ridges now we have disposable rocket launchers, surface-to-air missiles and machine-guns, including anti-aircraft guns. On one occasion I was positioned on a mountain facing the Drass-Kargil highway. It's fun to target the Indian convoys.
Our officers are very strict. A young soldier from Punjab died in front of me because of altitude sickness. The soldier came from the plains. He fell sick soon after coming up. He offered our commanding officer 200,000 rupees [about $4,000] to let him go down, but the offer was refused. He died four days later. We didn't know his name. I tried to find out, but they refused to tell me. If you die up in the mountains, there is no way to lift your body and take it down. Most of the time we slide the bodies downward. All the men who are fighting on those ridges know that they are in a hole from which they cannot come out alive. You can only return dead. There are a rare few like me, who somehow by fate got the chance to leave the mountains.
andUnder Cover of Night
The presence of Pakistani soldiers deep in enemy territory disproves Islamabad's claims of innocence
STRIKE: A Pakistani artillery position. Robert Nickelsberg for TIME
By GHULAM HASNAIN The Line of Control, Pakistan
Dragging deeply on a cigarette, Major Nadeem Ahmed contemplates his map, which shows more than a dozen Indian gun positions on a 17-sq-km target grid. Each position, marked in blue, has a name laced with hatred: Devil Gun, Kafir (non-believer) Gun, Hindu Gun, Gandhi Gun and so on. The Pakistani officer and his men have just fired 10 shells from their single artillery piece at the Indian positions a few kilometers away across the Line of Control. It is 10 p.m. and Ahmed is surprised that the Indians have not responded. Usually they fire back immediately.
The major turns on a cassette recorder and plays Western pop music, trying to break the tension in his dingy bunker. "I don't think the Indians will fire tonight," he says. "They may fire around 5.30 a.m., and there could be some air sorties." Ahmed asks his batman for his rifle and places it beside his cot; he has been warned by headquarters that the Indians might make a commando assault on his position during the night. He goes outside and in the darkness has a quiet word with his men: "Your eyes and ears should work like a snow leopard's. Do not ignore even the slightest sound of a rolling stone."
The men sleep in a simple bunker with a mud-and-thatch roof; rats rummage freely inside. In the wee hours, an explosion shakes the night. A soldier runs in. "Hurry, the Indians have started firing," he says. It is 1 a.m. Everyone moves to a shell-proof bunker. Fifteen minutes later the barrage stops. After another 15 minutes, some men return to their cots. At 4 a.m., as the major begins his morning prayers, the Indians start another barrage. The major is furious. He orders his men to target each Indian gun on the grid: "Hit all of them, especially Gandhi. Teach them a lesson." This is the routine of the mock war that has been going on for the past 10 years along the LOC. Until recently, the Indians and Pakistanis lobbed shells across the mountains mainly to remind each other of their presence. But now there's much more at stake. This is no shadow war: soldiers are fighting and dying in one of world's most inhospitable terrains.
As far back as last November, the first batch of Pakistani troops from the Northern Light Infantry Regiment--a unit experienced in mountain warfare--crept over the 3,500-m-high passes along the LOC to occupy the high ridges that the Indian army held in the summer. To avoid raising suspicion, even among local Pakistanis, they went without weapons. Their task was to build new bunkers on the ridges--but as far as possible from the empty Indian positions that would be unsafe because they are marked on Indian army maps. Pakistan was "stretching" the LOC to its advantage, to be able to block at will India's strategic road from the Kashmir Valley to distant Ladakh--the military base for that other source of conflict between India and Pakistan, the 6,600-m-high Siachen Glacier.
Near the town of Kargil in Indian-held Kashmir, Pakistani soldiers have assembled a Chinese-made 57-mm anti-aircraft gun inside a man-made cave protected by steel girders and concrete. It sits on top of a 3,000-m-high ridge that overlooks a 500-m stretch of the Kargil road. When a lookout spots a vehicle, he shouts "Allahu Akbar" (God is great), and the gunner pulls the trigger. The soldiers cheer each hit. The weapon has scattered convoys and made Indian troop deployments hazardous. Bombs and artillery shells fired by the Indians have failed to penetrate the cave.
Islamabad insists that the soldiers on the Indian ridges are Islamic mujahedin, or holy warriors, fighting for the freedom of Kashmir. That was the alibi Pakistan used for its military advance. Men from the Northern Light Infantry Regiment and later the Khyber Rifles were used because of their high-altitude experience and because they are from the region. They were encouraged to look like mujahedin, and they discarded their uniforms for traditional shalwar kameez, or tracksuits, grew beards and wore traditional white religious skullcaps. The soldiers say that when they reached the heights in February, some genuine mujahedin were at the abandoned Indian positions. But these men left after a few days because they could not survive in the high altitudes. They are now used for reconnaissance and as porters.
Morale is high among the gunners. But ask Pakistani soldiers why they are on India's side of the Line of Control ducking shells, bombs and bullets, and you're unlikely to get a clear answer. Some officers talk of the futility and danger of a war that their government denies they are taking part in. There is also the hint of a divide between the men at the front and the government. "None of us wants war with India," says one officer. "It is very damaging for Pakistan's economy, and we feel it will be difficult to sustain." A soldier adds: "The capture of these mountains has given us extra advantage, but I doubt that the Indians will forget this."
Not many of the men expect to come down from the mountains alive. At base camp in Skardu, 150 km from the frontline, phone-booth attendant Yawar Shah says the men weep when they call home to bid good-bye to their families. "You can see them crying in the cubicles," he says. "It is very sad."
AndFighting in the Heavens
Indian soldiers brave fierce fire as they push to reclaim territory seized by Pakistani intruders
By MICHAEL FATHERS Kargil
SEARCH: An Indian soldier, atop a Bofors gun near Drass, prepares to pound militant-held positions high in the hills. Marcus Oleniuk--Sygma for TIME
They line up by the score--truck after truck, tanker after tanker--parked in a convoy of more than 100 vehicles, some 20 km from Kargil on a dusty road beside the Drass River. These brightly painted vehicles, owned by private hauling companies, display small paper signs on their windshields: on military business. The civilians behind the wheel have driven through the night without lights, ferrying arms, ammunition, fuel and food to India's attacking army in the forbidding mountains of Kashmir. The trucks have gathered just after dawn under the protective heights of the steep slopes, waiting for an all-clear signal before they roar off one by one or in broken groups across a wider, open section of the river valley targeted by the heavy guns of Pakistan.
The guns fire less frequently than before, now that India's battle-hardened soldiers are slowly and with great difficulty clearing the surrounding heights of Pakistani intruders and denying them forward observation posts, military officials say. Behind the convoy, over a stretch of 150 km from Kargil to the 3,400-m Zoji Pass at the entrance to the Kashmir Valley, the Indian army is settling in, acclimatizing hundreds of frontline soldiers to the high altitude and adding more long-range guns to a bevy of artillery batteries along the river bank or tucked under the shelter of cliffs--all firing from barrels aimed almost vertically.
Away from the range of Pakistan's artillery, newly erected tents dot the upland meadows. Commandos from India's "White Devils" élite mountain and high-altitude warfare group train soldiers in rock climbing. Commandeered civilian trucks and military transporters rumble along the narrow road, spewing clouds of exhaust into the air. The scene is one of unending activity. At last, after weeks of uncertainty, miscalculation and indecision, India's military juggernaut is beginning to roll.
In this conflict, everything is hyperbole. The setting is spectacular; the fighting is difficult and brutal, taking place mainly at night; access and resupply is hazardous, requiring porters to carry heavy loads up near-vertical rock faces 5,000 m high and exposed to deadly crossfire. On the heights where Pakistan has penetrated deepest (about 6 km) into Indian-held territory--where some of the heaviest fighting is now taking place--the locals call it the second-coldest place in the world. No one seems to know where the coldest is.
If you go by climate alone, India has until mid-October to win back its mountain tops before snow blocks the Zoji Pass and cuts off road access to the battle zone. "Well over 70% of the job is done, though I will admit that the last 30% will be the hardest," says Colonel Avatar Singh, a spokesman for the Indian Army in Kargil. At a base camp near Drass, Colonel A.S. Chabbewal, operations chief for the Indian forces at that part of the front, predicts it will take "a few months more" to clear the area. "I'm quite hopeful it will be done by October," he says, adding that the army could, if necessary, fight a winter war.
The sanitized pronouncements of the military command cannot mask the dirty, vicious reality of the fighting around Kargil. This is war. It is not a "limited" conflict, as politicians on both sides of the Line of Control insist. It will go on until one side wins or the other gives way. Whether by design or miscommunication, both countries appear to be understating casualties. Numbers issued in New Delhi and Islamabad do not tally with reports from fighting units in Kargil and Drass, where soldiers from both sides have told journalists of bodies lying abandoned in inaccessible ravines and on rocky outcrops. India's young officer corps, in particular, are being decimated as they lead their units in World War I-style assaults straight into enemy guns. In one skirmish last week, three young officers were killed in an assault on two Pakistani-held peaks, which left 26 Indians dead. No prisoners are taken. "The Pakistanis prefer to fight it out rather than surrender," says Colonel Singh. Nor do the Indians give any quarter, say soldiers and porters who have returned from the battlefront. Most of the fighting is close-quarter combat, with bayonets fixed and rifles fired straight from the hip. The intruders are first softened up with round-the-clock Indian artillery bombardment and air attacks. The units on the mountainside inch their way forward at night, often covering as little as 100 m.
In the town of Kargil, once the halfway stop for tourists traveling to the Buddhist uplands of Ladakh, immigrants from Nepal take a break between their newly found work as porters for the Indian army. The money is good, they say--$7 for an 18-kg load. Some days they make as much as $40. It is they who usually bring back the Indian bodies or bury the Pakistani dead in a shallow bed of stones. Most of the 30,000 inhabitants of Kargil have fled; houses are shuttered and only a few shops are still open. Local doctors reported a rise in the number of miscarriages among Kargil women soon after the town became a target for Pakistani artillery.
From the 4,000-m-high Hamboting Pass, northeast of Kargil, one can see the snow-covered mountain chain that marks the Line of Control, 10 km away. Closer, near the village of Batalik, is a series of ridges the Indians say Pakistani forces occupy. This was the site of another round of heavy fighting last week. Above is a dazzling blue sky; small clouds float by, seemingly an arm's length away. For long periods, there is no sign of war. The landscape is empty, silent, sublime. The calm is shattered when an Indian helicopter appears in the distance, and a volley erupts from guns hidden behind a nearby ridge. This sums up the war: at times it is almost unreal, then its horrors are suddenly upon you.
Thanks rajat.High Stakes
As New Delhi and Islamabad preach and posture, a deadly battle for turf rages in the heights of Kashmir
By NISID HAJARI
Few people know what a war waged on the roof of the world looks like. Down in the plains, in capitals and far-flung villages, we can only judge the battle by the racket it makes--the thud of artillery, the whine of jet engines, the stiff-lipped declarations of generals in both camps.
For the past two months the world has listened to such rumblings from high in the hills of Kashmir along the Line of Control that divides India and Pakistan. This week TIME reports from the front line of the battle to control a skein of towering rocks. New Delhi bureau chief Michael Fathers and photographer Marcus Oleniuk, on the Indian side of the LOC, bear witness to the army buildup that has brought thousands of troops to the region--many of whom will clamber up rock faces into withering machine-gun fire from Muslim intruders. From a bunker in Pakistan-controlled territory, reporter Ghulam Hasnain and photographer Robert Nickelsberg watch shells fly overhead in both directions. A Pakistani regular, one of the few to survive the fighting atop ice-capped ridges, undercuts Islamabad's claims to be providing nothing but moral support to the intruders.
That revelation should only increase the fierce pressure on Pakistan to back down. Last week both Washington and Beijing pushed Islamabad to withdraw its forces. Indian sources claim that, through an envoy, Pakistani Prime Minister Mohammed Nawaz Sharif has already raised the idea of pulling back. But while the world waits for the high-flying diplomacy to produce results, the battle--raging even higher--continues to take its unseen toll.
Besides the choppers, it is wrongly assumed that 2 fighters also went down to Stingers. Its an academic point, but only the MiG-21 was actually shot down by a Stinger - he inadvertantly lost height while orbiting (and so came into the Stinger's envelope) and looking for Nachiketa's MiG-27 which had just gone down. The Mig-27, which went down first, flamed out while firing guns and RPs. Nachi carried out the relight drill successfully, and the engine began picking up but he saw a hill looming ahead and assessed that he would'nt reach adequate RPM in time, so rightly decided to eject. But the point is -only 1 fighter was shot down.Aditya G wrote:Two aircraft, 1xCheetah and 1xMi-8 are known to have been lost to enemy fire in Siachen in different incidents ....."
From Ramanas post:
As could be expected.Under Cover of Night
The presence of Pakistani soldiers deep in enemy territory disproves Islamabad's claims of innocence
STRIKE: A Pakistani artillery position. Robert Nickelsberg for TIME
By GHULAM HASNAIN The Line of Control, Pakistan
Dragging deeply on a cigarette, Major Nadeem Ahmed contemplates his map, which shows more than a dozen Indian gun positions on a 17-sq-km target grid. Each position, marked in blue, has a name laced with hatred: Devil Gun, Kafir (non-believer) Gun, Hindu Gun, Gandhi Gun and so on. The Pakistani officer and his men have just fired 10 shells from their single artillery piece at the Indian positions a few kilometers away across the Line of Control. It is 10 p.m. and Ahmed is surprised that the Indians have not responded. Usually they fire back immediately.