US and PRC relationship & India

[ramana]

Maybe he is clueless about the real facts.

[Suraj]

Statistics can be used many ways. For example, while Chinese exports quintupled between 2000-07, India's exports more than quadrupled. Further, our services exports increased by about an order or magnitude.

However, such confusing statistics get in the way of the narrative, since it is very important to ensure that PRC H&D is maintained, and more importantly, that the FT Beijing office isn't raided anytime soon.

[svinayak]

Statistics can be used many ways. For example, while Chinese exports quintupled between 2000-07, India's exports more than quadrupled. Further, our services exports increased by about an order or magnitude.

However, such confusing statistics get in the way of the narrative, since it is very important to ensure that PRC H&D is maintained, and more importantly, that the FT Beijing office isn't raided anytime soon.

This $1T in currency reserve will lose its value by 30-40% in value due to dollar devaluation.
This loss at the national level is not even counted in the overall growth from 2000-2007

[sampat]

Ma Says Taiwan-China Economic Embrace ‘the Beginning’ (Update1)

[Arihant]

Ma Says Taiwan-China Economic Embrace ‘the Beginning’ (Update1)

Taiwan is a fascinating case study in how freedom and democracy can be rolled back incrementally, and by stealth. The current Taiwanese government seems to be overly eager to make nice to China, making many in Taiwan (and elsewhere) uneasy. During a visit of a Chinese negotiator to Taiwan in 2008, they tried to prevent their own citizens from carrying their own flags, and shut down record stores playing music that asserts (the distinct) Taiwanese identity. A few weeks back, they made it illegal for professors in publicly-funded universities (most private ones aren't particularly good) to speak out about politics. There is considerable resentment, and growing dissent. Some professors that I personally know are continuing to speak and write about politics, and are openly defiant ("let them come and get me", according to one).

[svinayak]

Sin Chew Daily, Malaysia

U.S. Pursues India Options
as Leverage Against China
http://watchingamerica.com/News/32296/u ... nst-china/

By Ning Tai Shia
Translated By Yung-Ting Chang
28 July 2009
Edited by Robin Silberman
Malaysia - Sin Chew Daily - Original Article (Chinese)

Before participating in the ASEAN Regional Forum, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited India, one of the big South Asian countries. During her visit, the sides concluded two belated accords. One is the End-User Monitoring Agreement (EUMA), regarding sensitive defense equipment and technologies; and the other is to identify specific sites in India where American firms can build nuclear reactors and power plants. Moreover, India Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had also been invited to visit America on November 24, 2009, which is the first state visit invitation since President Obama has been sworn in. Obviously, the Obama administration is speeding up to solidify U.S.-India ties. By gaining ground in India, the U.S. could find an Asian counter-balance to China.

At a press conference before the visit, Ian Kelly, U.S. State Department spokesman, had been asked about a report stating the possibility that China could attack India or take some other actions. Although Mr. Kelly replied that he had “never heard that” and “we hope this would not happen,” the question itself subtly shows that the India visit has something to do with China.

China and India, both BRIC nations, usually have the same stance as those developed countries in terms of international affairs. However, India has often been considered a big country, yet relatively weaker than China. Even if they managed to cooperate, the mutual trust is still scarce. As the border issue between the two sides remains in dispute, India has regarded China as its biggest rival, who would seek cooperation with Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Myanmar, to marginalize India. That is also the reason why India is so eager to acquire advanced weapons from the U.S. to counter the possible military threat from China.

With this visit, the U.S. is able to sell nuclear technologies and advanced weapon to India. Nevertheless, what the U.S. expects is for India to use its big country power in South Asia, undertaking the responsibility to counter terrorism; maybe also as leverage against China. With eyes-only focus on the threat of Pakistan and China, India is not yet ready to behave as a big country with broad sight, and that would not be helpful in gaining any vantage point against China.

[Editor’s note: some quotes may be worded based on translated material].

[ramana]

I guess we can use this thread to follow the 'US and World' topics as its now reduced to US and PRC relationship after the meltdown.
BTW the old thread got shaeed!
------------------------

Peak oil will ensure that in next 50 years the support from Wahabized KSA will diminish. And by that time India will be G-2 if things go a certain way.Add to the mix the demographic mix changing in North America. And that will cut off the Anglo Saxon support for this rentier state.

ramana-ji
To early to write of N America. There is a huge (christian) young population in mexico for work and for warfare. Vast swathes of land, natural resources and water in Canada. Enough elites in massa who dont want a change in status-quo of unkil's corporations ruling the roost. Together they represent a mix who is better educated, with better opportunities on a system which is already established. Very high competitive advantage vis-a-vis SDREs and Cheenis.

Every (non military) powerful empire* declined due to loss of territories, or a loss of control by the "central" state to maintain cohesion of its union. None have declined by gaining territories, young populations or by forming a union by signing a document. I am sure this lesson is not lost on Unkil. But of course there are hurdles.

*I dont count the mongolian empire to be based on any system of economics.

The key to future 50 years from now is the Anglicization of the Hispanic population and a shifting of the political center southwards. The old centers might be retained for continuity but the dempgrpahic power is shfiting towards the south. I dont mean the South.

Will discuss this in the US and the World thread.
---------
One thing to happen before this is English has to get high status like Latin and move away from its Anglo-Saxon roots.

[ramana]

X-posted...

India believes China will focus on Arunachal after taiwan is sorted out.

Following story shows India's official thinking on China.

http://www.indianexpress.com/news/nsc-m ... m/497332/2

NSC meet discusses China, agrees India needs to keep an eye in long term

After virtually agreeing there was no need to “demonise” Beijing as a potential threat, the National Security Council meeting last Saturday emphasised the need to watch China carefully in the context of its recent actions vis-a-vis New Delhi in the Nuclear Suppliers Group on the Indo-US nuclear deal, ADB funds for Arunachal Pradesh and UN action to designate Pakistani Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) founder Masood Azhar a terrorist.

Chaired by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, the NSC discussed China for nearly three hours — a broad consensus emerged that Beijing was not a short-term threat to India but its actions needed to be watched from the long-term perspective. The NSC emphasised that India needed to grow at 7-8 per cent in the next decade to become a global economic powerhouse and match up to the challenge posed by Beijing.

The Ministry of External Affairs updated the meeting on China’s behind-the-door action against India while seeking NSG waiver for the 123 Agreement, the impediments it put against India over an ADB loan for development in Arunachal Pradesh and the hurdles it put up in the UN declaring Masood Azhar a global terrorist.

This indicated that Beijing saw New Delhi as a competitor for the high table and would use every opportunity to put India down. Newly appointed Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao spoke at length on China and National Security Advisor M K Narayanan summarized at the end of the meeting.

The essence of the discussion indicated that China would concentrate on Arunachal Pradesh — or South Tibet as it calls it — after it sorted out the Taiwan issue. The meeting noted that progress on upgradation of infrastructure on the Indian side was slow with environment hurdles in building roads in Arunachal Pradesh.

The chiefs of the Armed Forces briefed the meeting on India’s defence preparedness and indicated the need to overcome delays in weapons acquisition. The Army chief made it clear that artillery modernisation was long delayed since the 155 mm Bofors howitzers had been bought way back in 1986. The Air Force talked about the need to increase and modernise the two-decade-old air defence radar network. The Navy spoke on delay in acquisition of the aircraft carrier Gorshkov.

But the Home Ministry made it clear that there was no need to paint China as a threat and demonise it in the public eye. The need was to grow economically so that the country could stand up to any challenge in the near future.

{So Home Ministry is talking about economics and external affairs?}

While decisions on issues discussed at the NSC will be taken in a meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Security, the apex body was told that out of the $40-billion bilateral trade, China was exporting nearly $32 billion of finished goods to India while the latter was only exporting raw material. The finished goods, basic amenities included, could hit cottage and small scale industries, resulting in large scale unemployment.

I worry if they will get the time to go about liseurely. So there is a huge import imbalance and not doing anything about it. And gratitous remarks about need to grow economically for future. So when do they think PRC will solve its Taiwan problem?

At 7-8 % growth the current $1T doubles in 9-10 years ie 2018-2019..

Suraj what is the old GS(BRIC Report) projection for India in that time period?

[Paul]

According to NPR, USS Abuquerque, a USN sub will be based out of Southern california soon. This is in line with US policy of basing at least 60% of it's subs in the pacific. the knives are being sharpened on all sides.

[Arjun]

A very different take on 'Af-Pak' - its primarily aimed at PRC. Fascinating analysis by Joshua Meah:

Encircle the Dragon

[svinayak]

A very different take on 'Af-Pak' - its primarily aimed at PRC. Fascinating analysis by Joshua Meah:

Encircle the Dragon

This is true


IndiaPakistan strategy from 1980-2001 was to keep Indian tied down and appease China and Pakistan by US

Af-Pak strategy from 2007- is to put pressure on Pakistan and seperate Pakistan from China. This is are sophisticated stategies to keep the balance of power.

[Suraj]

The old Goldman Sachs BRIC estimates are out of date now. I'd estimate a GDP figure of somewhere in the vicinity of $3.5 trillion around 2018.

All standard disclaimers regarding statements about the future apply.

[ramana]

Thanks Suraj. Yes what I wanted was your estimate and not the old one.

Can you share your basis of estimates?

[Sanjay M]

RAND now claims ROCAF likely to lose air war with PLAAF (PDF link)

wasn't sure whether to put this under psy-ops, so I posted it here

[Sanjay M]

Given the toughness of China's leadership, I wonder if they would be inclined to use a nuclear first-strike to knock out Taiwanese bases, before risking sending their conventional forces into a difficult battle.

Since India has signed a logistics supply agreement with the US, would it be obliged to help out the US in the event of a conflict with China over Taiwan? That would put India on the hook for a lot of Chinese wrath, while US commitments to India seem rather dubious.

[ramana]

A French take on Chimerica...
X-posted..

Illusory Chimerica

While waiting for the illusory “Chinamerica,” the narrowing Chinese-American dialogue has something to reassure itself with, because the Chinese and the Americans are linked by a truly Faustian pact: some 800 billion dollars of American treasury bonds are held by China.

Most likely the contradictions between the two states will lead to a "chimera" rather than Chimerica!

Google images for it.

[Arihant]

RAND now claims ROCAF likely to lose air war with PLAAF (PDF link)

wasn't sure whether to put this under psy-ops, so I posted it here

This is psy-ops indeed, but it goes much further. The Chinese have managed to build a sense of inevitability in the public mind about their eventual global dominance. On a recent trip to Taiwan, I found many who were earlier quite vocal for the need for freedom and democracy now reconciled to the need to accept Chinese-style dictatorship as the necessary price to pay for economic progress (or even survival). I put to them that the world was witnessing a great experiment assessing the sustainability (and poverty-alleviation capacities) of two alternative forms of governance: a liberal democracy (India) on the one hand, and a brutal, immoral dictatorship (China) on the other. The fact that India could be viewed as a competitor to China did not even begin to enter the world-view of the average Taiwanese.

India needs to be pro-active in projecting itself in popular discourse in East Asia. There is no doubt that our soft power is growing. In Taiwan, there is growing positive sentiment about India. Bollywood is a key driver. "Tare Zameen Par" was being shown in the remote eastern Taiwanese town of Ilan. Yoga is hugely popular. There is a recognition that India is perhaps no longer the cesspool that it was previously veiwed as. But India as global power that might supplant China is a proposition that is still too alien.

We need to capitalize on our soft power, and insert ourselve more pro-actively into public discourse in these places.

[Hari Seldon]

I put to them that the world was witnessing a great experiment assessing the sustainability (and poverty-alleviation capacities) of two alternative forms of governance: a liberal democracy (India) on the one hand, and a brutal, immoral dictatorship (China) on the other. The fact that India could be viewed as a competitor to China did not even begin to enter the world-view of the average Taiwanese.

And with good reason I may add.

The PRC juggernaut is indeed unstoppable at this point. Much as I would love to be proved wrong, am realistic enough to see the writing on the wall.

What the old fables and fairy-tales carefully omit to mention is that 'slow and steady' is no match for 'fast and steady'. The chini hare will leave the desi tortoise so far behind, it will become difficult to recognise they were ever even in competition of any sort. So yes, I can forgive the Taiwanese their sobering realizations.

Just my 2 depressing cents.

[Sanjay M]

All it might take is a mere seasonal typhoon to sink Taiwan's govt, and send cross-strait relations into a tailspin:

http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/0 ... index.html

[ramana]

We should read Adm Mehta's speech in conjunction with Shyam Saran's speech at the begining of this thread....

.....



K.Subrahmanyam's comments on that speech, recd on email

FROM DAINIK JAGRAN – August 16, 2009 (English version )

Coping with China

By K.Subrahmanyam

Admiral Sureesh Mehta, Chief of Naval Staff and Chairman of the
Chiefs
of Staff Committee who is due to retire at the end of this month
delivered an address on national security under the aegis of the
National Maritime Foundation on the 10th of August. It was a fairly
comprehensive overview of our national security perspective. Though
delivered by the senior most Service Officer, the lecture was
remarkable as it went beyond the military realm and focused on a
broad strategic and political vision in the currently evolving
international situation.

In a sense this address by Admiral Mehta signified the arrival of
senior service officers at the top rung of national grand strategy
formulation. His eminently pragmatic, strategic vision has been
misinterpreted in certain sections of the media as a cry of despair
that India will not be able to catch up with China militarily. He has

made it clear that India has no intention to do so. At the same time
he has formulated the most viable strategy to cope with this
situation. Whether India - with a population likely to exceed China’s

in the next two decades ; the advantage of a much younger age profile

of that population; its post September 2008 integration with the
rest of the world ; and being a democracy along with the all other
major powers as also English-speaking - will ultimately catch up
with China it is too early to predict. China today has the advantage
of a decade and half of head start in economic reforms and
globalization and very close industrial cooperation with US and other

multinational firms. Admiral Mehta has detailed the lead China has
gained on this account over India. That is an inexorable reality
which
Indian strategists have to accept and factor in coping with China.
The
word Admiral Mehta has chosen to use is ‘coping with China’, not
confronting or competing with it.

While China by switching sides in the Cold War and
repudiating the Maoist legacy broke out of its isolation in the
seventies, India could do so only in 2008 with the waiver of NSG
guidelines. While China was a tacit but active strategic partner of
the US and NATO during the Cold War and an established permanent
member of the Security Council and an accepted nuclear power of the
Nonproliferation Treaty, India’s recognition as one of the rising
powers and a balancer in the international system began less than a
decade ago.

India presently has strategic partnerships with all great powers
including China. Today India’s largest trading partner is China. Yet
as Admiral Mehta pointed out, in China’s case India has a trust
deficit because of the long standing territorial dispute and among
other issues, the China-Pakistan connection. Unlike in India’s case
where its emergence as a power does not cause concern in the world,
that is not the case with China. Its propensity for intervention in
space ,both on earth and in outer space and cyber warfare have been
cited as causing concern to other nations.

Addressing those who entertain expectations that 1962 can
be repeated, Admiral Mehta highlighted that the economic penalties
resulting from a potential Sino-Indian military conflict would have
grave consequences for both sides. Unlike in 1962, China has today
multiple vulnerabilities and has to consider seriously the effect of
a war on its energy supply lines. In such circumstances mutual
cooperation is to the benefit of both countries. Therefore Admiral
Mehta’s advocacy is for India reducing its military gap with China
and
countering the growing Chinese footprint in the Indian Ocean region
He does not favor the traditional bean-counting or division for
division approach. in closing the gap. Instead , he wants to rely on
harnessing modern technology for developing high situational
awareness
and creating a reliable standoff deterrent. The recent launch of the
nuclear submarine, Arihant is a step in that direction. Admiral Mehta

further adds, that in order to minimize the chances of conflict,
India should proactively engage China diplomatically, economically,
culturally and in people to people contacts. At the same time India
should nurture its relations with US, Russia, Japan and other East
Asian countries to leverage towards this end . In his view our
growing relations with South East and East Asian countries would increase
opportunities for cooperative engagement with China as well.

What Admiral Mehta does not say in his speech is as important as what
he has said. China is looking forward to emerging as the foremost
power of the world. Its GDP is expected to overtake the US in the
next two decades. The recent economic recession has narrowed the gap
between the two and made China the second largest economy of the
world. While US and China have some mutuality of interest in ensuring

the stability of the dollar, as otherwise China will lose heavily on
its large dollar holdings, in the period beyond the recovery the US
will be keen to sustain its preeminence as the foremost military,
economic and technological power of the world. There will be radical
changes in the US-China economic relationship so far anchored on
China
selling enormous quantities of consumer goods to US and running huge
balance of payments surpluses. Those were saved and lent back to the
US to enable American consumers to spend more.

This world order is unsustainable and is bound to change. As US
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said, India is seen as one of the
key partners for the US to reshape the 21st century. The US has
agreed to sell high technology defense equipment to India while it is
not likely to sell them to China , its main rival in the coming
decades. Therefore Admiral Mehta’s reference to the innovative use of

technology by India to close the military gap with China.

Besides focusing on this core subject , the lecture also dealt with
nonstate actors, shaping our immediate neighborhood, securing our
maritime borders, internal security, intelligence ,cyber warfare,
higher defence integration and jointness among the three services,
nuclear issues , reducing dependence on other countries for
equipment,
trends in defence expenditure and adequacy of our defense outlays,
delays in our procurement procedures, governance and culture of
strategic thinking. His ideas are thought-provoking and deserve to be
objectively debated by the Indian strategic community.

In a sense this address breaks new ground. A service chief has put on
record his views on a whole host of national security issues just a
few weeks before demitting office. Many of these issues have been
under consideration for ages without solutions. In today’ security
environment these need to be debated openly in the country - to
generate public pressure for early decision-making in the Government.

Regrettably, in our Parliament national security issues do not
receive the attention they merit and therefore greater the need for informed
public debate.

..................................

[ramana]

I wrote this in 2000 for BRM....

Challenge of China

In order to understand the challenge that China represents, one needs to understand the challenge that the Soviet Union, another totalitarian state, once posed. The superpower label used to describe the Soviet Union was misleading, in that Soviet Union was chiefly an ideologically driven military and political power. Despite its prodigious output during World War II and after, the Soviet Union was by no means an economic power. Its inability to successfully transition from a war economy to a peacetime consumer economy ultimately proved to be its undoing. The West, led by United States, formulated the ‘Containment’ policy in order to contain the spread of Soviet power with its system of alliances. However one has to realize that the Soviet Union had already reached its limits of its power soon after end of WWII. Its expansion in Eastern Europe was due to the quest for buffer territory from Germany and later Western Europe. Its forays out of its ‘near abroad’ were limited and reciprocal. The Afghan war stretched its resources and sapped its morale. The economic collapse that followed the intervention led to its implosion and collapse as the ‘other superpower’.

China in contrast is both a rising economic and political power. Its military though modernizing is limited to strategic weapons and does not have any real capability to influence any major event in the near term. Unlike Soviet Union, which was implementing a Western ideology, China's political thought is rooted in nationalism. It has been beating back invaders for over 3000 years. Few nations can boast of its continuity in history and a track record of survival. It has absorbed many invasions and has survived each of them. Its interlude with Communism should be seen in that light as another invasion – an invasion of ideas.

Taking a long view of China’s history, the nearby regions have suffered whenever China had a weak center. From the time of the Mongol invasions to the colonial era, there has been negative fallout in the region whenever China had weak regimes. However strong centers have also resulted in a spillover of hegemonistic tendencies prompting a former Thai minister to say, "The best thing China can do is stay together and stay at home!" What is desirable is a benign son of heaven in Beijing for peace and prosperity in Asia and now in a globalized world. However till that happens, one has to be on guard.

Its threat is mainly an indirect one through proliferation to Pakistan and support of insurgencies in the North East. It could also harass India by prolonging the border settlement and oppose entry into world bodies. The response has to be increased economic growth and regional integration to reduce propensity for conflict accompanied by a watchful eye on defense related systems. As China eventually resolves for itself the role that it wants to play in the world, India has to be on its guard. China’s attempts to constrain India are doomed to fail for India has historically never taken a back seat to China. The realization should be that it is not that China directly threatens India but rather it reduces and diminishes India’s power.

I think both SSaran and Adm Mehta are saying this in a different way.

[ramana]

Moved the extraneous posts to the India-China N&D thread.

[brihaspati]

Here is the American viewpoint:
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2 ... ?page=full

China is on course to overtake Japan as the world's second-largest economy this year. As the regional economic hub, China is now driving Asia's economic integration. Beijing's diplomatic influence is expanding as well, supposedly thanks to its newfound soft power. Even China's once antiquated military has acquired a full plethora of new weapons systems and significantly improved its ability to project force.

Although it is true that China will become Asia's strongest country by any measure, its rise has inherent limits. China is unlikely to dominate Asia in the sense that it replaces the United States as the region's peacekeeper and decisively influences other countries' foreign policies. Its economic growth is also by no means guaranteed. Restive secession-minded minorities (Tibetans and Uighurs) inhabit strategically important areas that constitute almost 30 percent of Chinese territory. Taiwan, which is unlikely to return to China's fold anytime soon, ties down substantial Chinese military resources. The ruling Chinese Communist Party, which views perpetuating its one-party state as more important than overseas expansionism, is not likely to be seduced by delusions of imperial grandeur.

China has formidable neighbors in Russia, India, and Japan that will fiercely resist any Chinese attempts to become the regional hegemon. Even Southeast Asia, where China appears to have reaped the most geopolitical gains in recent years, has been reluctant to fall into China's orbit completely. Nor would the United States simply capitulate in the face of a Chinese juggernaut.

For complex reasons, China's rise has inspired fear and unease, not enthusiasm, among Asians. Only 10 percent of Japanese, 21 percent of South Koreans, and 27 percent of Indonesians surveyed by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs said they would be comfortable with China being the future leader of Asia.

So much for China's charm offensive.

[ramana]

x-posted...

Old China hand Arthur Kroeber on the innate, almost spiritual and inevitable greatness of the China model, in an ft article:

China’s ability to maintain economic growth of around 8 per cent despite the global shock took many by surprise. But this ability has nothing to do with systemic advantages, a distinct “China model” of growth, or skill in macroeconomic management.

Still less has it anything to do with the reasons cited by the People’s Daily editorial [Note: this is in reference to an especially silly editorial you can find here]. China’s present economic vitality results from a Great Wall all right – a Great Wall of borrowed cash. There is nothing remarkable or spiritual about an economy growing at 8 per cent when credit is allowed to expand by 34 per cent.

The fact becomes even less remarkable when we recognise that nominal GDP (the appropriate comparator for nominal credit growth) grew just 3.8 per cent in the first half. {Huh? How can nominal gdp growth be 3.8% and end-year gdp growth be 8% in real terms unless you have negative inflation of 4.2%, eh?}

In other words, 10 dollars of new loans were required to generate just one dollar of economic growth.

In fact China’s first-half growth shows one thing and one thing only: the existence of a powerful state with the ability to commandeer its citizens’ wealth and plough it into more buildings, bridges and roads, with no regard for the return those investments will bring.
{Returns lie in the eyes of the beholder, nobel saar. In PRC's case, the shock and awe of urban landscaping itself is reward enough, I reckon. Its too much for the mere producers of said capital to have a say in its utilization, after all. No? How do you say "Arbeit macht frei" in mandarin again? }

link

Old china hand Prof. Michael Pettis too seems to have taken a dim view to prospects of the PRC khanomy going fwd.
link

[ShauryaT]

Academic info:

India China Institute

[asprinzl]

Chinese are holding nearly one trillion in US treasury. Indians are holding more than a hundred billion. Chinese babus steal, cheat and loot their country. They put these money in banks in australia, NZ, Dubai, Cayman, London, Zurich and New York.

Chinese elites put their monies in similar places.

Indian babus steal, cheat and loot their country. They put these money in banks in Australia, NZ, Dubai, Cayman, London, Zurich and New York. Indian elites put their profits in similar places.

The banks in Australia, NZ, Dubai, Cayman, london and Zurich hedge their holdings by buying securities in American financial institutions or hold US treasuries.

If seen from the top, all monies flow into the US weather it is official Chinese holdings or unofficial Indian holdings. So when one says if the USD goes under only China will suffer.....one of wrong off the mark big time. Everyone has put their nest eggs in the same god dammned basket...in the US. That is the reality.
Avram

[ramana]

While its true that PRC has $2T of US currency apparently its not participating in the Treasury auctions as much as US households. So need an economist to interpret the PRC clout or millstone.

And no need to disparage Indian babus. They have stood the test of time despite a few bad eggs.

[Philip]

I'm posting this here as Dr.K was a controversial figure during the '71 war,who engineered Nixon's China gambit,now rooting for India! DOrchestrating a successful Indo-Sino-US triangle is one which Dr.K would be in his element today if he was at the helm of US foreign policy.Kissinger,villain or hero?

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world ... 73365.html

The case for Henry Kissinger

The man who ran US foreign policy from 1969 to 1977 is loathed by liberals as a ruthless practitioner of global Realpolitik. Yet Alistair Horne, his biographer, believes that there is also a great deal about him to admire
Tuesday, 18 August 2009

Power arranger: Kissinger makes a point with Nixon

There is a widespread view among the liberal intelligentsia to the effect that Henry Kissinger, US National Security Advisor from 1969 to 1975 and Secretary of State from 1973 to 1977, was a bad man. That may even be an understatement. In this fashionable consensus, he is not just a bad man: he is a war criminal.


His alleged crimes are numerous: the bombing of North Vietnam and Cambodia; covert support for the coup against Chile's President Allende in 1973; support for assorted other obnoxious right-wing regimes; and alleged involvement (no charges for which have ever stuck) in the campaign of murder and kidnapping known as Operation Condor. His most vociferous critics, such as the journalist Christopher Hitchens, have explicitly called for him to be tried, while in 2001 a French judge tried to get him to give evidence in relation to the disappearance of civilians in Chile.

Although he remains highly respected in the corridors of global power, and in the boardrooms of multinational corporations, in the salons of the chattering classes he is little better than a pariah. Yet is this reputation actually deserved?

Related articles
More Americas News
After some four years researching an authorised biography of Henry Kissinger, I came to the conclusion that fashionable opinion may be doing him an injustice.

What was obvious from the start was that no Americans – and few Europeans – could be neutral about him. They either loved him or hated him. For everyone who would happily have seen him arraigned on war crimes charges there were others who applauded his contributions to the cause of world peace.

I think I have come out with the latter group. This is not to say that I consider his record irreproachable. It is just that, on balance, I cannot avoid the conclusion that he is a great man.

A distinguished British biographer, Philip Ziegler, closes his official biography Mountbatten with the admission that, when enraged with his (posthumous) subject, he would have to set in front of himself a notice reminding himself: "Remember, in spite of everything, he was a great man." With Kissinger, I never felt a need for this reminder. In the first place, while I may have infuriated him during our many interviews, he never enraged me. But also the tribute, in his case, should surely have read not "in spite of" but "because of" everything. The very circumstances that have made him notorious – Watergate, Nixon, the Yom Kippur War, Vietnam – were those that define his greatness.

When, in 2005, I was working on the Kissinger papers at the Library of Congress, the Librarian, Dr James Billington, a distinguished scholar seldom given to hyperbole, mused to me how new leaders tended to be either "show horses" or "work horses". "But," he added, "Henry was both, and he deserved full credit." Speaking particularly of détente – and of the fact that Kissinger was working under the shadow of Watergate and a mortally-impaired president – Billington continued: "The period which Henry had to deal with was an extraordinarily difficult one – because of the cards that were dealt him."

This, to me, was the essence of his greatness. Kissinger was surely one of the very few statesmen to try to do something positive to break the log jam of the Cold War; to try to end the war in Vietnam; to bring a halt to the cycle of war in the Middle East. But his was a role of not just reacting – or of rolling with the punches. If circumstances were indeed "extraordinarily difficult", with Watergate frustrating him from attainment of his ultimate objectives, such as "peace with honour" in Vietnam, then it could be said that, at least, because of the straitjacket it imposed on his president, Kissinger was granted opportunities and powers never given to other mere secretaries of state before or after.

A supreme pragmatist, Kissinger was never interested in the art of the impossible – and nor, as a biographer, am I. That is why, having initially been invited to write his entire official biography, I eventually decided to devote myself to writing just one year in his life: 1973. This was, after all, the big year. It was the year that (in October) the world was shaken by the Yom Kippur War in the Middle East. It was the year Kissinger signed a pact to end the Vietnam War and of détente with the Soviet Union. But overshadowing all else, it was the year of Watergate. And in the midst of it, Kissinger won the Nobel Peace Prize, and was appointed Secretary of State.

As for my own credentials for the task, I had written extensively on the Yom Kippur War, had already published a book on the Allende period (Small Earthquake in Chile, in 1972), and thought I knew America. I also had extensive access to Kissinger's archives – said to weigh 33 tonnes – and to Kissinger himself. Four years on, I feel that I am only beginning to approach the level of understanding that his complex career deserves.

To restrict ourselves to the example of the year I have chosen, consider what Kissinger achieved in 1973. The previous year had ended, for Kissinger, on a note of high expectation in the development of US foreign affairs, but personal misgivings about his own role in it. Relations with Nixon (just re-elected by a landslide) were at a low, and he was seriously seriously considering taking up a fellowship in All Souls, Oxford, to write his memoirs. In his busy diary, the New Year of 1973 began with a trip to Paris (one of nearly a score of secret visits) to finalise with the tricky North Vietnamese a treaty ending the Vietnam War. There followed two trips to Beijing to consolidate the new opening to Mao's China, engineered by Nixon and Kissinger over the two preceding years. This was probably the most historic breakthrough in all the Cold War.

Next on the agenda came Kissinger's initiative to open talks with America's European partners, with a view to revitalising Nato as a bastion against any Soviet threat. Ill-advisedly, he dubbed it "The Year of Europe"; to which France's President Pompidou riposted with acidity that, for the French "every year was the Year of Europe". Hand in hand with all this, Kissinger pursued his principal objective of furthering talks on détente, and mutual limitations on ballistic missiles with the Soviets. This was to culminate in Brezhnev's dramatic state visit to Washington in June.

Every gambit of US foreign policy in 1973 was, however, overshadowed by the darkening clouds of the Watergate scandal. It would lead to the resignation of a destroyed Nixon the following August. Kissinger first learnt of the full import of the scandal in April of 1973. As the waters closed in ever nearer to an increasingly-paralysed Nixon, Kissinger, as head of the key National Security Council remained, fortunately – and wisely – the only one of the inner White House team to survive untarnished. Had he been contaminated, it would have constituted a disaster for US foreign policy – and, in my view, for the world. As he remarked to me more than once: "I was the glue that held it all together in 1973 – and I'm not being boastful ... "

He wasn't. But all his efforts were seriously circumscribed by Watergate and the far-reaching distrust which it instilled – most consequentially, in Congress.

In September, Nixon – his egoism and distrust having caused him to hesitate throughout the year – finally appointed Kissinger his Secretary of State, replacing the ineffective (and often humiliated) William Rogers. Immediately, two major international crises landed on Kissinger. The first was the violent overthrow of the elected Allende regime in Chile; the second, and far more dangerous, the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War, or in Arab terminology, the October War.

The world's intelligence agencies were totally surprised by the attack on Israel by Sadat's Egypt and Asad's Syria; as indeed was Kissinger himself, and Israel, and even Egypt's Soviet backers. Momentarily, there was an ominous threat of possible Soviet military intervention. It was accompanied by Kissinger (with Nixon incapacitated by alcohol) briefly raising the US nuclear alert to "Defcon 3". This was just one degree lower than that adopted by the US during the Cuban Missiles Crisis of 1972.

Brezhnev backed off. A ceasefire in the Middle East, hard-won by Kissinger, was followed by an equally hard-won semblance of peace between the warring nations. The peace was far from perfect (and was accompanied by an Arab-instigated fuel crisis); but any fair evaluation of Kissinger has to recognise that there were alternative outcomes that could have been infinitely worse.

There are some whose ideological position – specifically in relation the role of military force in international politics – makes it hard for them ever to think of Kissinger as anything but a monster of Realpolitik. As his biographer, I take a more neutral view. To me, Kissinger's career has been a mixture of successes and failures. Among the latter, I would include his handling of the oil crisis in its earliest stages. With an ear originally ill-attuned to the Arab world, or to the scale of their grievances vis-à-vis Israel, he did not take seriously enough Saudi warnings. The "Year of Europe" ended as an almost unqualified disaster, shipwrecked on the timeless rocks of European self-interest and American arrogance. On the other hand, the time and personalities were out of joint: Britain's prickly Prime Minister, Ted Heath, neither understood nor liked America and was fundamentally interested only in Europe; Germany's Brandt was playing his own game with Moscow; in France, Pompidou was dying, to be replaced at the helm of French foreign affairs by the anti-American Michel Jobert.

Kissinger's encouragement of rivalry between the two conduits of US foreign policy – his National Security Council and Rogers's State Department – does not rank among his finest hours either. On the other hand, charges about his involvement in the coup against Chile's Allende had little substance. If there is a "smoking gun" – showing that Kissinger facilitated the coup rather than merely welcoming it – Kissinger's critics have yet to produce it.

Then there is Vietnam. The fall of Saigon in April 1975 brought the collapse of US hopes in Indo-China, and all that Kissinger had striven for so arduously throughout those prolonged negotiations with Hanoi's steely Le Duc Tho. To this day, he regards his failure in Vietnam as the outstanding disappointment of his life – a source of never-ending regret. When the last US helicopters took off from the Embassy roof in Saigon, "only a feeling of emptiness remained". It is an emptiness that, he says, has remained with him ever since.

Could he have done better? There, once again, the shadow of Watergate hung heavy. By 1973 a hostile Congress was pledged to the liquidation of all US responsibilities in Vietnam, torpedoing Nixon's calls for continuing a modicum of military support to the threatened South. Could Kissinger – who was also thwarted in his hopes of some degree of neutrality, if not help, from Peking and Moscow – possibly have fought against the overwhelming tide of the Watergate mood, and what it had done to the American will at home? These are, of course, arguments about the outcome of the war rather than about whether or not the US should have been fighting it in the first place, or about whether any outcome could have justified the loss of life. But Kissinger did not start the Vietnam war.

On the credit side, Nixon's inspired China gambit undoubtedly made the world a safer place (although it would have had more impact without Watergate). Détente with the Soviet Union, a brave and far-sighted enterprise, was always the major plank in Kissinger's platform. Though weakened partly by the unanticipated war in the Middle East, and partly by the effects of the Watergate crisis on Nixon's authority, it remains a triumph for Kissinger's personal role. His wooing of Dobrynin, the Soviet Ambassador in Washington, makes fascinating reading. How many other foreign leaders could tell a troublesome Soviet apparatchik to "hold his water or I will send him to Siberia. I know Brezhnev better than he does. Ask him if he has ever been kissed on the mouth by Brezhnev, as I have ... "?

Though perhaps not a memory that everyone would relish, this nevertheless speaks of a unique world of experience in the career of one of America's most remarkable statesmen. And it reminds us to wonder: how much more dangerous might the world have become without Kissinger's initiatives in détente?

Kissinger also deserves high marks simply for managing to keep the holed US ship-of-state afloat and on course, throughout the terrible months of Watergate. (Just imagine if he had failed in this.)

But what I would award him the most marks for was his ending of the Yom Kippur War, and the tireless "shuttle" diplomacy which led to the construction of a peace still essentially in force to this day. The people of Egypt have – as I reminded a reluctant audience in Cairo last year – been free from war for more than 35 years. That is no mean achievement.

Yet Kissinger, as America's first Jewish Secretary of State, entered Yom Kippur with four monumental handicaps.

1. The Arabs instinctively distrusted him.

2. The atavistically anti-Semitic Russians also distrusted him.

3. Golda Meir, Israel's prime minister, consis- tently thought he should do more for Israel.

4. He was constantly badgered by "Israel First" lobbies in Washington.

His response to the latter was robust. Urged by one powerful Senator, "Scoop" Jackson, to send extra jet fighters to Israel, Kissinger retorted brusquely: "Tell him to go screw himself!" (Few "goy" leaders in DC today could get away with such a remark.) On another occasion, Kissinger warned the Israeli ambassador that if he received one more badgering call he would be "going out of the [arms] supply business".

Bearing in mind these impediments, Kissinger's tireless "shuttle diplomacy", back and forth to Moscow, Jerusalem, Cairo and Damascus (in one period of 11 days he made as many flights), seems to me to be a monumental achievement for which the world has shown insufficient gratitude. I have never played poker with him, but I assume that Kissinger would have been a superb player, playing it long and cool. He still has a mind like a Chinese chess player, capable of functioning on six levels at once. With an endless capacity for patience, he must surely rate as one of history's great negotiators.

Following the end of the Yom Kippur War, Kissinger managed simultaneously to conclude a peace settlement, to exclude the Soviets from monkeying in the Middle East (which they had been doing since the Suez debacle in 1956), and yet to maintain the fabric of détente. No mean achievement. For me it remains the greatest pity, and an inequity of fate, that Henry Kissinger did not receive the Nobel Peace Prize for that, rather than for the Vietnam peace that failed.

Although out of office these 33 years, Kissinger, now 86, still wields considerable influence in Washington's corridors of power, and in Moscow and Beijing – where he is well-received and listened to. One can reasonably assume that – though Kissinger backed John McCain – President Obama also makes use of his "back-channel" skills.

Does he deserve such respect? Or is he an instigator of atrocities who deserves to be unmasked? I can only repeat that, in my view, Kissinger's overriding legacy is his largely successful quest for a world balance of peace between the rival East-West blocs, and his persistent endeavour to defuse the horrendous danger of nuclear war by accident. If we are tempted to undervalue this legacy, we need only consider the largely accidental holocaust that overwhelmed the world in 1914.

Kissinger's seminal publication, written for his PhD from Harvard in 1957, was about two historic negotiators, Metternich and Castlereagh. Called A World Restored, it was a masterly study of how, after the fall of Napoleon, these two inspired statesmen (also vilified by some) engineered a balance of power which resulted in 100 years of European peace. One can be sure that President Nixon read it most closely, and it was to serve through Kissinger's time in the White House as a blueprint for the kind of world peace which he felt desirable, and attainable.

We should not disparage his achievement too lightly. In another era deeply challenging to America, a fellow Briton wrote memorably: "These are the times that try men's souls. The summer soldier and the sunshine patriot will, in this crisis, shrink from the service of their country; but he that stands by it now, deserves the love and thanks of man and woman." As in 1776, a modern Thomas Paine might well have deemed the year 1973 – or, for that matter, 2009 – to be one that was sent to "try men's souls".

But 1973 was also a year in which Henry Kissinger, for all his faults, proved himself to be neither "summer soldier" nor "sunshine patriot".

Alistair Horne's book, Kissinger's Year: 1973, is published later this month (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, £20). To order a copy for the special price of £18 (free P&P) call Independent Books Direct on 08430 600030 or visit Independentbooksdirect.co.uk

The case against

'One associates him with an aggressive foreign policy which is responsible for a lot of the dislike of America which still exists today' - Joan Smith (journalist and author):

For my generation he was one of the great demon figures. I think of him as one of the great Cold War ideologues, in a bad way: one associates him with an aggressive foreign policy which is responsible for a lot of the dislike of America which still exists today. It's the bad side of America as an empire: the idea that America comes first and that's the whole aim of its foreign policy – so that when you hear American politicians talk about the American people you wonder whether they are worried at all about the rest of the world.

The case against

'Kissinger and Nixon conducted the illegal, secret bombing in which 700,000 Cambodians died' - John Pilger (journalist and broadcaster):

Between 1969 and 1973, Kissinger and Richard Nixon conducted the illegal, secret bombing of Cambodia in which 700,000 Cambodians died beneath the equivalent tonnage of five Hiroshimas. Pilots' logs were falsified; Congress was deceived. In 1973, Kissinger backed the fascist General Pinochet's overthrow of Chile's democratic government. In 1975, Kissinger and Gerald Ford gave the "green light" (CIA files) to the Indonesian dictator Suharto to invade East Timor, secretly and illegally supplying him with US weapons. More than 200,000 people died.

The case against

'Realpolitik has animated the West’s enemies – this is the product of Kissinger’s approach' - Timothy Lynch (senior lecturer in US foreign policy, University of London):

His style of diplomacy has weakened the influence of the US. It was a realist-based approach to the world; but it was a superficial efficacy – the appearance that the US was getting on better with the Soviet Union and China, while they extended their influence into Africa and Latin America. My argument would be that US interests weren't advanced by cosying up to China and the Soviet Union. Realpolitik has animated the West's enemies – and these are all products of the Kissingerian approach.

The case against

'There is no reason why a warrant for the trial of Henry Kissinger should not be issued' - Christopher Hitchens, author

There is no reason why a warrant for the trial of Kissinger may not be issued ... Crimes that can and should be placed on a bill of indictment include: the deliberate mass killing of civilian populations in Indochina; collusion in mass murder in Bangladesh; suborning and planning of murder, of a senior constitutional officer in a democratic nation, Chile, with which the US was not at war; involvement in a plan to murder the head of state in the democratic nation of Cyprus; the incitement and enabling of genocide in East Timor ...

From 'The Trial of Henry Kissinger' (Verso, £8)

The case against

'He thought the issues in Chile ‘too important for Chilean voters to decide for themselves’. That sums up his view on democracy and other people' - Trevor McCrisken, chair of British American Security Information Council:

Kissinger has been a surprising ally in the cause of banning nuclear weapons; he was one of the first American figures to say that their spread was destabilising the world. But his view on democracy, and on other people in general, is summed up by that quote of his on the overthrow of the Chilean government: "The issues are much too important for the Chilean voters to be left to decide for themselves." It's not surprising that he's not regarded positively by many people on the left.

[ramana]

US must respect Pakistan’s strategic interests: Burns

* US, India believe China cannot be contained, should be engaged
http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?pa ... 009_pg7_36
By Iftikhar Gilani

NEW DELHI: One of former US president George W Bush’s top aides on Tuesday urged the US to respect Pakistan’s strategic interests.

Addressing an interactive meeting in India, former US undersecretary of state and architect of the Indo-US nuclear deal, Nicholas Burns, said his country needed to unite with Pakistan to combat extremist groups. Blaming past Pakistani governments for the worsening situation in the region, he said: “US-Pakistan relations are vital to the administration. We have to be friends with Pakistan so we can combat extremist groups. Past governments have been responsible for the worsening of the situation there and now we have to convince Pakistan to do more.”

Burns, who is in India to establish an Indian politics programme at the Harvard Kennedy School where he teaches, said the internal security situation of Pakistan should be a cause for concern for everyone. “There is nothing more important to worry about, than the internal security of Pakistan - it is highly unstable,” he added. However, he said the US and Pakistan needed to respect each other’s strategic interests and take into account regional and global perspectives. He said the US-India civil nuclear cooperation agreement had been a watershed, historically and symbolically, for the two nations. He said it marked the US’ recognition of India’s rise as a global power and “we hope to see the full implementation of the agreement, which could lead to cooperation in other areas”.

Engage, not contain: Burns revealed that America’s focus has shifted to South Asia and the Middle East because of the myriad challenges in these regions. Alluding to China as a rising global power, he said there was consensus in the US and India that it was not possible to contain China, but it was possible to engage with it. He said China should demonstrate greater responsibility and be willing to compromise for the global good.

On the US and India’s relations with Pakistan, Burns said both countries were great nations. However, he added, the US felt it was imperative to have “independent” relations with Islamabad and New Delhi even as it sought to improve bilateral relations between them.

[ramana]

Forget Uncle and Panda relationship. If China partners its huge mfg facilities with Japanese technolgy thats a powerhouse that cant be beaten.

For this to happen we need to see the rise of ordinary Chinese outside the power circles and the Japanese to give up some of their superiority complex.

India should facilitate this.

[Sanku]

But some one will still need to consume. Can the Chinese learn how to consume properly (keeping the balance between have and have nots, between nature and man etc etc..)?

[ramana]

Why not? Its not like the West is following the prinicple of balance.

[Sanku]

Why not? Its not like the West is following the prinicple of balance.

Thats true, but the west is failing to be a powerhouse or a terribly expensive powerhouse for the world, and personally I think China is doing that even today to an great extent actually.

To me China has to get out of the "lets be another west" complex it is in now to really benefit its people, but then again its only my PoV.

[muraliravi]

This might the answer if Uncle Sam tries to embrace Chinese too much.

http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpap ... r3363.html

An India-Russia-Iran nexus

[svinayak]

The book Exporting The Death clearly reveals that mercenaries are also Islamic groups and other Islamists from the days of the Afghan war. LeT was trained by the US special forces in the late 80s and it shows that they have still control over the group.

LeT and many other groups inside TSP are under some control of the US forces.

[ramana]

The book Exporting The Death clearly reveals that mercenaries are also Islamic groups and other Islamists from the days of the Afghan war. LeT was trained by the US special forces in the late 80s and it shows that they have still control over the group.

LeT and many other groups inside TSP are under some control of the US forces.

So all those bans are a cleaning up on the US part just like "good" Taliban?

RajeshA, Can you read the book in original language and give synopsis?

LINK

[RajeshA]

The book Exporting The Death clearly reveals that mercenaries are also Islamic groups and other Islamists from the days of the Afghan war. LeT was trained by the US special forces in the late 80s and it shows that they have still control over the group.

LeT and many other groups inside TSP are under some control of the US forces.

So all those bans are a cleaning up on the US part just like "good" Taliban?

RajeshA, Can you read the book in original language and give synopsis?

LINK

Here is the synopsis from the amazon site.

Ehemalige Bundeswehrsoldaten verdingen sich bei der amerikanischen Söldner-Firma »Blackwater«, Ex-Polizisten der GSG 9 verkaufen ihr Know-how an den libyschen Staat. Deutsche Söldner sind eine heiß begehrte Ware. Der Bundeswehr-Experte und Kriegsreporter Franz Hutsch hat in den Krisengebieten der Welt recherchiert und bringt Licht ins dunkle Geschäft mit der Sicherheit, in dem Deutsche eine immer größere Rolle spielen. Auch die Bundeswehr leistet ihren Beitrag. Nicht nur, dass sie ausscheidenden Soldaten eine »zivile« Ausbildung im Sicherheitsbereich finanziert und so in die Arme der Söldner-Firmen treibt: Die Bundeswehr kooperiert bereits heute mit privaten Militärfirmen, weil sie mit ihrer neuen Rolle als flexible Einsatzarmee überfordert ist.

Ex-soldiers of the Federal Defense Forces making money with the American mercenary-enterprise "Blackwater", ex-police-officers of "Border Security Group 9" (GSG 9) selling their know-how to Libya. German soldiers are hot property. Die Federal Defense Force experts and war-reporter Franz Hutch have done research in the various crisis regions of the world and they uncover the dark business with security, in which Germans are playing an ever bigger role. The Federal Defense Forces make their contribution. It is not only that they finance "civilian" retraining for retiring soldiers in field of security, thereby pushing them into the arms of mercernary-enterprises, but they also are already cooperating with private military-enterprises, because they are overburdened with their new role as an army, which can be flexibly deployed.

This book does sound interesting. Give me some time, and I will look into it. Some detailed comments (in German) on the link page!

[ramana]

Interesting how the Germans are playing their own game just as the post WWII era ex-Nazis turned up wherever their expertise was useful a la Odessa File.

[ramana]

Wasnt sure were to post this. Mods, please move if required.

The Unbalanced Triangle

Extract

What Chinese-Russian Relations Mean for the United States
Bobo Lo, a former Australian diplomat in Moscow and the director of the China and Russia programs at the Center for European Reform, in London, has written the best analysis yet of one of the world's more important bilateral relationships. His close examination of Chinese-Russian relations -- sometimes mischaracterized by both countries as a "strategic partnership" -- lays bare the full force of China's global strategy, the conundrum of Russia's place in today's world, and fundamental shortcomings in U.S. foreign policy.

China's shift in strategic orientation from the Soviet Union to the United States is the most important geopolitical realignment of the last several decades. And Beijing now enjoys not only excellent relations with Washington but also better relations with Moscow than does Washington. Lo calls the Chinese-Russian relationship a "mutually beneficial partnership" and goes so far as to deem Moscow's improved ties with Beijing "the greatest Russian foreign policy achievement of the post-Soviet period."

Precisely such hyperbole drives the alarmism of many pundits, who believe that the United States faces a challenge from a Chinese-Russian alliance built on shared illiberal values. But as Lo himself argues, the twaddle about Russia being an energy superpower was dubious even before the price of oil fell by nearly $100 in 2008. Even more important, Lo points out that the Chinese-Russian relationship is imbalanced and fraught: the two countries harbor significant cultural prejudices about each other and have divergent interests that are likely to diverge even more in the future. More accurately, the Chinese-Russian relationship is, as Lo puts it, an "axis of convenience" -- that is, an inherently limited partnership conditioned on its ability to advance both parties' interests.

But even Lo does not go far enough in his debunking of the Chinese-Russian alliance: he argues that it "is, for all its faults, one of the more convincing examples of positive-sum international relations today." This is doubtful. The relationship may allow the Chinese to extract strategically important natural resources from Russia and extend their regional influence, but it affords the Russians little more than the pretense of a multipolar world in which Moscow enjoys a central role.

[NRao]

Beijing urges US to end coastal watch

By Kathrin Hille in Shanghai

Published: August 28 2009 03:00 | Last updated: August 28 2009 03:00

China has called on the US to phase out its military surveillance missions close to China's coast, in Beijing's clearest indication so far that it will not tolerate US dominance indefinitely in an area it views as its strategic sphere of influence.

The remarks came after two days of negotiations on maritime safety between military officials from both sides following a series of confrontations between US and Chinese ships in waters off the Chinese coast earlier this year.

"The way to resolve China-US maritime incidents is for the US to change its surveillance and survey operations policies against China, decrease and eventually stop such operations," Xinhua, the official news agency, quoted the Ministry of National Defence as saying.

.............................................