Islamic Sectarianism

Sushupti · Post by **Sushupti** » 25 Jun 2011 01:54

so why cant it be written in Devnagari script as a first step?

That would amount to asking why can't Ashrafs be like Ajlaf.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 25 Jun 2011 02:41

Thanks for your views.

brihaspati · Post by **brihaspati** » 25 Jun 2011 03:28

ramana ji,
it surely can. But it will split the Ulema. One part will be forced to make noises and the other part will grumble below the radar. But it is an interesting proposition and will need strong "writers" in the new script. Language is almost always a matter of "claim" and "usage", and it can be represented as opening up the language to the wider audience!

The Nadwatul especially, and a wider section of Deobandis would protest. The former has explicit tradition of pushing Arabic, while the latter would give a merry theological dance about it.

brihaspati · Post by **brihaspati** » 25 Jun 2011 03:51

Gulen's movement is interesting but marginal, and appears to represent the general Naqsbandyia form in which Sufism appears to be sought to be popularized. For the Turkish case [which can be studied in parallel with Iran and Egypt] all the strands of "Islamist revival" - Sufi or non-Sufi seems to be based on a neo-con "sharia" and "sunnah" obsession. The movement that is behind the AP - has spawned a very interesting phenomenon, that of claiming all heterodox traditions as parts of orthodox ones.

If I have time will write about the Alevilik alternatives to Sunnilik, and how the Aleviliks are sought to be subsumed [or tried to be subsumed] within the AP - Sunnilik thrust. The Aleviliks probably represent the last line of defense against Islamism of the Turkish variety that is fast developing.

Just a casual drop about "sufism" in Iran: are people aware that Ayatollah Khomeini the father of "revolution" - was actually seen by many among the Islamic spectrum in Iran as being heavily influenced by "Sufism"? In fact he was supposed to be exceptional in his "Sufi" aspects among his peer cohort, especially the collection based around Qom - which differed from him in this respect, but nevertheless saw in him a potential focus figure and supported him.

Agnimitra · Post by **Agnimitra** » 25 Jun 2011 23:45

brihaspati wrote:Just a casual drop about "sufism" in Iran: are people aware that Ayatollah Khomeini the father of "revolution" - was actually seen by many among the Islamic spectrum in Iran as being heavily influenced by "Sufism"? In fact he was supposed to be exceptional in his "Sufi" aspects among his peer cohort, especially the collection based around Qom - which differed from him in this respect, but nevertheless saw in him a potential focus figure and supported him.

Yes, he had a predilection for "erfaan", even while he was for the rule of the faqih.

You're right about the Alevis and Bektashis of Turkey/Syria, too. Both undermine the rigidity of shari'ah.
TURKEY: COURT RULING SHOWS AUTHORITIES' REFUSAL TO SEE ALEVISM AS A RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY
The Alevis of Anatolia: Turkey's largest minority

In a similar vein, the mixed bag of Kurdish sects and religions is also a pocket full of potential as far as IED'ing the pan-Islamist juggernaut is concerned.
Religion of the Kurds

Agnimitra · Post by **Agnimitra** » 25 Jun 2011 23:56

ramana wrote:Bji,
So Urdu is a smattering of foreign words (like nuggets) in a layer of Hindustani (like the dough) written in Persio/Arabic script! So why cant it be written in Devnagari script as a first step?

Ramana ji, actually written Urdu can be quite the opposite - weighty Arabi, Persian and Turkish words linked together by khari boli conjunctions. Urdu is a brilliant funnel for linguistically reprogramming a culture. dar asal, har mafhoom ka idraak aur esraaf us shakhs ke saqaafat par mubni hai. The only "Hindi" words were "ka, aur, ke, par and hai."

Even many of the turns of phrase and modes of expression mimic those used in Persian. There's no doubt that in North India Urdu has a seductive and graceful appearance. But once one learns Farsi, Urdu looks like an effort of the Subcontinental trying to be Persianized, sort of like an Anglo-Indian trying to be very English. Or like Sanskritized official Hindi sounding clumsy and contrived, though Urdu does a better job of integrating things. Note that Urdu icons like Mirza Ghalib considered themselves Farsi poets first and foremost, and Urdu second!

brihaspati · Post by **brihaspati** » 26 Jun 2011 02:09

I guess what ramana ji is hinting at is that there are layers of usage of a language, depending on the social group. The base is still "hindawi", and the more Persianized version is among the urban-ulema-Lucknow-UP circuit [a strong component exists in Delhi proper], while the rural folk has a slightly different usage. So if people start writing it in nagari script, it has wide ranging psycho-social effects. Difficult job though.

Language is a lot about usage and claim. So why not claim it and gradually replace the "Farsi". See how Bangla has done it - urban Bengali [especially the section traditionally associated with admin and whoever happened to be the ruler] uses much more of Farsi[some scattered Arabic] words and even turn of phrases in daily use. Picture differs and the Prakrit/Sanskrit root comes out in the rural/non-urban-elite setting. But at least the 19th century "Bangla" reformers firmly brought in the nagari script to a great extent, and Bangla cannot really be used anymore for foreign "religious" purposes entirely. So that the BD "bangla" users have to constantly acknowledge that "across the border" there are non-Muslim users of Bangla too and that the language essentially has Sanskrit/Prakrit base. Many BD intellectuals actually use this to carry on resisting overt Islamization attempts on the language without risking their necks. [One can look up the Bangla-academy debates and current efforts on language-reform, spelling and "Pramita Bangla"].

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 26 Jun 2011 10:50

Carl that sentence sounds like one is eating paan while talking! Also explains why the WANA guys look down on wannabee Persio-Arabs!

Yagnasri · Post by **Yagnasri** » 26 Jun 2011 13:25

We want to be them and we are ashamed that we are not them. So we dress like them, we talk like them, we eat like them and we love all theing theirs and hate all things ours forefather were. What can I say more.

brihaspati · Post by **brihaspati** » 26 Jun 2011 17:02

ramana ji,
that sentence sounds so artificial because the words are loan-words - whose deparsed roots are far from, in fact not connected to the social unconscious or cultural past. Thus they stand out like unconnected islands on top of the relational semantics of hindawi.

Language in a continuous usage by a culture maintains a consciousness of unbroken connections with the past and its imagery. But because the Farsi and the Hindi developed in isolation for a long time, the subconscious connotation and connection was broken. So urban khaas jabaan Urdu is Farsi remaining as a collection of loan-words floating on top of the base of Hindawi.

This is of a different order of disconnect from the Sanskrit on Hindi. Once again just like Bangla, the urban dhimmi used more of the Farsi/Arabic words in its Hindi to please their masters. It is this particular section which complains vehemently against revival of greater use of Sanskritic words back in Hindi replacing the Farsi usage [I dont have anyone on forum in mind!]. But the further one goes away from the urban dhimmi usage of "b-a-s-t-a-r-d" Hindi, we find greater integration and usage of Sanskritic roots - and they do it without the benefit of "schools" or "universities". Go to rural Rajasthan for example, or even Maithili in Bihar - it will almost sound like Prakrit. There the language sounds more natural because the base and the superstructure is in sync with the cultural continuity. I mentioned this once before that in a Rajasthan village one morning, I woke up to some one describing "pakshi aati hain" - not "chiryia".

Hearing "chiryia" would bring up a whole long chain of imagery or associations in a native user of Farsi - without even being conscious of it, much much more than that will not come in a Hindi base user. And the sentence would be more meaningful and satisfactory for the former than the latter. It is natural for the urban dhimmi user of Farsi-ized Hindi to feel disconnected partially if the Farsi words are replaced by Sanskritic ones, because he/she has grown up in a desperate cultural linguistic limbo of trying to be "purer" in Farsi terms - and feels that he/she loses both banks of the river from sight while swimming in the middle.

Agnimitra · Post by **Agnimitra** » 26 Jun 2011 22:12

ramana wrote:Carl that sentence sounds like one is eating paan while talking! Also explains why the WANA guys look down on wannabee Persio-Arabs!

Absolutely true. And WANA types themselves get the same treatment from Herati and Kabuli Persians. They have a racist but quite common saying in Dari, "Pashtun khar ast" - the Pashtun is an ass, i.e., good to carry loads, etc but lacks a native intelligence.

I agree somewhat with Brihaspati ji's argument that Sanskritized Hindi isn't as culturally dislocative as Urdu - but only in the larger picture. Actually it is dislocative, but in reversing a prior trend. Urdu had become fashionable after some centuries of Persianization, and by the time it became lingua franca, it was not so abnormal sounding at all. It had created a pretty natural cultural space. Even if you take a normal Hindi sentence today, you can see it. "qalam aur kaghaz mez par rakha hai. kursi par baithiye."qalam, kaghaz, mez, kursi....all foreign loan words. Hindi does sound stranger at this time, but it could reverse a process to some extent so that things become grounded in Sanskrit. Only Sanskrit can completely reinstate Indic civilization as the umbrella over the whole subcontinent, after these substitutes are all exhausted. prAsAda-shikharE 'pi kAko na garuDAyate - even if a crow sits on the top of the steeple of the palace, it doesn't become Garuda!"

Sushupti · Post by **Sushupti** » 26 Jun 2011 23:00

"Pashtun khar ast"

Hey, "Khar" in above is from Sanskrit which means "Gadaha".

Agnimitra · Post by **Agnimitra** » 26 Jun 2011 23:24

^^^ Yeah Persian and Sanskrit have a lot in common. (Of course, "khar" in Persian is with the guttural "kh".)

Parsi Zoroastrians in India use some Sanskrit grammar texts in their curriculum to teach priests Avestan.

In Iran, if you talk of "Hendi", they have a sense of superiority to it. But if you talk of "Sanskrit", they feel much smaller and respectful. They know that their "Arya-nezhad" heritage is connected with Sanskrit, which they have lost to an extent. Sanskrit names for children are legal under the laws of Iran.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 27 Jun 2011 10:37

Carl, Words me khaya rakah hain! Its all in script. For instance English has so many loan words and is considered vibrant for the ability to take the loan.

Sushupti · Post by **Sushupti** » 27 Jun 2011 17:49

Khwaja mere Khwaja

http://neerajatri.blogspot.com/2011/06/ ... hwaja.html

brihaspati · Post by **brihaspati** » 27 Jun 2011 18:48

Carl ji,
isnt Hendi also indicative of the "foreign" connection for Iranian substrate? And the reason it is held so comes actually from that "Indian" association? This has been apparently an issue in the very politics of "Khomeini". His great-granddad moved to Kashmir from Khorasan, and his granddad returned to Iran. I think one senior took on the appellation "Hendi". So there is a view that Khomeini's politics has been consciously "universalist" while extra-confrontationist simply to counter that shadow of "Hendi". This would be of course again a classic pattern of the "returned" "foreign tainted" leader But that "Hendi" also connotates "foreign/India" as the other. Admiration of Sanskrit roots need not carry over to classic political obsessions.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 27 Jun 2011 20:25

In the late 70s, an Iranain told me Khomeini is India's revenge for Nadir Shah!

Agnimitra · Post by **Agnimitra** » 27 Jun 2011 20:41

^^ Yes Khomeini's detractors call him Hendi-nezhad. No doubt, "admiration of Sanskrit roots need not carry over to classic political obsessions." That racism works both ways and is always a given. Still, they're far more India-friendly on the street level than other middle Eastern countries, including Turkey. In fact, they're friendlier towards Indians than with Pakis, whom they associate with drug-smuggling, fraudulent enterprises, sectarian violence, and a "chipkoo" mentality (trying to say "Paki-Persian birather onlee"). The stereotype of the Indian is a calm, docile, trustworthy, intelligent, sweet-natured fellow, a bit of a clown with his typical mannerisms and non-macho SDRE-ness, not to be taken seriously but lovely to have around. They even included such an Indian character in Persian animation series that every Irani kid grows up watching. India is also associated with being a dirty, hot and difficult place to live in with blatant poverty and social inequality. As India grows economically and militarily, the part about not taking us seriously is under review for sure.

brihaspati · Post by **brihaspati** » 28 Jun 2011 01:48

"Racism" is perhaps too strong a word. Moreover, there is little or no existing Indian attempt at claiming a special Indian connection from within existing Iranian groups, through a "dialect" firmly connected with religious claims. The thing that happens with "Urdu" is not parallel present in Iran with something similar.

The road that Sufi justification of Islamism can take is well illustrated in Khomeini's interest in mysticism and philosophy, of the grounding of the notion of imam in Plato's philosopher-king through the reinterpretations of al-Farabi, Ibn Arabi, and Mullah Sadra; and particularly of Mullah Sadra's account of the spiritual development of a leader and his relation to the community, which Khomeini studied, taught, and then attempted to execute. This involved the paradigm of four journeys: from man to God, from God to God (moving back and forth between considerations of God's attributes and His essence, until their unity is realized), from God back to man, and from man to man (instituting the divine law).

Khomeini however insisted on written constitutional provisions for guidance of the state by clerics (velayat-e-faqih). He already had de facto guidance, and constitutional provisions coul make it more problematic for bothe the mullah as well as the constitution. Already there were practical dilemmas such as the ambiguous status of so-called "Islamic" revolutionary courts, more revolutionary than Islamic, presided over by such passionate mullahs as the infamous Sadeq Khalkhali, who ran for election to the Assembly of Experts (the constituent "assembly") on the platform of having "personally sentenced to death 200 enemies of God".

This is where the contradictions of "Sufi" "mysticism" within the framework of Islamism comes out. The "Sufi" mysticism at its philosophical beginnings, is a popular but individual level personal emotional search for connection to the divine, and hence it has no clear outline of the relationship to the collective. But Islamism is about the collective, and it has already developed the infrastructure needed to mobilize and coerce the collective for "action". The mullahs who are trained [and perhaps attracted to by the politics represented in the islamic infrastructure] to ensure this mobilization, therefore sooner or later come into conflict with the personal-emotional aspect of Sufism. but being more concerned and experienced in "collective coercion" they always are able to win over the "personal/individualistic" emotional aspect and channelize or force the "Sufi" into the traditional "Islamic" jihad mode.

Khomeini having used and being aware of both aspects - used the "emotional" aspect to connect to "popular" will [ I will try to illustrate this, and vaguely indicate the section I have in mind in answer to Carl ji - in a subsequent post], and come to political forefront, but used it to channelize popular will towards the traditional objective of the mullah, that of coercion and "submission" of the society to mullah-rule and mullahcracy.

The thing is - the key to understand both the success of Khomeini as well the future dangers to mullahcracy - comes from the same forces that had a traditional skepticism about "mullahdom", and called the son of Ayatollah Hosayn Ali Montazeri, "Ayatollah Ringo" and the son of Khomeini, "Prince Ahmad". Sufism, has proved its vulnerability to be used as a tool for Islamic mobilization.

There exists cartoons of graves marked "martyr" wearing hats (playing on the phrase kolah zadan, "to put a hat on someone, to deceive someone"; the cleric holding a flashlight which gives off darkness; the mock movie poster of "Hojatolislam Ringo" as a gun slinger; the family gathered around a silent TV over which a cloth screen has been draped, upon which a home-movie projector shows an American Western; the mullah trying to blow out a light bulb ("Out, oh cursed West"); the sequence of sun's rays peeking over the horizon, followed by a second scene in which people run toward what they think is the rising sun, followed by a third scene in which they run away from the semicircle which has risen over the horizon to reveal itself as the turban of Sadeq Khalkhali, the hanging judge of the revolution. [Ahangar]

Agnimitra · Post by **Agnimitra** » 28 Jun 2011 03:03

brihaspati wrote:Sufism, has proved its vulnerability to be used as a tool for Islamic mobilization.

It is and has always been a double-edged sword that can be used both ways against whichever nexus forms the ruling establishment.

April 27, 2011
Dervishes Protest In Northeastern Iran

Gonabadi dervishes are reported to have converged on the northeastern Iranian city of Beydokht this week to protest the summoning of their leader to court, RFE/RL's Radio Farda reports.

Mostafa Azmayesh, a representative of the Nematollahi Gonabadi Sufi Muslim community outside Iran, told Radio Farda that around 5,000 dervishes from various Iranian cities gathered in Beydokht, burial place of leaders of the order, on April 25.

[...]

The U.S. State Department in its most recent report on religious freedom cited "growing government repression" of Sufi communities and religious practices in Iran.

The Persian version of the the same news item has more tidbits:

The Gonabadi Sufis have been coming under increased pressure in recent years, and some of their Hosseiniyehs in various cities have been demolished, and a number of them have been thrown into jail. {Note: A hosseiniyeh is a community hall used for celebration or ritual lamentations on various occasions. Although affiliated with Sufi orders, they are open to the public irrespective of whether they are part of the Sufi order or not. In that sense, they are considered an asset of the local community more than the property of a Sufi sect}

In this context, around February 2006, a group from among the members of the Basij militia put the Shari'at Hosseiniyeh of the Gonabadi Sufis under seige for a few days, after which there were violent clashes. The clashes resulted in the imprisonment of 1200 Gonabadi dervishes, and the wounding of dozens of others. This hosseiniyeh was shut down and in the end it was demolished.

Again in the same thread of persecution, in around March 2008, a hosseiniyeh of the Gonabadi Dervishes in the suburbs of Borujerd in the province of Lorestan {non-Persian ethnic minority in Iran} was was demolished. Plainclothes Basij policemen beseiged the hosseiniyeh for 2 days before attacking and wounding more than 50 dervishes and imprisoning more than 700 of them. They then took possession of this hosseiniyeh of the city of Borujerd, and set it ablaze.

One year later, security forces used bulldozers to demolish a hosseiniyeh near Esfahan.

Urgent Call for Protest Against Iranian State Suppression of Gonabadi-Nimatullahi Sufis

brihaspati · Post by **brihaspati** » 28 Jun 2011 03:21

The problem is that - as I indicated - the personal individual aspect is no match for the collective organized mullahfication. Those that survive as "Sufi" inevitably come under the organized influence of the mullah, and in turn leading to more absolute forms. The retention of Islamic core as the foundation which cannot be abandoned - in the Sufi - always leads to its confusion and inability to resist the cleric as and when the cleric takes over leadership.

brihaspati · Post by **brihaspati** » 28 Jun 2011 04:09

It is actually most interesting to see the Gunabadi-Niamatullahi sect's problems with the regime. It is interesting because this is nothing new, and what usually does not come up in discussions is that

(1) they are themselves "splittist" [to borrow PRC terminology] within the Niamatullahi order, and divided the renascent "Sufi" movement rather damagingly when the overall order began to revive in the late 19th and early 20th century

(2) they have always tilted over and quietly submitted to the more exoteric mullahcracy. When up against the wall, the Niamatullahi order's leadership - both its factions - in general praise the Islamists. It is well documented that some of their most illustrious leaders have in fact written panegyrics on the very Islamist persecutors who had massacred thousands of their own followers.

For example the qutb 'Rida 'AlliShah' Tabanda, in the early 1980s, frequently hymned the praised 'Imam' Khomeyni in the Tehran papers, and publicly declared the readiness of Gunabadi dervishes to become 'martyrs' in the Iran-Iraq war by publishing several announcements in the Iranian press.[Humayuni, Ta'rikh, pp 221-2]. In 1979, the Amir Sulaymaniyya Takya where the Gunabadi Sufis congregated was set on fire, and some of the shaikhs and dervishes were imprisoned by the Islamic regime. In the early 1990s, the main Gunabadi cemetery in Tehran which housed the grand mausoleum of Salih 'Ali Shah,' as well as many other historical buildings dating back to the last century, were entirely destroyed-according to the ayatollahs, to make more space for public worship.

After Tabanda's death in 1988, his son Hajj Ali Tabanda ('Mahbub Ali Shah') succeeded him, inheriting familialy the spiritual rank of Gunabadi qutb [Gunabadi made it all-within-the-family]. On 16 January 1997, Mahbub Ali Shah suffered cardiac-arrest and died in Tehran, where he was succeeded by his uncle Dr Nur Ali Tabanda, a well-known lawyer (the son of Salih Ali Shah), whose tariqa name is 'Majdhub Ali Shah'. In an apparent move to counter the regime's continuing harassment of the order, Dr Tabanda published a proclamation to his followers in Nimruz, [no. 403, Friday 31 January 1997, p. 13.] the following week, commanding them to 'imitate' (taqlid) a fully-qualified mujtahid in matters of the Sharia, while declaring that 'interference in, or voicing of one's opinion about social issues is outside the jurisdiction of the Sufi tariqa, 'insofar as 'the great spiritual leaders never voiced their opinion on these matters since they never supposed it to be part of the Path's spiritual duties.' He also insisted his female devotees carefully 'observe the Islamic hijad', and prohibited the initiation of all drug addicts [one of his ancestors wrote an elaborate treatise on the benefits of opium smoking!]

Notwithstanding Dr Tabanda's previous participation in and support for Mihdi Bazargan's Freedom Movement and his present quietist rhetoric, the Gunabadi Sufis remain active supporters of the fundamentalist ideology of the Islamic Republic, a political stance which reflects this branch's emphasis on the preservation of the nomocentric side of Islamic teachings (hifz-i-zahir) and its concern for purely Sharia affairs.

A good source would be Humayuni, M. Ta'rikh-i silsilaha-yi tarnqa-yi Ni'matullahi dar Iran London: Bunyad-i Irfan-i Maulana, 1992.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 28 Jun 2011 07:02

Narayana Rao wrote:We want to be them and we are ashamed that we are not them. So we dress like them, we talk like them, we eat like them and we love all theing theirs and hate all things ours forefather were. What can I say more.

This is fractal recursivity. "We behave towards our own the way they behave towards us". It is an extension of Stockholm syndrome/dhimmitude. But in its defence - it can be stated to be a survival mechanism.

Prem · Post by **Prem** » 28 Jun 2011 08:26

Is not ironic that none of BDYs mentioned in whole discussion is Indian thus prooving that there is nothing indian about the whole subject and people.

Agnimitra · Post by **Agnimitra** » 28 Jun 2011 09:25

Brihaspati ji,

As the adage goes, kanTakenaiva kanTakam. Only by one thorn can another be removed. Sufism is the thorn that can be used to remove the Islamist thorn. That is the substance of my argument all along.

There is no denying the "unreliability" of Sufi cults in acting against Islamists. The fact that they are often seen as spineless submitters or as opportunistic cheerleaders for this or that Islamist or anti-Islamist takeover is well-known. For example, the writings of Ahmad Kasravi against "Sufigari" were widely known at one time, and a railway terminus in Tehran was named after him. (Then the revolution happened, and the Islamists renamed the terminus after Kasravi's assassin!)

The shenanigans employed by sundry Sufi orders in order to survive depend on their caliber and the tide of the times. Even in the case above, note that while the Gonabadis stayed behind and rooted for Khomeini, Dr. Nurbakhsh took the Nimatullahi order to 5 different continents, now established quite well in NA and Europe.

However, none of these details has anything to do with my argument earlier. I posted the report above to show that popular discontent with Islamists (or any other oppressive regime) usually first emerges in the Sufi social space. It is from that point that it can be channeled usefully.

Historically, it is true that this second thorn of Sufi cults remains in the flesh after the first thorn of a repressive regime is removed. But I have argued that was because Islamic civilization was dominant in that era, thus propelling a recursive scenario in its favour. Today it is different. There is a real chance that after removing one thorn with the other, both can be thrown away. There could be a recursive phenomenon pulling away from Islamofascism.

Moreover, it is also well known that India has a natural "advantage" in Sufi-like culture. Kasravi himself rages on and on about how the blight of spineless, world-denying, guru-worshipping, cultish Sufism is a malady rooted in ancient Persia and India! I see no problem using that image if we can. Let every Falana Ali Shah prosper if its at the cost of Islamists!

brihaspati · Post by **brihaspati** » 28 Jun 2011 16:28

Maybe the more correct view is that popular discontent against prevailing regime fuels "sufi" in an overwhelmingly Islamic society, but we should not make the error that it is against "Islamism". All Sufi tariqas stress an over-emphasis and obsession with Sharia and Muhammadism - hence sufi movements in Islamic society ends up strengthening the mullahcracy. It is like the "Taleb" expression of popular discontent at failure of prevailing regime by searching for a purer route to a purer next-to-divine regime.

Actually, Islamism might be under criticism outside Islamic societies, but that process itself generates renewed allegiance and fervour within.

The mullahcracy in Iran are not fools, at least not those who have managed to go up the hierarchy - just as any other street smart politician. There has been an age old debate within the mullahcracy of Iran about the single most risky aspect of the mullah becoming a politician and running a state - that of automatically becoming part of the corruption and deviations that are a necessary part of daily politics, and more importantly associated in the public eye as so.

Any opposition to the mullah that remains in the public domain but still basing its criticism on Islamic principles will be forced to claim or represent a "purer" form of "Islamism". It is important to force all Islamists including the Sufi "philosophers" into government - which taints them with necessary failure as is the fate of any real-running government. Otherwise, Islamism remains in the public space as a viable hope for a "better" alternative - Islamism itself is not guilty for all the people's troubles - but this or that mullah-cracy.

It has already been happening in Iran to a certain extent. Helping out the very dubious "sufis" is allowing Islamism an escape route.

Agnimitra · Post by **Agnimitra** » 29 Jun 2011 01:56

>> It has already been happening in Iran to a certain extent. Helping out the very dubious "sufis" is allowing Islamism an escape route.

I totally see your point. But the "help" I have been suggesting is the kind that increases the conflict between the two -- not really a rescue and coronation of Sufi sheikhs who want ride a tide of popular fancy or discontentment.

The deceptive ideals and false promises of all hues of Islamist movements have proven futile in providing a comprehensive framework for the co-existence of all types of human aspirations. This fact is increasingly being accepted by ordinary Moslems today, especially in this globalized environment. It can be most starkly exposed within Islamic society itself.
---------------------------------------------------------------

Interview about Indo-Moslem sects:
Interesting characterization of the petty foibles of Islamic maulaners versus the supposedly meaningless liberalism of the Other (i.e. Hinduism):

Yogindar Sikand: The Quran and Hadith places much stress on the unity of Muslims. How, then, do you explain the fact of fierce sectarian disputes among the different groups or sects of Muslims today?

Waris Mazhari: This has mainly to the fact that Islam, which, unlike say a religion like Hinduism, has a comprehensive framework of law or shariah that is all-comprehensive. Shariah contains certain norms or criteria to decide between right and wrong.
[...]
And since the shariah can only express itself through human efforts and understood through the use of human reflection, the result of which is called fiqh, there is ample room for differences between the different sects on numerous matters. These are then quickly pounced upon by sectarian maulvis, who readily use them to denounce as deviants or even as kafirs those who interpret the shariah even marginally different from them.
[..]
On the other hand, even though almost all the Hindu scriptures ordain division based on caste, Hinduism does not have this concept of a well-defined shariah. A Hindu can deny God and still be a Hindu. He can worship in a Muslim shrine and still be a Hindu. He will not be transgressing any shariah rule if he does so, and hence the scope for sectarianism of this sort is greatly reduced as different forms of worship are allowed for and are considered as legitimate.

He does not want to acknowledge that there can also be a higher platform of liberal thought and action that is more meaningful than the safety and peace of taqlidi shariah. But things are approaching a dialectic turning point for his Ummah. The strident sectarian rage of Talibanism and the soft-pedalling exohrtations to Islamic unity such as the above are two sides of a reaction to the writing on the wall.

Accentuating, both, Sufi vs. Juristic conflicting tendencies and the Arab vs. non-Arab culture conflict speeds up the process.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 29 Jun 2011 03:23

Many of the hadiths are from Ayesha's memory of what she thought was in the Prophet's mind. The veil and four witnesses hadiths are related to her.
She got lost in the desert and was escorted back to the city riding a camel by a warrior.
The viel hadith was to prevent the Prophet's women becoming the cynosure of all eyes. The hadith got extended to all women.

The city folks tongues wagged about her being lost in desert. So the four witness hadith came about to silence them- she was innocent unless she had four accusers. Unfortunately it was reframed as the perpetrators need four witnesses to be pronouced guilty.

Virupaksha · Post by **Virupaksha** » 30 Jun 2011 04:15

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/indi ... 045624.cms
Darul Uloom asks Saudi Arabia to ban Ahmadiyas from Mecca visit

The streak of wajib-ul-cattle will reinforce in India also if these imams are allowed to continue in positions of influence.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 30 Jun 2011 20:50

During the propphet's days there was death squad that used to go after women who wouldnt obey and conform to the dictats of the PUBH

X-Post...

Theo_Fidel wrote:A Lahori Motorham writes about being treated like uncovered meat...
Code: Select all
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\06\29\story_29-6-2011_pg3_7
Public nuisance

Sir: Sometimes being a woman in Pakistan is like a curse — and I am not even talking about atrocities like honour killings and child marriages that are routinely reported in the media. No, I am talking about everyday occurrences that make you swear under your breath at the mentality of this nation’s citizens. Just the other day, I was busy minding my own business in a popular clothing market in Lahore when suddenly an old, bearded man carrying a loudspeaker stood right next to me and started hollering loudly and arrogantly that women who do not cover their heads and faces in public (like myself) will burn in the fires of hell. Needless to say I quickly went my way but he went on and on with this diatribe and followed many other women around with his loudspeaker in hand. Nobody bothered to stop him from this rather irritating form of public harassment. It truly is a sad day when people, especially women, are judged by their exteriors and not what is on the inside.
FATIMA KHAN
Lahorem

Beleive it or not this is the origin of the Shia Sunni split....

The story goes like this. Aeysha the Prophet's wife got into a misperception issue when she was lost int he desert and people suspected her virtue. The PUBH asked around for advice mindful of the dictum "Caeser's wife must be above suspicion!". He eventually asked Ali. Ayesha was shocked when Ali advised discarding her to show PUBH's greatness and never forgave him for that. Her many crucial interventions against Ali in latter years were after this.

PUBH came up with the four witness hadith to get her out of the situation. Cooly the suspected person was halaled and the veil was enforced...The head covering is part of the veil..

But Ali and Islam paid the price for this leading to the great schism.

brihaspati · Post by **brihaspati** » 01 Jul 2011 00:26

ramana ji,
the real death squad went against those women who dared to "mock" or literally question Muhammad's outpourings. This was very specific - against the "poetess" and "singers". Women, in pre Muhammadan Arabia, apparently played a prominent role as bards and composers of poems/songs, etc. The first such woman poetess was assassinated on the orders of Muhammad, at night, while she was suckling her baby. The Hadiths, the Sira, have no hesitation in describing the act in gory details - as to how the assassin snatched away the suckling child from her breast and thrust in his dagger. It is made to look like a heroic act inspired by Muhammad, so even if not exactly happening that way in reality - was seen in later Islamic culture that was collecting the Hadiths - as something extremely laudable and iconic Islamic act.

The same was taken in executing the few women and men who were killed on "reconquering" Mecca. The women included were all accused of having "mocked" Muhammad.

The Ali-episode actually goes further down the road. It is not only Ali who criticized Ayesha, but also Umar - who refused to give her share of looted real estate she claimed, after the death of Muhammad. In fact we hear little of Muhammad's wives after his death. That is another episode. But the real conflict is about the circumstances of Ali's supposed marriage of a Persian princess, and the "inheritance" of blood-line argument. The conflict before a Persina outpost where Ali captued a child princess is the main starte of the controversy [and of course his assassination].

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 01 Jul 2011 02:25

Be that as may be, the fact is that women were brutalised during the prophet's time. So how can a modern woman expect better treatment form the Mullacrazies.

Agnimitra · Post by **Agnimitra** » 06 Jul 2011 01:14

If Syria's Alevi ruling class chooses an independent statelet for itself, it culd encourage others...

X-posting from West Asia thread:
Syria’s partition could crack Lebanon

There are many scenarios for what might happen in Syria. Lebanese should pay attention to one in particular. As it dawns on the Assads that their days in power are numbered, we should consider the option that they and the minority Alawite community will move to an alternate plan. Unable to subdue Syria, the regime may contemplate falling back on an Alawite-dominated statelet in northwest Syria.

In recent weeks the army and security services have been active in Idlib province along the Turkish border, after their assault near the Lebanese border, particularly in Talkalakh – accompanied by an ongoing campaign to pacify the Homs to Aleppo axis. Even if the Assads’ priority is to reimpose their writ over Syria in its entirety, the actions in these areas may, simultaneously, serve another purpose: to consolidate Alawite control over the margins of a future mini-state.

However, the terror tactics adopted by the Syrian army, security forces and irregular pro-regime militias are disturbingly similar to those of the Serb-dominated army and Serb paramilitaries during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Is the aim to cause permanent population displacement? That’s unclear. However, there is a geographical rationale behind the Assads’ strategy, and its repercussions cannot but affect sectarian relations.

[...]
As Lebanese watch developments next door, how might they react? If the Assads manage to retreat to an Alawite fortress, the repercussions in Lebanon (not to say Iraq) could be frightening. Attention would be drawn to Lebanon’s Shiites, but also Christians, to see if they might envisage a similar route toward communal self-preservation.

The Shiites are far less likely to be tempted by the idea of forming a communal statelet than are the Christians, for obvious reasons. The areas of Shiite concentration are not contiguous. Dispersed among the northern Bekaa Valley, the western Bekaa, southern Lebanon and Beirut’s southern suburbs, the Shiite community would be unable to bind these regions together into any sort of cohesive whole.

In reality, the hazards lie elsewhere. If the Assad regime were to collapse, this would represent, potentially, an existential setback, for Hezbollah. The party would strive to defend itself, and its options are limited. Some have speculated that Hezbollah might try to tighten its grip on the state and weaken its adversaries decisively, perhaps through a military strike broader than that of May 2008. However, that would almost certainly fail, instead provoking civil war.

[...]
The ensuing deadlock could push Hezbollah to do two apparently contradictory things: maintain its presence in state institutions at all costs in order to protect its interests; but also, facing an invigorated Lebanese Sunni community bolstered by an invigorated Syrian Sunni community, further separate territories under its influence from the rest of Lebanon, both physically and psychologically. In other words, even as it rejects a Lebanese sectarian breakup, Hezbollah may be compelled to pursue that very path to survive. And this could be accompanied by an impulse, even a political need, to collaborate with other friendly sectarian entities, an Alawite entity above all.

Which leads us to the Lebanese Christians. There is profound alienation among many Christians from post-Taif Lebanon, and from the idea of coexistence with the country’s Muslim communities in the context of the centralized state that emerged after independence in 1943. This has been debilitating for Christians, accelerating the community’s isolation and sense of decline. Yet virtually all mainstream Christian political groupings deep down aspire to a Lebanese state – federal, confederal or otherwise – that allows a majority of Christians to govern themselves and live among their own.

Agnimitra · Post by **Agnimitra** » 06 Jul 2011 01:19

Alevi Sect

Alevi Relations with other sects:

The relationship between Alevis and Sunnis is one of mutual suspicion and prejudice dating back to the Ottoman period. Sunnis have accused Alevis of heresy, heterodoxy, rebellion, betrayal and immorality. Alevis, on the other hand, have argued that the original Quran does not demand five prayers, nor mosque attendance, nor pilgrimage, and that the Sunnis distorted early Islam by omitting, misinterpreting, or changing important passages of the original Quran, especially those dealing with Ali and ritual practice.

Alevis see Sunni narrowmindedness as originating in Arabia and as contrary to the Turkish national character. Some Alevis believe Sunnah and Hadith were Arab elite innovations, created to ensure Arab dominance of Islam and to enslave the masses through manipulation. Sunnism, according to the Alevis, is not true Islam but an aberration that by its strict legalism opposes free and independent thought and is seen as reactionary, bigoted, fanatic, and antidemocratic. Alevis believe Sunni nationalism is intolerant, domineering, and unwilling to recognize Alevi uniqueness.

In today's political arena Alevis see themselves as a counterforce to Sunni fundamentalism in Turkey. Alevis, who have a great interest in blocking the rising fundamentalist influence, are the main allies of the democratic secularists, and are also searching for alliances with moderate Sunnis against the extremists. They are demanding that the state recognize Alevism as an official Islamic community equal to, but different from, Sunnism. As of today the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) only represents and promotes Sunni Islam based on the Hanafi school of law, and does not recognise Alevis.

There is some tension between folk tradition Alevism and the Bektashi Order, which is a Sufi order founded on Alevi beliefs.[25] In certain Turkish communities other Sufi orders ( the Halveti-Jerrahi and some of the Rifa'i) have incorporated significant Alevi influence.

Sivas Massacre
On July 2, 1993, Alevis were celebrating the Pir Sultan Abdal Festival. Coming out of mosques after their Friday's prayer, a mob of roughly 20,000 Sunni fundamentalists surrounded the Madimak Hotel in downtown Sivas, chanting anti-Alevi and pro-sharia slogans.[citation needed] The events quickly escalated and the mob ultimately set the hotel on fire and pelted the building with stones. While the fire killed thirty seven Alevis, several members of the police, soldiers, and the fire-department did nothing to stop the fire, or save the victims. The events surrounding the massacre were captured by TV cameras and broadcast all over the nation and the world. Every year, during the anniversary of the massacre, various Alevi organizations call for the arrest of those responsible. 33 individuals were sentenced to death in 1997 for crimes related to the massacre, but they were never executed, in part because Turkey abolished the death penalty in 2002. The hotel is slated to be turned into a memorial museum to the event.

There was also a drive-by shooting of Alevis in Istanbul's Gazi neighborhood in 1995 which resulted in the death of some Alevis. Then when protests followed, police periodically opened fire on the demonstrators. When the protests were over, there were a total of fifteen Alevis killed. The result was a revival of Alevi identity, and debate over this identity which continues today.

brihaspati · Post by **brihaspati** » 06 Jul 2011 03:15

Lebanon - there is an ongoing attempt at making the solution to be more "secular", and keep the centralized structure. Most groups except the Hezbo appear to be tinkering with the idea. Hezbo's are of course a different ball-game.

brihaspati · Post by **brihaspati** » 06 Jul 2011 03:20

The Aleviliks are being sought out by the communists and remnant Kemalists now. This may mean the last line of defence against the Islamist tide. However, the prospects do not seem that positive.

Agnimitra · Post by **Agnimitra** » 06 Jul 2011 07:48

What about relations between Kurds and Alevis? Approx. 30% of Turkey's Kurds are also Alevi. That accounts for about 3 million among the 10 to 18 million Alevis in that country.

Also, are Alevis potentially pro-Iran, considering that they deify Imam Ali as well as Safavid Shah Ismail?

Kurds, Turks and the Alevi revival in Turkey

brihaspati · Post by **brihaspati** » 06 Jul 2011 17:49

The problem is that whenever one is forced to look for subidentities as allies - who are already somewhat in a shaky position with respect to the rashtra - it is an indication that the movement is getting marginalized.

Any consolidation with "Kurd" creates problems of "nationalist" discourse within Turkish mainstream. Same goes for identification with Alevis. The Kemalist position had been weakening even from the time of demise of Kemal himself. Kemal filled a space left vacant when the older clergy got discredited due to the fall of the Ottoman empire. The clergy laid low for a while and in typical fashion recovered slowly and steadily. Kemal imposed a militarily supported regime which was constantly on the backfoot since then, and was forced to increase its overt military intervention to counter the growing strength of the clergy - which they were unable to tackle socially.

Leave any of the theologians around, alive and kicking and reproducing [Islamist holiness is solidly linked to family and reproduction unlike most other faith systems which adore ascetism in their theologians] - they will grow back in time - exactly as has happened in Turkey. Alevis and Kurds and Kemalists and communists - they are no longer strong enough even collectively, and they have moved too late, and not eliminated the real soucre of islamist regeneration when they still had the time.

Agnimitra · Post by **Agnimitra** » 06 Jul 2011 18:48

brihaspati wrote:The clergy laid low for a while and in typical fashion recovered slowly and steadily. Kemal imposed a militarily supported regime which was constantly on the backfoot since then, and was forced to increase its overt military intervention to counter the growing strength of the clergy - which they were unable to tackle socially.

One point in the article that struck me was - "The police, which after 1980 had been purged of left-wing elements, was in many places dominated by conservative Sunnis or right-wing nationalists, and there were a number of major incidents in which the police took part in murderous violence against Alevis, causing renewed alienation between the Alevis and the state."

Its well known that the Gulen movement educates and then encourages students to join the police, academia, etc. But I didn't realize that such changes had started as far back as 1980. A "purge"?

brihaspati wrote:Leave any of the theologians around, alive and kicking and reproducing [Islamist holiness is solidly linked to family and reproduction unlike most other faith systems which adore ascetism in their theologians] - they will grow back in time - exactly as has happened in Turkey.

Actually Fethullah Gulen is celibate, as are some of his senior lieutenant disciples, the "abis" who co-ordinate the vast networks. He sleeps and eats very little, too. Rather impressive personality.

brihaspati wrote:Alevis and Kurds and Kemalists and communists - they are no longer strong enough even collectively, and they have moved too late, and not eliminated the real soucre of islamist regeneration when they still had the time.

Its hard to believe that the Kurds, the largest nation without a state in the Middle East, can remain so for so long. Partition of Syria along with Iraq could pave the way. Alevi could dovetail with that, if given some encouragement. The Arabs who live in southern Turkey are Alevis, and Kurds are traditionally close to Arabs (closer than Turks, anyway).

brihaspati · Post by **brihaspati** » 06 Jul 2011 19:38

The purge was just waiting to happen. Kemal's hold lasted roughly 14 years, and there were problems even towards his end. So from the WWII period things began to change. The fundamentalists were getting quite powerful by the 70's.

When I referred to theologians and their "reproduction", I did not have Gulen in mind - but the general clergy of that region - which does have an added advantage in terms of continuity of religio-political long term planning compared to non-Muslims.

The very fact that Kurds still really do not have a state of their own should speak volumes. As I said, any connection with Arabs of the south or Kurds in general weakens any "domestic" political opposition to the current regime. The Kurdi politics is also complicated - dominated by "leftist" discourse a lot but tending towards an old 1940's style Judaic workers movement style ethno-cultural-Marxism - and if you follow, the trajectory of Alevi-Sunni-Kurdi interaction has been quite complicated and fluid in the past. Such a cross-border, cross-"nationalism" movement will only face greater consolidation of the regime.