India MEA: India rejects talks with Pakistan.NRao wrote:India not concerned over G8 nuclear stance
Pakistan FO: Pakistan rejects India's rejection of talks.
India MEA: India rejects talks with Pakistan.NRao wrote:India not concerned over G8 nuclear stance
So is the Russian Kudankulam reactors "grandfathered" - from reproc PoV?The recent Indo-Russian agreement will facilitate the reprocessing of nuclear fuel by New Delhi for atomic power plants built with Moscow's assistance, top officials of the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited have said.
India will not have any constraint to proceed with a ‘closed fuel cycle’ as Russia has recognised it as an equal partner and a responsible nuclear country, they said.
“The issue of spent fuel was never a problem with the Russians and they clearly said about the use of a closed fuel cycle with the Russian reactors which are already under construction and those reactors (at least four more) which will come up in the next decade," an official said.
The Indo-Russian joint statement said both countries will expand civil nuclear energy cooperation, with emphasis on nuclear power generation aimed at enabling India to realize its ‘goals of promoting nuclear power and achieving energy security in a self sustaining manner’.
The reference to a ‘self sustaining manner’ indicates the closed fuel cycle, the NPCIL officials said.
"Of course, the entire fuel cycle will be under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards," an official said.
Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Anil Kakodkar said, "the signing of the intent on January 25 with the Russian government was a way forward in the whole process of getting energy security for India".
IIRC from many years ago, the Japanese have ~50 tonne Pu.Gerard wrote:Turned into MOX fuel and shipped back to Japan.what happens to the content after reprocessing, in the case of Japan?
Most of the Pu is actually still in storage in the UK and France. The Japanese have 38 tons of reactor grade Pu in Europe and about 12 tons in Japan itself. They've started to fuel LWRs with MOX so the external stockpile will slowly come down as it is converted to MOX fuel.
Russians have no problem with India reprocessing any spent fuel under IAEA safeguards.So is the Russian Kudankulam reactors "grandfathered" - from reproc PoV?
Many sources give a figure of 43 tons in 2005Arun_S wrote:IIRC from many years ago, the Japanese have ~50 tonne Pu.
2 March 2009 - Open Letter to Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, International Atomic Energy Agency
http://www.globalcollab.org/Nautilus/pr ... M47v51.pdfSince the 1970's when Japan, France and others were warned about the proliferation dangers inherent within commercial plutonium, the global stockpile of commercial plutonium has risen to in excess of 250 metric tons. Sufficient for tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. In the case of Japan, its stockpile of plutonium has increased from 6 metric tons in 1993 to over 43 tons today.
If the Rokkasho plant starts operation as planned, Japan’s plutonium stockpile will likely to grow to more than 70t by 2020 from the current 43t in 2005.
. If the Rokkasho reprocessing plant operates at nominal capacity, about 8t of plutonium will be recovered annually. Japanese utilities plan to recycle all plutonium, including the 37.4t in Europe, into existing Light Water Reactors (LWRs), but no single reactor has been loaded with MOX fuel as of February 2006.
Which is what the French are also giving.Gerard wrote: Russians have no problem with India reprocessing any spent fuel under IAEA safeguards.
That doesn't mean they will supply the reprocessing technology. What they have given is reprocessing rights for existing and future reactors.
As Prime Minister Manmohan Singh heads to France, a key element in India's civil nuclear agreement with that country should give the
government comfort when he sits down for talks on nuclear trade with President Nicholas Sarkozy. The agreement permits India to reprocess French-origin nuclear fuel on its own. France will offer to reprocess only if India asks it to.
Russia is also learnt to have agreed to let India reprocess fuel that it may supply.
The understanding with the two nuclear suppliers is one of the reasons why India is not overly concerned about the recent G-8 statement on non-proliferation where the grouping apparently raised the bar on transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies (ENR) to countries that don't have it. At this point, India is only looking to be able to reprocess foreign-origin fuel, which in principle has been granted by France and Russia in their civil nuclear agreements which are yet to be made public. The other reason for its being reassured is that since India already possesses ENR technology, it can argue that this does not apply to it.
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However, it's true the US has been shifting goalposts on the issue. First, it said there should be "criteria-based" approach for ENR exports for countries that don't have it. Then it agreed to an approach that would decide on a case-by-case basis on the credentials of the country that applied. But this "subjective" argument was dismissed by Brazil and Argentina
, as was the argument that the IAEA additional protocol should be made a supply condition.
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There are two bottomlines that have to be remembered. First, India has a huge ace -- that climate change negotiations cannot go anywhere unless India has a viable alternative to hydrocarbon use, and that is nuclear. This is an argument that will trump many others in the current race for a climate change deal.
Second, the real target of the G-8, or NSG, is not India, which is not a proliferation threat, but Iran, which is. If ENR technology was to be denied to non-NPT countries, it would leave Iran within the tent and keep India out. However much the world may dislike the Indian nuclear deal, that is really not anyone's intention.
Never mind. Telling the US no reactors without ENR was just a silly joke that none of understood.
PARIS/NEW DELHI: The G8 declaration on inhibiting the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies (ENR) to those countries who have not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) would have no effect on India, Indian officials said here ahead of the meeting between Prime Minsiter Manmohan Singh and French President Nicolas Sarkozy Tuesday.
"We are receiving no help from anybody," official sources said. It would have no practical effect for India, which had been enriching for long, they added.
Can somebody please translate the bold-marked portion? How is targeting Iran, not India, compatible with hitting India, not Iran?RaviBg wrote:India may not be hit by G-8 raising bar on nuke tech transfer - Indrani Bagchi
However, it's true the US has been shifting goalposts on the issue. First, it said there should be "criteria-based" approach for ENR exports for countries that don't have it. Then it agreed to an approach that would decide on a case-by-case basis on the credentials of the country that applied. But this "subjective" argument was dismissed by Brazil and Argentina, as was the argument that the IAEA additional protocol should be made a supply condition.
There are two bottomlines that have to be remembered. First, India has a huge ace -- that climate change negotiations cannot go anywhere unless India has a viable alternative to hydrocarbon use, and that is nuclear. This is an argument that will trump many others in the current race for a climate change deal.
Second, the real target of the G-8, or NSG, is not India, which is not a proliferation threat, but Iran, which is. If ENR technology was to be denied to non-NPT countries, it would leave Iran within the tent and keep India out. However much the world may dislike the Indian nuclear deal, that is really not anyone's intention.
China reveals Iran's nuclear secrets to UNRajeshA wrote: Can somebody please translate the bold-marked portion? How is targeting Iran, not India, compatible with hitting India, not Iran?
RajeshARajeshA wrote:Can somebody please translate the bold-marked portion? How is targeting Iran, not India, compatible with hitting India, not Iran?
This might help us understand the issue.RajeshA wrote:Anujan ji, shravan ji,
I was merely confused by the statement....
The French and Russian deals provide for (a) LWR reactors (b) a guaranteed supply of enriched Uranium fuel (c) reprocessing rights (under IAEA safeguards) for the spent fuel.The french and russian deals with India are already "grandfathered" and the denial of ENR does not apply here.
CAN-DO (no pun intended) is no substitute for HAVE DONE.negi wrote:^ Those are only limited to research purposes or in nascent stages of development but afaik the Gas centrifuges are the one's commercially viable and pretty much an Industry standard.
Re-processing the spent fuel has never been an issue for India; those NPA's don't cry about our PU stockpile for nothing ; what do you think we do with the spent fuel produced by those ...15 ?...CANDU derivatives which we have built in so many years ?
We have 3 processing plants operating in Trombay, Tarapur and Kalpakkam.
Days before US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton arrives here on her first official visit after taking charge, India is learnt to have firmed up a site each in Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh that will be dedicated for the first US nuclear reactors after the nuclear deal.
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It’s learnt that officials from both sides have also firmed up the Technology Safeguards Agreement which will allow India to launch satellites built with US-origin equipment. This is expected to be signed during the visit and is an important precursor to the Commercial Space Launch Agreement, which has been pending for a long time.
Another crucial agreement that is on the verge of being finalized over the next couple of days is the End-User Verification (EUV) Agreement, which would then permit US to sell defence products to India.
However, sources said, US is not keen to go public on this because exceptions have been made for India, deviating from the standard format of the EUV so as to accommodate Indian concerns over on-site inspections. This agreement was delayed due to Left opposition in the last UPA tenure. Another agreement on science & technology cooperation will also be concluded during the visit which will set up an endowment fund — with equal contributory partnership between the two countries — to facilitate exchange of people and projects.
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GNEP is a very, very, very old "rabbit".negi wrote:
Btw last I read NPA's have pulled a new rabbit...aka GNEP it becomes more hillarious and chai-biskoot onlee from here on.
Enriched Uranium contains 5% of U-235 which is the active fuel. Rest is U-238 which does not burn.Tanaji wrote:I am confused:
Why do we need ENR tech for? What will we do with the enriched uranium? Wasnt the deal mainly to ensure a reliable supply of uranium to enable more power plants and energy security? Thats being achieved isnt it?
If its arguing for matter of principle, then its a different story.
CHENNAI: India has already received natural uranium in the form of pellets from Russia and as yellowcake from Areva of France for use in its safeguarded reactors, according to S.K. Jain, Chairman and Managing Director, Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL).
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Mr. Jain said on Tuesday that India had also received clearance from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the fabrication of this imported fuel into fuel rods. The process was now underway at the Nuclear Fuel Complex (NFC), Hyderabad.
“…I am happy to share with you that I flagged off on Saturday [July 11] the first consignment of fabricated fuel from the NFC for use in the second unit [already under safeguards] of the Rajasthan Atomic Power Station (RAPS),” Mr. Jain said.
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The supply of indigenous natural uranium fuel had gone up with the mine and mill at Turamdih in Jharkhand adding to the supply from the mill at the nearby Jaduguda. This had led to the PHWRs operating between 60 per cent and 65 per cent capacity factor compared to less than 50 per cent earlier. “I plan to take them to 70 per cent,” Mr. Jain said.
The fourth reactor at Kaiga in Karnataka would reach criticality in six to eight months with the increased flow of indigenous natural uranium.
India is learnt to have made a few key bilateral breakthroughs in the direction of neutralising “any adverse consequences” of the recent G8 resolve to block enrichment and reprocessing technologies unless New Delhi signs the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT).
Sources said France had indicated to India during the visit of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh (at the NAM summit in picture on left) to Paris as guest of honour at the Bastille Day parade that “nothing” in the G8 resolution would be allowed to come in the way of civil nuclear cooperation between the two countries.
France was the first nation with which India signed a nuclear co-operation deal after the NSG safeguards clearance and the initialling of the Indo-US civilian nuclear deal last year. The sources also said the Russians, with whom too India has signed a co-operation agreement, have given similar assurances.
Thought to be a setback, India has not officially reacted to the G8 proliferation statement adopted at the recent L’Aquila summit in Italy — “We are studying the text of the statement” has been the only formal word.
Off record, however, senior officials have downplayed adverse implications of the G8 decision and maintained it will not impact India’s progress on the front, especially with regard to nuclear fuel. “In any event, we are not seeking ENR facilities from abroad,” officials have explained. “We have our own ENR facilities.”
The Indo-US nuclear deal produced its first tangible results with consignments of nuclear fuel from France, Russia and Kazakhstan arriving at the Rajasthan Atomic Power Station (RAPS) site in Rawatbhata on Wednesday
Since RAPS is a safeguarded facility, inspection officials from the IAEA will arrive after a week just before the bundles are loaded into the second unit.
It is one thing to try and spin one’s way out of domestic criticism but if the Manmohan Singh government really believes the recent G8 ban on sensitive nuclear technology sales is no big deal then the situation is much more alarming than I first thought.
Two weeks before Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s scheduled arrival date in New Delhi, the State Department spokesman said that the U.S. hoped India would be in a position to identify the physical sites where American companies will get to locate their multi-billion dollar nuclear reactors. The final reprocessing arrangements and procedures have yet to be negotiated but the U.S. is keen to mark its territory. Yet, the Indian government baulks from publicly expressing its concern about the manner in which Washington is going about unilaterally seeking to alter the terms of the July 2005 Indo-U.S. agreement under which those reactors will be sold to us in the first place.
Not only that, senior officials who should know better have sought to downplay the significance of last week’s G8 statement on nonproliferation. When reporters sought a government reaction on the interim ban the eight countries announced on enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) items and technology sales to India, Pakistan and Israel, what they got were comforting but spurious arguments.
Prior to September 2008, the Nuclear Suppliers Group — the 45-nation cartel of nuclear exporters — had a blanket ban on all nuclear sales to these three countries, currently the only ones still outside the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. But on September 4, 2008, the NSG agreed to the U.S. proposal to exempt India from this ban. This U.S. proposal was part of the full civil nuclear energy cooperation commitments the White House made in exchange for getting India to agree to separate its military and civilian nuclear programmes and place the latter under international safeguards.
The letter and spirit of the July 2005 joint statement has since been reflected in three legally binding texts — the Indo-U.S. bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement (the ‘123 agreement’), India’s safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the NSG decision of 2008, all of which reflected a carefully-crafted balance of rights and obligations.
Even though the July 2005 agreement spoke of “full civil nuclear cooperation,” the U.S. was never keen to allow India access to sensitive nuclear items and technology. After a series of tough exchanges, however, Indian negotiators were able to secure restrictive but enabling language on ENR in the 123 agreement and Hyde Act, the U.S. domestic law to which bilateral nuclear commerce is wedded. The battle resumed in the run up to the NSG meetings last year but in the end India secured a clean exemption allowing it safeguarded access to every aspect of the nuclear fuel cycle. This clean exemption has now been negated by the U.S.-instigated G8 ban on ENR. As have the restrictive but enabling clauses of the Hyde Act and the 123 agreement, neither of which spoke of NPT adherence as a condition of supply.
The government needs to realise the problem will not go away just because one pretends it does not exist. Nor will it get what it wants internationally by remaining silent in the hope that some benign invisible hand will deliver India what it wants. The kind of unilateralism and reversibility Washington has pushed at L’Aquila and is pushing in the NSG goes against the letter and spirit of the Indo-U.S. agreement. India should have strongly pressed its case last year itself, when the Bush administration publicly announced its intention of seeking NPT conditionality for ENR sales. It should have told the U.S. this was not acceptable. And it should have worked with NSG members like Russia, France, Brazil, Canada, South Africa, Turkey and Kazakhstan who have either strong commercial interests in nuclear commerce with India or are opposed to tighter ENR rules for their own specific reasons. None of this was done. In May 2009, the NSG troika visited New Delhi for consultations. One wonders how vigorously India’s views on the matter were put across.
After falling asleep at the wheel, official sources have begun floating a number of explanations for why there is no need for the country to be unduly concerned about what has happened at the G8. Let us consider each one in turn.
* The general U.S. push towards restricting ENR sales move was not unexpected.
Well, if it was not unexpected, the country would like to know what was done to deal with these well advertised American intentions. It is not as if India did not successfully handle rollback attempts during the negotiations from 2005 to 2008.
* India is not a part of G8 and could not have known about the contents of the declaration in advance.
India has strong friendships with several G8 countries, including some without a strong attachment to the U.S. position. Given Washington’s declared intention of getting the NSG to freeze India out of fuel cycle trade and the fact that the G8 tends to form a ginger group within the NSG whenever new rules are discussed, it should have been obvious that the matter would come up in L’Aquila. Some proactive lobbying with France or Russia might have ensured a less damaging decision.
* G8 decisions are not necessarily binding.
G8 statements promising tender, loving care for Africa may not be binding but the group takes its nonproliferation decisions extremely seriously.
* The G8 has been discussing tighter ENR rules since 2004. India is not a specific target.
True, but the July 2005 agreement was premised on a break with the world as it was up to 2004, with only two categories of states: NPT and non-NPT. First the U.S., and then the NSG, acknowledged that India could not be clubbed together with the two remaining non-NPT states. Its nonproliferation record, strategic weight, economic heft and political responsibility meant the world was better off with India inside the ‘regime’ than outside. L’Aquila has revived the notion of India being just another outlier. That is why the G8 Nonproliferation Statement actually begins with an explicit call for countries not party to the NPT to “accede without delay”. Not only was such a call not made at the Toyako summit last year but the G8 actually endorsed the need for a “more robust approach to civil nuclear cooperation with India.”
* India is only bound by what it has agreed with the NSG.
True, but the NSG is on the verge of changing its guidelines and India has also pledged to accept and abide by any changes. The time to actively engage is now, when the new rules are being debated, and not after they are adopted.
* India needs time to study the NSG proposal that the G8 has adopted before it jumps to conclusions.
When the NSG discussed the issue of new rules for ENR trade in November, consensus was established on a broad range of criteria even as some proposals — like the requirement that a state adhere to the Additional Protocol before it can buy ENR equipment — remained “bracketed.” The G8 has decided to implement the non-bracketed “clean text” as an interim measure. With the NSG consisting of 45 countries, it would be astonishing if India did not already know what was in this “clean text.”
L’Aquila is an unpleasant wake-up call, a reminder to India that it must remain vigilant as it moves forward to implement its agreements on civil nuclear cooperation with the U.S. and the rest of the world. Let us not pretend that a rollback on ENR isn’t being attempted. Let us acknowledge it and find ways to deal with the challenge. Though the rollback attempt began during the Bush administration, the new administration is clearly committed to it.
The time for resting on the laurels of last year’s victory at the NSG has long ended.
To add to India's woes, on the eve of Clinton's arrival, the biggest dampener of all has come in the form of America's clever attempt at G-8 to insert a clause asking G-8 nations to ban transfer of enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technologies to countries that are not signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
By all accounts, it seems that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh [ Images ] and Indian diplomats did not even know about it, even though India had participated in the summit. America's action in this regard is considered the manifestation of President Barack Obama's [ Images ] desire for wide-ranging measures to control nuclear proliferation and free the world of nuclear arms.
Writing today in the Wall Street Journal, former envoy to the United Nations T P Sreenivasan, a staunch supporter of the Indo-US nuclear deal, stated, 'The latest G-8 decision to ban the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing items to non-NPT countries strikes at the very root of full civil nuclear cooperation. This move might jeopardise the talks scheduled for modalities of reprocessing. What would happen to the spent fuel from Tarapur (atomic power station) if reprocessing is not facilitated? This partnership may end up looking like a three-legged race in which two athletes are tethered together but incapable of deploying their collective strength.'
When asked about his response to the government's contention that India is solely guided by the NSG waiver, Siddhartha Varadarajan, senior journalist with The Hindu who broke the story about the G-8 ban, told rediff.com, "India may be guided solely by the NSG waiver but the G-8 will be guided by its decision and the NSG by whatever new rules they adopt in the future. If the government does not act now to prevent new rules from being adopted, it will eventually be faced with a difficult choice in the future, neither of which is good: Either it will have to accept the US-led unilateral reversal of the terms of the deal with the NSG, or will have to declare that it is no longer bound by its own commitments to the NSG, thereby ending nuclear imports from all the 45 countries, including reactors and fuel. Both of these outcomes will be bad for India."
Those who are against the deal also argue that the government can't say that since India has the technology for ENR, why bother.
"This is a ridiculous argument. Only those who have hands-on experience can appreciate the issues involved in coping with the denial of equipment and components, particularly in the ENR sector. While we have stuck our neck out by agreeing to set up a dedicated state-of-the-art reprocessing plant, we seem to accept the denial of any supplies related to this plant and at the same time, subject the design of the plant to external review to assess its safeguardability. This is a huge trap being laid out to deny us reprocessing rights and may ultimately prove suicidal," said Prasad.
When asked for further clarification on the issue, a source in the ministry said, "We have not seen the specifics of the G-8 document because it is not public, so I can't comment further." this Sheela Bhatt article came out on July 17!! Gerard: could you send GoI a copy of the G-8 statement you posted here on July 10!!!