Bharat Rakshak

July 16 (Reuters) - Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said the U.S. had offered to manage a potential transport corridor that would link the bulk of Azerbaijan to an Azerbaijani exclave via Armenian territory, the Armenpress news agency reported on Wednesday.
The potential corridor, which Baku is keen to secure, would run roughly 32 km (20 miles) through Armenia's southern Syunik province, linking the majority of Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan, an Azerbaijani exclave that borders Baku's ally Turkey.


Azerbaijan does not want the corridor to be controlled solely by Armenia due to concerns that Yerevan could revoke access too easily.
Asked at a news conference if Armenia had received a specific proposal from Washington regarding the proposed corridor, Pashinyan said: "Yes, we have received proposals from the United States," Armenpress, a state news agency, reported.
The transit link is one of several stumbling blocks to a peace deal between Azerbaijan and Armenia, neighbours in the South Caucasus region who have fought a series of wars since the late 1980s and remain arch rivals.

Pashinyan's comments came days after the U.S. ambassador to Turkey, Tom Barrack, said that Washington has proposed taking over the planned transit corridor.
"They're arguing over 32 kilometres of road, but this is no joke. It's been going on for a decade – 32 kilometres of road," Barrack told reporters in New York last Friday, according to a State Department readout.
"So what happens is America comes in and says, 'Okay, we'll take it over. Give us the 32 kilometres of road on a hundred-year lease, and you can all share it."

The EU, as it moves away from Russian energy dependence, is pursuing energy security through its ties with the Caucasus. China seeks economic access via the Middle Corridor. After setbacks from Israel’s military actions and loss of regional proxies, Iran, for the moment, is focused on countering Jerusalem’s influence and protecting its borders. Turkey, another contender for regional hegemony, aims to boost its leadership by backing its Turkic allies. Unlike the colonial-era Great Game, today’s dynamics are multipolar, with intersecting alliances and economic corridors, mainly in the energy sector.

Ankara is positioning itself as a regional energy hub, with the Zangezur Corridor enhancing its Eurasian footprint. The proposed transit route would reconnect mainland Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan exclave through southern Armenia. If realized, it would enable uninterrupted Azerbaijani access to Nakhchivan for the first time since the Soviet era, strengthening Azerbaijan–Turkey connectivity and avoiding reliance on Iran and Russia. Bypassed by new routes, Tehran’s strategic relevance in regional energy transit is shrinking. The EU is quietly backing infrastructure that reduces dependence on Iranian and Russian networks.

Moreover, the Zangezur Corridor would serve as a complement to the Middle Corridor, a vital east-west trade route linking Turkey, the Caspian Sea, Central Asia, and China. The Middle Corridor, also known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, is gaining momentum as a non-Russian alternative for East-West trade. For this, Azerbaijan becomes indispensable—there’s no viable substitute for its geography.


Azerbaijan is ramping up gas exports to Europe, via the Southern Gas Corridor, with plans to supply half of its 50 bcm annual production to the European Union. This route is critical for EU energy diversification, especially post-Ukraine war. Peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia would also enable Armenia’s inclusion in the Middle Corridor trade and energy route from China and Central Asia to Europe, bypassing Russia. This is crucial for Europe’s energy security as Georgia’s reliability declines. After a pro-Western phase, Georgia has significantly expanded its economic ties with Russia.

Azerbaijan benefits economically from the Ukraine war as Europe’s energy partner, strengthening its alliance with Turkey while pursuing its own economic interests. Azerbaijan’s Zangezur proposal is intended to be more unilateral, aiming for extraterritorial control over a single corridor.

Azerbaijan, as well, has become more assertive and multipolar, a friend to all. Due to the war in Ukraine and sanctions on Russia, Azerbaijan has boosted its oil and gas exports to Europe and has become a strategic energy partner for the EU. Meanwhile, Russian oil and gas exports via Azerbaijan have also increased, enabling Russia to continue its energy trade and circumvent Western sanctions. Azerbaijan has also played a role in facilitating Russia’s trade with Iran. At the same time, Baku seeks to diversify its diplomatic relations, strengthening ties with Ankara and Jerusalem.

Turkey, in particular, sees its regional influence rising. Ankara is now a key player, mediating between Baku and Moscow, and deepening its strategic footprint in the region. If Turkey maintains its current strategy, it could emerge as a key beneficiary of this new Great Game. At the same time, Russia risks losing its monopoly if it focuses on Ukraine at the expense of the Caucasus and Central Asia.


China also presents a challenge to Russian interests in Central Asia. Both nations vie for influence through initiatives like Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and China’s Belt and Road Initiative. China declined Moscow’s efforts to merge these projects. A leaked Kremlin memo indicates Russian concerns that Western sanctions are enabling China and others to displace Russian businesses in the region, take over trade flows, and shift production away from Russia. The report notes that Russia seeks to regain global trade access by positioning itself at the heart of a Eurasian bloc that rivals the United States, the EU, and China, thereby boosting its global status.

Yet Russia’s EAEU includes only four of the nine states on Russia’s southern border, as some countries, such as Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, want to maintain their independence in trade matters. Nevertheless, the EAEU promotes Russia’s trade with Central Asia and strengthens its economy despite sanctions. It is unclear if US President Donald Trump will act on his latest threats: a 10-day deadline for Russia to end the war in Ukraine and possible harsher sanctions, including 100 percent tariffs against Russia and secondary sanctions against its allies.