Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation

[ramana]

So Americans do understand this is the home game-the battle is half won already.

India can sit back and light a bidi.

No the long article really confirms Shiv's thesis that US is the extortee in this two-some game. And keeps throwing largesse to TSP pretending that they are giving while the reality in they are being forced to meet demands. Now that they are out on money they will make MMS give up Kashmir. And he might even do that to keep INC in power.

The Paki PALs is a figment of imagination that Kidwai sold to the reporter who in turn is selling it to the world.

The whole Bush Admin failed wrt to TSP and its terrorist leadership. Its beyond incredulity to think that PAkiban is surviving without TSPA aid. Offcourse they are in together.

Bottomline is the US wasnt ready to be a superpower.

[Nayak]

Swiss nuke blueprint sellers released

The court of Switzerland has released all three members of a Swiss family suspected of "nuclear arms smuggling into Iran and Libya".

The order to release Marco Tinner in Bern on Friday on a bail of 100,000 Swiss francs ($86,550) and after almost five years in investigative detention comes after the release from jail of his brother Urs Tinner in December and the Tinner patriarch, Friedrich, in 2006.

All three men who were arrested in Germany in October 2004 and extradited to Switzerland in May 2005 are suspected of criminal export violations.

Although free from jail, the family still faces possible charges of supplying the nuclear arms black market of Pakistan's Abdul Qadeer Khan with the technical know-how and equipment that was used to make gas centrifuges.

Khan - the father of Pakistan's nuclear weapon - claimed in 2004 that he sold the centrifuges to countries like Libya, North Korea and Iran that ran secret atomic bombs programs before 2003.

Although Khan admitted to passing nuclear information to foreigners, he said in a May 2008 interview with the Guardian that he had been forced to make the confessions.

"It was not of my own free will. It was handed into my hand," Khan said in the interview, adding that former Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf had forced him to make the confession.

The US and its European allies accuse Iran of having military objectives in pursuing its enrichment program and claim that the amount of UF6 at the country's disposal is "enough for a bomb".

This is while the UN nuclear watchdog conceded in its November report that Iran has managed to enrich uranium-235 to a level "less than 5 percent" -- a rate consistent with the development of a nuclear power plant. Nuclear arms production requires an enrichment level of above 90 percent.

Iran says its nuclear activities have originated from domestically-developed technology and has never had dealings with Khan.

"To obstruct attempts by Libya and Iran to develop nuclear weapons" the Tinners were recruited and paid some $10 million by the CIA, an August report by the Times revealed.

In a documentary aired on Swiss TV station SF1 on Jan 22, Urs Tinner said he tipped off US intelligence about a delivery of centrifuge parts destined for Libya's nuclear weapons facilities.

The Swiss case against the Tinners has been hampered by the destruction of relevant documents, which Swiss officials claimed was done to prevent their falling into terrorist hands.

According to the report, the destruction of the documents was more aimed at "providing the CIA with cover than to stop terrorism".

"The CIA feared that a trial would not just reveal the Tinners' relationship with the United States - and perhaps raise questions about American dealings with atomic smugglers - but would also imperil efforts to recruit new spies at a time of grave concern over Iran's nuclear program," read the report.

A January report by the New York Times came as further proof to the CIA covert ops against the Iranian nuclear issue.

The report disclosed that former president George W. Bush had denied a request by Israel for specialized bunker-busting bombs to attack Iran's nuclear facilities. Instead, the US president declared that he had authorized new covert actions intended to sabotage the country's nuclear program.

Following their release, the Tinners are waiting to see whether Switzerland's Federal Criminal Court will file charges against them for breaking Swiss laws on the export of sensitive material - a crime that carries a penalty of up to 10 years imprisonment.

CS/HGH

[arun]

Long 5000+ word transcript of an interview of A.Q. Khan datelined January 21, 2009 by Swiss weekly Die Weltwoche.

Comes across as quite the Islamic supremacist :

Muslims had shaken the very foundations of Western civilisation through their exemplary character, equality, absence of any discrimination, simple way of life and a clear, easily understandable message through the Quran providing a complete code of life.

Goes on to imply all his proliferating activities were authorized :

I was not involved in any unauthorized activities

Die Weltwoche Interview of A.Q. Khan

[Gerard]

http://www.draqkhan.com.pk/about.htm

[ramana]

Book review from Pioneer, 31 jan 2009

AGENDA | Sunday, January 25, 2009 | Email | Print |


Pakistan’s Islamic Bomb: Perfidy and Betrayal

The Man From Pakistan amply demonstrates that the Islamic nuclear bomb would never have become a reality had the West taken concerted action against Pakistan and prevented it from achieving nuclear capability, write Prafull Goradia and KR Phanda

The Man From Pakistan: The True Story of the World’s Most Dangerous Nuclear Smuggler
Author : Douglas Frantz and Catherine Collins
Publisher :Hachette India
Price: Rs 595

This book, The Man From Pakistan, by the husband-and-wife team of Douglas Frantz and Catherine Collins, provides enough information to prove how Abdul Qadeer Khan (AQ Khan) became the Father of Islamic Nuclear Bomb, a unique achievement in world Islamic history. At another level, the narrative demonstrates fully that there was no concerted action on the part of Western powers to prevent Pakistan from achieving the capability to manufacture nuclear device.

This happened because, first, the CIA did not consider it worthwhile to devote its resources to unearth the clandestine operations of Khan; it seemed convinced that Pakistan was too backward a country to undertake a highly advanced nuclear research and application programme.

Second, when the CIA provided clinching evidence to the political bosses in Washington that Khan with the active help and support of the Pakistan government, was procuring men and materials from the West to produce highly enriched uranium (HEU) at Kahuta — near Islamabad — the political masters advised the CIA to wait and watch. The US could not afford to displease Pakistan. Initially, the excuse was that Pakistan’s help was necessary to save Afghanistan from the Russian invasion. Later the mujahadins had to be provided all help to defeat the Russian armed forces.

While the CIA reported the hard facts to successive administrations in Washington, the full story of Pakistan’s bomb and its violation of American export law were kept from the Congress for fear of provoking a cut off in assistances to Pakistan that would jeopardise the effort in Afghanistan.

The story of how Pakistan came to possess the nuclear weapon began way back in 1972 after the defeat of its army in East Pakistan in 1971. While addressing a meeting of scientists and military experts at Multan on January 24, 1972, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto reminded the audience that Pakistan could counter India’s greater military numbers by developing a nuclear deterrent. He went on to ask whether any one among them could produce one within three years. Most of the scientists expressed their doubts as the project required enormous funds and willingness of the Western countries to allow the export of the requisite materials and equipment. Bhutto, however, did not have to wait for long for the opportunity to come his way with the sharp rise in oil prices in 1974. He convened an Islamic summit at Lahore which was attended by some 37 Muslim nations. Bhutto told his co-religionists that Pakistan would like to develop a nuclear bomb and he required their help. Libya and Saudi Arabia pledged funds for the project.

Shortly thereafter India detonated its first nuclear device and this event also convinced the Western world that nuclear technology could be applied to both civilian and military programmes. Soon, Pakistan started making frantic efforts. In June, 1974, the Pakistani scientists visited the Physics Dynamics Research Laboratory (FDO) in Holland as part of their programme to visit such laboratories in the West.

In 1970, Britain, West Germany and the Netherlands launched a joint project called Urenco, with the aim of a guaranteed and independent supply of enriched uranium for their civilian power plants. The FDO in Amsterdam was the Dutch venture meant to manufacture centrifuges, the narrow cylinders about six feet tall, used for producing enriched uranium. Khan who had two years experience with FDO as a metallurgist applied to work for the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission. He was not accepted.

In 1974 June, the Urneco consortium decided that Dutch centrifuges be upgraded with an improved version developed by Germany. Khan was one of the few scientists at the FDO who had sufficient knowledge of the German language. He was asked to translate the German documents into Dutch. As part of his job, he helped devise detailed specifications for some of the special metals used in the manufacture of most advanced centrifuges then available in Europe. Working at the organisation also brought him into touch with the suppliers of various materials. His hobby of photographing centrifuge components had resulted in a collection that later proved invaluable in Pakistan.

Khan was an ambitious person. He wrote a letter to Bhutto in August 1974 and after getting no response he wrote another one in September. He was asked to meet Bhutto in December 1974. For the meeting, Khan had brought a trove of plans and photographs with him and was prepared to say yes if Bhutto asked him to stay back and start the nuclear programme. Khan had stolen classified centrifuge designs say the authors. Khan expressed the view to Bhutto that Pakistan’s current programme to use plutonium as a fissile material left the country open to West interference whereas the enriched uranium route relatively took a shorter time, involved less cost and the project could be completed in absolute secrecy. Bhutto was satisfied with Khan’s strategy and asked him to join the Pakistan establishment.

While the US and other Western allies went about telling Paris not to supply equipment to Pakistan for reprocessing plutonium, Pakistan quietly went on completing the process of uranium enrichment. The Pakistan government assigned specific diplomatic staff in European capitals to help procure materials and equipment from the firms listed with the FDO in Amsterdam. Khan was given a free hand and he made full use of his personal contacts at the FDO, also including Muslims settled abroad. Front companies were floated; University laboratories were also roped in to help procure the necessary equipment from abroad. After Bhutto, General Zia continued support Khan’s efforts to enrich uranium. On March 28, 1979, a German television broadcast a programme that Khan had obtained access to centrifuge technology while working under contract at the Urenco consortium and had taken it back to Pakistan. He was now the Director of a similar project in Pakistan. When Bob Gallucci of the US State Department met General Zia and showed satellite photos of Kahuta, the General dismissed it as a cowshed. Despite General’s dismissal of the charge levelled by Gallucci the fact was that Pakistan was on the verge of exploding a nuclear device. By the mid 1980s, Kahuta, also known as Khan Research Laboratories, had evolved into a nuclear city. In the decade following, Khan busied himself in transferring the technology to North Korea, Libya, Iraq and Iran.

The government of Netherlands had thought of prosecuting Khan. Ultimately the proposal was dropped as this would have created a storm in internal politics of the country. The CIA was also consulted but it did not show any interest. The US obviously adopted double standards in the matter of controlling the spread of nuclear arsenal. The US President went all the way to Moscow to impress on the President of the Soviet Union not to supply nuclear wherewithal to Iran. However, the US Administration did nothing even when it had hard evidence against Khan and the Government of Pakistan. The illegal transfer of technology brought immense material rewards to Khan. He built up properties in Pakistan, London, Dubai and Timbuktu.

Pakistan’s Islamic Bomb: Perfidy and Betrayal

Continued....

When Musharraf came to power, Pakistan had already built a large nuclear arsenal. The role Khan played in the spread of nuclear technology among countries particularly inimical to the United States was condemned all over the world. Musharraf’s Government had also collected a large volume of evidence against the corrupt deals undertaken by Khan. The report prepared was not made public as that would have exposed a large number of government officials involved in such deals. Musharraf did not want a domestic backlash and he did not want to belittle Khan either. But Musharraf was determined to get Pakistan back into the international community, and he could not tolerate Khan’s behaviour. Nuclear dollerence was in place, the delivery system was in place. On May 11, 1998, India detonated three atomic devices and two more two days later. Pakistan did not want to be left behind. It exploded six such devices in the last week of May, 1998. Now it was time to stop this dirty business of proliferation, write the authors.

On March 10, 2001 Khan’s career in Pakistan’s nuclear industry officially came to an end. He was saluted at a retirement dinner by Musharraf, who praised his services to Pakistan. {Note its before 9/11. Was this also another grievance that TSP had?}

AQ Khan’s nuclear project was another example of the unscrupulousness of Pakistani statecraft. The latest piece we witnessed is the repeated denial of Ajmal Qasab being a Pakistani national.

While Khan was working on his nuclear programme, Islamabad continued to deny that anything was happening. The project was initiated by Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto as an act of revenge on India against the 1971 defeat. The resulting atomic device was claimed also as a retaliation against India’s exploding its bomb in 1998.

Not all its Machiavellian statecraft helped Pakistan to remain one country. In 1971, Islamabad betrayed its Bengali brethren. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had won a clear majority in the 1970 general election. But most Pakistanis did not want the demi kafir Bengali to be their prime minister.

The 1950 Nehru Liaquat Pact to protect the respective minorities in the two countries was not implemented in Pakistan. The Hindus were squeezed out of the western wing and most of them were oppressed out of the eastern half. But no exchange of population took place as was the desire of MA Jinnah and his Muslim League.

Yet not all the perfidy and betrayal have helped Pakistan. Today it is near the edge of another split. The NWFP, Baluchistan and FATA are more in the hands of Taliban than Islamabad. What use is the Khan bomb except to AQ Khan who is enormously wealthy now and lives in a palace.

Comment:

Pakistan’s Islamic Bomb: Perfidy and Betrayal
By N.S. Rajaram on 1/25/2009 6:12:48 AM

Based on what I have learnt, the book's account appears to be based on hearsay and superficial knowledge. For example it claims "Khan was one of the few scientists at the FDO who had sufficient knowledge of the German language. He was asked to translate the German documents into Dutch." I find this incredible. Dutch and 'Deutch' (German) are extremely close and many educated people in the Netherlands know German.

Also is that all the great Robert Galucci, the Non-Prolif bishop if not grand ayatollah, did was to protest to Zia and then slink back to DC?

[arun]

From The Toronto Star :

Nuclear rogue released

Decision to free Pakistani scientist who sold secrets to Iran, N. Korea sets off alarm bells in Washington

February 07, 2009
MUBASHIR ZAIDI
LAURA KING
LOS ANGELES TIMES

ISLAMABAD–A Pakistani court yesterday freed nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan from unofficial house arrest, capping a rehabilitation that began almost from the moment he confessed in 2004 to secretly selling sensitive nuclear technology to rogue regimes around the world. ……….......

Many international experts consider Khan's alleged activities over a 15-year period, which included providing atomic secrets to Iran, North Korea and Libya, to have been highly damaging to efforts to control nuclear proliferation.

The decision to grant freedom of movement to Khan stirred alarm in Washington, which fears Iran has continued to pursue nuclear arms and Pakistan may not be able to safeguard its own arsenal in the face of rising Islamic militancy.

The White House said President Barack Obama wants Pakistani assurances Khan isn't involved in the activity that led to his arrest. State Department spokesperson Gordon Duguid said Khan remained a "serious proliferation risk."

Asked yesterday what the international community would think of his release, Khan was defiant.

"Are they happy with our God? Are they happy with our prophet? Are they happy with our leader? Never," he said. "I don't care about rest of the world. I care about my country. Obama cares about America, not about Pakistan or India or Afghanistan." ……………..

[arun]

Editorial in the San Francisco Chronicle:

What kind of ally is Pakistan?

Saturday, February 7, 2009

It could be an episode of "24." A rogue bombmaker peddles nuclear weapon technology to Iran, North Korea and Libya. He's caught but then set free in the seething, violent politics of his home country.

This isn't a Hollywood script. It's the real-life story of A.Q. Khan, the father of Pakistan's nuclear program. On Friday he was freed from house arrest in the country's capital in a move that drew sharp criticism from Washington.

Pakistani leaders served up the awkward news as a hands-off legal matter and the end of a lengthy court case that began when Khan was arrested in 2004. But it carries another meaning - a very troubling one - for Pakistan's neighbors and allies.

Quite simply, the nation isn't a reliable force for peace or stability in a central front of the terrorism fight. Khan was accorded the status of a populist hero, a scientist who gave his country a mighty weapon to hold far-bigger India at bay. When he set up a black market network to sell nuclear supplies to three of the worst countries imaginable, he was given wrist-slap treatment and protected from international investigators.

Pakistan's reputation needs shoring up. Its fitful efforts to eradicate Taliban strongholds have led the American military to send missile-equipped drone planes to do the job. The Mumbai attacks in November that killed 179 people were launched from Pakistan and have left relations with India at the brink of war. The assassination of presidential contender Benazir Bhutto last year was an additional low point.

Washington must take stock of its erratic and undependable ally. During his campaign, President Obama said he wouldn't hesitate to attack terrorists on Pakistan's soil, and in his first week in office, he followed through by permitting a drone attack on terrorist camps despite Pakistani protests. Even "smart power" and gentle diplomacy have their limits.

Another decision may come if Congress passes a $7.5 billion civilian aid package for Pakistan. At this point, it's hard to imagine the idea would win support, but if it did, there must be the guarantees the country would genuinely move against the Taliban.

There are appealing reasons to go easy on Pakistan. A new and fairly weak central government needs time to establish itself. Suicide bombs have killed more than 50 people since December in attacks tied to sectarian religious fights. Tensions exist between the nearly autonomous military and the civilian leaders.

The United States requires Pakistan in the terrorist fight. Washington is sending 30,000 more troops to reverse a losing, seven-year fight Afghanistan. The United States can't allow the Taliban to use next-door Pakistan as a safe harbor and training base.

Bombmaker Khan may be one nightmare in this region. But imagine another: a crumbling Pakistan that can't control extremists spreading across its home turf. That's a course all too plausible to envision.

[ramana]

Pioneer op-ed...

EDITS | Thursday, February 19, 2009 | Email | Print |


A bigot and his ‘Islamic Bomb’

G Parthasarathy

The Islamabad High Court’s decision to release the ‘Father’ of Pakistan’s ‘Islamic Bomb’, Dr AQ Khan, following a secret agreement between him and the Pakistani Government, has provoked widespread international concern. There are no takers for the Pakistani Government’s stand that the AQ Khan affair is a “closed chapter”. The Pakistani decision constitutes defiance of American concerns about the danger that Dr Khan’s release poses to international security. Just after the court verdict, Dr Khan asserted his Islamist credentials, saying, “I will always be proud of what I did for Pakistan. I am obliged only to my Government, not any foreigners. Are they happy with our Government? Are they happy with our Prophet? Never.”

Dr Khan’s religious bigotry is shared by not only many in the Pakistani military establishment, but also by his close associates involved in that country’s nuclear weapons programme. The Islamic dimensions of Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions were spelt out when Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto noted that while ‘Christian, Jewish and Hindu civilisations’ had nuclear weapons capability, it was ‘Islamic civilisation’ alone that did not possess nuclear weapons. He declared that he would be remembered as the man who had provided ‘Islamic civilisation’ with “full nuclear capability”.

Bhutto’s views on Pakistan’s nuclear weapons contributing to the capabilities of the ‘Islamic civilisation’ were shared by Dr Khan’s close associate and fellow nuclear scientist Sultan Bashiruddin Mehmood, who, along with his colleague Chaudhri Abdul Majeed, was detained shortly after the terrorist strikes of 9/11. They were both charged with helping Al Qaeda to acquire nuclear and biological weapons capabilities.

Mr Mehmood openly voiced support for the Taliban and publicly advocated the transfer of nuclear weapons to other Islamic nations, describing Pakistan’s nuclear capability as the property of the whole ummah (Muslim nation). Mr Mehmood and Mr Majeed also acknowledged that they had long discussions with Al Qaeda and Taliban officials. A ‘Fact Sheet’ put out by the White House stated that both scientists had meetings with Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar during repeated visits to Kandahar, with Al Qaeda seeking their assistance to make radiological dispersal devices.

The two scientists were active members of an Islamic organisation (UTN) that was engaged in securing information on biological weapons. Two other Pakistani scientists, Suleiman Asad and Al Mukhtar, wanted for questioning about suspected links with Osama bin Laden, ‘disappeared’ near Myanmar’s borders with China.

Dr Khan commenced his proliferation activities in 1987 when, with the approval of Gen Zia-ul-Haq, he offered assistance to Iran. This process continued through the 1990s, with Dr Khan supplying Iran with ‘inverters’ — equipment crucial for uranium enrichment — in 1994 through a Sri Lankan intermediary, Abu Tahir Bukhary Syed. Engulfed by economic bankruptcy, following the termination of American assistance, Pakistan turned to North Korea for what led to a missiles-for-nuclear technology deal.

This followed a Pakistan-China-North Korea Agreement in January 1994 for cooperation in manufacture of missiles and guidance systems. Between 1994 and 1998, Dr Khan paid over a dozen visits to North Korea. By 1998 aircraft of the Pakistani Air Force and Shaheen Airlines were carrying missile components and nuclear enrichment equipment and materials between Rawalpindi and Pyongyang.

Around the same time, Dr Khan offered nuclear technology to Iraq and Libya. While Saddam Hussein was guarded in responding to the offer, Libya’s Col Muammar Gaddafi had no such reservations and went full steam ahead with getting enrichment equipment and even nuclear weapons designs (of Chinese origin) from Dr Khan. Moreover, in 1998, Saudi Arabia’s Defence Minister, Prince Sultan, was given unprecedented access to Khan Laboratories in Pakistan. This was followed by exchanges of visits between Dr Khan and Saudi scientists in 1998-1999. Around the same time, Saudi Arabia’s King Fahd had told senior American officials that his country would need a nuclear deterrent if Iran developed nuclear weapons.

Pakistan’s nuclear tests in May 1998 paradoxically marked the beginning of Dr Khan’s decline as the scientists and physicists led by his rival Samar Mubarakmand carried out the tests. In the meantime, the CIA had infiltrated his network in Dubai and Geneva and gained access to its computers and global operations. Gen Pervez Musharraf was confronted with the evidence the CIA had collected.

Fearing that if he did not act against Dr Khan, the Americans could expose the role of the Pakistani Army in assisting his activities, Gen Musharraf extracted a ‘confession’ and an ‘apology’ from him that he had acted illegally. But, like in their approach to Pakistan-sponsored terrorism, where they invariably give a clean chit to the ISI, the Americans have absolved the Pakistani Army, the real villains in Dr Khan’s proliferation activities, of all responsibility for what had transpired.

The Americans have indicated that their operations in Geneva and Dubai revealed that Dr Khan was not only peddling nuclear weapons designs that China had passed on to Pakistan, but also the Pakistani modified versions of these designs. Since Dr Khan had passed on nuclear weapons designs to Libya, the presumption is that he also passed them on to Iran.

But the Americans have also left several questions unanswered. Dr Khan was sentenced to four years imprisonment by an Amsterdam Court in 1983 for illegally stealing nuclear weapons related enrichment technology and centrifuge designs from the Netherlands-based Physical Dynamics Research Laboratory where he worked between 1972 and 1976. The sentence was later overturned on a technical formality. The former Prime Minister of Netherlands, Mr Ruud Lubbers, has revealed that his Government was all set to arrest Dr Khan in 1975 and 1986, but was advised against doing so by the CIA. Why was the CIA so keen to let Dr Khan off the hook? Was it part of then American policy to turn a blind eye to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme?

If expedience led the Americans to permitting Dr Khan to go free two decades ago with disastrous consequences, have they and their friends realised the dangers they could face in the future by deliberately covering up the role which the Pakistani Army and successive Army chiefs have played in encouraging and facilitating nuclear proliferation worldwide? Have they also assessed the likely implications of the ‘see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil’ policies they have adopted on the role of the Pakistani Army and the ISI in promoting global terrorism? Diplomacy based on delusion and self-deception inevitably has catastrophic consequences.

The period between 1975 and 1986 was when the US was trying to counter India and looked other way or was silent when the PRC transferred the weapons to TSP. This is the only way to connect the dots. They even invoked the Pressler amendment in 1992 after the PRC test of a TSP weapon and claimed it was due to still ongoing work on nukes in TSP. So even the reasons for invoking Pressler were dubious.

[arun]

Excerpt from the Washington Times.

Author is identified as “California Democrat”, who “chairs the Intelligence and Terrorism Risk Assessment Committee's Intelligence and Terrorism Risk Assessment Subcommittee.”:

Loose nuke scientist

Jane Harman
Monday, February 23, 2009

One of the most important challenges confronting the intelligence community is learning the nature of and damage done by the worldwide network in nuclear centrifuge technology, bomb components and training run for almost two decades by Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan - the revered "father" of his country's nuclear program. Considered a pariah abroad but a hero at home, that task got a lot tougher when Pakistan's Supreme Court ordered Mr. Khan released from house arrest earlier this month.

At the recent Wehrkunde Security Conference in Munich, Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi astonished delegates (I was one), telling us that his government had not decided whether to challenge the court decision …………….

But for those who stay awake at night worrying …………………… Pakistan's action is distressing.

When Mr. Khan "confessed" in 2004 to his illegal nuclear dealings, he was promptly placed under "house arrest" and pardoned by then President Pervez Musharraf. The U.S. government was denied access to Mr. Khan ………………

Though much of the network was taken down following Mr. Khan's confession, there is no conclusive evidence that it was destroyed.

As ranking member on the House Intelligence Committee at the time, I was never convinced. And Mr. Khan is again a loose nuke scientist with proven ability to sell the worst weapons to the worst people.

What to do? The Obama administration should promptly seek Pakistani permission to question Mr. Khan, …………............ The U.S. Congress can condition further aid to Pakistan on those events. ………….......

[arun]

Excerpt devoted to A.Q. Khan from the Australian :

Unhappy marriage with Pakistan

Greg Sheridan, Foreign editor | February 28, 2009

……….. Zardari's Government has released from the ludicrously unrestrictive house arrest he formerly enjoyed one A.Q. Khan. Khan is the former boss of Pakistan's nuclear efforts. He is without question the single greatest proliferator of nuclear weapons technology to rogue states in the history of the human race. He sold nuclear weapons technology to all comers.

Part of the implausible story Musharraf used to tell was that Khan did this without the knowledge of the Pakistani military. Now Zardari has formalised Khan's status not as the most shameful and globally destructive criminal Pakistan has produced but as the hero of the nation. ……….

The Australian

[Gerard]

Pakistan and nuclear proliferation

Last September, the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism requested a meeting with Khan to discuss nuclear proliferation. The meeting did not take place, not least because the hotel that the Commission was enroute to was blown up hours before its members' arrival, leading the Commission to cancel its visit to Pakistan.

[Gerard]

Learning From the A.Q. Khan Affair

[ramana]

Please post all those book reviews and notes on TSP and PRC exchanges in this thread for completeness.

Thanks,
ramana

[Anujan]

Okay Ramana.

you need to get hold of Gordon Corera's book "Shopping for Bombs", all is explained

Thank you Lalmohan.

Half way through "Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity and Rise and Fall of AQ Khan" By Gordon Corera. I want to post a longish review, so breaking it into two parts.

My initial impressions first.

Corera goes out of his way when describing the genesis of the Paki nuclear program, to impress upon the reader that there was *no* islamist fervor in developing the Bomb. Neither from ZAB nor from AQK. Instead, he makes a case that the name "Islamic Bomb" (during the genesis of the program) was pragmatic and was aimed at monetary and diplomatic support from ME countries, especially Saudis, UAE and Libya.

The part where he discusses whether the Paki establishment (Army, ISI, Political masters) knew or abetted the nuclear transfer, Corera deliberately tries to be vague. This is believable (I will explain why) and unbelievable at the same time.

Believable because, he gives an impression of Paki estabilishment as disparate collection of power centers, each of which can harm the other. For example, ISI could harm the PM and vice versa, so they had evolved a scheme to coexist and not interfere much with each other's affairs. What is more interesting is that, these were not just organizational power centers, but also personality-based power centers. In this scenario, if Beg approves Nuclear know-how transfer, would you hold Paki government responsible ? As in was the decision taken in accordance with the chain of powers laid down by the constitution, formulated according to normal practices and implemented in accordance with Pakistani law ? If this is what one is asking when he wonders "Did paki government authorize the sale", the answer, ofcourse is a big NO ! This bears a striking parallel to terrorism emanating from Pakistan. Did Zardari sign a piece of paper authorizing Mumbai strikes and transmit it through official chanels to the ISI ? Obviously no. Same with Kargil. Was it debated in the assembly with the opposition, with a formal declaration of war ? No. So the Pakistani state was not involved.


On the other hand, this is a deceptive explanation. If one were to argue that Pakistani state was not involved in proliferation, one should also attach a disclaimer that the "state" in Pakistan does not correspond to what one would accept as a normal "state".

An impression given in the book, but not expaned upon (so far) is that the Chinese cooperation could have been extended to also piggyback on the Khan network to procure dual use items for China itself. Giving the chinese plausible deniability about industrial espionage from the west.

Some juicy excerpts so far.

Pakis going about methodically setting up infrastructure for shady dealings:

Payments from the Gulf states to Pakistan are suspected to have passed through the bank f credit and commerce international (BCCI), a shadowy organization founded by Pakistan that funded Pakistan's nuclear question among an array of other shady dealings.

About the nuclear lobby:

Business interests were a powerful lobby everyhwere. President Carter appointed Josephy Nye, a cerebral academic...to be the lead diplomat on the subject (preventing proliferation). Nye soon found that in addition to battling europeans who disliked the administration's moralistic tone, his new post also engaged him in vicious internal politics with those keen to secure contracts for nuclear energy.

Paki Bum design no 1:

Rifling through his papers, they reportedly found a document proving Pakistan was in reciept of outside help. A drawing of simple but effective nuclear bomb and steps needed to make it. It was clear that the design had come from China. Beijing had handed a full, proven weapons design, thought to be based on a chinese test in 1966.

Gul-Motorma History:

Hamid Gul and his deputy put out word to Islamists that "the ISI had intelligence that Benazir Bhutto has promised the Americans a rollback of our nuclear program. She will prevent a Mujahidden victory in Afghanistan and stop plans for Jihad in Kashmir

Impact of Paki proliferation on JK:

Similar proposals were being pushed forward....Beg and Interservices intelligence agency chief Durrani approached President Ghulam Ishaq Khan with a proposal to sell nuclear technology to finance ISI operations which were ongoing in Afghanistan (but now without US financial support), and just starting up in Kashmir. (Corera claims this did not move forward)

After Indian tests and US pressure on Pakistan to not test:

At the same time, Saudi Arabia was encouraging its fellow Muslim state to test. Saudi Arabia offered Nawaz Sharif fifty thousand barrels of oil a day to overcome the impact of any western sanctions that resulted from testing

(Saudi Nawaz romance goes back a long way)

About the involvement of Paki official agencies (Corera says "its hard to say", "not clear" ityadi)

In december 1997 Chief of Army staff, General Karamat traveled to Pyongyang. And at the same point, there were signs that NoKo's uranium enrichment program began to move forward more rapidly. Although there is no direct evidence, this seems to be the point at which barter began....By 1998 there were nine flights per month, following high level visits of NoKo officials to Pakistan.

About the detection of Pu in Paki tests

Theories abound that not only were North Koreans present at Pakistani tests, but the Pakistanis may have actually tested a North Korean device for them in addition to their own. This may have been the sixth and final test which took place at a different location and had a different signature, including traces of plutonium when other bombs were thought to be only uranium

Saudis with ICBMs ? Why ?

Concern had grown over Saudi Arabia's possible interest in unconventional weapons after it emergedin the late '80s that Saudi Arabia had secretly purchased dozens of of intercontinental CSS2 ballistic missiles directly from China's operational nuclear force inventories. Because of their relative inaccuracy, the missiles were almost useless for carrying conventional explosives.

Rest of the review and excerpts when I finish the book.

[Anujan]

Okay, so I finished the book "Shopping for Bombs" by Corera. This is the second half of the review, the first half of the review is a post above this post in the book review section.

My initial impressions first:

This book is a out and out chronicle of AQK's path to perdition. Other juicy details, infos, analysis about the non-proliferation regime etc are added on as a supporting artifacts to enhance AQK's story. So if you want to read it, please dont expect a comprehensive analysis of spread of nuclear weapons, the policy shortcomings, commissions and omissions by Unkil which resulted in the spread. Severely lacking still, is any sort of analysis about the motivation and weapon capabilities of the countries which were the recipient of Khan's help (including Pakistan itself. There is zero info about Pakistan's weapons capabilities. More on this later). With this focus (on AQK's story), as background, this book IMHO has two severe shortcomings. Two central questions have not been addressed satisfactorily

1. Was Pakistan a party to proliferation ?

The author wriggles around this while simultaneously making statements about C130 planes being chartered, but stating that there is a possibility that the military did not know. He mentions that KRL employees were always shadowed by Paki intelligence agents, but there is a chance that ISI didnt know. The most damning proof is that Beg and Karamat floated a plan to peddle nuclear capability and use the money to fund Jihad in A'stan and JK (which the author claims did not materialize), but when Pakistan was found peddling nuclear secrets, the author readily accepts that it might be because of AQK's personal greed and gain. This comes across as total BS. For example:

By the end of 1990s he went even further. Khan Research Laboratories was setting up booths around arms fairs around the world and advertising its willingness to sell both conventional weapons and centrifuge technology...The Pakistani government also got into the act. An advertisement appeared in local Pakistani newspapers in 2000 offerring specific nuclear expertise and material.

But Pakistani guvrmand wouldnt know. In the latter part of the book though, the author does bring in the fact that accepting Pakistani state's involvement, would mean that the US would be unable to pursue GOAT by giving out Baksheesh.

Even when he was army chief (Mushy), AQK's work was run through the former president's office in the 90's he explained. Mushy may have been trying to shift blame, but in doing so, he also acknowledged that Khan had not been acting alone and indeed did have the backing of some parts of the state.

2. Why did it take so long to bring AQK down ?

This looks like cuckooland and completely unbelievable. I am not the one usually given to conspiracy theories, but it all sounds like one huge conspiracy by Unkil and the west, to try very hard to look away till Pakistan had the bum. I am willing to buy the Zia era omissions and commissions, but what about the '90s ? The same 90's when GB-senior was making noises to PVN about CRE in India. Some of the happenings were incredible. in 95, for example, Unkil found a nuclear site in Iraq with documents which had a letter which stated

"We have enclosed for you the following proposal from the Pakistani scientist Dr AQK regarding the possibility of helping iraq estabilish a project to enrich uranium and manufacture a nuclear weapon...he is prepared to give us project designs for a nuclear bomb"

Apparently pakistan was confronted with this, and then pakistan denied it and Unkil and IAEA were satisfied with this response and did not pursue it further. A Paki was caught in 2001 Britain trying to export aluminium to AQK. A search of his records showed that he had sold several dual-use materials before. His legal defence was arranged through the Pakistani embassy and he got a 12 month suspended sentence, because the court determined that

"he did not know the role of AQK in Pakistan's nuclear program".

Unkil and the west seem to have woken up, *only after they realized that AQK was selling his ware abroad* and that conflicted in a big way with Unkil's foreign policy objectives. Glimpses of this are throughout the book. For example, the author says that excess procurements by AQK were thought as supplying a separate secret Pakistani enrichment facility and that the international community were taken by surprise when they discovered that it was actually meant for Libya and Iran.

3. A lesser rant is that the author takes great pain in protraying AQK as a "nationalist" but not "islamist". I suppose only the bearded ones are Islamists. For example the author quotes Khan of saying

Efforts to curtail the development of Muslim world, which the western powers see as a potential threat to their monopoly

And several other Ghazi like rantings.

Some juicy excerpts -
The Pakiness of AQK:

Khan summoned together a group of accomplices...They went to a building on some prized land that housed the Institute of Behavioral Sciences in Karachi. It was a busy time of the day, and about 40 mental health patients were waiting for examination....Khan's group confronted the security guards...and adopted postions in a somewhat dramatic battle order. Khan summoned the officials from the institute and told them that the building had been taken over....
In court, Khan's lawyers would defend him "the plaintiff is a national hero...It is pertinent to point out that the plaintiff deserves great respect and trust in the society"

To Rakshaks wringing their hands about "Quasab is not Pakistani". This has a looooong history:

The Pakistani reply that there was a lack of specificity to complaints was not just used over Khan but over all issues such as support for Taliban, for training camps in (Pakistan occupied) Kashmir, and problems over the line of control with India. British diplomats felt the argument was used whenever Pakis knew what the problem was but wanted deniability to continue pursuing something considered to be in the national interest

A joke here:

Powell told reporters that he had talked to Musharraf about the subject {AQK} and Pakistan's leader had given him a "four hundred percent assurance that there is no such interchange taking place now"

About Amritraj (he did not threaten to bomb pakistan to the stone age. The reality is lot more funny and sinister)

Armitage pointed to a decoration sitting in his office that he had recieved from the government of Paksitan, and said that if Islamabad did not help now (after 9/11), he would send it back and no American would ever want another decoration from Pakistan {Mahmood Ahmed immediately had a brown pant. Kinda reminded me of Al Paccino saying in Godfather, "You broke my heart Fredo, you broke my heart !" causing Fredo to get brown pants and downhill ski. Ultimately Paccino kills Fredo.}

AQK's insurance policy (AKA why he is still alive):

Since he returned to Pakistan from the Netherlands in 1976, Khan kept a diary....Khan kept volumes upon volumes of diaries in a large metal trunk...the current whereabouts of the diaries are unclear, although they are believed to be out of the country.

About Paki bum:

The designs were for a bomb that would weigh around 500 Kgs, not the latest, most advanced Pakistani design...Many of the notes were in Chinese, some in english. The latter were apparently from Pakistanis who had attended seminars given by weapons experts in China in the early 80s. One note said "Munir's (of PAEC) bomb would be bigger"

I am on to my next book "America and the Islamic bomb : the deadly compromise" by David Armstrong. Will post reviews and impressions soon.

[Anujan]

With the above book review as background, I have several speculations:

Speculation No 1: The JK jihad lost steam, because the money to fund it ran out. Atleast part of this money came from peddling Nuke secrets around the world. At about the time Unkil made his displeasure known, Mushy was singing the peace tune in JK. This is not a far fetched speculation, Beg and Durrani had put forward a similar proposal in '90 when US was winding down in A'stan.

Speculation No 2: The Saudis are really really pissed that Pakis sold technology to Iran. It must have come as a double jhappad, because of funding that they gave, directly to KRL to make the bum. Pakis took the money, made the bum and started selling it to Iran, thus elevating Pakiness to new heights. Double dealing even the Ummah incarnate. That is behind the recent lack of Baksheesh methinks.

Speculation No 3: It is a lesser known fact that AQK also peddled around UF6 gas like there is no tomorrow. He gave 1.5 tons to Libya, another ton or so to Iran and another ton or so to NoKo. He promised 20 tons to Libya. Where was all this UF6 coming from ? It is a tremendously valuable commodity and manufacturing it is tricy. The author further points out that UF6 in pakistan was managed by PAEC. Where did all this UF6 come from ? Surely from somebody within the NSG. Could it be from the fliend ?

Speculation No 4: This whole attention to AQK is a tamasha and distraction. The real ones to watch out for is PAEC. The impression that I got from the book is that AQK was used more as a procurement front end and the real work was done by PAEC. While AQK collaborated with NoKo and ran a black market for enrichment, PAEC collaborated with China for weaponization and delivery and that is what should be explored in great detail by Rakshaks. The dlagon seems to have held AQK at arms length, probably knowing of his other activities and instead chose to cooperate with another entity which was not involved in proliferation. There are three cases in point

1. KRL developed liquid fueled Ghauri, based on NoKo's Nodong, which had several guidance problems. PAEC had solid-fueled Shaheen based on the M-series which was a much more mature design from China.
2. The 98 tests were conducted under the supervision of PAEC. If AQK was really he father of the bum, why PAEC ?
3. AQK had a design and by most accounts KRL did weaponize the bum. This design was not the one that was presumably tested because Mubarakmand is reputed to have commented before the tests "We will show Khan how a nuclear explosion looks like"

Moral of the story - more eyes on PAEC please...

Added later: AQK seems to have been set up as a front man for doing all kind of messy job for procuring materials for making a bum program. A bit of his ego seems to have been massaged by making it appear that he was in charge of bum development and delivery (missiled).

The materials and techonology acquired by AQK seems to have been transferred to PAEC, who were in charge of building the "real" bum and "real" delivery (shaheen for example) systems. Chinis (after initially helping AQK), seem to have held him at an Arm's length.

The clues are scattered throughout. If, for example, as it has been repeatedly claimed, AQK was given a chini proven design, why was PAEC involved as lead in '98 tests ? A simplistic answer would be "Maybe AQK gave it to PAEC". Unlikely. There was a severe rivalry between the two for weaponization (Munir Ahmad Khan and Mubarakmand of PAEC hated AQK and vice versa).

To get a real idea of Chini help to Pakis for weaponization, and to understand the capabilities of the Pakis, PAEC should be scrutinized closely.

[ramana]

PAF has evolved into a nuclear force: Tanvir
Responding to a query, he said 95 percent of PAF personnel and officers are not out to earn livelihood but they joined PAF with the passion to defend the motherland through obtaining mastery over the machine and ammo.

The message he is giving here is that India might have PAD and AAD which can negate the Gauris and Ghaznis manned by TSPA, but PAF will deliver with its planes. IOW he is asking for every plane to be considered a delivery vehicle. Unfortunately his inventory doesnt lend itself to that. So its an empty boast.

The message he is giving here is that India might have PAD and AAD which can negate the Gauris and Ghaznis manned by TSPA, but PAF will deliver with its planes.

So the interceptor tests have shaken their confidence in their imported missile arsenal

gentlemen, from browsing BRF, i can come up with another scenario...

1. pak warheads are not small enough to mate with the missiles they have
2. chini warheads which were, have now been withdrawn or had chini PAL's put on them
3. pak has built largish warheads that can only be air delivered
4. unkil may have put PAL's on them...
5. ...or nobbled the F16's so that they can't carry/deliver large loads
6. A5 vagerah vagerah cannot do the job due to huge size of warhead
7. so C-130's have been configured to carry palletised large Uranium gun type devices, which may or may not explode...
8. ... but may spew out radioactive contaminants

ergo, all of PAF is a nuclear capable farce
QED

They have to provide that assurance. If the Fizzayas as knocked out completely and India taking complete air dominance they may still have some hidden in other countries air space such as Iran/Dubai etc.

This is a sign of desperation and lowering the threshold even more.

The missile could become ineffective and open for first strike because of their setup time.

Well they never developed anything despite what US experts say. What they have are PRC designs and most likely working copies. I say this because despite all the US experts talk the TSP tried to test something they jerry rigged on May 16th 1998 and the test was announced by German Chancellor Khol and the Japanese PM at the G-8 mtg going on then. It was hastily retracted implying bad news. Recall the BND (German Secret Service) has good eye on the TSP and Mrs AQK is South African/Dutch origin. I recount all this to show that TSP doesnt have working stuff they designed.

Having said that they have tested something based on Pu which again they dont have on May 30th 1998. This is supposed to be a missile warhead. And the NoKo scientis were elated about this. And Gauhar Khan, Ayub's son was shown very pleased on CNN. So with my SDRE mind I think this is their barbarian payload. However as George Fernandes said India is not deterred by ping pong balls.

CHIC design was tested by PRC for TSP.
PRC got tech from Soviet and also from US.

PRC is doing what they have seen from Uncle. They transferred to TSP

Warhead Blueprints Link Libya Project To Pakistan Figure

Twelve days ago, a 747 aircraft chartered by the United States government landed at Dulles Airport here carrying a single piece of precious cargo: a small box containing warhead designs that American officials believe were sold to Libya by the underground network linked to Abdul Qadeer Khan, the creator of the Pakistani bomb.

Experts familiar with the contents of the box say the designs closely resemble the warheads that China tested in the late 1960's and passed on to Pakistan decades ago.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dy ... ge=printer

The packet of documents, some of which included text in Chinese, contained detailed, step-by-step instructions for assembling an implosion-type nuclear bomb that could fit atop a large ballistic missile. They also included technical instructions for manufacturing components for the device, the officials and experts said.

"It was just what you'd have on the factory floor. It tells you what torque to use on the bolts and what glue to use on the parts," one weapons expert who had reviewed the blueprints said in an interview. He described the designs as "very, very old" but "very well engineered."

http://www.twq.com/05spring/docs/05spring_albright.pdf

The documents appear to have been information that Pakistan had received in China in the early 1980s. They include detailed, dated, handwritten notes in English taken during lectures given by Chinese weapons experts who were named by the notetakers. These notetakers appear to have been working for Khan, based on their cryptic notations deriding a rival Pakistani nuclear weapons program led by Munir Khan, the chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Organization. The design appears to be for a Chinese warhead that was tested on a missile, has a mass of about 500 kilograms, and measures less than a meter in diameter.

http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/816/more ... p-in-libya

had no reason to question that description, but it was inconsistent with other information we have about the “Chinese warhead that was tested on a missile”—the fourth Chinese nuclear test (CHICOM 4) in October 1966. Alex Montgomery (preparing for a forthcoming article in IS) recalled that John Lewis and Hua Di report that the warhead weighed 1,290 kg. I wasn’t sure how to resolve this discrepancy: 500 kg or 1,290 kg?

Given the size and shape of the nose cone, I believe the mass and dimensions of the physics package tested in October 1966 on a DF-2 are much closer to Albright and Hinderstein (a mass of about 500 kilograms and a diameter less than a meter) than Lewis and Hua (1,290 kg).

[svinayak]

CHIC-4 is unique in PRC arsenal. Its a HEU implosion design which makes it compact and rocket deliverable. Till it was unveiled in 1967 or so implosion was only for Pu designs and was a technical surprise for PRC.

http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/China/ChinaTesting.html

This pure-fission U-235 implosion fission device named "596" was China's first nuclear test. The device weighed 1550 kg. No plutonium was available at this time.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/china/nuke.htm

The first Chinese nuclear test was conducted at Lop Nor on 16 October 1964 (CHIC 1). It was a tower shot involving a fission device with a yield of 25 kilotons. Uranium 235 was used as the nuclear fuel, which indicates Beijing's choice of the path of creating high-yield nuclear weapons right away. Of the ten test shots that followed by 29 September 1969, six are believed to have been related to thermonuclear development. The others had as their goals the adaptation of CHIC 1 for bomber delivery and test of a missile warhead (CHIC 4). The third nuclear test was conducted on 9 September 1966 using a Tu-16 bomber. In addition to uranium 235, this nuclear device, with a yield around 100 KT, this time contained lithium 6, which attested to China's readiness to test a thermonuclear explosion. CHIC 6, an airdrop test on 17 June 1967, was the first full-yield, two-stage thermonuclear test.

All these are information given by Uncle and others. It is their words.
They have many information which are not yet open. We need to figure this out.

Gerard, A very interesting thing about the drawings in the box. How did they think its was similar to ChiC-4? I mean if someone gives one a blueprint of a lathe how does one know if its like HMT model LT-100 or what?

you need to get hold of Gordon Corera's book "Shopping for Bombs", all is explained

They know it is CHIC 4 because they gave the Chic 4 to PRC.

It was 25-30 years later before they saw this design floating in the middle east.


Very clever way to find out which countries are interested in nuke bombs and map all the supply chain which was feeding the rogue nuke market with AQ Khan as the head.
They know all the people and groups within those countries also.

Every country was playing a role which it was without their knowledge.

Warhead Blueprints Link Libya Project To Pakistan Figure

Twelve days ago, a 747 aircraft chartered by the United States government landed at Dulles Airport here carrying a single piece of precious cargo: a small box containing warhead designs that American officials believe were sold to Libya by the underground network linked to Abdul Qadeer Khan, the creator of the Pakistani bomb.

Experts familiar with the contents of the box say the designs closely resemble the warheads that China tested in the late 1960's and passed on to Pakistan decades ago.

Gerard,
Can you find any link which shows transfer of Uncles bomb material to Pakistan.

hypothesis: unkil encouraged/blind eyed the pak programme back in the 70's to see what dragon would release to paks, and so show unkil what the dragon had under the chong sam. unkil probably never thought that dragon would give a working example to pak, or that pak would make its own. double bluff in order to expose the dragon

What if Uncle, Dragon and TSP together are in it.

[Anujan]

Halfway through the Book "America and the Islamic Bomb: The Deadly Compromise" by Armstrong and Trento.
THIS IS THE BOOK RAKSHAKS SHOULD BE READING !! The authors are very subtle with a supple, complex and information-filled narrative. But we are getting ahead of ourselves.

Earlier I had posted a review for "Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity and Rise and Fall of AQ Khan" By Gordon Corera. To recap: Corera's book is psyops and WKK rolled into one. He has written a story of a pakistani renegade james bond who surprised the morally upgright west. The west was in a dilemma as to what to do, and somehow took AQK down with great heroism. Along the way, Corera has a few good things to say about how the bomb is not a Islamic bomb and the Paki guvrmand is completey (doe eyed) innocent about proliferation activities. If you think that you are going to get the same psy-ops from "America and the Islamic Bomb", you are in for a pleasant surprise. In page 2 of the Book the author says

The protrayal of Khan as a lone wolf operating out of government control provided the media and the public with a major diversion from the truth...The unpleasant truth is that what is known as the AQ Khan scandal is, fundamentally, a scandal of US foreign policy...The gravest dangers now confronting the west---Islamic terrorism and nuclear proliferation--- are, in short, the ba$tard children of foriegn policy decisions made long ago.

The author has no compunction in calling a spade a spade, and liberal use of profanities. However, it is not just a fact filled indictment of western perfidy. He outlines the domestic compulsions, political expediencies and foreign policy objectives which led to such decisions, while pointing out that the decisions, invariably put short term gain ahead of long term objectives. He traces the roots of nuclear proliferation to "pro-business" republicans, with their capitalism privatization mantra, who wrote laws prohibiting US government from Nuclear power generaiton, and private industries to own and operate reactors. This spawned a spate of private industries worldwide, who were suppliers of sensitive nuclear technology. All the while singing the non-proliferation song. This is the "raw material" AQK would use, to procure components for the Pakistani bomb. The author tries to point out that the bomb was always a "Islamic bomb". The participants were islamists of two kinds (a) Those who would not compromise anything for Islam (b) pragmatists (like Bhutto), who was normally an islamist, but could hide the tendencies when he had to turn his charm on. For example, when Bhutto announced plans to pursue a bomb (in 1972)

The scientists broke out in cheers. They danced and shouted "Allahu Akbar !", "Allahu Akbar !" {Imagine Dr Prahlad yelling "har har mahadev" after Agni IV go-ahead.}

Neither does he mince any words about the knowledge of the Pakistani government about proliferation. He points out a logical progression of government help to Khan's procurement activities

Khan enjoyed the full backing of the Pakistani government and its diplomatic corps for his purchasing campaign. Military aircraft were requsitioned for shipments of large or senstive equipment and PAEC officials were provided with diplomatic credentials and installed in Pakistani embassies in the west to facilitate purchases for the bomb program. Diplomatic pouches were sometimes used to smuggle proscribed items

.
The west's perfidy and deception is repeatedly pointed out without mincing words. For example

AQK has long boasted that Pakistan's enrichment program remained hidden from the west for nearly three years. Western officials have largely substantiated the claim. It is, of course, false; but has been a useful fiction for all concerned. It has allowed AQk to portray himself as a wily scientist who outwitted western intelligence agencies...and it has permitted the west to plausibly explain why it failed to prevent Pakistan from developing the enrichment capability.

On the other hand, the author does paint a complex picture of political compulsions. US-Pakistan relationship had deteriorated after Butto's hanging. However, Iran had a revolution and a band of armed fundamentalists had taken over Mecca to overthrow the Saudi royal family. Rumors had spread in pakistan that Mossad with CIA's help had orchestrated the operation and an angry mob gathered at the US embassy in Pakistan and set it on fire. This had two consequences, (a) US pakistani relationship hit a new low (b) The muslim anger against the US had to be deflected. Hence Brezinski and Carter had a masterstroke. They would help the mujahideen against the Soviets and deflect muslim anger against godless communists. This would result in Pakistan being a reliable ally after the loss of Iran while counter balancing Soviet-leaning India with Pakistan, whose proliferation activities would be tolerated. A same situation arose after 2003 Iraq invasion. No WMDs were found, so the Bush government, desperately looking for progress along the proliferation front, took down AQK network and presented it as a great success. However, they did not ask for access to AQK nor prosecute his crimes fully, because skeletons would have started to tumble out from the cupboard.

Some juicy excerpts:
The Paki tendency to use baksheesh on their army has a long history

The United states had begun to question the wisdom of its alliance with Islamabad. American development aid had done little to improve Pakistan's fundamental economic and political weakness, while US military assistance had helped create a Pakisani defence behemoth that Islamabad could not sustain without continued american support....By 1957, (Eisenhower) concluded that US alliance with pakistan had been a "terrible error" (his words) {10 years after partition, Pakis were already showing sings of being...Pakis. Zia made us bad onleee is just an excuse}

The author makes an interesting point that the pakis had anticipated in 1965 that they cannot wrest JK from India if India had a nuclear weapon. So try tried a war, and failed. Then they hit upon an idea that they might be able to wrest JK from India if pakis had a weapon, and so started GUBO to tallel than mountain fliends.

The CIA report (in 1965) predicted that Islamabad might seek "tangible assistance" from China in the form of fissionable material, technical aid or even a completed weapon. It was a prescient assessment

Some interesting snippet here

{Khan had written to a scientist at Urenco asking him for drawings}. Veerman showed Khan's letter to his FDO supervisor. He was later picked up by Dutch security and held for two days. Government agents reportedly accused Veerman of spying, but veerman turned the tables, accusing them of allowing dangerous technology to leave the country. The agents finally sent Veerman home, telling him to keep his mouth shut "You many not talk about this anymore, it is dangerous for Holland"

Why Carter served only one term

Carter's mass firing at the CIA headquarters became known as the Halloween massacre. Many of the covert officers had been George HW Bush's subordinates when he was CIA director. When Bush ran for office, Carter found himself with scores of former high level intelligence officers doing everything they could to remove him (carter) from office. Led by Theodore C. Shackley, the CIA's associate deputy director for operations, many of these officers formed what would be a renegade CIA accountable not to the president, but to his political opponents . For a complete account, see Joseph Trento "Prelude to terror: The Rogue CIA and the Legacy of America's Private Intelligence Networks"

Will post the rest of the review once I am done.

[ramana]

X-posted...

The Inheritance: The World Obama Confronts and the Challenges to American Power
by David E. Sanger (Author)

# Hardcover: 528 pages
# Publisher: Harmony (January 13, 2009)
# Language: English
# ISBN-10: 0307407926
# ISBN-13: 978-0307407924

Sanger describes what President-Elect Obama will face - results of the costs of distraction and lost opportunities in Iraq. He does not cover our weakened position due to the 2008 market collapse. His best material involves the latest developments in Iran.

The 2007 NIE report on Iran reported that they had ceased working on a bomb in 2003, but omitted the fact that this is the easiest portion - far easier than creating the required enriched fissionable material, especially given the availability of Russian experts and Pakistani help. The classified version also alleged Iran had added covert enrichment sites to the main (known) one. After crying wolf re Iraq, U.S. intelligence was unable to raise the alarm about Iran. The "good news" is that the U.S. tunneled into Irani computer systems and obtained extensive background information.

President Bush then decided to try sabotaging Iran's efforts - eg. arranging power supplies that generated unstable electricity that destroyed centrifuges (about 50) when turned on. The "bad news" is that Iran is now estimated to have 4,000 active centrifuges - enough to build a bomb/year, and is building new centrifuges that are even better. Experts see Iran as having enough material for a few weapons by 2010-12, and being set back only two years by a bombing campaign that would create enormous new problems in Iraq and elsewhere.

During the Spring 2008, Israel requested precision bunker-busting bombs and Iraq overflight rights to do the job themselves. President Bush refused.

The U.S. started Iran down the nuclear path in the 1950s; fortunately, Khomeini ignored it when the Shah was deposed. However, Saddam's use of chemical weapons on Iran rekindled interest. The U.S. had an opportunity to obtain Iran's cooperation post 9/11, especially at the time of "Mission Accomplished." Cheney, however, believed the Iranians were on the verge of collapse and successfully argued for ignoring their proposal.

Sanger now sees the U.S. at another point of strength in negotiating vs. Iran - their economy is at a nadir with the recent drop in oil prices.

Meanwhile, our intelligence chiefs have made repeated secret trips to Pakistan to try and stem a growing insurgency and cope with an ally aiding the enemy. "The Inheritance" also takes readers to Afghanistan, where Bush II never delivered on his promises to rebuild, paving the way for the Taliban's return. General McNeil (2008) tells Sanger that managing troops from 26 nations (mostly NATO), most of whom are under instructions to avoid regions where casualties were likely, and often also required advance approval from their capitals, is not a good way to win a war.

The Afghan government revenue in 2008 was $716 million, vs. a $4 billion narco-trade (per CIA). (Couldn't the NATO troops at least be used to clear the poppy fields?) Bush promised a "Marshal Plan" for Afghanistan ($90 billion in today's dollars), but months after that speech the U.S. had pledged only $290 million (half that from Iran, and only a small portion of the $5 billion total).

Another problem is Pakistan and its history of supporting the Taliban (valued by the Pakistani military and ISI for keeping India out of Afghanistan). Sanger says they have neither the will nor the means to take on al Qaeda and the Taliban. Worse yet, it has 70,000 nuclear workers, including about 2,000 "hard core" scientists and engineers. Our NIE review of the region concluded that Pakistan, with its economy near collapse, is the real prize for al Qaeda.

Then Sanger covers North Korea where actual WMD were built while the U.S. pursued phantoms in Iraq, and the technology then sold to Syria - unknown to the U.S. Sanger also then tells how China used the Bush years to expand influence in Asia and lock up oil supplies in Africa.

Sanger ends with three scenarios that depict terrorism vulnerabilities. The first (nuclear) involves a crude, very-low power nuclear device set off in D.C., and costing $500,000. The parts could either be smuggled into the U.S. in pieces or assembled - the U.S. detectors are outdated and probably couldn't detect it (despite creating 400-600 false alarms/day at Long Beach). New technology would reduce the false alarms, but probably still couldn't detect a nuclear weapon, per Sanger.

The second vulnerability is vs. biological weapons - major cities have detectors, but reading the results takes at least a day. Estimated cost: $500 million.

The third vulnerability involves a cyber attack - requiring about three years and another $500 million, and capable of destroying expensive diesel generators, electricity transmission lines, neutralizing our defenses, etc.

This important book explores the colossal failure of the Bush presidency. It shows us that Bush's policies and decisions were even worse than we knew. And that's really saying something.

It doesn't get into the Iraq war, how we got in and how we are attempting to get out. The focus instead is on opportunity cost. The real price of the war in Iraq is more profound than the $800 billion spent or even the sad human cost in deaths and casualties. The true price tag includes what we should have been doing instead. As author David Sanger puts it, when "the `decider' became the ditherer," the country became distracted from more immediate problems in Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and North Korea. The winner after eight years of Bush's leadership? China.

The problems were not all Bush's fault, of course. But the way he and his administration responded weakened our country. "At the moment when we most needed to act like a truly enlightened superpower, we let fear trump judgment, we depleted our political capital and moral authority, and we sullied our reputation as the world's safest, best-regulated place to invest. The scorecard at the end of eight years is unforgiving: Barack Obama now inherits a country in far more peril -- both strategically and economically -- than Bush did when he took office."

The Inheritance is full of behind-the-scenes vignettes and insights. The author met with Bush in Crawford, Texas, eight days before the newly-elected president would be sworn in. Bush was joshing and informal, but as they entered the house, he warned, "Wipe your feet well, boys. I may have just been elected President of the United States, but Laura will have my *** if there's mud in her living room." Later, talking about his newly named press secretary, Ari Fleischer, Bush confessed "There's a lot I won't be telling him. There's a lot you won't hear." As Sanger puts it, "He got that right."

The epilogue, titled Obama's Challenge, begins with this quote: "Great crises create the opportunity to forge great presidencies." Here's hoping.

Here's the chapter list:

Introduction: The Briefing
Part 1: Iran
The Mullah's Manhattan Project
1. Decoding Project 111
2. Regime-Change Fantasies
3. Ahmadinejad's Monologue
4. The Israel Option

Part 2: Afghanistan
How The Good War Went Bad
5. The Marshall Plan That Wasn't
The Other "Mission Accomplished"

Part 3: Pakistan
"How Do You Invade An Ally?"
7. Secrets of Chaklala Cantonment
Crossing the Line

Part 4: North Korea
The Nuclear Renegade That Got Away
9. Kim Jong-Il 8, Bush 0
10. Cheney's Lost War
"Everything is Appomattox"

Part 5: China
New Torch, Old Dragons
12. Generation Lenovo
The Puncture Strategy

Part 6: The Three Vulnerabilities
14. Deterrence 2.0
15. The Invisible Attack
Dark Angel

Epilogue: Obama's Challenge
Acknowledgments
Note on Sources
Suggested Reading
Endnotes

There is something bothersome about the CHIC-4 design that lends itself to proliferation. Maybe its the original sin?

[Gerard]

Japan products found on N. Korea missile kit vessel in 1999

Japanese-made precision tools and special steel were found among missile-manufacturing equipment that was confiscated on a North Korean freighter detained at an Indian port in June 1999 while en route to Pakistan, a former senior Indian government official said Saturday.
While North Korea is known to have provided missile know-how to Pakistan in return for nuclear weapons technology, this is the first concrete example of how Japanese equipment ended up being used in North Korea's proliferation of missile technology.

[Gerard]

“Khan’s damage incalculable”

[arun]

The article states the patently obvious.

Namely that besides Abdul Qadeer Khan, Pakistan’s “ military and political rulers were also undoubtedly complicit ” in proliferating nuclear weapon technology :

Policy Watch #1513

Pakistan on the Brink: Implications for U.S. Policies

By Simon Henderson

May 4, 2009

……………Given the country's history of nuclear trade with China, Iran, Libya, and North Korea, concerns about leaks of weapons and technology linger. Although past proliferation has been blamed on the activities of the now retired and still restricted Abdul Qadeer Khan, the country's military and political rulers were also undoubtedly complicit. ………………

The Washington Institute

[Gerard]

Pakistan Expanding Dera Ghazi Khan Nuclear Site
http://www.isis-online.org/publications ... ingCPC.pdf

Pakistan Expanding Plutonium Separation Facility Near Rawalpindi
http://www.isis-online.org/publications ... ewlabs.pdf

Update on the Khushab Plutonium Production Reactor Construction Projects in Pakistan
http://www.isis-online.org/publications ... il2009.pdf

Profitable and Low-Penalty: Illicit Procurement of Items with Nuclear Applications for Pakistan
http://isis-online.org/publications/exp ... eb2009.pdf

[VinodTK]

Cross posting from International nuclear watch & discussion thread

Pak's nuke quest pre-dated India's 1974 test: US report

[Gerard]

IAEA: Ahmadinejad election rival launched Iran nuclear program

One of the documents revealed that the then-head of Iran's atomic energy organization requested Mousavi's approval for purchasing the centrifuges on the black market. Iran subsequently acquired the centrifuges through the smuggling ring of Pakistani scientist Abd al-Qadir Khan.

The document from March 1987, classified as secret, said that Iran's then-chief atomic energy official said Tehran's activities related to Khan must remain secret. The document appeared as part of a quarterly report the IAEA issues as part of its supervision of Tehran's nuclear program.

[Gerard]

Swiss order more evidence destroyed in nuke probe

Urs Tinner, his brother Marco and their father Freidrich are suspected of supplying Khan's black market nuclear network with the technical know-how and equipment used to make gas centrifuges. Khan sold the centrifuges for secret nuclear weapons programs in countries that included Libya and Iran before his operation was disrupted in 2003.

[SSridhar]

US helping modernize Pak N-arsenal

The United States is helping Pakistan modernise its nuclear arsenal in hopes to make them safer, says a report released on Sunday.

Andrew Cockburn, a renowned author who has written several books on security issues, says that the official aim of US technical support, at an estimated cost of $100 million a year, is to prevent accidents and to ensure that they are out of the extremists’ reach.

But in pursuit of this objective, ‘it is inevitable that the US is not only rendering the warheads more operationally reliable, we are also transferring the technology required to design more sophisticated warheads without having to test them’, the report adds.

The author quotes a former national security official as saying that if the US is involved, ‘we can make sure they don’t start testing, or start a war’.

This system known as ‘stockpile stewardship’ was conceived after the US forswore live testing in 1993. It allows scientists to ‘test’ weapons through computer simulations. This vastly expensive programme not only ensures the weapons’ reliability but also the viability of new and improved designs.

The report says that in 2008, the Pakistan military approached Bruce Blair, president of a Washington-based World Security Institute, seeking advice on means to render their weapons more secure.

‘Their aim was clearly to render their nuclear force mature and operational,’ says Mr Blair. In the same way, says Mr Blair, a few years ago an Indian military delegation turned up at the Russian Impulse Design Bureau in St. Petersburg, to ask for help on making their weapons safer to handle. ‘They said they wanted to be able to assure their political leadership that their weapons were safe enough to be deployed.’

The author argues that the United States has allowed Pakistan’s nuclear programme to continue because it needs Islamabad’s help in other issues.

In 1979, Zbigniew Brzezinski, a former US national security adviser, underlined that to get full Pakistani cooperation against the Soviets in Afghanistan, the US required ‘a review of our policy toward Pakistan, more guarantees to it, more arms aid, and, alas, a decision that our security policy toward Pakistan cannot be dictated by our non-proliferation policy’.

The author also recalls that when President Reagan was asked for his views on Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions, he replied ‘I just don’t think it’s any of our business.’

The author claims that ‘during the years Dr A. Q. Khan was peddling his uranium enrichment technology around the place, his shipping manager was a CIA agent, whose masters seem to have had little problem with allowing the trade to go forward’.

The Obama administration also has not changed this policy of tolerance towards Pakistan’s nuclear programme.

‘Most of the aid we’ve sent them over the past few years has been diverted into their nuclear programme,’ a senior national security official in the current administration recently told the author.

Most of this diverted aid -- $5.56 billion as of a year ago –was officially designated ‘Coalition Support Funds’ for Pakistani military operations against the Taliban.

The author also quotes US Joint Chiefs Chairman Admiral Mullen as saying recently that the Pakistanis have been urgently increasing their nuclear weapons production.

‘Pakistan’s drive to build more nukes is an inevitable by-product of the 2008 nuclear cooperation deal with India that overturned US law and gave the Indians access to US nuclear technology … despite their ongoing bomb programme,’ the author notes.

The Indo-US deal, the author argues, blew an enormous hole in the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

[Gerard]

‘Their aim was clearly to render their nuclear force mature and operational,’ says Mr Blair. In the same way, says Mr Blair, a few years ago an Indian military delegation turned up at the Russian Impulse Design Bureau in St. Petersburg, to ask for help on making their weapons safer to handle. ‘They said they wanted to be able to assure their political leadership that their weapons were safe enough to be deployed.’

NPO Impuls does not appear to be involved in warhead development. They developed the launch systems for missiles like the SS-18, the seekers for the Kh-29T etc. Mr. Blair would seem to be talking out of his musharraf. The Cockburn (Cock and Bull) counterpoint article makes many tall claims without credible evidence. Why would Pakistan approach Blair? He is an ayatollah and never worked in the nuclear weapons development. He was a Minuteman launch control officer. What advice could he possibly give Pakistani weapons developers? How to turn a key?

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ ... 7spd1.html

ENTERPRISE NAME: IMPULS SCIENTIFIC PRODUCTIONASSOCIATION
LAST UPDATE: February 1996
ALTERNATE NAMES: NPO Impulse
ADDRESS: 195220 St. Petersburg, Russia Ulitsa Obruchevykh, 1
Tel: (011-7812) 243-9765, 530-9343 (Experimental Plant); Fax : (011-7-812) 243-9642, (Expl.Plant), E- Mail: N/A; telex: 121033 IMPL; Teletype: 321205 BARK
GENERAL OVERVIEW: The Impuls Scientific Production Association develops and produces combat control systems for missile- and space-launch complexes, as well as information processing systems. It includes an experimental plant and an experimental designbureau.
PRIMARY BUSINESS: Combat control systems.
FORMER MINISTRY SUBORDIN. : Ministry of General Machine Building
APPROXIMATE EMPLOYMENT: Total: 4,161; Date: 1994.
PRINCIPAL OFFICERS: Boris G. Mikhailov, Director Vyacheslav V.Onishchenko, Head of the Foreign Relations Department.
OWNERSHIP: state-owned
YEAR ESTABLISHED: 1960
MILITARY PRODUCT LINES: Combat control systems and information ciphering equipment.
CIVIL PRODUCT LINES: Microwave ovens.
KEY TECH. / EQUIPT. EMPLOYED : N/A CONVERSION PROJECTS:N/A
HUMAN RESOURCES SUPPORT: N/A

http://russianforces.org/blog/2007/07/p ... russ.shtml

[Gerard]

Pak National Assembly wants to quiz AQ Khan over proliferation confession

[SSridhar]

Pak National Assembly wants to quiz AQ Khan over proliferation confession

This questioning is of course, not to reveal proliferation secrets. It is to put Gen. Musharraf in the dock. It will be carefully managed to achieve that purpose. In the end, AQ Khan will be honourably discharged of his earlier 'confession' and resurrected as a 'national hero' and PPP will get the gratitude of the Pakistani masses. PML-N will perforce have to support PPP in this.

[Gerard]

Swiss gov't: legal battle over nuclear case

Arguing that it is acting in the interest of national security, the government has taken the unusual step of blocking access of key documents from the court and ordered for them to be destroyed.

Parliament has also stood up against the decision, saying that the government's refusal is an act of interference which violates the Swiss constitution.

On Thursday, cantonal police armed with a court order raided the Federal Criminal Police offices in Bern, seizing a safe containing the key to the secret documents.

The government on Friday dismissed the court order as having "no effect," and said the decision to destroy the "most dangerous" documents in its possession "is absolute."

[SSridhar]

Swiss gov't: legal battle over nuclear case

Wow. That means that the documents which were already destroyed and about to be destroyed now are very incriminating to either Switzerland itself or a friendly but very powerful country.

[Gerard]

The pressure from the US must have been immense. The Swiss Federal Council is telling the Parliament, the Federal courts, the canton police to go to hell. That sort of constitutional crisis over evidence in a criminal court case? Those documents must make interesting reading. No wonder Photochor is so brazen.

[p_saggu]

Pakistani Nuclear Sites

[arun]

X Posted.

The possibility of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan's spy agency, the ISI, collaborating to proliferate nuclear technology to terrorists is recognised by UK’s Parliament.

UK House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee’s Eighth Report on Global Security dealing Afghanistan and Pakistan published on July 21, 2009:

160. We conclude that allegations raised during our inquiry about the safety of nuclear technology and claims of possible collusion between Pakistan's intelligence agency, the ISI, and Al Qaeda are a matter of deep concern. ……………

From the chapter titled, “Pakistan's strategic importance and role in relation to Afghanistan” :

LINK

The Index for the complete report and links to its different chapters:

CLICKY

[arun]

Israeli newspaper Haaretz on how the US during the Reagen Presidency covered up Pakistan’s nuclear weaponisation programme:

Thu., August 06, 2009

Khan, king of the nukes

By Zvi Bar'el

Richard Barlow, an analyst at the the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, was sure his career was about to take off. It was the 1980s, and he had information suggesting Pakistan was buying components to build a nuclear weapon, and even had refitted F-16 fighter planes purchased from the United States to carry nuclear bombs. He ran to his superiors and expected to be lauded. Instead he was fired, and word spread that he was a spy. All the suspicions against him were refuted in an investigation, but that did not help him: Barlow had revealed something the American administration preferred to keep secret.

For then-president Ronald Reagan, cooperation with Pakistan was essential at a time when the Soviet Union was threatening to control Afghanistan, even if the price was helping a Muslim state acquire nuclear weapons. Barlow's revelation - that the administration was violating laws prohibiting the sale of military equipment that might lead to nuclear proliferation - was considered treason. He was pushed out and the administration carried on its business with the senior Pakistani official responsible for acquiring nuclear technology, Abdul Qadeer Khan. ……………

…………… Meanwhile, U.S. President Barack Obama finds himself trapped in the same dilemma as all his predecessors since Reagan: How do you handle a nuclear state that has not signed the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, which was on the verge of a take-over by the Taliban several weeks ago, whose military is said to support this group, and which supports the parties that pose the biggest threats to U.S. interests in the Middle East and the Far East? On the other hand, this is a regime the United States needs to eradicate the Taliban in Afghanistan and in northern Pakistan. There are quite a few aspects of the Pakistani-Afghani dilemma that the United States has itself alone to blame. From the pinnacle of his mountain of cash, national pride and international connections, Abdul Qadeer Khan doesn't really care.

From here:

Haaretz

[Arun_S]

Terrorists 'have attacked Pakistan nuclear sites three times'

August 11, 2009
Terrorists have attacked three of Pakistan’s military nuclear facilities in the past two years and there is a serious danger that they will gain access to the country’s atomic arsenal, according to a journal published by the US Military Academy at West Point.

The report, written by Professor Shaun Gregory, a security specialist at Bradford University, comes amid mounting fears that the Taleban and al-Qaeda will breach Pakistan’s military nuclear sites – most of which are in or near insurgent strongholds in the north and west of the country.

The most serious attack was a strike by two suicide bombers on the Wah Cantonment Ordnance Complex, thought to be one of Pakistan’s main nuclear weapons assembly plants, about 18 miles northwest of Islamabad, in August 2008.

The incident, which claimed 70 lives, was widely reported but little mention was made of the nuclear risk.

Other attacks included the suicide bombing of a nuclear missile storage facility at Sargodha, in central Punjab, in November 2007 and a suicide attack on Pakistan’s nuclear airbase at Kamra, near Wah, on December 10, 2007.

In the Counter Terrorism Center Sentinel, Professor Gregory writes that the attacks illustrate “a clear set of weaknesses and vulnerabilities” in Pakistan’s nuclear security regime.

The strikes occurred as Pakistan sought to ramp up its nuclear capability — and as US special forces formulated contingency plans in the event of the country falling to insurgents.

A US Defense Intelligence Agency document revealed in 2004 that Pakistan had a nuclear arsenal of 35 weapons, a figure it planned to more than double by 2020.

In June, Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, an al-Qaeda commander in Afghanistan, suggested that the group would show no hesitation in using nuclear weapons. “God willing... the mujahideen would take them and use them against the Americans,” he told al-Jazeera television.
Pakistan’s security regime is modelled on the American system and includes the separation of warheads from detonators, which are stored in underground bunkers staffed by highly vetted personnel. Many details of the country’s nuclear programme — including the location of many warheads and their exact number — remain unknown.

However, most of the country’s nuclear weapons sites were built in the north and west of the country in the 1970s and 1980s, mainly to distance them from India — a ploy which now means many are located in insurgent areas. There are also concerns that vetting programmes may not identify Islamist sympathisers, whose influence extends far up Pakistan’s military hierarchy.

Professor Gregory writes: “There is already the well-known case of two senior Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission scientists, Sultan Bashirrudin Mahmood and Chaudhry Abdul Majeed, who travelled to Afghanistan in 2000 and again shortly before 9/11 for meetings with Osama bin Laden himself, the content of which has never been disclosed.”

[Lalmohan]

Gerardji, SSridharji

who would have the muscle to make a soverign law abiding country fixated on rules brazenly go against its own prized constitution? what is being hidden? what we know already - that the CIA and other in Unkil's machinery looked the other way when Khan did his thing - ostensibly to see where it led, but more importantly i think they thought they would pamper the pakistanis thinking they would never succeed. I don't think they counted on the Chinese input. So if you like, China put a topi on Unkil's head over this, and Unkil has been scrambling ever since.

[Gerard]

I think they just looked the other way when they detected the Chinese inputs. Just as terrorism against India was no problem until the west itself began to feel the pain, the Pakistani bomb was no threat to them. In fact, it was useful in keeping India in check. What they didn't count on was the extent to which the Pakistani proliferation began to affect their interests in Korea, the Arab world etc. They didn't expect the Urenco centrifuge and Chinese bomb designs to be all over the world.